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Dear readers!

Welcome to the special issue "International studies. Company. Policy. Economy ", prepared for the Annual Congress of the International Studies Association (ISA) Power, Principles and Participation in the Global Information Age, which will be held in SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, USA APRIL 1-4, 2012.

We express our sincere thanks to the International Studies Association members, Professor Gregory Glissenu and Professor Andrei V. Korobkov for the opportunity to make the presentation of our journal on the reputable and prestigious congress!

There were published renowned international experts articles on topical themes of Kazakhstan and Central Asia development in this journal's issue.

This issue will be also presented at international conferences in Seoul (South Korea), Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Burgas (Bulgaria):

- 3rd International Academic Conference "Ethnic Relations and Social Changes in Central Asia" conducted by Institute of Central Asian Studies Hankuk University of Foreign Studies on 30 of March in Seoul (South Korea).

- A conference "Afghanistan's stability and regional security implications for Central Asia" organized by the Central Asia Program (George Washington University), and EUCAM (Europe-Central Asia Monitoring), thanks to a grant from the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program in the Dushanbe, may 17-18, 2012.

- 6th CICA-STR International Conference on Terrorism and Aggression: Towards Increased Freedom and Security conducted by Coloquios Internacionales sobre Cerebro y Agresion (CICA) and the Society for Terrorism Research (STR), in the Burgas town, Bulgaria, September 8-11, 2012.

We wish you a fruitful work at international conferences!

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ENHANCING ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN XINJIANG AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND CASPIAN SEA COUNTRIES

NING WANG

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Xinjiang Has Reached A Rapid Growing Period

Economic globalization, which makes regional production and consumption worldwide, has brought enormous opportunities to Xinjiang. All parties can benefit from international trading since economic globalization optimizes allocation of resources, realizes diversification, and internationalization of resources and market. If Xinjiang is able to seize the opportunities and enhance the economic cooperation with surrounding countries, it will take full advantage of resources and market in Central Asia and Caspian Sea, achieving the goal of developing a mutually beneficial environment.

Good international environment and greater attention and support from the Chinese central government are two facilitators for Xinjiang's development. First, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has established the basis for Xinjiang to undertake political and economic cooperation with Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries; second, central government has achieved economic development and stability in Xinjiang.

Xinjiang is located in central Asia, which provides great geographic advantages since it connects the Central Asian countries and other parts of China. There are various mineral products and potentially powerful market in Central Asia. Also, China is currently a booming country with the largest market and the fastest growing economy. Along with the rapid economic development in China, the consumption of resources would increase exponentially. There are abundant mineral and bio-resources in Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries. Thus, further developing the trade between Xinjiang area and the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries will be mutually beneficial.

Xinjiang has many similarities with Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries in terms of languages, religions and customs, which is advantageous to Xinjiang in terms of understanding and operating markets in those countries. Xinjiang should couple with the demand for local commodities in order to make full use of its advantages. Therefore, Xinjiang should produce and export more goods to meet the demand from surrounding countries. At the same time, Xinjiang needs to enhance the cooperation with other Chinese provinces for example, the Xinjiang region could benefit from a partnership with Chinese regions that house greater managerial or technological advantages in order to become a key component in facilitating economic cooperation between the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries and other parts of China.

Strengthening the Cooperation Between Xinjiang and Central Asian and Caspian Sea Countries

The Caspian Sea is located in the junction of the Eurasian continent, with a coastline of more than 7000 kilometers and a water surface area of over 370000 square kilometers. Caspian Sea countries include Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. There are abundant energy resources in the Caspian Sea area. The proven oil reserves are about 10 billion tons and the proven natural gas reserves account for about 5 percent of the reserves worldwide. Among the five Caspian Sea countries, Xinjiang borders Russia and Kazakhstan.

Xinjiang shares a long border with its neighboring countries, which provides favorable geo-economic conditions for Xinjiang to conduct economic cooperation with Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries. The five Central Asian countries have a population of 54.5 million, with an additional 16.68 million people in the three external Caucasus countries and 147.7 million people in Russia, and the total number is 218.88 million. This means the markets in Xinjiang and the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries have great development potential.

In terms of industrial specialization, the Central Asian area has been the supplier of raw materials to the former Soviet Union. The specialization has caused Central Asian countries to have single industrial structures and rapid development in the raw materials industry; however, the processing industry has seriously lagged behind and those countries have a strong external dependence on a variety of imported industrial products. After independence, the five Central Asian countries, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea areas retained the division of labor within the former Soviet Union. China has a comparative advantage in labor-intensive products (textiles, garments, light industrial products), while Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have advantages in manufacturing resource-intensive products (e.g., energy, raw material commodities such as oil, natural gas, timber, steel, fertilizer and non-ferrous metals, etc.). China's products and the goods produced by its surrounding countries including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Arab countries are highly complementary during bilateral trade. China also has some complementary goods with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, since ancient times, Xinjiang has been a multi-ethnic region in which many ethnic groups live. China and Kazakhstan have built the «Khorgos International Border Cooperation Center» in Khorgos, Xinjiang, which provides favorable conditions for Xinjiang to further develop markets in both the Central Asian and Caspian Sea areas.

Expanding Collaboration Efforts

Xinjiang so far has 11 ports facing Central Asia that allow both domestic and international trades, and has 72 cities and counties opening to the outside world. However, since Xinjiang and boarding Central Asia areas are far removed from an accessible ocean and lack the rivers necessary to transport goods. Under such circumstances, only when Xinjiang and the Central Asian and Caspian Sea region facilitate the development of a functional trade infrastructure, railways functioning as the primary arteries flowing goods to major ports, highways functioning as a support structure, and aviation and pipelines as complementary transportation networks. Xinjiang could then function as a primary trade hub, facilitating low cost transportation of goods (due to economies of scale) and enabling the region (both Xinjiang and its trading partners) to grow in strategic and economic importance.

- Railway: Currently several railways that connect China and the Central Asian area are already in use. However, the biggest problem is the difference in the railway standards between China and Central Asia. The railway built in China cannot be directly connected with the one that produced in Central Asia, but requiring further adjustments. Therefore, if China and Central Asia have the same standard in terms of railway structure, in other words, if 2300 kilometers more standard railway could be built up, China, Central Asia and Europe will be connected smoothly.
- Highway: Xinjiang has already developed strong highway infrastructure, boasting 101 different highways to the 5 surrounding countries.
- Civil Aviation: So far the civil aviation network has 114 domestic and international flight lines, connecting nearly 70 metropolis and middle-size cities as well as 12 counties. Urumqi is the center of the transportation net.

Optimizing the Existing Trade Infrastructure and Improving the Quality of Cooperation

The core to optimizing the existing trade infrastructure and improving the quality of cooperation is optimizing the industrial structure and upgrading the quality of import and export products. In terms of agricultural products, Xinjiang shares a lot of similarities with the surrounding Central Asian area since both parts have the same weather. For example, cotton, beets, melons and grapes produced in Central Asia are of the same high quality as those produced in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is well known for producing grapes with highest quality, but Central Asia has an abundance of grapes too; Xinjiang is famous for making the special carpets, but the Central Asian countries have also enjoyed a good reputation for their carpets; Moreover, Xinjiang has plenty of energy and minerals, but Central Asia and Caspian Sea area is also one of the important areas to export energy and mineral products. Therefore, if Xinjiang does not develop emerging industries or high technology products, it would have a difficult time to enter into a booming market in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea area.

International collaboration is based on the needs for all participants, so the motivation of collaboration comes from the shortage of resources and being complementary among all parties. In order to enhance the collaboration between Xinjiang and Central Asia and Caspian Sea area, Xinjiang needs to categorize its products and compare them with the goods these areas. Consequently it can produce the goods at a comparative advantage and then export the goods that Central Asia and Caspian Sea area needs and import the ones that it needs.

Strengthening Relationships With Partner Countries to Develop Mutually Beneficial Partnerships and Creating A Safe and Efficient Cooperative Economic System

- Adjusting Regional Industrial Structure to Follow the Lead of High Technology Industry

Xinjiang should encourage the export and undertake the technical reform in order to enhance its creative and research capacity. Moreover, Xinjiang should use technical innovation to facilitate the export of commodities, and promote technology development by exporting. In this way, Xinjiang will be able to create its own brand and expanding its share on international market.

- Strengthening Relationships With Partner Countries to Develop Mutually Beneficial Partnerships

Strengthening relationships and developing mutually beneficial partnerships refer to both Xinjiang and the eastern coastal provinces in China and even more

pertinent, to China and the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries. First, Xinjiang should strengthen the economic cooperation with the coastal region so that the superior goods produced in eastern provinces can be transported to Xinjiang and then exported to the Central Asian and Caspian Sea and Eastern European markets. Second, Xinjiang should collaborate with Central Asia and Caspian Sea countries in terms of trading, developing new products and technology in order to realize the overall collaboration for producing, supplying and consuming. Meanwhile, domestic enterprises also have challenges to survive in the complicated and unpredictable international environment.

– Creating A Safe and Efficient Central Asian and Caspian Sea Cooperative Economic System

Creating a safe and efficient economic system not only depends on the variety, quantity and quality of the goods exported, but also depends on the quantity and quality of human resources. Under such circumstances, we need to view the whole issue from aspects of economics, culture, law, short-term and long-term benefits, resources exploitation and environmental protection. Moreover, we need to integrate production and manufacture, research and development, merchandise and labor export, trade among countries and regions, transportation and logistics together in order to produce the good with the highest quality. Third, China and Central Asia should also develop service trade and actively establish the energy cooperation in order to be mutually beneficial. When the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries work together, we will be able to create a safe and efficient cooperative economic system, which accelerates the economic, political and cultural development for the whole Central Asian and Caspian Sea region.

CENTRAL ASIA IN CULTURAL AND CIVILIZATIONAL SYSTEM OF COORDINATES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

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The problem of Central Asia and the path of its cultural and civilizational development in the era of globalization has become urgent in recent years. Here there are new states, are looking for ways to self-identity, self-realization as the original culture.

With regard to a single cultural-civilizational space in Central Asia today, a heated academic debate. For example, the American scholar Martha Brill Olcott, in her pamphlet, – «Twelve Myths of Central Asia», concludes that the whole of Central Asia is a kind of a civilizational one, ethno-cultural, geopolitical entity, and that is how the region should be considered under this angle and the situation in the present and future should be analyzed¹.

For such statements, there are sufficient grounds, as Central Asia as a part of world civilization was able to develop its own cultural-civilizational space.

At present, the conditions of contemporary globalization is characterized by the development of Central Asian society repeated complication of its regional structure and the expansion of ethnic and cultural ties, as well as increasing dependence on the action of external factors, where the process of globalization is closely related to the modernization process and in a sense is its continuation. The realities of today show that the two processes are intertwined and interdependent. On the one hand, the nature and results of modernization determine the direction of forming a global world; on the other hand, globalization is making significant adjustments in the processes of modernization, becoming the leading process of social transformation and modernization of individual societies – its consequence.

But globalization is not the only way to socio-cultural development, and the desire to maintain the development of alternative forms of expression in the growth of autonomy of regional systems that are active participants in this process. In contrast to globalization, the sources of conflict which lie in an attempt to combine the different age structures in a more complex structure – a world civilization, regionalization – that internal integration in order to preserve the independence of national markets, ethnic and cultural identity, etc.,² where the region – cultural civilizational concept. As a relatively independent, it is absolutely not self-sufficient as a subsystem of the global integrity and outside the interrelationship and interdependence – simply the area. Hence – the problem of the ways of inter-relationships.

The beginning of the twenty-first century has shown that regional integration has become the hallmark of world development. Many countries are united in

[1] Olcott M.B. Revisiting the Twelve's Myth of Central Asia. Russian and Eurasian Program. Working Papers, № 23. – Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001. – 28 p.

[2] Astafieva O.N. Cultural and civilizational face of globalization // globalization: Textbook / Society. Ed. V.A. Mikhailov and V.S. Buyanova. – M., 2008. – P. 179.

regional blocs, and their strength is not comparable with the possibilities of a country, which reinforces the role of the social aspects of integration. In respect of cultural and civilizational specifically related to our geographic area deserving attention is the idea of creating a Union of Central Asian States (UCAS). This idea was put forward by Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev, in February 2005,³ is, in fact, a revival of the idea of federalism Turkestan. Its outstanding representatives were such leaders of the national movement in the region, such as - M. Shokai, M. Behbudi, T. Ryskulov, A. Fitrat, S. Khojanov and others. Historical practice confirms that the Turkestan Federation, the idea of the unity of the Central Asian peoples is perspective. In particular this applies to economic integration.

This idea was supported by the poorest in Central Asia today - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, the President Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, during his official visit to Astana, categorically and unequivocally opposed the creation of UCAS, stating that each country defines its attitude to this initiative, recognizing the extent to which this initiative is in the interest of countries in the region. Stressing that for Uzbekistan this initiative is not acceptable.

However, it should be noted that the role of regional economic relations in the future will only increase. Consequently, on the one hand, the success of economic regionalism must strengthen the consciousness of belonging to one civilization. And on the other – economic regionalism may succeed only if it is rooted in a common civilization⁴.

Of course, globalization raises some risks for the states of Central Asia, due to lack of information when making decisions related to the hard replenish as the functioning and development of many economic processes are inherent elements of uncertainty. This is the reason of occurrence of situations that do not have a clear outcome. For the region's population, these risks are related to social transformation of society, behavioral change, adaptation to new conditions of production of new values. In general, all this can be combined into the concept of risk of social adaptation to new economic and political conditions. In addition, the threat of economic, environmental, informational, and military crises, political, civilizational, religious and ethnic conflicts increased.

However, not all of the negative trends in the economy, society and the state should be attributed to the processes of globalization. The reverse situation is true – not all successes are associated only with the integration process. Globalization is just a tool, of course, somewhat heavy, but quite effective in terms of economic, social and political development.

Under these conditions in modern Central Asian society currently is controversial and complex transformation of one social system to another, some social and moral values in the other. And against the background of these fundamental changes are radical restructuring of consciousness, thinking, deep breaking rules and regulations behaviors and lifestyle. The crisis of communist ideology, on which previous rules and regulations, values and ideals were based, it is no painless.

Speaking of integration in Central Asia, we do agree with K.- ZH. Tokayev that: «Integration is vital to the region's countries themselves. Economic cooperation in Central Asia opens wide possibilities for addressing the complex economic, political, social and environmental problems. Such interaction and advantageous to all the Central Asian states can be a factor in accelerating socio-economic development of these countries»⁵.

Modern states of Central Asia have a whole set of cultural and civilizational preconditions of integration that can be placed at the regional multilateral

[3] Nazarbayev N.A. Kazakhstan on the way to accelerated economic, social and political modernization // Message from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan (2005) / [http / www.akorda.kz](http://www.akorda.kz) / Official site of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

[4] Huntington S. The Clash of Civilizations. – M., 2003. P. 21-24.

[5] Circuit current under the banner of independence. – Almaty, 1997. – P. 104.

interactions. These factors are much more serious and weighty, than in Europe. However, today a colonial type of development implemented the gap of traditional economic ties and individualism in economic harm of Central Asia as a whole. One of the measures of culture and civilization of Central Asia in the era of globalization and integration of Central Asian society in the world system is to carry out such social and economic reforms that will lead to the formation of socio-economic and oriented to provide increased wealth of the region and living their peoples.

Therefore, the cultural and civilizational aspect of the development of the region brings a particular problem – the need for understanding the importance of economic, social, political, spiritual and cultural unity. The crisis nature of the modern period of history intensifies the interest in qualitative changes that need to focus on the positive use of the crisis, determining a burst of consciousness – the ability to feel this moment, to determine the production trends of further development, as well as to understand the globalization of civilization, its penetration into all national and cultural systems, a dialectical relationship of traditional and modern outlook.

As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in Central Asia for the first time in its history took place as independent states. At the same time they are faced with significant problems in the economy. If a period of decline of the Silk Road region was deleted from the system of global relations (while maintaining the connection, at least at the regional level), after the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly visible signs of failure even bilateral economic relations within the region. Conservation of this situation gives rise to various challenges in economic development in Central Asia. The outcome of the process of disintegration was partial and in some places and the complete disintegration of the former political, economic, scientific and cultural relations.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Soviet economic management and advanced economies by cutting off the region of the Russian system of commodity-money circulation collapsed pre-existing inter-state extremely close economic ties. At the same time with all the force revealed the so-called economic-geographical isolation of the Central Asian republics, which is neither more nor less than the geo-economic cause of «multi-vector» of their courses. As a result, entire industries in the region proved to be viable, the economic situation has deteriorated dramatically, and the social sphere has been degraded, especially in the early years of independence, which caused a sharp drop in living standards and rising social tensions and mass exodus of skilled professionals in the region. Therefore, the development of modern civilization in Central Asia in the era of globalization should be first of all, considered the level of its development. Level of civilization in turn depends on the model of development – the ratio of job creation in certain sectors of the economy.

Countries in the region are partly to an industrial society, which is characterized by the secondary sector of the economy: industry, engaged in processing raw materials, as well as the industry including the subsequent production of various goods. Partly to pre-industrial countries with the primary sector of the economy, characterized by industries that directly produced various kinds of raw materials and products, including agriculture, mining, fishing, etc. Modern Central Asia – is one of the wealthiest in the world energy region. For example, according to international sources of oil reserves Kazakhstan takes the 8th place in the world (3,4% of world oil reserves, or 39,62 billion barrels). The share of Turkmenistan for more than 4% (4,3%) of world gas reserves⁶. By coal-mining region belongs to the 10th place in the world, it leads the reserves

[6] BP Statistical Review of World Energy. – L., 2009. – P. 251.

of ferrous and rare metals. In the production of more than 30 of them are on the 1-20 positions. In terms of total gold production (Uzbekistan - 90 tons, Kyrgyzstan - 24, Kazakhstan - 18,9) ranks 9th. It is obvious that with such a scale by combining resources, Central Asia could become self-sufficient and developed region with a decent standard of living, to gain recognition in the global economy⁷.

It is natural that such a region rich in oil, gas and nonferrous metals, located over a large territory between such major leaders as Russia, China and the Islamic world, draws attention to the major players of world geopolitics and geo-economics. To effectively address the costs of globalization, countries of Central Asia should strengthen cooperation within the framework of regional integration, not to stay in the peripheral zone of global economic processes, the resource base. In fact, we are talking about the survival of the region and their emergence as independent economic and political players. It should be remembered about the impact of the global financial crisis, which could accelerate the emergence of new centers of economic growth.

Globalization is one of the leading trends of the global society has an impact not only on economic and political processes, but also on the relationship of cultural and civilizational sphere. It puts to the states in the region, focused on other than the Western, values, reason, the problem to fit into the contemporary global processes and relations, while keeping their own specific traditional value systems, where the spiritual culture as the totality of the mind and feelings, knowledge and ethics, is universal driving force for human development.

The level of development of spiritual culture in a decisive influence on the cultural level of production, consumer culture, physical, medical and environmental culture, a culture of life, culture of interpersonal and international relations. Cultural potential of a society determines the ability of States to ensure a dynamic and safe development of their countries in the face of new challenges generated by globalization and the modern dialectic of world culture and civilization.

In today's Central Asian cultural development in the context of globalization due to the two ideological components. The first is formulated and implemented with varying degrees of hardness of the idea of national revival. The implementation of this ideology of national revival and development in Central Asian region gives a large spread of options – from the false rejection of the Western experience, as, for example, until recently, Turkmenistan, to a system of free multi-cultural development of peoples of Kazakhstan with the revival of ethnic traditions and the continuation of the cultural experience of the previous stage of the socialist of development.

The second ideological component of the cultural processes in Central Asia – it is not formulated, and because of its «silent» as if «invisible», but the ideology of globalism, active, penetrating through the channels of popular culture and shaping them. Naturally, in this line of development we are also seeing a variety of options in the region of global trends and understanding their role in the culture of different countries.

In these circumstances, the urgent task of the cultural and civilizational development of the peoples of the region today is to preserve the system of values that have developed over many years by our ancestors, a clear answer to the question about the future of their countries to find their national identity, thus to recover the basic cultural and civilizational landmarks give citizens confidence in the future. In turn, the revival of the country and its people is possible only if the maximum involvement of intellectual and creative potential of every citizen.

[7] Kuznetsov E.A. Kazakhstan's role in the development of integration Central Asian States // Moderization of higher education and science: the ways and perspectives of innovation development time – Almaty, 2008. – P. 312.

In terms of regional integration as a way to cultivate the Central Asian unity of⁸. Only a detailed and subtle reverence cultural traditions coming from the past - all these can adopt new forms of political thinking, based on the high spiritual ideals, as opposed to «cooling rationality.»

Considering the spiritual heritage of the past from the standpoint of historical perspective and role in the integration process, one could argue that it facilitates the implementation of a fruitful dialogue between the peoples of Central Asia, and infused with human values, may contribute to the renewal of regional integration. Cultural heritage of the peoples of Central Asia is a prerequisite of spiritual integration of the peoples in the new geopolitical situation. It can not be certain guarantee of effective integration into the global cultural and political and economic community of the future. Perhaps in the near future the implementation of democratic reforms and the strengthening of the national interests of the idea of Central Asian integration will be more productive in the geopolitical strategy of Kazakhstan, rather than the Eurasian idea⁹.

Activities of cultural and civilizational renewal of the Central Asian states can be carried out in two directions – theoretical and practical. On the theoretical direction to solve the problem of forming the content of culture and civilization, required for the Central Asian states and to develop it as a viable and desire for perfection. This will work on the synthesis of the positive elements of different cultures. It must, above all, be carried out in the field of ethics, political and legal culture, focusing on the norms and traditions in the cultures of different nations which have universal values. On a practical direction to popularize obtained by the harmonic content updated synthesis of culture, tending to its introduction into the life of the peoples inhabiting the region.

Cultural and civilizational renewal of Central Asia in the era of globalization should be a priority in its future development. Today, with regret to note that the standard of living and social protection, health indicators, education and cultural development of the population, the state of crime and the environment in Central Asia among the worst in the world. Thus, according to UN report on human development in Kazakhstan in 2011 was only the list of countries with high human development – 68th place, while Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the list of countries with average human development index ranking, respectively, – 115, 126 and 127 seats. Gas-rich Turkmenistan has taken on this list – 102 place¹⁰.

Contemporary processes of globalization accompanied not only by regional integration, they give rise to the disintegration of regional, local level, are the cause of violations of the internal equilibrium of the world opening up societies. The weakening and destruction of old forms of collective, ethnic, territorial and social identity in a society that lays the groundwork for the formation of new structural heterogeneity and social differentiation.

Hence there is need, not only in geopolitical and geo-economic, but also in its cultural and civilizational dimension. Its paradigm can be distinguished according to S. Benhabib: «Culture has become synonymous with the now widely consumed identity»¹¹. Thus, in the minds of the Central Asian society (especially its political elite) is still deeply ingrained the idea of national identity, which slows down the integration process. In Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the formation of national character is in full swing. And around them and construct a universal ideology that can form a broad social base of the existing regimes. Thus, in the Kyrgyz Constitution makes reference to the

[8] Kodar A. Concept of Culture of the RK // Tamyр (art, culture, philosophy). – 2004. – № 2 (12). – P. 7.

[9] Kurmangalieva G. Cultural heritage of the past in the integration processes of Kazakhstan and Central Asia // Adam alemi – Peace man. – 2006. – № 2 (28). – P. 13.

[10] Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A better future for all / <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

[11] Benhabib S. The claims of culture. – M., 2003.

national epic hero - Manas and declared the former president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev – two thousand two hundred years of Kyrgyz statehood. In Uzbekistan, with the filing of President Islam Karimov at the role of national hero, is well suited figure «Bobo-colon» («great grandfather») – Timur (Tamerlane), and the empire he created – the basis of Uzbek statehood. In Turkmenistan, remember the Parthian empire, in which the former grandeur of the country must rely.

In Kazakhstan, this symbol through the efforts of historians and lay people (and not only to historians) was himself the great «tremor of the universe», – Genghis Khan. As the ideological foundation for the development of Kazakhstan proposed to develop a program President Nursultan Nazarbayev, «Kazakhstan-2030».

In Tajikistan, the smallest of all the Central Asian states, which is a kind of «Aryan island» in a «sea of Turks», President Emomali Rahmon is actively promoting the Aryan civilization was at the forefront of modern Tajik state. Thus, 2006 was announced in Tajikistan – the Year of Aryan Civilization and was continued in the July 2006 meeting of the leaders of three countries – successors to the civilization (Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan). In general, the parallel event can be characterized as an attempt by management in the region of Tajikistan to create an alternative idea, as opposed to the idea of Pan-Turkism, which is not in the interests of Tajikistan and Iran, contributing to the formation of the identity of modern Tajikistan.

As we can see the current trends of identity of the peoples of Central Asia gained a distinct socio-cultural character. Still being felt interpretation of the problem on a national basis, and ideology shifted the discussion to the purely political sphere. If Central Asia as a single region have begun to position only after the collapse of the USSR, today it can be regarded as sub-continent (subregion), and in the future – as a relatively independent super-region (A.B. Nauryzbayeva).

In order to turn Central Asia into modern civilization, with an integrated regional cultural and civilizational ideology is necessary to strengthen the axiological approach to the interpretation and rationalization of the peoples of the region's place in history, which should be based on well thought-recognized and the idea of historicism, which excludes the fight for the title of «oldest», «cultural» in the traditional, standardized on the Western model of civilization project.

Cultural and civilizational system can not evolve in arbitrary direction, it accepts only those innovations that contribute to its immanent development and rejects anything that contradicts it. Cultural and civilizational system has a certain critical threshold of internal changes in the output for which it ceases to be itself when it loses the inner identity, self-identity.

It should be emphasized that in a global transformation of all aspects of life of Central Asian society, integration in any case is not intended to leveling of national identity (language, culture, customs and etc.) of the peoples of Central Asia. This phenomenon affects the areas of state sovereignty as defense, foreign policy, security, communications, transportation, economy.

Identity may be contained in the history, traditions, language, literature, music and folklore. It is on this basis is constructed identity of European countries. Feeling of common identity, formed under the influence of culture is an important factor in the integration process.

Identity includes such factors as national identity, common interests and values, historical experience, the religious factor. This identity includes several elements:

- Cognitive (cognitive), meaning the citizens' awareness about the region;

- Affirmative (yes), which includes an emotional attitude to the region, a sense of solidarity;
- Instrumental, which is manifested in the political culture of the population, as a basis for mobilization of the population, the perception of national political issues, etc.¹²

Therefore, in tough fight economic zones, civilizations survive and succeed only large community. Alternatives to the integration of the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia (including the Iranian-speaking Tajikistan), in nature simply does not exist. Platform unification can be a common identity (regional identity), its own Turkic civilization (with an admixture of Persian-Tajik), and history. This is a necessary condition for the decolonization of the Turkic peoples who find themselves at the bottom of world pyramid as suppliers of raw materials. Only by uniting economically, technologically and spiritually self-sufficient superethnos-civilization can adequately respond to the challenges of globalization and the policies in their own interests (N. Amrekulov). In this aspect, particularly would like to emphasize the view of the great writer Chingiz Aitmatov, who in a recent interview said that: «The historical community, linguistic similarities, shared traditions, customs, gives us countless opportunities to be together and build together new world, a common civilizational community»¹³.

In an era of «post-ideological» differences in culture came to the fore, thereby eroding the foundations of a globalizing world. If the first belonging to different civilizations recognized the issue of differences, at present this affiliation is central to philosophy. In addition, as noted by A.I. Utkin, the real basics of life now «are civilizational grounds, i.e. grouping is not against a country X, not for the country Y, is not around Z, and the facts about its history and geography, in a niche of its cultural-historical, civilized community»¹⁴. It is important to note that the rapid process of globalization, the West imposed on their models all the other civilizations of the Millennium faced with the situation when the anti-civilization by centuries of tradition, supplying, mental and geopolitical codes, historical and cultural memory, moral and religious norms and canons. It is a position that integrity should be today a global solution to all the Central Asian states that are logged in, coordinate and integrate their efforts. In this connection takes the relevance of the choice of the Central Asian version of globalization.

In this case, the stability of civilization implies a certain cultural area, which is characterized not only spatial boundaries are often blurred enough, but a set of specific cultural phenomena, both material and spiritual values that determine the specificity and nature of the civilization, language, religion, art, traditions, customs and The stability of other shows and is transmitted not only through objective forms, but also deep psychological mechanisms, unconscious related to certain behavioral and mental stereotypes and spiritual identity, collective representations of society.

Obviously, the political, economic and eco-socio-cultural integration is vital to the region. However, in contrast to the potential integration of its real possibilities at the present time, unfortunately, small, narrowly prevail as national interests of each country and in different directions and the inadequacy of economic reforms in the countries of the region is increasingly causes the disintegration¹⁵.

Therefore, the relationship between some states in the region would be better designated as a few tense than brotherly, friendly, partner. However, in recent years it was under the influence of the above-mentioned processes of globalization

[12] Sheryzdanova K.G. Cultural and ideological aspects of the logic central azimuth and interest // Modern civilization and whether the problem of improving the competitiveness of national states. – Almaty, 2008. – 483 with. – P. 456-457.

[13] Abbasov T. Grand rapids eternal peace / Interview with Chingiz Aitmatov // From the Caspian Sea. – 2008. – № 1 (9). – P. 33.

[14] Utkin A.I. The Atlantic and other worlds: Civilization barrier Ry // U.S. and Europe: prospects for inter-relationships at the turn of the century / ed. A.I. Utkin. – M., 2000.

[15] Chen Tsimin. Central Asia: whether the political process and regional at the safety of flax. – Almaty, 2002. – P. 122.

developed separate models, options for integration development. Interest of states of the region for coordinated action in the region are gradually starting to show in that region, there are many objective problems, are equally relevant and meaningful for each individual country and for all put together. On this basis, the trend towards convergence of the region on many fronts in recent years it has become apparent. The variety of trips to the forms of partnership with each other is not an obstacle to the realization of the Central Asian countries of the importance of strengthening the relationship, on which depends the future of the region as a whole. Today it is clothed in flesh by various bilateral, multilateral agreements on joint and concerted action in the political, economic, cultural and other fields, although the real returns are nowhere as long as no one felt.

The idea of Central Asian integration at this stage has not yet fully realized, as in the region, there are objective differences in the ongoing process of modernization, which is still largely carried out by Western standards. Not all are equally ready to accept and implement it. Those affected by cultural and historical differences that are stable and less susceptible to change than, for example, economic and political relations. Therefore, in the direction of Central Asian integration as an alliance of Central Asian states have a lot of work and cultural heritage of the past can and should provide the solid foundation in this process¹⁶.

Under present conditions, of course, it is impossible to achieve integration. Even the integration of the European Union took place in an evolutionary way, for half a century. We can distinguish two main reasons that prevent this. Firstly, they are different models of economic and political development, despite the fact that virtually all countries in the region are authoritarian. But those in the region still different levels of authoritarianism, different levels of openness to the outside world. If Kazakhstan, for example, one of the first Central Asian countries hit by the crisis because they are too active, has joined the international economic space, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have suffered less. That's because their economies were still more isolated from external factors.

Another objective factor – different rates and levels of economic development, is a completely different economic model. They are difficult to reconcile. As, in fact, authoritarian states determine their foreign policy only very heads of state. That is, we observe a high level of subjectivity in their work, personal likes, dislikes presidents often prevent them solve those very problems which, in fact, suffer from their populations. For example, problems of water and energy. Same problem with the water. But in terms of global warming in 10-15 years – they want it or not – the region will have to solve it. And this can be done only at the level of interaction between the five Central Asian countries, namely in the framework of cooperation and not integration.

Secondly, as the initiator of the integration of Kazakhstan at the moment is a little cool down begins to the idea of UCAS, more emphasis on the development of the Customs Union, which from January 1, 2010 officially started to work, that is, with the participation of Russia and Belarus. Turning back to Central Asia – in the direction of Belarus and Russia, towards the EEC, which is a big problem for Kazakhstan itself, shows that it starts a little disappointed, including a regional perspective.

If we talk about the prospects, it is possible to distinguish several stages, which ideally would lead to no integration association, but at least the basis for cooperative interaction, and in the future – integration:

- First stage – the political will. Without political will, no project will not work. What does the political will mean? This is where virtually all of the ruling

[16] Kurmangaliyeva G. Cultural heritage of the past in the integration processes of Kazakhstan and Central Asia // Adam alemi - Peace man. – 2006. – № 2 (28). – P. 14.

elites in Central Asia, the prospects of their own countries will be linked to the prospect of the region as a whole. That is, when no one is going to pull the blanket over himself, when no one would accuse their neighbors of any problems or those of other threats, allegedly from them go. That is the political will – is the first foundation for all good causes. Political will requires mutual respect for each other and some kind of equality;

- Second phase – the cross-border trade. This is what, in fact, quite specifically, and more – hurts the interests of all citizens in the region. That means the open border trade cooperation. That is the opening of borders, establishment of border trade zones, free economic zones and so on. Because it is in some degree to stimulate the development of certain regions, then transferring them to other specific areas;

- The third stage – the creation of a common customs area. That is, when the first will be to some extent unified customs laws and will be in some degree created favorable conditions for the movement of goods within Central Asia. Creating such a unified customs space is feasible, but it certainly needs a bit away from the lopsided economic development of the region. Because almost all the countries of Central Asia – a raw state.

- The fourth stage – the final. In the long run is to create a single economic space where it is necessary to create a supranational body, which would transfer the trust of economic sovereignty - not political. The presence of a supranational authority suggests that, under the authority of the state would all have an equal number of votes. To speak about creating a political union is not necessary, since even in the long run, the political sovereignty of the question. Necessary to begin with the economy, because in the world there is no good example of all the regional associations, which would be based on weak economic projects. Only the economy, as economic cooperation and closer, shall we say, cooperative processes in the national economy – they will lay the foundation of creation, a strong, competitive Central Asian region, which will be Russia, China and the United States. If the Central Asian states themselves can not solve the problem of its own region, it will continue to remind those same billiard balls (A. Uolfers), which will play a larger, more competitiveness of the country, determining its trajectory.

Of course, that the «conditions of post-Soviet Central Asian country's independence as originally equivalent to the present and in future will be tested, in which the main focal issue for themselves in the region and outside players will appeal to the national interests»¹⁷.

But we must not overlook the fact that any integration process may run into dilemma that arises between the economy and geopolitics: if the first seeks to integrate national economic policies, the latter begins to deform the integration process, picking up from the depths of memory or that the claims (ethno-national, territorial, etc.) that do not fit into the norms and notions of stable and sustained historical and economic process. The result of this clash of geopolitical conditions invariably becomes, as a political resource depletion and the emergence of a number of conflict zones and that today we can observe the example of Central Asia in connection with last year's events in Kyrgyzstan.

On this basis, we can say that existing ways of improving the normalization of relations barriers are partly connected with the complex geopolitical process of cultural and civilizational identity of the region. Point of view of the region to mark their relationship to these processes lie in different planes. This often manifests itself in opposition to the benefits of nomadic and sedentary cultures that drive to a certain degree of ill feeling often experienced by the population of

¹⁷ Kushkumbayev S.K. The impact of globalization on Central Asia: Regional Integration and Security // Analytic-Analytic Review. – 2001. – № 2. – P. 11.

these countries to each other, seeing a growing trend of mutual alienation among peoples of the region.

It should be noted that the promotion of such an experience of mutual alienation and political ideology of social order in the region against the background of what is happening in the world striving to get closer positions on important issues of mutual cooperation, is paradoxical and non-pragmatic. Instead, the idea of a single civilized community, today, in some states takes up primordialist approach, when challenged the right of another, not only for access to a common cultural heritage, but sometimes their existence. The dissemination of such mythological waves of primordialist nationalism in this space, which has always felt the dominance of emotional over the rational thinking, willy-nilly prevents dialog returns the priority nature of the interaction of cultures of its peoples.

Observed in recent years, narrowing the field interpretation of social environment character once prevailed cultural and civilized community requires strengthening the active role of one of the countries in identifying and developing concerted action in addressing these issues. Such a mission in itself in our opinion could take on Kazakhstan today as the most integrated into the global economy of the region. According to its potential force her to prevent ever-increasing fragmentation of political space in the region as a result of the latent clash of different geopolitical interests.

Therefore, the convergence position of the region to address common problems will depend on the prospects of convergence than the great powers competing for the expansion of the zone of influence in the region, but the willingness of countries in the region safely take the leading role of developed countries in the region.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that, despite the political boundaries separating the Central Asian countries, the region's peoples live in a cultural-civilizational space, have common traditions, culture, religion and history. Of course, to divide the historical, cultural and civilizational heritage of the region – is impossible. This property belongs equally to the entire population of our common cultural and civilizational space. Understanding this leads us to new ideas on regional integration – in order to expand our knowledge about its capabilities.

Thus, regional integration – not only has no alternative path to stability, progress, economic and military-political security, but also increase the authority of the Central Asia in the global community and deepening integration at the regional level is becoming an important way of overcoming the global crisis.

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PROMOTING NATIONAL LEADERS: EXPERIENCES OF POST-SOVIET REALITIES

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The forthcoming presidential elections on March 4th, 2012 in Russian Federation, will be marked with the reappearance of Vladimir Putin to the post of the head of state. This event is quite legitimate within Russian social-political realities. At the same time, looking at the irremovability of the heads of some post-Soviet republics, and, on the contrary of others, where the change of presidents had been done as a result of «colour revolutions», Russian «tandemokratia» represents relatively effective variant of supremacy and general political course succession.

All, mentioned above, make the issues of political and, first of all, national leadership topical. It is quite obvious that the process of promoting national leaders and establishing on that basis the institute for national leadership in the post-soviet countries is rather challenging on account of the factors as described here below.

Firstly, a clear-cut and generally accepted notion of *National Leader* does not exist in either scientific, or official terminology throughout not only the post-soviet countries but also the entire world community; the same is true for the universal criteria to measure the national leadership. Hence, the countries in question are practically lacking the conceptual basis to establish and develop the institute of national leadership as such.

Secondly, the process under discussion reflects the entire complexity and ambiguousness of the state-building processes, political modernization and society development in the relevant countries. On the background of frequent fluctuations between the democratic and authoritarian development trends along with the numerous social, political and economic crisis and challenges, up to the civil and interstate armed conflicts, there is no point to mention the existence of sustainable and efficient mechanisms of promoting the national leaders.

Thirdly, in the context of society atomization as observed basically in each of the post-soviet states primarily determined by its social stratification by income, and the absence of its consolidating idea, it is difficult to gain the overall perception and recognition of one or another politician as a national leader. Particularly it is the case where community spirit changes periodically affected by various factors.

Fourthly, the influence of the subjective factor that is, in turn, connected with the personality features and traits of the state leaders and other members of political elite of the post-soviet countries. While having the necessary psychological, professional and other capacities to appear on the national leadership level, not all of them are able to come through the test of post-soviet realities.

The political practice of promoting political leaders who claim for the head of state status and managed to serve at different times in such capacity in the post-soviet states (except for the Baltic countries) enables to identify the following key varieties of such process:

1. *The Emergence of Political Personalities in the Political Arena in the Forefront of the USSR Disintegration Mainly by Playing off Against the Former Soviet System.*

It needs to be noted that those were mainly charismatic personalia with special talents and capabilities for which they have gained an exclusive popularity in public at the outset of their carrier. Specifically, those were the first presidents of Russia (Boris Eltsyn), Ukraine (Leonid Kravchuk), Armenia (Levon Ter-Petrosyan), Georgia (Zviad Gamsakhurdia), Moldova (Mircha Snegur), as well as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus (Stanislav Shushkevich)¹.

None of them, however, have gained the national leader title. Most of them were not able to cope with the challenges of the first years of independence and establish a sustainable policy and power system in their countries. For instance, in 1992 Gamsakhurdia was overthrown under arms. In 1994 Shushkevich was relieved of his post of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus based on the findings of the Parliamentary Commission headed by Alexander Lukashenko who was the Parliament member at that time. Kravchuk had to hold the pre-term presidential election in 1994 at which he lost the vote in favor of ex-Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

In 1996 Snegur has lost the vote in favor of Pyotr Luchinsky, the former soviet and party leader of Moldova. In 1998, as a result of aggravating disagreements within the power elite, Ter-Petrosyan has submitted resignation from the presidential post². Though Eltsyn was elected for the second term, he gradually lost control over the situation within the country and eventually had to transfer the powers to his successor, Vladimir Putin who held the Prime-Minister post.

2. *Nomination of a Leader by the Political Regime of Power*

Here we refer to the mechanism typical of the post-soviet states, specifically where the leaders of the countries in question were nominated from among the former party and state leaders.

At the same time, from the standpoint of ensuring stability in the state-building process and succession of the official policy line, the reference may be given to both successful and unsuccessful experiences. In the latter case, the first President of Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutalibov and the second President of Tajikistan Rakhmon Nabiyev could be mentioned who have been overthrown under arms in 1992. The successful experience is demonstrated by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan represented by the first presidents, respectively, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Islam Karimov and Saparmurat Niyazov died in 2006.

3. *Nomination of Compromise Political Figures*

In the absence of sustainable and efficient institutional mechanisms of recruiting political leaders, the latter could be nominated through the agreements reached between the elite groups powerful at that point in time. In such case, the emphasis is normally placed on the persons who seem to be politically weak and satisfy the relevant elite groups in terms of meeting their interests.

In this respect, the successful experience is represented by ex-President of Kyrgyzstan Roza Otunbayeva and the sitting presidents of Tajikistan (Emomali Rakhmon) and Turkmenistan (Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov). At the same time, as opposed to her colleagues from the neighboring countries, R. Otunbayeva has demonstrated a brand new for the Central Asian region model

[1] Ashimbayev D. Fifteen-year presidency. Part 1 // «World of Eurasia», № 5, 2005, p. 22

[2] Levon Ter-Petrosian // Wikipedia - The free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levon_Ter-Petrosian)

of governance and succession of the supreme powers serving as the president of the transition period. Having assumed the plenitude of power and responsibility in the critical period, she ensured the shift of form of government from the presidential to parliamentary republic and has quitted as the head of state in less than 1.5 years without any attempts to secure a footing in her post³.

As far as Rakhmon and Berdymukhamedov are concerned, after the accession to the head of state office and progressively as they were strengthening their positions, they have gradually edged out the persons who played key roles in their promotion from the political and power system of their countries, up to the criminal prosecution⁴. Thereby, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have actually come in for the permanent presidents.

The unsuccessful experience in relation to the issue concerned was shown by Georgia and Kyrgyzstan represented by the former presidents Eduard Shevardnadze and Askar Akayev respectively. Both of them are known to have been toppled as a result of the so-called color revolutions.

4. Nomination of Leaders in Opposition to the Former State Heads

A comparatively successful experience was shown here by the following presidents: the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko who has actually managed to gain the president-for-life status by obtaining the right to run for president for an unlimited number of times; the President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan and the President of Ukraine who had two consecutive presidential terms and left the post without any excesses. Considering the current situation, the reference here may be given to the current President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili who has managed to outride the opposition pressure and win the early presidential election held in 2008⁵.

The less successful was the presidency of Pyotr Luchinsky in Moldova and Victor Yushenko in Ukraine who had only one term of presidency. The first of them has quitted his post as a result of the two parliamentary election wins (in 1998 and 2001) of the oppositional Communist Party of Moldova Republic. In 2000 the Communist Party deputies have proclaimed Moldova the parliamentary republic by the amendments made to the Constitution of Moldova Republic, and in 2001 Vladimir Voronin, the Leader of the Communist Party, was elected to the presidential post. As far as Victor Yushenko is concerned, he, while holding the presidential post, was not able to establish a sustainable governmental coalition and has failed to make it to the second round of election held in January-February 2011.

The unsuccessful was the presidency of the second presidents of Azerbaijan (Abulfaza Elchibei) and Kyrgyzstan (Kurmanbek Bakiyev). In 1993 Abulfaza Elchibei, driven by the political crisis caused by the armed forces rebellion headed by colonel Suret Guseinov, has actually held aloof from governance and has further been officially dismissed from the presidential post by the decision of the Parliament⁶. Bakiyev was toppled in April 2010 as a result of mass political upheavals that may be figuratively called *the second tulip revolution*.

5. Succession of Supreme Power

Here we speak about the transition of presidential powers to one of the close teammates of the former head of state to maintain the continuity of the official political course and status quo of the ruling elite.

The reference here may be given to the assumption of power of the current presidents such as Ilkham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan whose case is often called the dynastic transfer of power; Serzh Sargsyan, the President of Armenia,

[3] Otunbayeva Roza // «Lenta.ru» (<http://lenta.ru/lib/14171007>)

[4] Central Asia Eoday: Challenges and Ehreats / edited K.L. Syroezhkin: Monograph. - Almaty: KazISS, 2011, p. 60, 61, 80

[5] Georgian presidential election, 2008 // Wikipedia - The free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_presidential_election,_2008)

[6] Zenkovich N.A. Heydar Aliyev. - M.: Exmo, 2007, p. 328

Dmitry Medvedev, the President of Russia as well as his predecessor Vladimir Putin.

When it comes to promoting **the national leaders** as such, the process has its own, though rare cases connected with the political experience of the relevant post-soviet countries:

1. *Formation of the Cult of Personality*

Said experience was shown by Turkmenistan whose first president Saparmurat Niyazov was officially declared *Turkmenbashi* (Head of the Turkmen) in 1993.

At the same time, as it follows from the world historic experience, after resignation of the heads of certain countries that have been awarded the titles of *supremo*, *father of nation* etc. or after their decease the cult of personality has inevitably been dispelled to a greater or lesser extent. As a result, all the merits of such persons are either qualified the black spots of history or artificially buried in oblivion by their successors. The latter of said trends is seen in Turkmenistan progressively as the second President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov governs the country⁷.

2. *Historic Acknowledgement*

The highest level of proclaiming a politician the national leader is by acknowledging his title without any conditions and ceremonies by the overwhelming majority of his fellow countrymen.

That was the case to proclaim the third president Geidar Aliyev the national leader of Azerbaijan after his decease in 2003. At the same time, to a certain extent the title is maintained by the factor of presidency of his son, Ilkham Aliyev.

To be impartial, we should also mention some nuances of the official exaltation of Geidar Aliyev's leadership while alive. Specifically, I'm referring to the fact that in 1997, June 15 was declared the National Survival Day in Azerbaijan that has been celebrated as a national holiday as from 1998. It is connected with the fact that on June 15, 1993 Geidar Aliyev has resumed his governance of the republic started as far back as in soviet times and was elected the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan⁸.

3. *Official Proclamation*

In this case we need to mention the assignment of Yel Basy (Leader of Nation) status to the Current President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev by the Constitutional Law «On Amendments to Some Constitutional Statutes of the Republic of Kazakhstan Regarding the Improvement of the Legislation in the Sphere of Ensuring the Activity of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Leader of Nation» and the Law «On Amendments to Some Legal Documents of the Republic of Kazakhstan Regarding the Improvement of the Legislation in the Sphere of Ensuring the Activity of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Leader of Nation» as adopted by the Parliament and enacted on 14 June 2010⁹.

At the same time, the efficiency of such mechanisms to ensure the national leadership of the President of Kazakhstan has not been manifested so far in any specific practical terms. Therefore, the mechanisms in question will be evaluated at the lapse of a certain period of time when some or other events will take place in relation with e.g. the succession of the supreme power in this country.

4. *Promotion through Parliamentary and Party Mechanisms*

Here we may refer to the initiative put forward in 2007 by some party organizers of the ruling All-Russian Political Party United Russia to proclaim Vladimir Putin the National Leader who held the presidential post of the

[7] Central Asia Eoday: Challenges and Ehreats / edited K.L. Syroezhkin: Monograph. - Almaty: KazISS, 2011, p. 90, 91

[8] Azerbaijan celebrates The National Survival day // «RIA Novosti», 15.06.2010 (<http://ria.ru/world/20100615/246310134.html>)

[9] Chebotarev A. KZ-Leader // Internet-magazine «Oasis», № 15, August 2010 (<http://www.ca-oasis.info/oasis/?id=1014>)

Russian Federation at that time¹⁰. Said initiative was designed to address the issue of the so-called third term for Putin. But the latter refused from the plan and preferred to recommend Dmitry Medvedev, Senior Deputy Chairman of the RF Government for the head of state post. And now, when we expect Putin to come back to the presidential post it may happen that the United Russia party members will come forward with the same initiative again.

In view of the above, below are the main trends to mention that characterize the process of promoting national leaders in the post-soviet countries:

First of all, being at the outset of the state independence and gaining the status of the first president are not the guarantees of the national leader nomination. The same observation is true for the factor of the long-term inking of one president or another. For instance, the potential claims of Emomali Rakhmon, the President of Tajikistan, for the leader of nation role are seriously constrained by the factor of regional and clan disunity of Tajik society and the country's political elite.

A yet more serious trend is the lack of potential national leaders amongst public and political personalities being in opposition to the ruling powers practically in all the post-soviet states. That is to say, there are no leaders of the level as e.g. the head of Polish Solidarity Lech Walensa or the human rights advocate and dissenter Waclaw Gavel who was the first President of Czech Republic. The same is also true for the Baltic countries. So, e.g. Vitautas Landsbergis, the full leader of independence movement in Lithuania in 1988-1991, did not gain the national leader acknowledgement of his people.

For the time being, only Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, can be identified as the prospective leader of nation who has been given the title *godfather (batka)* among the people¹¹. In Belarus this title is typically assigned to the recognized people who courageously protect the interests of their families and communities. Therefore, the President of Belarus has the key precondition to remain the national leader in the history of his country and gain the public recognition subject to a favorable set of circumstances.

On the whole, the incumbent presidents of the post-soviet states need to invest a lot of effort in order to come to a level of national leaders. Those who, by virtue of some or other factors and mechanisms, have already managed to do that need to dedicate their further activities to preserving and keeping the relevant official status or public recognition in future.

[10] Barakhova A., Nagornykh I. «National Leader» project // «Commerzant», № 204, 7.11.2007

[11] Dyadin P. Why belorussians call Mr.Lukashenko «batka» // «UDF.BY – Belarus News», 18.02.2010 (http://udf.by/news/main_news/7503-pochemu-belorusy-zovut-lukashenko-batkoj.html)

19-20 April 2012, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Institute for Comparative Social Research CESSI-Kazakhstan
and the **"Community Foundation of Alexander Knyazev,"**
are organizing an international conference **"Central Asia and the
project of Eurasian Union"**.

The conference is supposed to consider the following questions:

- Globalization and regionalization, the theoretical basis and practical needs in the context of increasing global competition.
- Origin and development of the Eurasian Union idea in the late XX - early XXI centuries.
- Background, benefits and difficulties of the integration project - from the Customs Union to the Eurasian Union.
- Regional security: public and real politics and ideology.
- Eurasian Union: A Strategy for economic cooperation and security in the context of increasing international threats.
- A new integration project for Eurasia and the future contours.
- Eurasian Union and other regional organizations: the point of contact, prospects and problems.
- Regional consolidation and multi-vector policy: the role and place of extra-regional players.

The main purpose and objective of the conference – to identify by the expert community the most pressing areas of need for greater cooperation and security of Central Asian countries, including the prospects for the expansion of the Eurasian Union.

We invite you to participate in the conference work!

Sincerely,

Alexander Knyazev – Russian Academy of Sciences Center for the Study of Central Asia the Caucasus and the Volga-Ural Institute of Oriental Studies, Regional Programs Coordinator, Doctor of Historical Sciences

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THREAT OF TERRORISM IN KAZAKHSTAN: FROM VIRTUALITY TO REALITY

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2011 was not an easy year for Kazakhstan, it was rather difficult on the issue of national security protection due to the country first directly faced with the threat of religious terrorism and extremism. And despite the fact the authorities first denied this threat at all, events happened in Spring, especially Summer events of 2011 (special operation in Kenkiyak), finally forced official authorities to admit the fact the threat of religious extremism and terrorism in the country is growing.

Certainly, the spread and character of these events could not be compared to similar events becoming critical in national security policy of the other Central Asian countries – terrorism actions in Tashkent on February 1999 and the so-called Batken events in Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000.

There is no yet planned terrorism actions or any terrorism organization declared war to the State authorities, however, considering the political situation in the country to be stable for a long period and protest demonstrations happened were not radical, it is naturally, the events of Spring-Summer 2011 caused social anxiety from one hand, and forced the authorities to treat the problem of terrorism and extremism more seriously from the other hand.

Events of 2011 caused a certain social resonance and discussions among experts. The evidence the authorities had recognized terrorism threat was a special meeting of Security Council held, where issues of terrorism and religious extremism were raised. Furthermore, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev in his September speech during open session of the Parliament especially emphasized the problem of religious extremism as a global agenda and as an issue of national security.

Here we need to notice, before the events of 2011 terrorism in Kazakhstan never considered to be a real threat for the national security, but considered mainly as a potential danger. In accordance with this, system of national security was oriented basically on prohibition and prevention of other threats, such as interethnic conflicts, extinction of narcotic traffic, neutralization of economic treats, the last time, for instance, corruption extinction.

The problem of terrorism was not also considered on the expert level individually for Kazakhstan, but was discussed in the frames of general situation in Central Asia. Thus terrorism was treated in Kazakhstan predominantly as external threat, as a danger from outside, according to this, prevention of the terrorism threat was stipulated by such measures as, for example, improvement of the state boundaries protection system, enforcement of migration legislation etc.

First signals

Generally, terrorism was considered as distant threat and rather imaginary before during public agendas.

Events that occurred last year:

- Mass escape of prisoners from colony with strict regime in Mangistau oblast, June 2010. These prisoners supposedly were members of religious extremist organization. High organization and impertinence of this escape should be noted as well as that part of escapees blew themselves up (nonofficial data).

- Series of arrests and liquidations of Kazakhstan's citizens within the territory of Russia. These individuals were considered as ones taking part in terrorist activities in North Caucasus.

Events that occurred in the beginning of this year:

- Special operation of elite division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs called «Sunkar» which was supposedly directed against individuals who were a part of extremist group. This operation was conducted in April of the current year. As a result of this operation, two suspected individuals were liquidated and 11 fighters of «Sunkar» were injured.

- New terrorist attacks in the territory of Southern region of Russian Federation led by natives of Kazakhstan.

- Rahimdzan Makatov exploded himself in Department of Committee on National Security (DCNS), Aktubinsk oblast, May 17. According to some data, this man was a member of religious extremist organization.

- A car was exploded near temporary containment cell of DCNS, Astana. As a result of detonation of explosive with no shell, two people died right at the place on May 24.

- July 1, police officers were killed in village of Shubarshi, Temir rayon, Aktubinsk oblast. According to mass media reports, two police officers of patrol-guard service of Temir Regional Department of Internal Affairs (RDIA) and two fighters of special-force division were supposedly killed by members of religious extremist organization.

- 16 prisoners tried to escape in prison of Balkhash at night, July 11. Then they killed one and injured four officers of Committee on Penal Enforcement System (CPES). While military assault, this group of prisoners exploded themselves. According to unofficial data, these escapees were followers of one extremist directions of Islam.

- Activity of terrorist group was discovered and terminated in Atyrau oblast, end of August. This group was planning to organize terroristic attacks within a territory of several oblasts. Under criminal case (article «terrorism» was included), the court authorized arrests for 39 citizens where 11 assigned to be arrested in absentia.

All the events above caused widespread public resonance and led to social tension. In turn, these are worsened by absence of clear, timely, competent and informational response to be given by government. It is obvious that events with so-called «telephone terrorism» which were publically considered as unimportant, now are perceived more sensitively by citizens of Kazakhstan.

Regardless of how events in Aktobe and particularly in Astana will be classified, and who/what is behind such events, tendency of sustainable increase of terroristic threat is obvious and can be observed in our country:

- There are more and more data indicating that citizens of Kazakhstan do take part in terroristic activities within territories of other countries.

- Number of citizens of Kazakhstan arrested due to commitment of crimes somehow related to terroristic activities and extremism within the territory of

our country increases. This way, according to official data, 7 terrorist attacks were prevented during 2008-2009¹. Therefore, problem of terrorism which seemed to be distant and imaginary some time ago seems to be direct threat for national security now.

- Volume of extremistic and religious materials confiscated is much greater than the one observed during 2006-2009

Actually, there is a new challenge for the government. And such a challenge seems to be pretty serious because increased terroristic threat is completely the opposite to devaluation of main ideologeme – stability. Specified relation may negatively affect relationships between government and society. This is because terrorism makes people suspect inability of government to keep peace and quiet within society.

Staging of increased terroristic threat in Kazakhstan

In truth, signs of terrorism were observed even before in Kazakhstan. Some researchers consider these to be events that occurred in airport of Shymkent, February of 1992. Then some hostages were taken. The others consider these to be the events of 2000, when members of extremistic group were liquidated in Almaty. But all these above were only rare and local signs of terrorism and their nature could be considered more as criminal.

In general, three stages of increased terroristic threat in Kazakhstan may be highlighted. These would be as follows:

1. «Escapees and foreign terrorists» (end of 90s and beginning of 2000s)

Ten years ago there was a problem with terrorists in Kazakhstan. But generally these would be so-called «foreign» terrorists and escapees who were disappearing from police of their home countries. They would be chased for participation in terroristic activities and illegal armed groups. It was also considered that the territory of Kazakhstan served as transit area. Yet all these suggestions were not proved in reality. Nevertheless Kazakh special forces kept arresting «foreign terrorists» and later on transferred them to their home countries.

This way, law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan arrested and transferred eight citizens of Uzbekistan to their home country. These men were suspected as being terrorists and escaping in the territory of Kazakhstan.

During 2004-2005, 11 citizens of Russia, Uzbekistan, and some other countries, were arrested in the territory of Kazakhstan and extradited later on².

In 2006, 20 people suspected to be somehow related to terrorism were arrested in Kazakhstan and extradited to their home countries. These were particularly citizens of Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkey and China³.

2. «Recruitment» (beginning and middle of 2000s)

Within this stage, increased involvement of citizens of Kazakhstan to terroristic activities in neighboring countries as well as in far-abroad countries was discovered.

The most famous event known was liquidation of terroristic group named «Dzamaat Mujahidin of Central Asia» by domestic special forces. This group was responsible for organization of series of terroristic attacks in Uzbekistan, 2004.

[1] IA Kazakhstan Today, <http://www.today.kz/ru/news/kazakhstan/2009-10-14/teract.14.10.09r>.

[2] Web «Zakon.kz», <http://www.zakon.kz/68872-za-uchastie-v-terroristicheskoi.html>, 03.02.06r.

[3] <http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/cap/itogi2005-2006>

The group included citizens of Kazakhstan who would act mostly against Uzbek authorities. According to their ideology, rights of Muslims were impaired badly there.

There was also some data available indicating that citizens of Kazakhstan took part in illegal armed groups within the territory of Afghanistan and several other countries. This way, one of prisoners kept in jail of Guantanamo was a citizen of Kazakhstan. Therefore famous American nongovernmental organization, National Reconnaissance Office, presented analytical/forecasting report called Mapping the Global Future, wherein Kazakhstan along with Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was considered as region suitable for settlement of cells and extremistic Islamic groups. Kazakhstan was said to fit living for «professional fighters of jihad» having specialized knowledge and skills to organize terroristic attacks. In other words, Kazakhstan considered to be as a country free from terroristic threat some day before, and now could be mentioned in various expert reports.

3. «Local or «insider terrorists» (since end of 2000s)

This period, on the one hand, is characterized by a sharp increase in number of participation of Kazakhstani citizens in terrorist activities in the territory of other countries.

Thus, in July 2009, during a raid by Special Forces in Dagestan, eight militia fighters were killed and five of them, according to law enforcement sources, possessed Kazakhstani Passport⁴.

On July 19, 2009, the Kyrgyz secret services detained 18 people on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities in Bishkek and in the South of the country, among whom there were citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan⁵.

On September 19, 2010, during a raid by Special Forces in Tajikistan's Rasht Valley Tajik power authorities found a passport of a citizen of Kazakhstan, Artur Nabiyeu with one of the killed militia fighters⁶.

Since the start of the year 2011 in the territory of Russia 6 citizens of Kazakhstan involved in terrorism have been detained and killed.

On January 19, 2011 MFA of Kazakhstan confirmed the detention of a citizen of Kazakhstan on suspicion of organizing terrorist acts in Bishkek⁷.

In February 2011, in Makhachkala two suspects of participating in illegal armed formations, who are citizens of Kazakhstan – Albert Abdikarimov, born in 1989, and Rainbek Erzhanov, 1990 were detained⁸.

On the other hand attempts of terrorist activities even in the territory of our country have been recorded. This is shown by the following table.

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009*	2010	2011 I KB
Number of persons made accountable	16	20	6	33	14	22	24	31	7

Table 1
The number of detainees and convicted persons for offences related to terrorist activities in the territory of RK

*Since 2009 – data on convicted according to the following Articles of the Criminal Code of RK:
Article 168 – power hijacking
Article 233 – Terrorism
Article 233-1 – Advocacy of terrorism or public incitement to commit an act of terrorism
Article 233-2 – Establishment or leadership of a terrorist group and participation in its activities

Therefore, recent developments in Aktobe, Astana and Shubarshi regardless their terrorist backgrounds confirmed or not, are not only wake-up call, but also

[4] «Diapazon» journal, 16.02.11r, <http://diapazon.kz/kazakhstan/kaz-incidents/35804-zachem-pugat-rossijan-terroristami-iz-kazakhstan.html>

[5] Web «Vesti.kz», 17.07.2009r., <http://vesti.kz/asia/19917/>

[6] <http://www.parusk.info>, Web 22.04.11r., <http://www.parusk.info/2011/04/22/42848>

[7] IA «Gazeta.kz», 19.01.11r., <http://news.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=331922>

[8] Web TengriNews, 31.03.11r. <http://tengrinews.kz/crime/182829>

speak for the growing trend of increasing threat in Kazakhstan. Thus, in one of the extremist websites in September 2010, it was published the so-called fatwa of Jihad against Kazakhstan, which contained not only appeals to the «opposition», namely organization of collective armed attacks. On this website the ideologists of extremism in detail explained how attacks against law enforcement officers should be arranged. Perhaps Kazakh law enforcement bodies didn't attach much significance to these materials and to sites. Indirectly this fact is indicated by that access to these sites has not been directly blocked. And only a month after the explosion in Aktobe and Astana General Prosecutor's office of Kazakhstan announced about revelation of 15 foreign sites the content of which violates the prohibition on propaganda and excuse of terrorism and extremism. Their distribution in the territory of RK was declared illegal by judicial process and actions were taken to limit access by Kazakhstani users to materials.

Accidental explosions or task-oriented law enforcement officers hunt?

Many experts immediately noticed that explosions in Aktobe and Astana took place in the buildings of the secret services – the Committee of national security, and 'shubarshskie' events are connected with the murder of police officers. Surely, it is difficult to judge on any link and regularity based on only a few facts. While the experts use merely circumstantial evidence, in particular, the short period between these events and the identity of the target. And comparing the facts it can be concluded that the attacks on law-enforcement agencies have become a trend. But the main point in the other – is there any organization acting directly within the territory of Kazakhstan? And here it must be noted that, unlike other similar cases in other countries, following the events in Aktobe, Astana and Shubarshi no organization has claimed responsibility. Although generally anonymous attack is nonsense, because any attack as a general rule originally aimed at a broad information and public response. And as judged by the developments in Aktobe, Astana and Shubarshi there is no any evidence of a well-handled beginning. Although these actions are directed against law enforcement agencies but are of spontaneous nature. Therefore, it is beforehand to talk about obvious and direct causes to tie events in Aktobe, Astana and Shubarshi into a single chain or to consider this as a planned series.

At the same time, it should be noted that the deliberate attack on law enforcement bodies is one of the tactics of terrorist groups. In particular, it is proved by comparative data on terrorist activities which are recorded in the Caucasian region of Russia.

Thus, in 2009, in Ingushetia there were 4 terrorist attacks with the involvement of suicide bombers, 3 of which were aimed at the power departments⁹.

In Dagestan in 2009, there were 9 terrorist attacks, 8 ones against law enforcement bodies¹⁰.

During January-October of 2010 there were 8 terrorist attacks, including 5 ones with regards to power structures, and all of them were done by suicide bombers.

But such actions are not unique to the Caucasus, a similar tactic is noted in a number of countries of the Central Asian region.

Thus, on October 3, 2010, in front of the building of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan in Khujand town a suicide bomber detonated himself. 12 people have been injured¹¹.

[9] «Northern Caucasia» journal, 05.04.2010r., <http://www.sknews.ru/regions/moscow/33706-xronologiya-terakty-sovershennye-terroristam-smertnikami-v-2009-2010-godax-na-severnom-kavkaze.html>

[10] IA RIANovosti, 24.10.10r., <http://ug.rian.ru/incidents/20101024/82050249.html>.

[11] Web «Vesti.kz», 03.09.10r., <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=390046>

On November 30, 2010, two explosions echoed in the building of the Sports Center in Bishkek, where the hearings on the case concerning the shooting of protesters last April took place. Two police officers were injured¹².

On 25th October'2010 next to the building of Central Internal Affairs Directorate in Bishkek a bomb similar to one detonated on November 30th was disarmed¹³.

On 5th January'2011 in Bishkek in the course of scheduled check of passport regime three policemen were killed¹⁴.

Therefore, it is no mere chance that experts pay attention to the strategy of the current terroristic activities which is perhaps directed against law enforcement officers. In their opinion, such actions enable achieving a few targets.

Firstly, it was aimed at derogation of influence of the power departments who in public opinion will look helpless, unable to even protect their own facilities and staff.

Secondly, selection of units to be attacked exactly from among the power departments on the back of intense fighting against corruption and broad distribution of numerous facts of incompetence and corruption of road and the financial police, customs authorities, the Procurator's Office in mass media according to the intent of terrorists will not give rise to social condemnation and certain individuals will sympathize and welcome such a fight.

Thirdly, based on the experience of the Northern Caucasus and other centers of terrorist activities, the total persecution and destruction of people in uniform can finally result in disorganization of the power departments.

To what extent Kazakhstan is prepared to confront the threat of terrorism? National anticorruption system.

In Kazakhstan as compared with other countries in the region, considerable efforts have been made to establish and improve the legal and institutional framework in place to discover and prevent terrorist and extremist activities. In July 1999, Kazakhstan adopted the Act «Concerning the fight against terrorism» stipulating the legal and organizational bases to fight against terrorism in the Republic, the procedures for operating of State bodies and organizations, irrespective of their form of ownership, as well as the rights, duties and guarantees of citizens in connection with the fight against terrorism.

In December 2003 there was an establishment of anti-terrorist Centre of the National Security Committee by the Order of the President for more effective work of all security agencies in the fight against terrorism and religious extremism.

The anti-terrorist center shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of all special, law-enforcement and other agencies to fight against terrorism.

In October 2006, the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan upon the application of the General Prosecutor of Kazakhstan the following organizations were declared terroristic and activities of these organizations were prohibited in the territory of Kazakhstan:

1. "al Qaeda";
2. "Islamic party of the East Turkestan";
3. "Kurdish national congress";
4. "Islamic movement of Uzbekistan";
5. "Asbat-al-Ansar";
6. "Moslem Brotherhood";

[12] Web TengriNews, 30.11.10r, <http://tengrinews.kz/events/92034>

[13] Web Newsru.Com, 25.10.10r., <http://www.newsru.com/world/25dec2010/guvd2.html>

[14] Web Newsru.Com, 05.01.11r., <http://www.newsru.com/world/05jan2011/kyrgyzia.html>

7. "Taliban";
8. "Boz Gurd";
9. "Mujahidin Jamaat of the Central Asia";
10. "Lashkar&Taiba";
11. "Association of Social reforms".

Later activities of organization «Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami», «Aum Sinrike» and Organization of liberation of the East Turkestan have been prohibited by decision of the Court in Astana.

All organizations included in the list are international terrorist structures the activity of which is primarily aimed against regional neighbor of Kazakhstan that confirmed the talking points on external nature of terrorist threat to our country.

Therefore, Kazakhstan actively developed and promoted international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and extremism as a member of organizations such as the anti-terrorism centre (ATC) of the CIS, the regional anti-terrorist structure (RATS) of SCO. However, the forms and methods of terrorist organizations also grow; terrorist change strategy and tactics. Creating and extending anti-terrorist structure it is important to understand that the struggle against that threat must be carried out not only by special services and special units. Moreover, the force activities are often the last step of defense.

Retaliatory attack

If the experts are right that today's terrorist activity as a whole in the Central Asian region and in Kazakhstan is of focused and planned nature then a whole complex of measures in order to prevent the growing terrorist threat is required.

- There is a need to improve the forms and methods of prevention of terrorist threats. As the threat of terrorism was viewed as a potential rather than a real threat, the domestic security services should actively improve practical experience and skills of fighting against terrorism in the real world.

- Special attention should be paid not only to protection of strategic infrastructure (oil and gas pipelines, water and heating) as well other sites of great public importance, but also to enhance measures to protect the population in emergency situations arising from terrorism. As in the case of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, both citizens themselves and the concern services must know and be able to deal with crisis situations.

- Special attention should be paid to building up systems for timely and relevant education. It is objective, timely and balanced information that enables to restrain the emergence of various kinds of speculation and rumors, and prevent any provocation of throwing in misleading materials.

But, most importantly, the problem of terrorism should not be confined only to strengthen punitive function of the State, to strengthen the special services and other, for the most part, institutional arrangements, and first and foremost it should aim at neutralizing preconditions, causes contributing to the spread of terrorism. Today in expert spheres, there is no consensus on the causes of terrorism. Some people believe that the catalyst is deterioration of the socio-economic problems (poverty, beggary, marginalization of society). Others see the essence in nature of the political regime (the degree of outspokenness / closedness of society, level of education, level of rights and freedoms). Some believe that terrorism is based on socio - cultural deformation (devaluation of certain values and moral norms).

But terrorism, like any other phenomenon, has a range of causes and complex interwoven motifs. In Kazakhstan there are at least three main factors contributing to the growing threat of terrorism.

First, factor of social depression, lack of elevators and channels of social mobility. Social stratification and caste groups. The impossibility of self-actualization and achieving social success. Social disorder and absence of life especially among young people. And all of these problems are worsen by corruption in society. In addition in the time of achievement a critical threshold in separating rich and poor there are social protests, one form of which is quite likely to be terrorist attacks. Of course, the social factor is not fundamental to the issue of increased threats of terrorism; however, an illustration of this example is that out of 16 prisoners attempting to escape from Balkhash prison none had a higher education and only three worked before conviction¹⁵. While at the same time, most of the members of the so-called «kenkiyak» group liquidated during the special operation were not unemployed and had quite enough good earnings.


Secondly, the low efficiency of public policies in the ideological sphere, in particular a formalism in the regulation of religious and ethnic terms, the linguistic and religious policy.

Thirdly, the terrorism always is affected by presence of 'trouble spots' in the neighboring States. In this case, keeping of the current instability in Central Asia results in threat of destabilization of situation in the region. Probability of escalation of the political crisis in Kyrgyzstan and possible further attempts to destabilize the situation in Tajikistan. In this connection activation of the various kinds of extremist and terrorist organizations in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. So, just for five months of the current year in Kyrgyzstan amid continuing demoralization of the law enforcement bodies of the country and weakness of the authorities in general, 88 people were arrested for an extremist religious activities and terrorism.

Unfortunately, however, at this stage in the response of the State there is still hard line with a focus on repressive measures. Thus, one of the primary responses of the State was the initiation of a new law «On religion and religious organizations», the essence of which is to create a clear legislative framework for the activities of religious associations and increase accountability for their violations. In particular, it was proposed to govern establishment, State registration, reorganization, liquidation of religious groups. In addition, it was suggested to regulate the procedures of theological examinations, publication and dissemination of religious literature, religious rites and ceremonies. It is not by chance that debate on this Bill has caused much discussion and a mixed public reaction. Norm prohibiting to perform prayers in State institutions, in schools and military units has become one of the main «stumbling blocks».

But talking about the attempts of the State to formalize and regulate religious sphere there must be clear understanding that the law itself does not in principle affect the situation of religious extremism and terrorism. On the contrary, it creates a feeling of a confrontation between the State and religion. After all, it is clear that the factors that are the immediate causes of the ideas of extremism and terrorism are not tools of religion as such, but are collection of various moments and circumstances – the absence of channels of social mobility, a certain caste of society, available (but not exclusive) the right to personal success for everybody, etc. Thus, the fight against terrorism must focus not only on religious sphere but be based primarily on the revision of approaches in other areas of public policy - in social, educational and information fields. Meanwhile, the maintenance of the punitive trend in the fight against extremism could lead to «motivated» aggression by potential terrorists, and radicalization of conservative extremists, or generally, to the threat of a confrontation between the State and the Muslim community. In such a case, a struggle against the secular nature of the current system may become the next stage of evolution of the terrorism threat.

At the same time, we cannot underestimate the threat of terrorism or attempt to stop it speaking and deny the threat in a particular country. But terrorism cannot be allowed, you cannot play into the hands of terrorists by establishing in society an atmosphere of panic and phobias, thus reinforcing the effect of visibility because any attack primarily designed for public and mass effect. Such a balance would build an adequate and effective security management system and respond to the terrorist threat.



ABOUT DOCUMENTARY FILM

«Peoples' Deportation to Kazakhstan in 1930-1950: History Commonness»

The film was shot following an international sociological research under the project «Memory for Future». The project was initiated by the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan and was implemented under the support of the CIS Interstate Fund for Humanitarian Cooperation. The goal of the project was a retrospective collection of information on peoples'

deportation to Kazakhstan in 1930-1950 from the witnesses of the process, which allowed gathering unique historical information and establishing a base of interviews taken in 13 countries of the world. Experts from Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, the U.S.A., Germany, Poland, Turkey, Great Britain and South Korea were involved in the project's implementation. 82 interviews were taken in total from the participants and witnesses of the deportation process.

The film was shot specially for the first CIS International Forum of Historians within which the first scientific-research conference «From History to Modernity» was held in Astana on May 28, 2010. The film was demonstrated for the first time at the Plenary Session of the Forum.

The documentary film was shown on Kazakhstan's National TV Channel Khabar on May 31, 2010 – the Memorial Day for Victims of Political Repressions. The presentation of the film took place also at the Institute of Eurasia of the Istanbul University (Istanbul, Turkey) on October 20 and at the Gulag History Museum (Moscow, Russia) on October 30 – the Memorial Day for Victims of Repressions in Russia.

Thanks to our friends and partners the film was demonstrated to a wider audience. Our partner in this project – **Severny Krest (Northern Cross) non-commercial organization (New York, the U.S.A.) – headed by Yuri Sandulov**, included our film in a marathon of documentary films launched in May 2010 under the auspices of Overseas Media Inc in New York. The film was also transmitted by RTVI channel in Europe, Middle East and the CIS states on May 8, 2010 at 15:30 (Moscow time). In the U.S.A. and in Canada it was shown on May 8 at 2:30. **We express our gratitude to President of Severny Krest Yuri Sandulov for demonstration of the film within the marathon and for cooperation in implementation of the project!**

On June 22-26, 2011 Tallinn (Estonia) hosted the 6th International Festival of Russian-language TV and Radio Programs called «Efirnaya Shkatulka». The festival was organized by the International Academy of Television and Radio. The previous festivals took place in Latvia, Armenia, Israel, Germany and the Czech Republic. In 2011 the number of Internet mass media participating in the festival increased; 25 countries representing four continents of the world – Australia, Asia, Europe and America – took part in it. For the first time the journalists from China (including Taiwan), Canada, Kyrgyzstan and Australia attended «Efirnaya Shkatulka» Festival (http://www.interatr.org/news/?ELEMENT_ID=2430). The demonstration of the film «Peoples' Deportation to Kazakhstan in 1930-1950: History Commonness» was a real success at this event. The film was presented by one of its creators, the renowned newsreader, editor and author of various programs **Sergey Mironovich Pyashik. We are grateful to Sergey Mironovich for the presentation of the film during the Festival!**

Duration of the film: 23 min. The film is available in Russian, English and Turkish (subtitles) languages.

You can download the film at www.ispr.kz

CHINA'S MODERN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

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China, its issues and its foreign policy, stir everyday all-round interest of researchers – political scientists, sociologists, international relations experts. The fatal economic reforms started in 1978 under the leadership of the reformer Dan Siao Pin have been yielding more impressive results, considerably changing China.

Today's China surprises with its economic indicators, the most roughly growing economy. The gross domestic product has grown six times, on the average making 9% a year after the start of the reforms and currency reserves up to 403,3 billion dollars. Its military power and international authority keep on growing.

Thereupon, attention given to China's behavior in the international arena and foreign policy is no wonder. Growing China, thanks to its economic, geographical and demographic size is «a global challenge» not only for the key world leaders. Long-term strategic geopolitical, economic and political interests of this state at the present stage embrace the Central Asian region, and after all it is not coincidence that today, China makes as one of its strategic aims of its foreign policy to maintain and acknowledge de facto its «exceptional position» in Central Asia, participating more actively in the «New big game» around Central Asia getting consistently and surely the fresh positions it has never enjoyed earlier.

Further development of mutual cooperation between China and the Central Asian states is of great importance for both parties. First of all, it is connected with the threat of Islamic extremism and the necessity of joining together efforts in the fight against terrorism. Chinese analysts also notice that Central Asia itself arises interest of «the key players» in the international arena, first, as important geostrategic area and, secondly, as the region rich in strategically important resources (oil, natural gas)¹.

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Peng paid a visit to Tashkent in 1994. Li Peng outlined four basic vectors of cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Central Asian states:

- 1) to adhere steadily to good neighborly relations and peaceful co-existence;
- 2) to develop mutually advantageous cooperation and to promote general prosperity;
- 3) to respect choice of each nation and not to interfere with their internal affairs;
- 4) to respect sovereignty and to promote stability in region.²

[1] A. Volokhova. Situation in Central Asia and China's interests in the region: the assessments of Chinese political scientists. // Far East Problems. – 2003. – № 3. – P. 39.

[2] K. Syroezhkin. Modern China problems and Central Asian security. Almaty. – 2006. – P. 201.

According to Li Peng, «relations between China and the countries of Central Asia have entered a new stage. We want, – he continued, – the Central Asian countries live in unity and develop friendly relations with all countries, including Russia and other CIS countries»³.

Chinese experts specify that China adheres to six basic guidelines in cooperation with the countries of Central Asia:

- proceeding from the principles of equality and recognition of mutual interests, to run business according to economic laws; mutual availability, benefits and creation of favorable conditions should be taken as a basis of export-import transactions; commercial transactions should be carried out according to the established procedure;

- it is necessary to diversify forms of co-operation in every possible way. It is necessary to transfer gradually barter trade to payments in cash and to improve system of bank payments. China approves development of economic cooperation of the countries of Central Asia with its provinces and cities;

- proceeding from real conditions, to use skillfully local raw sources and advantages of local materials, their competitiveness, to reveal requirements of the market, degree of reliability of a partner, opportunities of large enterprises;

- to improve transport communications, to lay new «silk ways», to work to the benefits of the people of the various countries the existing transport communications connecting the European and Asian continents;

- to consider today's insignificant economic help of China to the Central Asian countries as cordiality;

- in every possible way to develop border cooperation with each of five countries of Central Asia contributing thus to the general development⁴.

The article of the member of the Shanghai institute of International Studies Wan W., reads that the collapse of the USSR and formation of independent Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan is quite beneficial for China. Firstly, as a result, territorial and boundary contact of China and Russia had essentially reduced, and some kind of a buffer separating the People's Republic of China from Russia was formed on the 3,700 kilometer long border of the People's Republic of China with three new Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Thereby, Wang W. underlines that Russia's pressure and influence of the West mediately through Russia on China decreases. Secondly, arising opposition of Russia and the Central Asian countries «is favorable to Beijing as there appears a possibility to use contradictions between them for the development of relations of China with both parties». Such situation is favorable to China for as a result it has better safety conditions and obtains «good conditions to enter the markets of Central and Western Asia» and to accelerate reforms in Western China (first of all, in Xingjian)⁵.

Thus, the main tasks of the People's Republic of China in relation to Central Asia are, firstly, to maintain stability on the western borders and contribute to realization of the program of accelerated economic development of the western part of the People's Republic of China. Secondly, the key is to maintain the guaranteed access to energy sources for its booming economy. Then comes counteraction to the USA dominating influence at economic, political and military levels.

The Russian factor in this new geopolitical situation plays a big role in formation of the Chinese policy in Central Asia.

[3] I. Azovsky. Beijing policy towards former Soviet republics of Central Asia. //Central Asian macro-region and Russia. – M., 1993.

[4] Yang Chengxu. China's diplomacy amid volatile and unsteady international situation. //China in world politics. Edited by A. Voskresensky. – M. – 2001. – P. 20.

[5] A. Timorshina. International cooperation between China and Kazakhstan (1992-2002) //http://humanities.edu.ru

This is caused by a realistic estimation of the increased influence of the USA in the world and regional affairs, the present level of strategic potential of the People's Republic of China and a balance of forces between the US and China. Recognizing that the basic strategic problem in the next decade for Beijing is the complete modernization of economy and other spheres, that China alone is not capable to resist actively to the increased strategic pressure of Washington. Thereat, appropriate assessment of Russia's policy towards the US assumes particular importance. Understanding that Beijing cannot pursue an aggressive line regarding Washington against the background of the present Russian-American relations advances, since being in obvious discord with Moscow policy towards the US, China risks to remain face-to-face with a powerful superpower.

The main strategic motives of China are seemed to be defensive by nature at the present stage. The persisting lag behind more economically successful neighbors in East and Southeast Asia, as well as own dynamic growth in the last decade, give Beijing both clear aims and quite justified hopes for to have them achieved. Major internal problems of development – inter-regional breaks, ecology, poverty, etc. (as well as possibility of their gradual settlement) also define long-term interest of the country in a stable external environment.

In the second half of the 90s collective security and struggle against «Islamic fundamentalism» issues came to the fore in the China-Central Asia relations.

Signing of an «Agreement on strengthening of trust in military sphere in the border areas», initiated by China in April 1996 in Shanghai, and an «Agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in border areas» signed in Moscow in April, 1997 laid the foundation for «the Shanghai five» that in the late 90s transformed to the «Shanghai forum», and in June 2001 – to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China regarded this organization as a guide of its interests in Central Asia. The format of negotiations from bilateral (China – the four of the post-Soviet states) to «the Shanghai five» has changed to the five-sided (each of the five members is an independent party of negotiations) and it has allowed China successfully to solve its main problem – to settle the problem of disputed boundaries. Also, thanks to this Organization, China managed to solve significant geopolitics problems. Formation of a strategic alliance between Russia and China, capable to create a counterbalance to domination of the West began in Shanghai.

Modern geopolitical position of China in Central Asia is characterized by two differently-directed factors. It is obvious that in the context of the counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan following the September 11 events, China, on the one hand, had some opportunities, but at the same time, on the other hand, faced new security challenges.

In the context of the war on terrorism and separatism in Xingjian – Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, the counterterrorism operation, overthrow of the Taliban regime and relative stabilization in Afghanistan were favorable to Beijing as there was close relationship between extremist groups in XUAR and the Taliban. In recent years Xingjian separatist groups obtained the Taliban's active material and support, found shelter when required in the territory of Afghanistan, received certain combat trainings in the bases of the Taliban. According to experts, there are about 27 organizations associated with XUAR; their methods vary from mass protests to terrorist sabotages, namely, the organization of united national revolutionary front of East Turkestan, Islamic movement of East Turkestan, Yana Ayat, Lobnor tigers, Kharakat and others. Some of these and other organizations had contacts with the Taliban. Decreasing of the threats posed by extremist groups in the region, accession to power of the new government in Afghanistan have positively affected situation in Xingjian. Extremist groups from Xingjian lost Taliban movement's strategic support.

As a whole, these are the positive moments for China which took place after September 11, 2001 in the context of the counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan. But today it has become obvious that campaign in Afghanistan had also a reverse side concerning interests of China. It is the problem of military bases of the US and their allies in the territory of two central Asian states – Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (existed earlier until the so-called Andijan events), one of which borders on China, another one sharing no border with China declares its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

In the long view the China's foreign policy concept will be focused on Russia as a counterbalance to the USA and under this concept the People's Republic of China will try to increase its presence in Central Asia. On the other hand, the US military bases in Central Asia, when relations between these countries are aggravated, afford certain opportunities to Washington.

When reasoning about geopolitical prospects of China in Central Asia then they depend on several moments:

- to keep non-hostile situation in the region, avoid threat of force or the force itself in settling matters of dispute, absence of direct confrontation with a number of countries, despite problem points;
- to prevent expansion of the US military presence in the region by through negotiations with the USA, Russia, countries of Central Asia;
- to strengthen contractual basis with the countries of the region, Russia on maintaining security; more active participation in ensuring safety, first of all, for the struggle against extremism, terrorism and drug traffic;
- extended security guarantees for the countries of the region;
- the SCO development and its military-political components;
- more active participation in the economic processes occurring in the region, activation of economic cooperation between China and the states of the region.⁶

It is obvious that since the 90s through the 2000s China acted as a winning party in the region. Geostrategic and military-political success of China:

- disappearance of the geopolitical competitor represented by the former USSR;
- Russia's gradual withdrawal from the region and objective economic weakness of new independent states;
- first-hand territorial acquisitions;
- direct economic gains from trade with the region, especially with Kazakhstan;
- Xingjian economic expansion due to the improvement of geopolitical situation and intensification of economic relations with Central Asia and further with other markets;
- control over trans-border rivers and their exploitation for its benefit;
- creation of geopolitical organization (SCO) with the obvious dominance of the People's Republic of China; expansion of China's geopolitical ambitions up to the Caspian Sea.⁷

Events followed after the September 11 terrorist attacks had significant influence on the Chinese policy. Power of such influence depended on level of interest of Beijing in geopolitical changes and its involvement into global processes. And as a result of these events China could not «stand aside», at least because the US-run geopolitical shifts directly affected it. The People's Republic of China, striving to become the global power and to rank among the main players in the international arena, has experienced enormous influence of a new situation and tried to exploit it. Situation developed in the region demanded working out of the mechanism providing direct participation of the country in the resolution

[6] F. Khamrayev. China's policy in Central Asia //Analyst. 2008. – №3. – P. 30.

[7] V. Kindalov, O. Limanov. Russia and China in Central Asia: changing geopolitical situation. //Central Asia and the Caucasus. – 2003. – № 3. – P. 84.

of the issue of maintenance of regional security. The choice was made in favour of the positively acknowledged mechanism working within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Chinese experts, estimating the role and SCO prospects, came to conclusion about the need to preserve this structure, as «the SCO is the most convenient and legitimate communication channel and safe coordination of activities in Central Asia»⁸. And China builds a new Central Asian vector around the SCO. The core of this policy is that relying on the SCO to actively participate in the resolution of the regional issues, to develop relations with the countries of the region, promote their stability, and also to implement its strategic interests focused first of all, on the development of resources in Central Asia.

Economic penetration into the region and realization of various economic projects (bilateral and multilateral within the SCO) with China's participation, naturally, became one of the main elements of the foreign policy of China.

China's policy in Central Asia was based on the «peripheral diplomacy» concept after the accession to the power of «the fourth generation» of policymakers. It has been supplemented since 2005 by the strategy of «peaceful development» which replaced «China's peaceful rise» strategy and concept of «building up a harmonious peace», proposed by Hu Jintao.

China is inclined to allocate two levels of relations in the region: on the one hand – relations with «great powers», on the other hand – with «neighboring countries». Relations between China and Central Asia also have two levels. Relations with neighboring countries are of paramount importance. It maintains the necessary level of official contacts with the other countries. Chinese researcher Sin Guanjen places special emphasis on the Republic of Kazakhstan among the other states of the region⁹.

The Kazakh-Chinese relations have now reached the highest point of their development. Relations of good neighborhood and friendship turned into relations of strategic partnership. Principles and legal base of development of mutual relations were formed, 200 documents on bilateral cooperation were signed. Active cooperation of Kazakhstan and China contributed to successful overcoming of negative consequences of the global financial and economic crisis. In 2009 alone China directed 13 billion dollars into the economy of Kazakhstan. In 2010 volume of bilateral goods turnover exceeded 20 billion dollars. At the same time, the structure of bilateral goods turnover leaves much to be desired as before. 90% of Kazakhstan's exports to China account for raw materials. Import consists of mainly finished goods –oil and gas pipeline tubes, drilling machinery, metalware, truck cranes, household appliances, etc.

China attaches great value to Kazakhstan as to the partner in energy cooperation. In September 1997 governments of Kazakhstan and China signed a cooperation agreement in oil and gas sphere. Kazakh Energy and Natural Resources Ministry and the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation entered into a general agreement on development of Kazakh deposits and construction of the oil pipeline to China.

Kazakhstan became the first Caspian littoral country to host the Chinese oil-extracting companies. In the market of hydrocarbons of Kazakhstan China is represented by the largest energy companies such as CNPC, Sinopec, CITIC. The volume of oil extracted in Kazakhstan with participation of Chinese companies, makes about 20 million tenge, including 13 million tenge of Chinese share.

Kazakhstan-China energy cooperation in 2005 ceased to be limited only to oil and gas. During Hu Jintao's visit to Kazakhstan in July 2005, the parties signed an agreement on mutually advantageous cooperation between KEGOC

[8] K. Syroezhkin. China's Central Asian policy (conceptual approaches). //Analyst. 2010. – №1. – P. 12.

[9] M. Shaikhutdinov. Geopolitics: history, theory, practice. – Astana. – 2006. – V 2. – P. 341.

JSC and State GRID Corporation of China; concluded agreements between Kazakhstan and China on cooperation in the field of geology and subsurface use. Presently, reconstruction and building of the Atyrau and Shymkent oil refineries are underway; the oil and gas pipeline infrastructure is being dynamically developed. Construction of the second section of the Beineu – Bozoi – Shymkent gas pipeline began December 2010.

Besides, the parties continued cooperation in the sphere of atomic engineering. Kazatomprom and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) entered into the agreement valid until 2020 on extraction and processing of uranium.

At the end of 2006 during the visit of President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev to China the agreement in principle on the construction of the second phase of the Kenkiyak – Atasu oil pipeline (as the first phase of the Atasu – Alashankou has already been built) was reached. Thus, Russia's monopoly position of as a transit country as well as a buyer of Central Asian energy carriers was inflicted a strike.

Turkmenistan ranks second in priority. Saparmurat Niyazov and President of China Hu Jintao signed in Beijing in April 2006 the general agreement on realization of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project. This document provided for transportation of Turkmen gas up to 30 bcm per year in 30 years to China. November 2011 President of Turkmenistan G. Berdymukhammedov took part in the official inauguration ceremony of the 87000 km long pipeline which will deliver Turkmen gas to the southern regions of China.

Besides, the Chinese party assumed the obligation to hold consultations with the governments of the transit countries to reach agreements on mutually advantageous terms for Turkmen gas transits through their territories. China provided the long-term soft loan worth 300 million dollars for 20 years at an annual interest rate of 3%. In recent years it was the first long-term foreign credit Turkmenistan had obtained. As of June 2005 Turkmenistan registered 37 investment projects with participation of Chinese companies to the amount of 383 million dollars¹⁰.

At the same time the People's Republic of China is also active in exploiting natural resources in other countries of the region. In particular, in August 2006, China and Kyrgyzstan signed a letter of intent on long-term energy cooperation. The letter of intent stipulated mutually advantageous interest in the construction and reconstruction of electric systems and power stations, and exchange of technical experience. The Sarydzhazsky and Kambara hydropower stations, construction of power transmission lines to Kashgar, construction of coal-fired thermal power stations, also reconstruction of the Uchkurgan Hydroelectric Power Station and the Bishkek Thermal Power Station are of particular interest to Chinese investors. In other words, Kyrgyzstan can receive investments, and China becomes a potential importer of Kyrgyz electric power. At present the State GRID Corporation of China ranks among the world's 100 largest corporations and annually allocates 15-20 billion dollars as investments into power industry. Chinese business makes a considerable contribution to the housing construction of Kyrgyzstan and development of construction industry industrial productions. In 2005 China allocated a 50 million Yuan grant to the government of Kyrgyzstan for social housing construction¹¹.

Tajikistan energy facilities stir China's interest too. November 2006 China's Sinohydro declared its readiness to participate in implementation of a hydroelectric power station on the River Zeravshan. By the way, the last-mentioned has not escaped attention: China's economic activity in Central Asia aroused certain degree of jealousy not only of the USA, but also Russia and Kazakhstan.

[10] Turkmenistan: Weekly Review for July 15-28, 2005 // <http://www.eurasianet.org>

[11] Kyrgyzstan and donors. // <http://www.president.kg>

Tajikistan received China's free aid for the country's armed forces, for the last years the grant assistance made 10 million dollars.

At the last summit the SCO heads of government in 2006 for the first time discussed not politico-military, but economic projects. Russia announced its intention to unite a number of power projects, including atomic engineering in Central Asia within the SCO. In particular, Russia is ready to participate in construction of the main power networks to transfer surplus power of hydroelectric power station in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in his turn, showed the country's financial possibilities. He made the final communique read about the beginning of the disbursement of the Chinese loan for joint projects and the program within the SCO framework. The point at issue is the credits worth 920 million dollars China extended this year to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to finance China's imports. Prime ministers recognized construction of a transport corridor from the Caspian Sea to China through the territories of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as the first project ready for immediate realization.

China has its oil and gas interests in Uzbekistan as well. The China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation subsidiary works there. The company should have started geological prospecting works within the Ustyurt, Bukhara-Khiva and Fergana platforms. Tight deadlines of preparation and execution of the agreement attract attention. Judging by them, China intends to outstrip Russia and also other oil and gas companies not yet aspiring to enter Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan and China signed 170 international legal documents covering various spheres of mutual relations. Early 2011 China realized 35 direct projects in Uzbekistan with investments approaching 4 billion dollars¹².

Against this background Beijing statements to support entrance of the national capital to the foreign markets and realization of transnational economic activities seem quite natural. Basically, it means increasing the scales of economic presence of China in various regions of the world, including Central Asia.

Certainly, Central Asia and Kazakhstan will be an important foreign policy priority of the 10-year-period of Xi Jinping leadership caused by political-economic and military-strategic values of the region.

At the same time, level of Central Asia significance for China shouldn't be needlessly exaggerated. Our region is one of many regions, by a twist of the fate, geography and history adjoining to the great southern neighbor.

It is important to bear in mind that many risks for Central Asia and Kazakhstan arise not so much from China as from the character of China's exceptionally difficult and unpredictable relations with other global players, first of all, Russia and the USA.

[12] China-Uzbekistan relations. //http://china.org.cn

About International project «Modern interpretation of Alash philosophy among the Kazakh Diaspora: situation, assessment, lessons (socio-historical analysis)»

This project of the People's Assembly of Kazakhstan was implemented under the patronage of Samruk Kazyna National Welfare Fund and the Fund of the Kazakhstan People's Assembly PF.

The project aims at studying the modern interpretation of the phenomenon of Alash among the Kazakhs living abroad. Alash, as an idea of independence, became one of the major factors of preservation of approximately 5 mln Kazakhs living in 45 countries of the world to date.

Within the project an expedition to Urumqi and to the local Kazakh villages was organized. The expedition allowed personally observing the lifestyle of the Kazakhs' nomadic culture. In Istanbul, Turkey, the members of the expedition found the witnesses and descendants of those Kazakhs who remember still the dzhut (massive loss in livestock) of 1931-33 year of the XX century. These Kazakhs immigrated to Turkey from Afghanistan. In Paris, Nogent, two houses where M. Shokay with his spouse had lived were found. In Berlin a grave of M. Shokay was found. According to the workers of a local Turkish mosque this place has become a place of pilgrimage for the Kazakhs from every corner of the world. The Turkestan Legion composed of the soldiers imprisoned by the fascists and its formation history is one of the pages of the Great Patriotic War. Their destiny was tragic and complicated. The film shows the place where these people were buried.

During the survey we were consulted by the renowned researchers of Alash phenomenon. Some of them kindly agreed to participate in the film. We would like to thank Professor Uyama Tomohiko, Slavic Research Centre of the Hokkaido University, Myrzhakyp Dulatov's heritage researcher and Professor Musa Taşdelen of the Sakarya University in Istanbul, Turkey.

Within the research a number of in-depth interviews with the representatives of the Kazakh Diaspora, Kazakhstani and foreign experts was conducted. Scientists coming from the Kazakh Diaspora, namely, Prof. Shadman Akhmetuly (Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, PRC); Prof. Murat Heiniyat, Deputy Director of the Institute for Religious Studies, PhD; Prof. Yassin Kumaruly, Editor-in-Chief of a research journal of the Xinjiang Academy of Sciences; Prof. Kayyum Kesici (Munich, Germany) and Prof. Abdulvahap Kara (Istanbul, Turkey) rendered great assistance in preparing the research.

The results of the research were presented in a documentary film «Sonbesin Ot Alauy». The film shows rare episodes from past and present of Kazakhstan's history. The authors' team would like to thank Vice Rector of the L. Gumilyov ENU, well-known researcher of Alash Dikhan Kamzabekuly for the archival materials provided within the preparatory work.

Working group of the project

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Natalya Pavlovna Kalashnikova – Doctor of Political Sciences, Academic Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Kazakhstan People's Assembly, Consultant of the Secretariat of the Kazakhstan People's Assembly; research fellows of the Institute: Damilya Beketayeva – Master of Sociology, Gulden Yemisheva – Master of Sociology, Gulden Shalova – Master of Sociology, Ainur Mazhitova – Master of Sociology, Yevgeniya Rudneva – Master of Sociology, Alua Zholdybalina – PhD, Nailya Akhmetzhanova – Master of Science in Agronomy, Moldir Baitore, Sabina Urazalinova, Dilara Askarova, Ruslan Kolobayev, Venera Adykhanova, Yevgeny Satirov, Askhat Nurekin, Batyr Aubakirov.

The film can be viewed at www.ispr.kz



U.S. CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

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Introduction

There can be no doubt that during the eighteen months it has been in power, the Obama Administration has in due course defined the main vectors and priorities of U.S. foreign policy, determined the country's key geopolitical interests, drawn up and adopted a National Security Strategy, and compiled a Nuclear Policy Review.

The following factors are having an impact on U.S. policy in the post-Soviet expanse, which includes Central Asia (CA): relations with Russia, the PRC, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Turkey, Pakistan, and India; the military operation in Afghanistan; NATO's enlargement; the energy factor; the coordination strategy between the West and the European Union (EU); and the problem of radical Islam.

Since the beginning of his presidency, Barack Obama has designated intensification of the U.S.'s influence in the Asia Pacific Region (APR) and further development of relations with China as the priority vectors of his foreign policy.

In order to help the American economy recover from its severe crisis, the U.S. tried to create a geopolitical alliance with the PRC (a duumvirate of world administration), but Beijing rejected this proposal.

Another main issue (apart from recovery from the crisis) for the Obama Administration is bringing the war on so-called international terrorism (meaning the military operation in Afghanistan in particular) to its successful conclusion.

This means that the foreign policy strategy of the present-day American Democrats hinges on the geopolitical situation in Central Asia, while also keeping in mind Russia's interests.

The current U.S. administration is keeping a close strategic eye on the Central Asian region, particularly after the events in Kyrgyzstan. This is posing both new threats and new opportunities for the CA countries in the context of reinforcing the geopolitical balance in the region.

A decision was adopted recently to reduce the level of the U.S.'s military presence in Afghanistan with subsequent withdrawal from this country (presumably between 2011 and 2014). If this happens, the security situation in CA, Afghanistan, and Pakistan could drastically change for the worse.

It appears that the U.S. is no longer making democratization the fundamental principle of its foreign policy. The Obama Administration realizes that establishing democracy does not boil down to perfunctorily introducing election procedures into a country, but depends on the conditions within the country itself being ripe for such changes and on creating a socioeconomic and political infrastructure, which requires many years of effort.

The U.S. intends to make use of «intelligent» power (which presumes a combination of «hard» and «soft» power). Today preference is being given not to combat action, but to political and economic methods, as well as to diplomacy and cultural ties.

Principles, Methods, and Tasks of Barack Obama's Central Asian Policy

According to the Central Asian policymakers in the Obama Administration, the U.S. must overcome the internal structural contradiction in its policy in the new circumstances, as well as resolve three vitally important problems:

1. Mistrust of the CA states regarding the U.S.'s efforts to establish democracy in the region's republics. Before launching its Central Asian policy, the White House, in order to improve its image, would do well to strengthen its contacts with the governments of the region's countries.

2. Russia's opposition, which does not suit U.S. policy.

3. The situation in Afghanistan.

On the whole, American experts are very skeptical about the prospects for implementing the Greater Central Asia (GCA) concept Barack Obama inherited from the George Bush Administration.

Washington has determined the objectives and tasks that form the foundation of GCA for the mid and long term. So, although implementation of the project is encountering all kinds of problems, this does not mean that this vital geopolitical matter should be removed from the agenda.

Today, the U.S.'s interests in the region go beyond the framework of GCA, and in the foreseeable future they will be implemented on the basis of existing projects and bilateral agreements with the CA states.

On the whole, the GCA project is only part of Washington's strategic plans aimed at transforming the whole of Eurasia into an extensive U.S.-controlled geo-economic expanse that includes the Caspian region, CA, the Middle East, and South Asia (SA). So, in theory, a «sanitary cordon» could be created along Russia's and China's borders. This scenario would enlarge the geopolitical field of the region's rivals, which fully meets the White House's interests.

The main adjustments in U.S. policy amount to restoring several posts and subdivisions in the administration and creating an SA and CA department, strengthening Afghanistan's role in

integration of the Asian countries and formation of GCA, using the North-South transportation corridor to diversify export of energy resources from CA, applying different strategic approaches, and turning Kazakhstan into a regional leader and so-called corridor of reform. In addition, there are also plans to focus greater attention on the role of education and nongovernmental organizations in promoting democracy in CA (this process is still arousing a certain amount of concern in the region).

The U.S. is adjusting its Central Asian policy in light of the mistakes made by the former White House administration.

American experts point to three serious mistakes of the U.S.'s CA policy in the past:

On the whole, experts characterize the foreign policy of the Obama Administration as contradictory and inconsistent. The main reasons for this, in their opinion, are the current president's lack of experience in international affairs and, more importantly, the very unfavorable situation in the U.S. with respect to the national and global economy.

1. When resolving various problems of the region's states, the U.S. did not even attempt to coordinate the positions of different government departments.

2. The specifics of the CA countries and people, as well as of the region as a whole were not taken into account.

3. The U.S. did not coordinate its actions with the activity of other external actors.

After the Democrats headed by Barack Obama came to power, it was expected that Washington would begin actively revising its strategy in CA and, in particular, reject the GCA concept.

In order to continue the war and equip the American contingent in Afghanistan, Washington needs a reliable route through the territory of the CIS countries (including the CA states), otherwise the transit of cargo will be impossible from the security point of view (due to the political instability in Pakistan and aggravation of its relations with India). So we are talking about further enlargement of the American military presence in the Central Asian countries, which, it is hoped, will play a vitally important role in supporting the U.S.'s military operation in Afghanistan.

The U.S.'s plans for Afghanistan have led several CA countries to hope for a significant increase in American aid and investments. But they were also worried that Washington would use the antiterrorist operation to provide a more permanent base for its military contingents in the region (a similar situation existed in 2001-2002).

Another vector of American policy in need of adjustment in the region is the U.S.'s attitude toward the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The White House believes that this organization is controlled by Russia and establishing relations with it will mean recognizing the CSTO as a legitimate member of the international community.

So Washington needs to maintain at least minimum contact with the Russian Federation and PRC regarding the most important problems arising in the CA countries, since this will help to promote the development of relations with the region's countries, as well as eliminate the possibility of criticism from Moscow and Beijing about the U.S. exclusively pursuing its own interests.

It stands to reason that Barack Obama's policy in the Central Asian region should correct the mistakes of the White House's former administration. First of all, there must be stronger coordination among the U.S.'s various government departments (the State Department and Pentagon in particular).

On the whole, however, the Obama Administration has inherited sufficiently powerful levers from its predecessors that ensure its strong and regular impact on the CA countries from the position of so-called soft power. This implies the many different funds and their branches, information and cultural centers, American «corners» and councils, and so on that have appeared in the region. There are 22 of them in Kazakhstan, 15 in Kyrgyzstan, 9 in Tajikistan, 5 in Turkmenistan, and 1 in Uzbekistan (not to mention the programs broadcast by Voice of America in Uzbek).

But as it transpired, the Obama Administration does not have a clear conception of its policy in CA. U.S. interests in the region are primarily related to ensuring the transit of military cargo for the U.S. and NATO coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Barack Obama's attention was drawn once more to the Central Asian region when the turmoil broke out in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. The White House assumed a position that implied that such countries as Russia (the CSTO leader) and Kazakhstan (chairman of the OSCE) should take responsibility for stability in this republic (and in the region as a whole).

The new landlord of the White House is still placing top priority on strengthening cooperation between the U.S. (along with the EU) and the CA states in the energy industry. The stakes are being placed on further

Americanization of the Caspian and on reorienting the flows of Caspian oil and gas resources toward Europe. The U.S. and its partners in the EU will continue to exert efforts to ensure that the main oil and gas pipelines link the Central Asian region and the European markets without passing through Russia.

The global financial crisis and drop in world energy prices could lead to the curtailment of several energy projects lobbied by Washington in the Caspian. Despite this, however, the Central Asian region will remain an arena for playing out the intense competitive struggle between the U.S. and Russia.

The U.S. and Kazakhstan

At present, the U.S. is developing contacts most successfully with Kazakhstan (largely because the republic is the chairman of the OSCE). The U.S. regards Kazakhstan as an ambitious, influential, and predictable political player (in contrast to some of the other CA countries) not only in the Central Asian region, but also throughout the post-Soviet expanse.

On the basis of the industrial-innovative strategy being implemented in the republic, U.S. investment companies and banks that regard Kazakhstan as a promising developing market have stepped up their activity. Washington also thinks that Kazakhstan's membership in the Customs Union should not prevent its possible future membership in the WTO.

At present, American agroindustrial companies and enterprises engaged in the delivery of medical equipment and educational institutions that would like to invest in projects being implemented in the republic are actively developing cooperation with Kazakhstan. But it should be presumed that the current share of funds going into the oil industry and that being allotted to other branches of Kazakhstan's economy will not change; oil, gas, and affiliated transport routes will continue to account, as before, for 65% of American investments.

During the years bilateral economic relations have been developing (since 1993), the U.S. has invested \$14.3 billion in the Kazakhstan economy (mainly in the oil and gas industry and affiliated services). But at present, export from the U.S. to Kazakhstan has fallen to the 2005 level; in 2009 it amounted to \$600 million, although there was a time when it reached \$1 billion. Equipment for the oil industry accounts for 40% of this sum, transport technology for 25%, and computers, telecommunications, electronics, and the chemical industry for the rest.

American analysts regard Kazakhstan as the most influential state in the region, but its territory (the largest among the CA countries) is too extensive for the small population to control. Moreover, Kazakhstan borders on Russia and depends on it for oil and natural gas transit to the West. Perhaps over time, when the infrastructure projects begin working, the situation will change.

On the eve of the Russian-Georgian war, Kazakhstan tried to find export alternatives for its rich energy resources, including pipelines via the Caspian Sea and to China. However, the construction of these routes is not complete, and this means that any agreements between Kazakhstan and the U.S. must be approved by Russia. As American analysts believe, the republic will not take the risk and act on its own.

When the U.S. and NATO leadership succeeded in coming to terms with essentially all the main states that border on Afghanistan about the transit of non-military cargo for the coalition forces mission, the question was raised of inviting new countries and military contingents to participate in this operation. Kazakhstan's candidacy was examined as early as the beginning of 2008 (during the term of the George Bush administration), before the decision to enlarge the coalition military operation in Afghanistan had been made.

American representatives regularly used diplomatic channels to explore the possibility of Kazakhstan's participation in such an operation, highly evaluating the part the republic's servicemen played in the Iraqi mission. It was tentatively suggested that similar cooperation might also be pursued in Afghanistan. This cooperation implied recruiting Kazakh servicemen as staff officers, army medics, and field engineers for training Afghans to demine their own territory (just as the Kazakh servicemen had done in Iraq).

This makes us wonder why Astana in particular was offered this opportunity. NATO correctly presumed that the armed forces of other CA states would not be able to interact efficiently with NATO structures in Afghanistan, since not one of them, apart from Kazakhstan, has had experience with working jointly with the alliance. In addition, it is Kazakhstan of all the region's countries that is carrying out an active pro-Western policy. Astana is participating much more actively in NATO's Partnership for Peace program than its closest regional neighbors.

Some Russian experts think that the possible participation of Kazakhstan's armed forces in the Afghan operation is a prerequisite for closer cooperation between this country and NATO. By conducting an independent military policy, Astana is considered to be departing from its pro-Russian course.

The question of an independent state participating in military operations lies entirely within the competence of its parliament and president; there is nothing extraordinary in the possibility of sending Kazakh servicemen to Afghanistan (particularly since the presence of the coalition forces there is legalized by U.N. mandate). Moreover, this development of events would make Kazakh diplomacy even more multivectoral.

Nevertheless, Russia and the CSTO structures might react very negatively to Kazakhstan's participation in the Afghan operation being implemented under NATO's leadership.

It is very likely that by following its foreign political interests to strengthen cooperation with the West and raise its international prestige, Kazakhstan will join the operation in Afghanistan. But the possible negative consequences of such a step must also be kept in mind: loss of personnel, the Afghan population's displeasure at the direct presence of Kazakh servicemen in the country's territory, and a negative public opinion being formed with respect to Astana's military policy.

So Kazakhstan signing an agreement on transit to Afghanistan will raise Moscow's role. This also applies to the CA countries. By activating its policy with respect to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan should be ready for changes in Russia's position.

There is no doubt that relations with the U.S. traditionally occupy an important place among Kazakhstan's foreign policy priorities. Despite all the changes in the world balance of forces, America will long remain the most powerful global power.

The U.S.'s active policy in energy security directly affects the interests of CA and the Caspian region. Washington is insistently pushing through the idea of diversifying export routes and opposing the appearance of monopolies in this sphere.

Further development of the CA countries, including Kazakhstan, greatly depends on how the problem of Iran's nuclear program is resolved. Astana recognizes Tehran's right to the peaceful atom and is in favor of a diplomatic solution to all problems. In this respect, the Obama Administration was quite positive about the idea of creating a nuclear fuel bank in Kazakhstan.

The U.S. is also an important partner of Kazakhstan in the investment sphere (the total amount of American investments in the republic's economy, as

well as in the fuel and energy complex and high technology has already topped \$15 billion). In this respect, the Kazakh-American initiative on state-private partnership could play an important role.

Kazakhstan, as the U.S.'s key partner in Central Asia, should continue to maintain friendly and constructive relations with Washington, developing a strategic dialog with respect to all the main vectors of cooperation (political, economic, and military), as well as regarding security and the development of democracy.

On the whole, Kazakhstan is a predictable and understandable partner for Washington, cooperation with which can be characterized as an important and key link in U.S. foreign policy on the Central Asian region. A confidential and constructive dialog has long been established between the two states.

At present, Kazakhstan's main goal is to ensure the U.S.'s participation in the OSCE summit to be held in December 2010, which will make it possible to promote Kazakh-American relations to a new level.

The U.S. and Kyrgyzstan

The Kyrgyz authorities' decision to close the American airbase at Manas came as a surprise to the Obama Administration. Washington regarded this airbase as a key transit point through which additional contingents of troops could be sent to Afghanistan. Moreover, Manas was to be used to compensate for the decrease in shipments via the Pakistani route.

The U.S. expert community was the first to react to the situation that developed around the Manas base, seeing Moscow's hand in Bishkek's actions. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of the fact that Kurmanbek Bakiev's statement on closing the base came at the same time as Kyrgyzstan entered an unprecedented agreement on Russian financial and economic aid to the republic.

Head of the Pentagon Robert Gates was more reticent about this. He noted in particular that Russia was trying to take advantage of everything associated with closing the American airbase in Kyrgyzstan, the base being of immense importance for sending troops and cargo to Afghanistan, particularly since there are plans to double the U.S. military presence in this country next year.

In the context of the Great Game, the decision to close the Manas base was not at all accidental. In the context of the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia in the post-Soviet expanse and other regions of Eurasia, measures to curtail America's permanent presence in Kyrgyzstan are quite logical; they reveal the depth of the contradictions between the sides that were manifested with particular clarity during George Bush's second presidential term.

As we know, at that time, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev confirmed that Bishkek was willing to discuss with Washington ways to further use the Manas airbase, for example, for transporting non-military freight for the needs of the antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan. In principle, this decision suited both the new U.S. administration (since it made it possible for it to «save face» and not look like the losing side) and Russia, which, in the final analysis, is not interested in undermining the position of the Western coalition in Afghanistan.

And finally, the version proposed by Kurmanbek Bakiev was also very acceptable for Kyrgyzstan itself; it means that the republic was maintaining its relations with the U.S. and not losing money by foregoing the base in Manas.

China has also been showing an interest in this kind of compromise, which, keeping in mind the vulnerability of the U.S.'s position in CA, could put a certain amount of pressure on it.

The question of opening a U.S. military facility in the republic was considered even before the events in April 2010 that led to the overthrow of President

Bakiev. A center for training Kyrgyz special forces costing \$5.5 million was to be established in the Batken Region. The American side had previously allotted several million dollars to build similar training centers.

In May 2010, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs George Krol visited the region. He held consultations in which representatives of the new Kyrgyz leadership and Russian officials participated. This visit demonstrated Washington's visible concern about the development of the situation in Kyrgyzstan, since it threatened U.S. interests in the region.

The U.S. intends to cooperate with international organizations—the U.N., OSCE, IMF, and World Bank—with respect to rendering economic aid to Bishkek. At the same time, the U.S. is continuing to implement programs that were launched before the revolution; they are aimed at supporting the development of democracy, the economy, as well as the free and independent media. Moreover, the U.S. rendered technical support to holding the referendum and latest elections, including via American nongovernmental organizations.

It is worth noting that in June of 2010 the Pentagon temporarily stopped its refueling planes, which support the military operation in Afghanistan, from filling up at the Manas airport. At that time, NATO Special Representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus Robert Simmons also visited the country.

It appears that the American command is concerned about the development of the situation in Kyrgyzstan and does not exclude the possibility of closing the Transit Center at Manas.

The U.S. and Uzbekistan

A slightly different situation is developing in relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan, which is still theoretically an important link in the entire Central Asian security system. Despite the fact that Uzbekistan's officials have been making loud statements about the joint fight against international terrorism and assistance to the coalition forces in carrying out the operation in Afghanistan, Washington has long lost confidence in Tashkent's policy.

Washington regards Uzbekistan as the central and most significant player in the region. This state has regional hegemonic ambitions and has more opportunity than other states to stand up to Moscow. There are large Uzbek diasporas in all the neighboring states, which makes it possible for Tashkent to intervene in their policy. In contrast to other post-Soviet states of the region (apart from Kazakhstan), Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in terms of food and energy.

Uzbekistan is the most important potential partner for the U.S.; in contrast to Kazakhstan, it borders not on Russia, but on Afghanistan, with which it has road and railway connections. There is also a Soviet military base in the republic, which the Americans have already used.

The events of recent months have shown that, despite the Russian-Georgian war, Uzbekistan is not worried about Russia making any abrupt moves. American analysts are taking particular note of this fact.

At present, Uzbekistan is potentially growing in importance for the U.S. It provides the shortest and most reliable routes for shipping cargo. But here too the U.S. is showing a certain amount of caution, not convinced that the Uzbek side will act as predicted in any given situation.

In principle, the Uzbek and U.S. presidents have still not managed to establish a stable and reliable dialog and personal contacts, but they intend to develop their relations further to the extent possible.

Washington is very well aware that Islam Karimov is unpredictable not only for the U.S., but also for the other leading world players in this region, Russia, China, and the EU countries.

Since the Americans have decided to lay their Afghan route in the direction of the so-called Northern Corridor (through the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), Uzbekistan has become a key link in carrying out NATO's military operation.

In addition, the Americans have made the tactical decision to replace the Manas airbase with the Navoi aerodrome (with Tashkent's consent), the necessary reconstruction of which will be done by South Korean specialists. At present, the U.S. is using its runways for carrying out non-military shipments.

In principle, the Uzbek leadership has also given the go-ahead to NATO's more intensive use of this route, even if the latter continues to take advantage of the Manas airbase.

It appears that Uzbek President Islam Karimov has recently been considering withdrawing from alliances with Russia—the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and CSTO. Uzbekistan's orientation toward the U.S. and the West might have an impact on the geopolitical balance of forces existing in the region (primarily undermining Russia's position) and launch the republic into the next round of the struggle for regional leadership.

In 2009, a warming trend was felt in the relations between the two states. In 2010, the U.S. offered to cooperate with Uzbekistan in programs to support the American troops in Afghanistan, and Tashkent offered Washington the services of the Navoi airport for supplying its troops.

But experts believe that these moves cannot be classified as an ultimate change in Tashkent's geopolitical orientation. The matter more likely concerns a tactical move by Islam Karimov, who finds it more beneficial to engage in closer cooperation with the EU and U.S.

At the end of January 2010, after the first round of Uzbek-American political consultations (they were initiated by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, who visited Tashkent in October 2009), Islam Karimov signed a Cooperation Plan with the U.S. for 2010 that envisages interaction in the political, social, and economic spheres, as well as in security matters.

The paragraph that concerns cooperation in security calls for organizing training and retraining of Uzbekistan's officers (study courses and training sessions) at the U.S.'s leading military education institutions, including within the framework of the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).

In addition to ensuring security of borders and combating the spread of terrorism, the sides will cooperate within the Foreign Military Financing and Excess Defense Articles Transfer programs. Moreover, Uzbekistan and the U.S. will exchange information and undertake corresponding measures to prevent threats associated with the transit of non-military shipments through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). There are also plans to join forces to build the Khairaton–Mazari-Sharif railroad.

Uzbek companies have already built 11 bridges along the Mazari-Sharif–Kabul route and are finishing the construction of a 275-mile high-voltage transmission line capable of transmitting 150 MW of electricity from Termez to Kabul. During the second half of the year, there were plans to carry out a special undertaking with the Atlantic Council to implement Uzbekistan's regional security initiatives and create a «6+3» Contact Group for Afghanistan under the auspices of the U.N. Implementing various projects in agriculture, industry, and power engineering have also been included in the cooperation plan.

In the economic sphere, the U.S. has plans to increase assistance to Uzbekistan to modernize its irrigation systems, restore degraded land, and use new technology to raise the harvest yield of farm crops.

It should be noted that the main reason for the foreign policy rapprochement between Islam Karimov's government and the Obama Administration is the Trans-Afghan Transport Corridor project, which will give Uzbekistan access to the ports of the Indian Ocean.

At present, Uzbekistan is emphasizing its key role in peaceful settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the republic has no intentions of becoming a U.S. vassal. The Uzbeks are pragmatically prompting American representatives to cooperate, while keeping a reasonable distance.

It should also be noted that Washington is worried about Tashkent becoming too involved in the ongoing ethnic conflict in South Kyrgyzstan with the aim of helping its fellow countrymen and preventing export of the revolution to Uzbekistan. At the same time, in the event of large-scale destabilization of the region, the U.S. is not excluding Tashkent's more active role as the most influence military force in the Ferghana Valley.

The U.S. and Turkmenistan

As Western observers note, Turkmenistan has recently become a new arena of rivalry between Russia and the U.S. in the CA region. The matter primarily concerns the fight over the direction of the main gas pipeline (meaning the competition between Nabucco and the Caspian pipeline). Moreover, there is competition over the training of servicemen and delivery of hardware. Russia is still trying to draw Turkmenistan into military relations by means of its participation in the Joint CIS Air Defense System, for example.

In turn, the U.S. is continuing to show an interest in establishing its air bases in Turkmenistan, the territory of which, being a transportation-transit corridor, is important for continuing the coalition operation in Afghanistan.

By increasing its cooperation with Turkmenistan, the U.S. is guided not only by its own interests, but is primarily trying to ensure Europe's energy security. For this purpose, American companies intend to increase their participation in developing Turkmen fields. In March of this year, an International Business Forum on the problems of hydrocarbon production in Turkmenistan was held in Ashgabad, which promoted further strengthening of economic contacts between the two countries.

American analysts believe (drawing a parallel with Georgia) that Turkmenistan's geographic location makes it possible for it to break away from Russia owing to the following circumstances:

1. Turkmenistan does not border on Russia (moreover, most of its population is concentrated in the far south of the country, that is, as far away as possible from Russia).
2. The country has a border with one of the major regional powers—Iran.
3. The infrastructure that joins Turkmenistan with Russia passes through two states.
4. Russia depends on the export of Turkmen gas (and not vice versa), which greatly complicates its attempts to strengthen its influence in the republic.

Turkmenistan will be able to play one of the main roles in implementing America's plans, which envisage building new routes for making deliveries to Afghanistan without passing through Russia. But it will be very difficult to ship cargo and personnel by rail from Turkey through Georgia and Azerbaijan and then send them across the Caspian Sea to a Turkmen port and on by land to Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, Turkmenistan is not showing any particular desire to establish closer ties with the U.S. The situation may change only if personal contact can be established between the presidents of the two countries. In this respect, it should be noted that Turkmenistan's new president, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, has shown himself to be quite active in foreign policy, visiting NATO headquarters in Brussels for the first time, where the sides agreed to intensify relations in several key spheres.

The Pentagon continues to hope that cooperation will develop with Ashgabad. In June 2008, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Vice Admiral Kevin J. Cosgriff and Rear Admiral William Gortney visited Ashgabad where they met with the republic's Defense Minister and Head of the State Border Service. But Turkmenistan's leadership has never taken any decisive steps toward establishing military cooperation with the U.S., since it is still probably worried about preserving its power.

Turkmenistan is of interest to the U.S. not only because it has a common border with Afghanistan, but also because there are abandoned military facilities in its territory not far from the Afghan border which could be a potential replacement for the Manas base. However, Ashgabad still does not fully trust the West and is not entering any transactions with it (in 2008, some voiced the opinion that the West might have been involved in the attempted coup).

The U.S. and EU hope that under the current leader Ashgabad will become much more pro-Western oriented and will develop the European vector in its foreign policy.

As before, the West has its sights set on reorienting the gas flows from Turkmenistan to Europe and making this republic less dependent on the pipelines that pass through Russian territory. Special U.S. State Department Envoy Richard Morningstar, who regularly visits Ashgabad, has repeatedly tried to convince the Turkmen president of the importance of partnership with Washington, primarily in the energy sphere (he cites energy cooperation between the U.S. and Kazakhstan as an example).

The American side repeatedly emphasizes that the more actively the Turkmen leadership permits U.S. companies to enter the republic, the more intensively the political and military ties between the two states will develop. The Afghan coalition operation and Turkmenistan's indirect

participation in it (meaning rendering the NATO troops all kinds of transit and supply services) will make it possible for the republic to count on increasing business and investment partnership with the U.S.

The Turkmen leadership asked the EU to examine the possibility of gas delivery from Turkmenistan to Europe through Iran (using the recently built gas pipeline from Dovletabad, which has a throughput capacity of 12 bcm of gas a year), bypassing Azerbaijan, but the U.S. was categorically against such an alternative.

The U.S. and Tajikistan

A new round in the U.S.'s political activity in Tajikistan began after former ambassador to the U.S. Khamrokhon Zarifi was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the republic in December 2006. This showed Dushanbe's willingness to step up bilateral cooperation.

In May 2007, NATO made a decision to increase the transit of shipments through Tajikistan (for the ongoing military campaign of the coalition forces in Afghanistan). In so doing, Russia was assured that there was no intention of increasing the actual size of the North Atlantic Alliance's contingent in

Tajikistan. NATO representative Robert Simmons, who visited Dushanbe in May 2007, took part in this discussion.

With respect to enlargement of the Afghan operation, Tajikistan could essentially become the U.S.'s main partner and ally in CA. It should be noted that cooperation between Washington and Dushanbe has become much more active recently, although the Tajik side has still not made any specific statements that make it possible for the U.S. to regard Emomali Rakhmon as a reliable and predictable partner.

By the time the Americans made it understood that they were open to talks with all interested CA countries on matters of transit of military and non-military shipments, as well as creating temporary bases, the Tajik leadership had expressed its clear dissatisfaction with Russia's policy regarding the already long planned building of the Rogun Hydropower Plant.

The U.S. has long stopped criticizing Emomali Rakhmon's domestic policy; it prefers to wait until it becomes clear how events will further develop around the coalition forces' Afghan mission. Nor should we forget that at the current stage Tajikistan is important for the U.S. not as a target of beneficial economic investments, but as a strategic springboard against the Taliban in Afghanistan. And whether Tajikistan becomes one of the U.S.'s new partners in CA (including the possible deployment of military bases in the republic) will depend on how cooperation between Washington and Dushanbe develops in the future.

The U.S. has already been rendering Tajikistan significant economic aid; for example, two bridges were built across the border river Panj, as well as two other bridges linking the republic with Afghanistan. For Tajikistan, which has long been in the grips of a transportation blockade imposed by Uzbekistan, direct access to the shores of the Indian ocean (via Afghanistan) is of immense importance.

The situation currently developing in cooperation between the U.S. and Tajikistan is radically changing, since bringing the Afghan operation to its logical conclusion is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Obama Administration.

As of today, the Americans can offer this kind of expanded cooperation (including the creation of U.S. military bases) to any of the CA states. Dushanbe has the opportunity to make its support of the Afghan campaign of the coalition forces hinge on economic projects that are beneficial to it. The U.S. has been offering the Tajik leadership the most diverse assistance, and Dushanbe, which has very scanty financial resources, has been unable to refuse it. At the present stage, the total amount of money America has allotted to Tajikistan already tops \$1 billion, and this figure could essentially increase in the future.

Tajikistan has quite a good opportunity for suggesting that the U.S. deploy stations in its territory for servicing the troops participating in the operation in Afghanistan (at least), which means striking while the iron is hot.

In addition to building new bridges and rendering financial support in implementing aid programs in various spheres, it might be possible to interest the U.S. in issuing a loan for building the Rogun Hydropower Plant already mentioned, as well as other hydropower facilities. It goes without saying that in this case the Americans will try not to simply allot certain funds, but to invest them in the form of technology and equipment.

In order to safeguard itself against Afghan instability and implement projects to build energy facilities, Tajikistan will have to make non-standard political decisions.

After intensification of the financial crisis and change in the administration in the White House, the U.S. tried to probe the possibility of further increasing its influence in the CA region. This was related to enlargement of the military operation in Afghanistan.

In mid-November 2008, U.S. State Department Representative George Krol visited Dushanbe. At a meeting with the President of Tajikistan, he said that the change in the American administration would in no way influence Washington's policy regarding CA, which was extremely important for stability throughout the whole of the Asian continent. George Krol assured Emomali Rakhmon that the world crisis would not have an effect on the amount of financial aid to the region's countries.

The U.S. positively evaluates the measures undertaken by President Emomali Rakhmon to ensure stability in the republic. They include endowing the security service with special authorities for opposing Islamic fundamentalists and applying repressive measures against instructors of underground madrasahs suspected of proselytism.

It should be noted that the republic considers itself to be one of Russia's most devoted allies. Tajikistan has never had American military bases in its territory and has not advanced military cooperation with NATO, while all proposals regarding cooperation are primarily aimed at Moscow. Moreover, Russia has a good chance of winning in the military rivalry for influence in Tajikistan. It has two military bases in the republic, and also arms and trains Tajik servicemen.

At the same time, according to several experts, Tajikistan is regarded as the most pro-Western state in the region, despite Moscow's attempts to put pressure on Emomali Rakhmon.

Relations with Russia are still one of Tajikistan's foreign policy priorities. But both sides are well aware that Russia far from always shows an economic interest in implementing a given joint project and frequently does not have enough financial resources to carry it out.

This situation could tip the scales in favor of the U.S. and China (with its multi-billion investments) and turn Russia into just another regional player.

At the beginning of February 2010, bilateral political consultations were held in Washington between Tajikistan and the U.S., during which the sides intended to examine issues concerning the political-economic situation in the region, implementation of hydropower and transportation projects, as well as the situation in Afghanistan.

The Tajik authorities are willing to ask the U.S. to invest in various branches of the country's economy, primarily in power engineering. Dushanbe is perfectly aware that its overseas partners might be interested in those projects that are in one way or another related to Afghanistan. According to experts, tired of waiting for Moscow to provide the assistance it needs, Tajikistan is turning its sights to Washington.

According to some analysts, in the context of the difficult economic situation in Tajikistan, President Rakhmon is left with increasingly fewer opportunities for retaining control over the country. Dushanbe is worried about only one thing – where to get money from. Today, the U.S. and China (in contrast to the U.S., it is interested only in obtaining its own economic gain, without the political component) are the main sources of funding the republic needs; Russia has removed itself from the picture, while the EU is issuing small loans and grants that cannot have a significant influence on the domestic political and economic situation in the country.

The U.S. is working in Tajikistan in keeping with the traditional pattern: it is issuing grants to develop civil society institutions, carry out reforms of the self-government structure, and support the public activity of politicians. In addition, the republic is receiving funds for protecting and equipping the border, as well as for fighting drug trafficking. However, the amounts allotted show that this is nothing more than a surreptitious way to line the bureaucrats' pockets.

The cooling off in relations between Tajikistan and Russia suits Washington to a tee, although the U.S. is not ready to render large-scale aid to Dushanbe. On the other hand, the American administration, which values the republic strategically for its proximity to Afghanistan, is worried about the rapprochement between Dushanbe and Iran, as well as China's growing influence and economic presence in Tajikistan.

Development of Tajikistan's military cooperation with the U.S. consists of several aspects, one of which is creating a camp not far from Dushanbe for training Tajik servicemen, who until now have been undergoing training at Russian military centers.

Since denunciation of the contract between Kyrgyzstan and the U.S. on the Manas air base, Washington has been looking at the Aini aerodrome (it was modernized with the participation of specialists from the Indian Defense Ministry) as an alternative base for using Tajikistan's air and land transit corridors. In addition, the White House administration is still considering the possibility of a U.S. military operation against Iran.

So the U.S. will continue asking Tajikistan to provide it with exclusive rental rights to the Aini aerodrome or its joint use. At the same time, efforts will be made to resolve questions regarding the financing of a whole series of economic projects (in power engineering and transportation) in the republic, including those in which China is currently investing. It should be noted that the Tajik leadership is counting precisely on this aspect of possible aid from the U.S.

So until the Afghan campaign of the coalition forces is over, the Americans will continue to intensify their presence in Tajikistan too.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The Obama Administration is largely pursuing the Central Asian policy begun by its predecessors, any adjustments, as a rule, being related to abrupt changes in the current situation.

The main components of this strategy are intensifying the U.S.'s influence on the CA countries (from the point of view of the Afghanistan problem), moderate support of nongovernmental organizations, use of symbolic rhetoric on human rights, support of pipeline projects that bypass Russia and Iran, activation of cooperation in the military sphere, and emphasis on cooperation with Kazakhstan beyond the bilateral framework.

Today, Barack Obama's policy in CA focuses on caution and taking Russia's interests into account. In the future, we should expect an increase in Washington's concern about the strengthening of China's and Iran's positions in the region. It is entirely possible that this factor in particular will bring the U.S. and Russia closer together. Barack Obama's election as U.S. president was accompanied by loud statements on foreign policy issues, including the future of American policy in Afghanistan; the Great Game entered another qualitatively new round in its development. It was announced that Washington's foreign policy would focus on stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. This envisaged reversing the negative trends existing in this country and completing the building of a democratic society there. But no new real proposals for resolving the Afghan question were made.

So the U.S.'s «new» Afghan policy is based on the traditional strong-arm approach that consists of increasing the military contingent and intensifying combat action to deal the final blow that will defeat the Taliban movement.

One of the unpleasant surprises for the White House was the shift in accent in the Taliban's military strategy, which began to pay more attention to targeted action that interfered with the delivery of military shipments, food, and fuel

and lubricants for the coalition forces in Afghanistan. The main roads that link Kabul with other regions of the country and Pakistan were slowly but surely blocked. The Pakistani route took the main brunt of the Taliban strike.

The fact that the Manas military base will probably be closed is in full keeping with Russia's interests. This event would help it to increase its influence in the CA region and resolve several problems existing in relations with the U.S. in its favor.

It can be presumed that one of the objectives for stepping up the decision to close the Manas military base immediately after Barack Obama's election as president was the desire to deprive the new head of the White House with the opportunity of continuing George Bush's policy regarding Russia.

From the viewpoint of long-term security and geopolitical leadership, closing the Manas base has both its pluses and minuses for Russia; this event will perceptibly increase its geopolitical opportunities, but will nevertheless create a direct threat to its security from Afghanistan. The thing is that the Taliban's stronger position openly challenges CA's stability, and the problems with delivering supplies to the Western forces may have a negative effect on their security, which will have negative consequences for the territories bordering on Afghanistan, including Russia.

With this in mind, Moscow offered its alternative for supplying the American troops in Afghanistan, which envisaged transit of strategic cargo. This will allow Russia to solve two strategic tasks. On the one hand, the American troops in Afghanistan will be provided with uninterrupted deliveries of supplies, while on the other (against the background of the unreliable routes through Pakistan), the Kremlin is essentially monopolizing the delivery of shipments to the NATO forces, which makes it possible for it to put pressure on the Americans.

The White House was unlikely to bargain with the Kremlin until Barack Obama reinforced his negotiating position. It appears that several alternatives exist at present for fortifying the U.S.'s position, whereby each of them presents quite a complicated task:

1. Scaling down the military confrontation in Afghanistan as soon as possible (which will make deploying large contingents in this country unnecessary);
2. Returning the Manas air base;
3. Finding an alternative route through Russia as quickly as possible.

All of Afghanistan's neighbors (apart from Turkmenistan) have the status of member or observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); therefore use of this format for discussing not only the Afghan problem, but also developing the organization's independent position and policy is very acceptable.

But keeping in mind the events in XUAR in 2009, it is very likely that China, which is pursuing an anti-American policy, will put pressure on the SCO participants. Russia may steer a course toward increasing its influence in China (by strengthening economic cooperation and increasing aid to this country). This development of the situation could lead to greater cooperation between the U.S. and the Central Asian countries on international security, stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, joint protection of the borders, holding regular military exercises under the NATO aegis, and combating various global threats.

RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN KAZAKHSTAN – PROBLEMS AND TENDENCIES

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Radicalization of religious trends, harboring in itself a considerable conflict potential is a biggest challenge to security in the modern world. Fight against terrorism, political radicalism, religious extremism is taking on an increasingly global, international scale. The explosions claiming human lives, are no longer uncommon to CIS nations, Central Asian including.

Expert opinions differ on religious situation in Kazakhstan. Research into the current assessments of the problem leads us to assumption that despite a basically stable religious situation in Kazakhstan, there are, nonetheless, some indications to a possible radicalization of religious movements under certain conditions. To verify this hypothesis, specify risk factors of religious radicalization and define main approaches in the state policy in preventing terrorism and extremism on religious grounds, in 2009 Kazakhstan experts, the authors of this article including, carried out a sociological research.

Research methodology. In the sociological research in Aktau, Uralsk, Pavlodar, Petropavlovsk, Karaganda, Astana, Almaty, Shymkent, Oskemen and Kyzylorda 1200 respondents were polled. Questionnaire served a main toolkit of research, with all the questions in it in thematic blocks.

The respondents' answers show that religion in Kazakhstanis' life plays a considerable role. New sociopolitical and sociocultural conditions have brought about growing national identity and change of spiritual values on the post-soviet space, evidence to which is enhanced religious consciousness of the population. Kazakhstan is no exception in the process, and to a certain part of Kazakhstan society religion became not only a factor of ethnic identity, but also a normative-value regulator of social behavior.

Table 1.
Kazakhstan
population's
attitude to
religion

Variants of answer	Aktau	Uralsk	Pavlodar	Petropavlovsk	Karaganda	Astana	Oskemen	Almaty	Shymkent	Kyzylorda	Average in Republic
Believer	82,5	67	71	73	71	79,5	71	68,5	72,5	86,5	74,25
Non-believer	3,5	7,5	7,5	7	10,5	3	9	16	5,5	6	7,55
Indifferent to religion	7	13	9	11,5	13,5	9	10,5	8,5	18,5	4	10,45
Other attitudes	1	2	4	0	0	1,5	0	0,5	1,5	1	1,15
Difficult to answer	6	10,5	8,5	8,5	5	7	9,5	6,5	2	2	6,6




Diagram 1. Kazakhstan population's attitude to religion regionally



Diagram 2. Kazakhstan population's attitude to religion in general in Kazakhstan

The main gauge of a religious situation is the people's religious identity. The answers of the respondents revealed:

The religion you confess	Aktau	Uralsk	Pavlodar	Petropavlovsk	Karaganda	Astana	Oskemen	Almaty	Shymkent	Kyzylorda	Average in Republic
Moslem	93	71	70	56,5	68	86,5	72	66,5	73,5	94,5	75,15
Orthodox	5	25	20	37,5	27	9,5	22,5	24,5	16,5	5	19,25
Protestant	0,5	1	0,5	1	0	1	1	1	0,5	0	0,65
Catholic	0,5	1,5	3,5	3	3	1,5	1,5	1,5	6	0	2,2
Judaism	0	0	1	0	0,5	0,5	1,5	1	2	0,5	0,65
Buddhist	0	0	0	1	0	0,5	0	1,5	0	0	0,3
Another	1	1,5	5	1	1,5	0,5	1,5	4	1,5	0	1,75

Table 2. Respondents' religious identification





Diagram 3. Religious identification of respondents regionally

Diagram 4.
Religious identification of respondents in general in Kazakhstan




The sociological poll shows that most of the respondents identify themselves as Moslem – on average 75,15 % of respondents; "orthodox" is second in the religious identification among the polled – 19,25 %. As a whole it corresponds to ethnic distribution of the population in the polled oblasts. Special attention needs to be paid to "another" category which can include people who do not know their mind yet and consequently can be a target of new sects and non-traditional movements.

For instance now according to official data adherents of more than 46 confessions live in Kazakhstan that has practically the whole spectrum of religious faiths – over four thousand religious organizations¹.

Table 3.
Assessment of relations between different confessions in Kazakhstan

Variants of answer	Aktau	Uralsk	Pavlodar	Petropavlovsk	Karaganda	Astana	Oskemen	Almaty	Shymkent	Kyzylorda	Average in Republic
Friendly, good	65	39	41,5	39	50	45	49,5	47	60,5	51,5	48,8
Conflict-free	14	21,5	36	29,5	25	21	23,5	25,5	23	13,5	23,25
Neutral, indifferent	15	14	15	18,5	12,5	17	14,5	14,5	8,5	19,5	14,9
Strained, disturbing	3	10	2	3	6	5,5	5	4,5	4	5,5	4,85
Another	0	0,5	0,5	0	0,5	1,5	0	0,5	1	0	0,45
I find it difficult to answer	3	15	5	10	6	10	7,5	8	3	10	7,75

Diagram 5.
Assessment of relations between different confessions in Kazakhstan regionally



[1] Муханбетжанова Г. Религия в казахстанском обществе // Казинформ, 26 мая 2009 года.




Diagram 6. Assessment of relations between different confessions in Kazakhstan

The relations between people of different confessions are a most important link of the state stability. Despite the changed religious situation and religious structure of the population, the situation remains relatively stable. As a matter of fact, at the moment the deterrents of a negative religious scenario are maintaining «status quo» in inter-confessional relations and preservation of a leading position of traditional to Kazakhstan faiths – Islam and Orthodoxy that is conducive to the population’s religious cohesion and balance of religions and of the republic.

Variants of answer	Aktau	Uralsk	Pavlodar	Petropavlovsk	Karaganda	Astana	Oskemen	Almaty	Shymkent	Kyzylorda	Average in Republic
Became better	54	19,5	20	18,5	25	25	39,5	40	40,5	34	31,6
Became worse	8	10,5	4,5	7,5	8,5	11	6,5	12,5	6,5	7,5	8,3
Remained same safe	18	33,5	47,5	30,5	35,5	29,5	25	23,5	29	28	30
Remained same disturbing	3,5	10,5	7	1,5	5,5	5	6,5	6	6	7	5,85
Another	0	1	1	2	0,5	1	0	1	2	1	0,95
I find it difficult to answer	16,5	25	20	40	25	28,5	22,5	17	16	22,5	23,3

Table 4. Changes in inter-confessional relations in your living area over the last year?





Diagram 7. Changes in inter-confessional relations in your living area over the last year, regionally

Diagram 8. Changes in inter-confessional relations in your living area over the last year, generally in the Republic



To the question «What are the changes in inter-confessional relations in your living area over the last year?» more than 30% of respondents have answered «became better». The answers «Remained same safe» make 30% of all the respondents.

Attention should be paid to the answers «became worse» and «remained same disturbing» with high indices, testifying to some social unease of certain population groups in the regions. According to experts, the main destabilizing factors able to trigger religious conflict in the Kazakhstan community are growth of religious radicalism among the believing population, slackened traditional religious structure of the population, influence of non-traditional confessions and sects, religious and ideological extremism of anti-system religious and near-religious dogmas².

Another point to be focused on is that 23,3% of the on-republic polled find it difficult to answer the question. It might mean that they either give no thought to inter-confessional relations, or don't want to openly express their opinion.

Table 5. Sources of knowledge about religion

Variants of answer	Aktau	Uralsk	Pavlodar	Petropavlovsk	Karaganda	Astana	Oskemen	Almaty	Shymkent	Kyzylorda	Average in RK
Advice, mentoring of seniors and experienced believers	47,5	73,5	54,8	58,5	61,5	59,0	57,0	67,5	38,0	45,0	56,2
Reading of religious literature	7,5	5,0	6,0	3,5	10,5	14,5	,5	7,0	18,0	12,5	8,5
Dialogue with clerics	7,0	2,0	10,1	6,5	5,0	4,5	3,5	4,0	18,0	12,0	7,3
Religious preachers	8,5	2,5	1,0	3,5	8,0	2,0	7,0	3,0	2,0	2,0	4,0
Visiting of holy sites	10,0	5,0	13,6	7,5	8,5	9,5	15,5	10,5	3,5	12,0	9,6
Special lessons, courses	6,5	3,5	4,0	5,0	1,5	3,0	5,0	1,5	1,5	1,0	3,3
Religious clubs, meetings, debates	5,0	2,5	,5	2,0	1,0	1,5	,5	,5	1,0	1,0	1,6
Study in religious educational institutions	3,5	2,5	2,5	1,5	,5	1,0	1,5	1,0	2,0	3,0	1,9
I find it difficult to answer	4,5	3,5	7,5	12,0	3,5	5,0	9,5	5,0	16,0	11,5	7,8

[2] Асанбаев М. Характеристика основных факторов риска, способствующих росту религиозной конфликтности в казахстанском обществе // <http://www.sarap.kz/rus/view.php?id=152>




Diagram 9. Sources of knowledge about religion, regionally




Diagram 10. Sources of knowledge about religion generally in the Republic

The question «What are your sources of knowledge about religion?» is important, as religiousness of the population is growing not only because of a natural need in free spiritual self-identity, but also through expanding multiple foreign missionary movements and pseudo-religious organizations, seeking to fill non-ordinary religious doctrines with the last applied researches, unusual practice. And these missionaries succeed, experts mark, largely thanks to external financial support³.

The fact that the population’s source of knowledge about the doctrines is seldom religious preachers (4%), special lessons, courses (3,3%), study in spiritual educational institutions (1,9%) spiritual clubs, meetings, debates (1,6%), points that so far the traditional sources are most common.

Variants of answer	Kyzylorda	Shymkent	Atyrau	Uralsk	Karaganda	Astana	Petropavlovsk	Pavlodar	Oskemen	Almaty
Yes	39,0	23,8	44,5	54,0	40,0	35,2	48,5	66,0	40,0	35,5
No	57,0	65,8	48,0	38,9	52,5	57,8	47,5	28,0	52,0	60,0
Another	4,0	9,4	7,5	6,6	7,0	6,0	4,0	4,5	8,0	3,5

Table 6. Actuality of religious extremism and terrorism problem to Kazakhstan

[3] Там же.

Diagram 11.
Actuality of religious extremism and terrorism problem to Kazakhstan regionally





Diagram 12.
Actuality of religious extremism and terrorism problem to Kazakhstan, generally in the Republic



Most of the polled citizens of Kazakhstan (51,05%) have answered that the problem of religious extremism and terrorism is actual to Kazakhstan. About half of the respondents (46,45%) note that to Kazakhstan the problem of religious extremism and terrorism doesn't pose threat and isn't actual therefore.

Expert assessments of the causes of extremism are based on two main positions – opinion on the social and economic sources of religious radicalism in Central Asian region, and the second view, making an accent on «religious and political motives of conflicts in the region»⁴.

According to supporters of this view, radicalism growth in the Central Asia is caused by not so much worsening economic and social situation of the population, as by presence of conflict potential in the relations between various forces of the society itself that foregrounds presence in it of certain contradictions of religious, ideological and political nature. It leads us to believe that the problem of religious extremism will remain topical in mid-term outlook.

Table 7.
Facts of religious extremism manifesting themselves in Kazakhstan oblasts

Variants of answer	Kyzylorda	Shymkent	Atyrau	Uralsk	Karaganda	Astana	Petropavlovsk	Pavlodar	Oskemen	Almaty
Distribution of leaflets	45,0	35,6	15,0	38,4	30,0	25,6	31,0	22,5	21,5	22,5
Drawing into sect	19,5	18,8	23,5	19,2	20,0	18,1	18,0	12,5	20,0	15,0
Propaganda of sects	21,0	12,4	22,0	23,2	18,5	24,6	18,0	49,5	25,5	12,0
Unsanctioned meetings	4,5	4,5	4,0	4,0	10,5	6,0	5,0	13,0	6,5	4,0
I find it difficult to answer	8,5	26,7	31,0	9,6	12,5	23,1	25,0	1,5	25,0	43,0
Another	1,5	1,5	4,5	5,6	8,5	2,5	3,0	1,0	1,5	2,5

[4] Shirin Akiner. Violence in Andijon 13 May 2005: An Independent Analysis // www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0507Akiner.pdf (Accessed on October 10, 2005).




Diagram 13. **Facts of religious extremism manifesting themselves in Kazakhstan oblasts, regionally**

Although the majority of the believing population, more than 90%, confess Sunni Islam and orthodox Christianity in Kazakhstan the influence of non-traditional religions to the citizens, religious communities and the organizations has considerably increased of late. Their aggregate share ranges within 5% of the believing population, but there is a strongly pronounced tendency to increase. If this process amplifies and has a strongly pronounced tendency to expansion, in the long term it can lead to cardinal change of a confessional structure in republic that considerably increases probability of religious conflicts in Kazakhstan community.

The situation is aggravated by the non-traditional religious organizations' use of religious ideology as a guise to justify the anti-constitutional activity seeking an overthrow of legitimate power, their open enough and active spiritual expansion among the population practically in many public places by means of simple dialogue, propaganda, distribution of print literature etc. Indices of the sociological poll prompt the need for the state to work out complex political-legal and information outreach measures to maintain a stable religious situation.

RK Constitution proclaims Kazakhstan as a secular state; it defines and guarantees the citizens' rights for freedom of speech and expression, equality of and tolerance to all the faiths. According to many experts, RK state policy in inter-confessional relations is liberal enough, clearly spelling out freedom of confession, equality, toleration and pluralism⁵.


At the same time, opening of borders and the liberal religious legislation of Kazakhstan were to a certain degree conducive to activation and expansion of various religious and pseudo-religious communities and the organizations, such, for example, as "Hizbut-Tahrir" or "Tabligi Dzhamaat" aspiring to replace secular statehood by Islamic theocratic form of government. Therefore it is especially important to ascertain what conditions and factors can cause proliferation of religious extremism.

Factors	%
Inter-confessional conflicts	23,8
Internal confessional contradictions	4,55
Religion involvement in political life	9,7
International situation influence	7,55
Weakness of state policy in religious sphere	10,8
Social and economic conditions (unemployment, poverty, etc.)	13,1
Such factors are absent	4,2
I find it difficult to answer	26,4

Table 9. **Factors that can cause proliferation of religious extremism**

[5] Асанбаев М. Характеристика основных факторов риска, способствующих росту религиозной конфликтности в казахстанском обществе // <http://www.sarap.kz/rus/view.php?id=152>

Diagram 14.
Factors that can cause proliferation of religious extremism



As seen in the answers it is inter-confessional conflicts in the first place – 23,8% of respondents that can cause proliferation of religious extremism. The successive causes named for it are social and economic conditions – 13,1%, weakness of state policy in religious sphere – 10,8% of the polled.

Scientists-experts’ ranging of the factors of religious extremism causes is: growth of religious radicalism among the believing population, slackened traditional religious structure of the population, influence of non-traditional doctrines and sects and as a consequence of it increase of conflict potential in Kazakhstan society on religious grounds, religious and ideological extremism of anti-system religious and near-religious doctrines, and also active Christian proselytism undermining the foundations of traditional religious structure of the population, deteriorating thereby the religious situation in the republic⁶.

In the end of the poll the respondents were offered to mark out the base measures the state structures should undertake to prevent proliferation of religious extremism. Seven preventive measures were meted out for it:

Table 10
The Main measures the state structures should undertake to prevent extremism proliferation

Measures	%*
Developing an education system, as knowledge prevents religious bigotry	26,1
Carrying out active youth policy for fighting unemployment, organize leisure expanding access to education	24,2
Fighting narcobusiness, closing access to financing of terrorism from sale of drugs	19,4
Fighting illegal migration as illegal migrants can be involved in terrorism	18,8
Carrying out more effective social and economic policy, supporting low-income people, elimination of poverty	18,4
Regular outreach and public awareness work in mass-media	17,8
Cooperation, instead of fighting with religious radical organizations to create with their help a religious state in Kazakhstan	4,05
Another	8,2
I find it difficult to answer	17,9

Results of the research into the current situation in extremism and terrorism lead us to forecasting an increase of terrorist danger posing a serious threat to majority of states irrespective of their economic development level, military potential and state government model⁷.

To eradicate this evil it is necessary to put up reliable barriers to it, first of all to penetration of ideology of terrorism into public consciousness, to eliminate the conditions for proliferation of terrorism and terrorist ideology, to suppress instigation to terrorism, to fight "radicalization" of public sentiments.

[6] Голдикова В.И. Политика Республики Казахстан в религиозной сфере // [http:// www.antisekta-kyzylorda.kz/articles/detail/10](http://www.antisekta-kyzylorda.kz/articles/detail/10)

[7] Леви Клиффорд Исламский радикализм – растущая угроза правящим режимам в ЦА // [http:// www.russians.kz/politics/994252-islamskijj-radikalizm-rastushhaja-ugroza.html](http://www.russians.kz/politics/994252-islamskijj-radikalizm-rastushhaja-ugroza.html)




Diagram 15. **The Main measures the state structures should undertake to prevent extremism proliferation, generally in Kazakhstan**

Need is obvious in nurturing in the public community a mentality of repelling the idea itself of resorting to any violence for attaining political or any other ends.

Along with state power civil institutes, educational institutions and organizations, media, clergy, artists and business could be tapped.

For effective ideological resistance to proliferation of religious extremism public authorities, local governments and public institutes should pool efforts in the following directions:

- information-analytical support for countering terrorism and extremism (brochures, books, references, posters, social advertising, objective publications in press on activity of law enforcement bodies, thematic documentary films and video clips etc.);
- propaganda and counterpropaganda (timely outreach on results in the specified area, adequate and timely reaction to false information, distribution of leaflets and propaganda literature);
- ideology (nurturing religious and inter-ethnic tolerance, patriotism, a healthy way of life, supreme universal values etc.);
- organizational work (support to public and religious associations of traditional constructive, including antiterrorist orientations; interaction with mass-media, holding conferences, meetings, «round tables», competitions in best antiterrorist materials etc.);
- education (develop a specialist training system, civilians including, in informational resistance to terrorism).

Ideological resistance to extremism and terrorism should include:

- effective system of public education on the danger of terrorism, religious intolerance, genocide and other crimes spawned by extremism and terrorism. To practice in high schools special lecture courses on anti-terror, suited to the profession the students are trained for;
- enhancing the part of media in counteraction to extremism and terrorism, development of uniform technology in covering anti-terrorist problems, orderly regimentation in covering terrorist acts. Paying more attention to anti-extremist and antiterrorist materials in cyberspace, and also repelling attempts of using this space for propagation of extremist ideology and instigation to antisocial actions;
- active information-political actions, nurturing antiterrorist behavior of citizens (increase of general educational level of citizens, stimulating development of the population's traditional and original culture; stepping up propaganda among all the population layers, elucidation on the essence of antiterrorist ideas, bringing it home to them that potential victims of terrorism acts will not be particular individuals and groups, but majority of citizens;

- development of effective public education system in the part of cultural and confessional diversity, historical unity of the country's residents, history of religious intolerance, genocide and other crimes generated by extremism and terrorism;

- system of measures to bring out condemnation of extremist ideology and practice, terrorism, violence in media, strengthening of counter-propaganda, reorientation of media to introduction in social practice of tolerant behavior, etc.);

- presence in the state of a structure responsible for public awareness on the content and demands of the antiterrorist legislation, on committed terrorist acts, their consequences and victims, for publication and distribution of anti-extremist and antiterrorist literature on a system basis;

- studying and application of foreign states' related experience, as youth extremism is not only a problem of young democracies, but also of such nations as the USA, Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy and others. Creating international efforts' coordination system for counteraction to terrorism and extremism.

Each state should react in due time to a changing religious situation, and ethnically and religiously diverse Kazakhstan is in need of a critical, but objective studying of the situation in religion, involving in it leading scientists and theologians, lawyers, politologists, philosophers, sociologists, economists, clergy of the religious organizations working in our country.

Today need in experts-analysts is growing who could work to perfection of the legislation on religion, in the field of psychology of religion, religion sociology, in the area of interaction between the state and religions.

For partnership between the state and the religious organizations, for bridging of existing legislative gaps a task group was formed with the Advisory council of the Committee for religious affairs, with membership in it of scientists, political scientists, religious scholars, lawyers and worshipers of faiths to work out propositions on legislation amendments on freedom of confession.

Most important for sustainable development of Kazakhstan society is dialogue - both among confessions and between the society, the state and religions. It in its turn necessitates permanent development of interaction tools, both on central and regional levels, in the form of social councils, consultative-advisory bodies, commissions, working groups on religion, public hearings on religion.

For the further improvement of relations between society, state and religious structures it is important to have independent subjects of confessional policy, apart from the state and the religious organizations. These should be:

- scientific academic structures, formed around theological and religions history subjects;

- expert councils making weighed judgments on moot points of law enforcement practice, including experts in religious studies and law, representatives of the religious organizations, academic and state structures;

- interreligious councils – communicatively-consultative venues rallying together worshippers of a wide range of faiths;

- international organizations, whose role in internationalization of law will be inevitably rising;

- various associations and believers' organizations that can and should have their forms of representation, particularly on local government level, outside traditional confessional institutions;

- mass-media, both secular, and religious. Religious topics are oft superfluously and incorrectly reflected in media. Some publications show superiority of one religion over others, offend believers' feelings, others show full incompetence of the journalists in religious matters. Media should help develop national information-analytical network providing monitoring into the situation in religion.

All these measures, in our opinion, would considerably help prevent radicalization of religion in the Kazakhstan society.

AFGHANISTAN'S STABILITY

AND REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA

A conference organized by the Central Asia Program (George Washington University), and EUCAM (Europe-Central Asia Monitoring), thanks to a grant from the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program

MAY 17-18, 2012, SERENA HOTEL, DUSHANBE

- Session one.** Afghanistan and Central Asia: historical and anthropological perspectives.
- Session two.** Security challenges, economic interests, and cultural interaction.
- Session three.** The NATO Chicago summit: transitioning Afghanistan's security lead.
- Session four.** Towards a new regional cooperative security framework: a view from Central Asia.

In the years and decades to come, the regional character of the “Afghan question” will become more acute at the expense of its international character. With the ISAF withdrawal, the regional players, which already play a key role in the Afghan domestic situation, will enjoy more and more autonomy and be in a position to exercise drastically greater leverage over it. Among all the neighbors of Afghanistan, the viewpoint of the Central Asians is the least known, yet they share common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic traits with many Afghans. They have a long common history with them, a good knowledge of the terrain thanks to their participation in the Soviet-Afghan war, and more generally in the Soviet economic, and political presence in Afghanistan. They also have their own ethnic, family-based or personal networks in Afghanistan and a specific vision both of the future of the country and which solutions to bring to bear. Despite their knowledge, Central Asian experts on Afghanistan have never had the occasion to present their perceptions and strategies and thus aid the Western community in general and NATO in particular to shape strategies for Afghanistan. Moreover, the states of Central Asia, in particular Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, are directly targeted by the destabilizations emanating from Afghanistan, in particular by Islamic insurgency and drug-trafficking, which renders their reflections on their neighbor's situation sometimes more acute. In order to bridge that immense gap in knowledge, this workshop is designed to give the main Central Asian experts the floor, providing an opportunity to benefit from their experience and competencies, and to foster dialogue between them and Western experts.



PROFICIENCY OF THE POPULATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN IN STATE AND NATIVE LANGUAGES*

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1. The level and dynamics of change in residents' proficiency in state and native languages

The pace and policies for the official language introduction into the country's social communication space, level of the language culture of the Kazakh society depend primarily on steady, progressive, equal and ideal in term of rates increasing degree of the people's proficiency in the Kazakh official language.

As it becomes clear proficiency in the native language among the ethnic groups is quite uneven. The respondents interviewed in the study were divided into the largest ethnic groups. The first group embraced the Kazakhs. The second group consisted of the Russians and representatives of other Slavic ethnic groups. The third group of other Turkic-speaking ethnic groups, apart from the Kazakhs, included the Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tatars, Turks, Azerbaijanis and representatives of other minor kindred nations living in Kazakhstan. The fourth group included the Europeans of non-Slavic ethnic groups, non-Turkic-speaking natives of the Caucasus but of minor groups of the East Asian and other nations.

This language-based division allows measuring the various potential of the representatives of the ethnic groups in further learning of the state Kazakh language as one of the Turkic languages and its use in communicative system of Kazakhstan's society. Table 1 provides the answers given by the respondents belonging to various ethnic groups about the level of their native language proficiency (% out of the total number of respondents).

* This article presents some results of the sociological research "Language Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: A Sociological Analysis." Complex research consisted of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods: public inquiry with a distribution of 6000 respondents, aged 18 and older, 10 focus groups with representatives of various ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan, 50 narrative interviews with respondents - non-Kazakhs, who are fluent in the official language, an international expert interview (60 experts).

Answer	Kazakhs	Russians, the Slavs	Turkic-speaking	non-Turkic speaking	Array
Cannot speak	0,3	1,3	2,0	10,2	1,1
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	0,8	1,8	3,3	4,9	1,5
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	1,8	0,8	2,5	2,4	1,5
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	4,3	1,6	13,8	8,7	4,0
Fluent in speaking and reading	15,0	8,3	26,3	18,4	13,4
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	77,7	85,5	52,3	55,3	78,2
No answer	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,3

Table 1
What is your command of the native language?

The share of the Kazakhs «fluently speaking, reading and writing in their native language» made 77,7% that is less than the Russians’ proficiency in the Russian language but significantly more than the other ethnic groups except for the Russians and Kazakhs.

In case if we extrapolate the data received during poll of more than 6,000 respondents to the adult population we can see that 78% of Kazakhstanis are fluent in Kazakh. Naturally, this figure in no way can reflect all differences in learning the mother tongue by various ethnic groups.

For example, the Russians are notable for greater command of Russian up to 85,5%. It can be explained by the quantitative predominance of the Russian language speakers in Kazakhstan and the Russian language advantages adapted to the modern requirements and its higher demand for ensuring all-round communication in the information-intensive fields.

The representatives of other but for the Kazakhs and the Turkic ethnic groups (52,3%) are known for the least competence in their mother tongue due to assimilation pressure of the Russian language and the constricted mother tongue usable range outside family and everyday life and restricted opportunities to obtain secondary and higher education in their native language.

The representatives of the non-Turkic-speaking ethnic groups showing on an average greater proficiency in their native language (55,3%) at «fluent in speaking, reading and writing» level have partially brought along the culture of speech obtained at educational establishments before they arrived in Kazakhstan and devolve their knowledge to children. Some representatives from the category of other non-Turkic-speaking ethnic groups read books and enjoy mass media and other cultural resources from their historic motherland in order to support their native language command in their families read.

On the other hand, they as well as Kazakhstan’s minor Turkic-speaking ethnic groups experienced the same language losses and the share of those who cannot speak the native language among the non-Turkic-speaking nations hit 10,2%. Generally it concerns the Germans and the Koreans. Those who cannot speak their mother tongue comprise even more than in the entry as average throughout the group of the non-Turkic-speaking people.

The dynamics of the native language proficiency by the representatives of Kazakhstan’s ethnic groups reveals inequality of the language learning and its use processes. Table 2 represents data of surveys conducted using comparable methods since 2005.

Table 2
What is your
command of the
native language?

Answers	Kazakhs			Russians, other Slavic groups			Others		
	2005	2006	2011	2005	2006	2011	2005	Turkic- speaking	Non- Turkic speaking
							2011		
Cannot speak	-	0,2	0,3	0,3	-	1,3	1,6	2,0	10,2
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	0,3	0,6	0,8	1,4	1,2	1,8	6,4	3,3	4,9
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	0,5	0,6	1,8	0,6	0,9	0,8	2,7	2,5	2,4
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	4,1	5,1	4,3	-	0,3	1,6	7,4	13,8	8,7
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	16,1	12,5	15,0	1,4	1,5	8,3	21,8	26,3	18,4
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	79,0	81,1	77,7	96,3	96,2	85,5	60,1	52,3	55,3

Since 2005, according to data, the absolute language fluency, including writing skills has insignificantly reduced probably due to many factors. New rules of verbal learning of social realm, complicated grammatical forms of the language, spasmodic lexical enrichment, frequent artificial terminological introductions became too heavy to learn the language by the Kazaks and Kazakh-speaking people. Most of them received education or learned the language through conservative methods of teaching tied to the past state of the language.

This gap is natural and its shortcoming could be removed in the course of time. First of all, it is crucial to evenly implement the countrywide modern lexical norms, rules to the methodological teacher's training process. Then a lengthy process of language training at secondary and higher education establishments lies ahead. Over the years spent for getting education we can expect from socially, economically active part of the Kazakhs and Kazakh-speaking people deeper knowledge and good command of the native language, its use, and first of all, good writing skills.

The level of the Kazakhs' native language proficiency was negatively impacted by the fact that this level is determined according to the information provided by the respondents, but not through various tests or examinations which cannot be applied in mass polls.

None of the respondents will ever want to manifest in public his (her) insufficient proficiency in the native language, which is the official one in this particular case. It triggers off the native language proficiency index instability surveyed over the years for the fluctuations of the assessments generated by temporary circumstances for success or failure in the activity, establishment of communication with the use of language and various evaluation in each certain case.

The Russians significantly, almost by 10%, reduced the level of the native language literacy at the level of «fluent in speaking reading and writing» from 96,3% to 85,5%. The first reason that is practically lies on the surface is the

lowering of the Russian language teaching volumes, its level and quality at all educational establishments. The group of the Russians who cannot write properly in their native language has increased since 2005 from 1,4% to 8% throughout the entire group on the account of the young Russians who got incomplete (12,5%) and complete secondary education (12,5%) or probably those who quitted studies.

The group of representatives of other ethnic groups except for the Kazakhs and the Russians for the past five years observed the native language fluency lowering as well as Turkic-speaking and non-Turkic-speaking reps by 8,8% and 4,8% correspondingly. The same reasons could be traced here. All the representatives of this category enjoy higher level of incompetence in the written native language than the Kazakhs and Russians by 26,3% and 18,4% correspondingly.

Kazakhstan’s ethnic groups’ proficiency in the Russian language which is the language of interethnic communication and is used on a par with the official Kazakh language shows that it remains on the high level approaching to the level of the people’s native language proficiency.

The same six-step scale was applied to obtain Q-data ranging from «cannot speak» to «fluent speaker». Another index of the Russian language fluency stipulated by its function, including the use of professional vocabulary and terminology was added. We mean preparations and reproduction of information-intensive texts of scientific and technical documentation, business correspondence, development of speeches and reports, various publications and other documents and information blocs and speech units.

Table 3 represents the answers of the respondents divided into ethnic groups to the corresponding question of the questionnaire with seven-scale gradation of the answers.

Answer	Kazakhs	Russians, the Slavs	Turkic-speaking	Non-Turkic speaking	Array
Cannot speak	1,6	0,5	0,3	0,5	1,1
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	1,2	0,9	1,3	1,0	1,1
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	2,9	0,2	1,5	0,0	1,6
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	10,1	0,5	6,3	2,4	6,0
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	8,7	1,5	8,8	0,0	5,7
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	57,7	62,4	62,3	65,0	60,0
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	17,1	33,6	19,5	30,6	24,0
Full, professional proficiency	74,8	96,0	81,8	95,6	84,0
No answer	0,6	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,5

Table 3
What is your command of the Russian language??

The key exponent to state the revealed situation is that practically the same number of the representatives of ethnic groups – natives of Kazakhstan – is enough fluent in Russian (fluent in speaking, reading and writing) as the language of interethnic communication. It means the Russian language still performs greater constitutional function and remains in-demand.

The Russians and other non-Turkic-speaking respondents are notable for higher or almost equal professional vocabulary fluency whereas the Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking individuals use it half as much. It is obvious that the Kazakhs substitute successfully the Russian language (they have good command in the Russian) for the Kazakh moreover at the lofty literary and information and communication level.

Other non-Turkic-speaking respondents who constantly communicate in Russian show the good command of Russian as the Russians do.

When answering the questions on the Kazakh language proficiency as the official one, the approaches changed, especially, it concerns the Kazakhs and representatives of other Turkic-speaking ethnic groups. This is due to that Kazakh is perceived by the native speakers rather as the language of face-to-face communications with the fellow-countrymen and those who can speak it in the everyday life having nothing to do directly with the information and communication support of the state activity sphere. Use of the language as the official one requires other characteristics of the state language itself and methods of its application (Table 4)

Table 4
What is your command of the official Kazakh language?

Answer	Kazakhs	Russians, the Slavs	Turkic-speaking	Non-Turkic-speaking	Array
Cannot speak	0,4	39,0	6,3	24,3	16,3
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	1,2	33,4	8,8	26,7	14,8
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	2,9	14,6	8,8	20,4	8,3
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	4,2	5,8	25,0	17,5	6,6
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	10,5	2,0	19,5	4,9	7,7
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	58,4	3,6	30,3	4,9	33,8
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	22,0	1,4	1,5	1,5	12,2
Full proficiency	80,6	5,0	31,8	9,8	46,0
No answer	0,4	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,3

77,7% of the Kazakhs answering the question on the competence in the Kazakh language as the native one noted that they are proficient in reading, speaking and writing. As for the official Kazakh language proficiency, 58,4% of the respondents noted that their reading, speaking and writing fluency is not enough for public service, therefore 22% of the interviewed Kazakhs noted that except for fluent reading, writing and speaking they know vocational vocabulary and terminology concerning their activity.

One should note that in this case with the national language the self-evaluation method of proficiency level fixing affects also to an even greater degree the high rates of the language competence. As the language practice in many governmental agencies shows such personal views as ambitiousness, strivings to exaggerate own potential could be easily contested by failure to fulfill a language command or some other job. Besides, the Russian language boasts the high level of usage as the original and target languages even in those

governmental agencies that use the Kazakh state language for record-keeping great while.

There is an approach to get more objective findings on the level of the language proficiency through socio-metric technique when a group consisting of no more than 10-15 people exchanges mutual cross-over assessment of the skill level among the staff on the definite scale. The experience in application of such a technique shows 10-15% slump in proficiency level in various groups than represented in self-appraisals. Heads of government and other structures, organizations and institutions should focus on such data along with the tests and interviews while assessing the ability of the staff to strengthen positions of the state language and raise efficiency of the language usage. But this proficiency level research technique is invalid for interviewing large scale arrays of strangers.

This proves the need to pose the question on significance of various functional qualities of the state language proficiency in the process of comparison and analysis of the results of the surveys conducted for the past ten years among the public servants, representatives of Kazakhstan’s main and other ethnic groups. Thereat we should take into account that the professional vocabulary skill level has not been earlier taken off in the polls (Table 5)

Answer	2001			2005			2011		
	Kazakhs	Russians	Other	Kazakhs	Russians	Other	Kazakhs	Russians	Other
Cannot speak	0,7	21,8	21,9	0,2	33,1	26,6	0,9	28,6	-
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	1,8	55,1	41,0	0,9	45,1	24,5	1,8	38,8	-
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	6,9	14,3	15,2	0,9	10,0	10,6	2,7	20,4	20,0
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	15,1	5,9	13,3	5,0	8,3	9,6	4,5	4,1	29,1
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	19,4	0,3	5,7	16,1	2,3	18,1	8,5	-	13,7
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	55,4	0,3	1,9	76,9	1,1	10,6	51,3	4,1	37,2
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,3	2,0	-
No answer	0,7	2,2	1,0	-	-	-	0,9	2,0	-

Table 5
What is your command of the official Kazakh language?
(category: public servants)

Over the past 10 years of implementation of the state-run programs and efforts aimed at improvement of the language policy, drastic changes have taken place in strengthening the positions and expanding the spheres of the state Kazakh language use.

The number of those who understand some phrases and speech among the Russians and the Slavs engaged in public service has increased up to 4,1% of all the Russians engaged in public sector fluently reading, writing and speaking the state language and even 2% of the proficient knowing professional terminology (2% is 6 people of sample group out of 290 public servants). Thereat we should bear in mind that those self-assessments may be also greatly exaggerated for the Russian-speaking people can in practice always find a job in the Russian

language in state agencies since the majority of government agencies use the Russian language to translate record keeping activities.

As for the representatives of other ethnic groups, except for Kazakhs and Russians and other Slavic groups, Turkic-speaking people have succeeded in learning the official Kazakh language. 37,2% of those who got into the sample group of this category noted they are fluent in the official language. The number of those who understand and make himself (herself) understood grew 1,5 times or twofold. However, we should take into account that 10 respondents out of 290 public servants being included into sample cannot give occasion to generalization but shows the development trend.

Over the period of ten years the number of Kazakhs engaged in civil service and fluently speaking the official Kazakh increased almost by 1,5 times, bringing thus to a large 30% group of those who can read and write properly texts abundant with professional information, notions and intricate sense.

In general, the process of learning the official Kazakh language is uneven and cyclical at large due to rather the lack of continuity in organization of teaching process in system-based and self-regulating organizations and the persistent opportunity for non-Kazakhs or Russian-speaking Kazakhs to broadly dispense with the knowledge of the state language. In Kazakhstan almost everyone can speak the Russian at the acceptable socio-communicative level and may freely use the language almost in all spheres of life. Actuality and factorial meaning of this situation is seen from the Kazakh language competency analysis among the educational groups for 8 years (Table 6).

Table 6.
What is your command of the Kazakh language?
(in view of education, population at large)

Answer	2003					2011				
	Incomplete secondary education	General secondary education	Vocational secondary education	Incomplete higher education	Higher education	Incomplete secondary education	General secondary education	Vocational secondary education	Incomplete higher education	Higher education
Cannot speak	50,0	16,4	24,7	17,5	13,1	28,0	13,0	19,4	5,5	13,2
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	6,5	13,5	20,0	14,4	17,4	18,2	12,4	15,9	14,2	14,2
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	6,5	2,4	5,0	1,0	5,1	7,4	6,6	9,0	9,6	8,6
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	6,5	7,2	7,7	10,3	8,3	5,4	5,8	6,6	8,1	7,2
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	15,2	16,9	14,7	11,3	12,6	7,6	9,5	7,0	11,0	6,9
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	15,2	41,5	26,3	44,3	42,6	26,5	43,5	32,6	33,7	30,6
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	-	-	-	-	-	6,6	8,6	9,2	17,4	19,2
Don't know/No answer	-	1,9	1,7	1,0	0,9	0,3	0,6	0,3	0,5	0,1

The first thing arousing attention is that for 8 years since 2003 the number of Kazakhstanis who cannot speak official Kazakh, except for those with higher education, has decreased. As the answers of the respondents grouped by education level indicate, Kazakhstanis learn primary language skills at the level of understanding some phrases and speech at the system-based educational establishments, schools and institutions.

The number of those who understand only some phrases among the school leavers and students increased as well.

The number of those who understand the speech and can hardly make themselves understood, also those who can read but cannot write texts decreased. It can be explained by the fact that the part of respondents joins the higher category of those who are able to write and know professional terminology. This category grew both due to the respondents with higher education and those who failed to some reasons to obtain general secondary education.

If in 2003 the share of those fluently speaking the state language throughout the array made 33,9%, in 2011 the percentage of those with high proficiency in Kazakh and professional terminology reached 39,8%. This figure grew basically due to the highly-educated people holding leading positions in the information-intensive sectors of economy such as civil service, management, industry, science and culture, and mass media. The previous language building programs of the above-mentioned spheres provided for accelerated promotion of the Kazakh language by administrative methods. It yielded some results at large.

Learning of Kazakh as the official language by various age groups shows a favorable trend. (Table 7).

Answer	18–25	26–30	31–45	46–59	60 and above
Cannot speak	7,5	11,6	13,6	16,7	30,2
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	12,6	19,8	11,7	14,9	18,4
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	10,7	9,1	7,8	6,5	9,1
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	8,0	6,3	7,6	6,0	5,0
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	7,0	7,2	8,4	9,1	5,5
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	36,8	32,9	37,7	34,7	24,8
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	17,0	12,4	13,0	11,8	6,7
No answer	0,4	0,7	0,2	0,3	0,3

Table 7
What is your command of Kazakh as the official language?
(distribution by age groups)

Among all respondents divided into the age groups the majority of those who cannot speak the official language belong to the group aged 60 and above, i.e. those who retired with the language intellectual equipment obtained during the Soviet era.

Many Kazakhstanis of active and middle age (30-60 years old) during the perestroika and first years of the country's independence felt the impact of the first laws on language, the programs on development of official Kazakh and rehabilitation of its positions. Probably, they started to learn it then, showed interest in learning the language or at least paid attention to the Kazakh speech heard around in order to learn its basics. Therefore, the number of those who do not understand and cannot speak the Kazakh language at this age is already half as much as the elder.

The Russian-speaking youth of various ethnic groups aged 18-30 probably for education purposes individually proceeded to learning the Kazakh language and as a result the number of those who cannot speak the official Kazakh language is several times less than the elder groups.

The same trends are seen in the language mastery as proficient in reading, speaking and writing and fluent in professional notions and expressions. The youth, 17% of which enjoy high level of language fluency, leads in this aspect.

The tendencies of the youth attitude towards the language may be quite correctly extrapolated to the future of language processes in the Kazakh society and qualified as one of the achievements of Kazakhstan's language policy to strengthen positions of the Kazakh language since the first years of independence. All that is left to do is to explore and keep the experience of goal-seeking and spontaneous inclusion of the youth into learning of the state language and use it for further implementation of the state policy for fulfillment of new language development programs in Kazakhstan.

Substantial differences in learning the official language as a consequence of the degree of its communicative space reclamation are observed the countrywide stipulated by the peculiarities of their socioeconomic development, cultural and geographic, ethnic and demographic and settlement characteristics. The regions are grouped as follows: Centre – Karaganda region, West – Atyrau, Mangystau, West Kazakhstan, Aktobe regions, South – South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, Almaty, Kyzylorda regions, East – East Kazakhstan, Pavlodar regions, North – North Kazakhstan, Akmola and Kostanay regions, Almaty and Astana cities.

Table 8
What is your command of Kazakh as the official language?
(distribution by regions, compared to 2003)

Answers	Almaty		Astana		Centre		West		South		East		North	
	2003	2011	2003	2011	2003	2011	2003	2011	2003	2011	2003	2011	2003	2011
Cannot speak	19,4	24,2	37,1	16,9	29,7	28,7	10,4	4,7	2,9	5,9	34,0	30,1	37,9	25,8
Cannot speak, but understand some phrases	16,6	18,7	28,6	33,3	21,3	22,3	11,9	9,2	9,1	7,7	19,8	25,1	27,6	15,1
Understand, but cannot make myself understood	4,2	11,5	-	6,9	4,5	10,9	4,4	10,1	5,0	6,4	3,8	9,1	2,3	7,3
Understand but can hardly make myself understood	8,0	13,3	5,7	13,0	6,5	5,4	13,3	6,3	5,8	6,2	13,2	4,6	5,1	4,8
Fluent in speaking and reading, but cannot write	14,1	9,5	-	5,6	13,5	4,1	14,8	11,7	18,8	7,7	11,3	4,6	11,9	8,0
Fluent in speaking, reading and writing	36,4	15,4	25,7	20,8	21,3	24,0	44,4	39,8	56,8	46,9	17,9	21,4	15,3	30,9
Fluent speaker, including professional vocabulary knowledge	-	7,2	-	3,5	-	3,9	-	18,1	-	18,9	-	5,0	-	7,7

As we can see in Table 8 the tendency driven by the past inertness of the prevailing number of the Russian-speaking population still dominates in the city of Almaty: in 2003 the number of those Almaty residents who could not speak the language amounted to 19,4% against 24,2% in 2011. At the same time Almaty witnessed the less number of those who can perfectly speak the official language up to 22,6%, while in 2003 36,4% of the respondents said they were fluent in reading, speaking and writing.

The reverse process took place in Astana. The share of those who cannot speak the Kazakh language declined more than twofold. Arrival of the Kazakh-speaking people from more Kazakh-speaking southern regions involved in the civil service adjusted the balance of the languages towards predominance of the

Kazakh language. The number of those who can speak the language has almost come to the 2003 figures.

In the rest of the oblasts and regions with relatively stable ethnic composition, all the correlations in terms of Kazakh language competence are conditioned basically by the existing prevailing either Kazakh-speaking or Russian-speaking dominance.

The people of the western part of Kazakhstan were even before known for the high rates of the state language command. Their share increased more from 44,4% up to 57,9%. The same time the number of the population not speaking Kazakh dropped twice.

For example, in central regions almost the third part of the population still does not speak Kazakh. However, they believe that the percentage of those who fluently speaks the Kazakh language has risen by 6,6 % against 21,3% fixed in 2003 survey. Thus the level of the state language proficiency has moved up insignificantly.

The people of the western part of Kazakhstan were even before known for the high rates of the state language command. Their share increased more from 44,4% up to 57,9%. At the same time the number of the population not speaking Kazakh dropped twice.

In southern regions, generally, in Kazakh-speaking oblasts the greater number of those who know Kazakh has risen since 2003 to make 65,8%.

The northern regions notable for the prevailing Russian-speaking population faced an exception case: the number of the people fluently speaking the state language has doubled since 2003 from 15,3% to 38,6%. It is probably due to the high-level Kazakh language mastery of the North Kazakhstanis surely rather with some participation of the Slavic and European and other Russian-speaking ethnic groups.

While characterizing the language environment in Kazakhstan by the expert community, the complexity of the real processes which are unable to be evaluated is observed.

Answer	Number	%
Actual bilingualism	16	26,7
State language dominance	6	10,0
Russian language dominance	15	25,0
Equal use of the Kazakh and Russian languages with a little knowledge of English	20	33,3
Russian language dominance in big cities; Kazakh language dominance in remote regions	3	5,0

Table 9
In your opinion, what is the real language communicative environment in Kazakhstan to date?

More than one third of the experts (33,3%) noted that the population of the republic equally uses both Kazakh and Russian and has a little knowledge of English. 26,7% are confident that there is actual bilingualism in Kazakhstan while 25% of the experts state the dominance of the Russian language in the country. Thus, we can say that the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan is notable for functioning of two languages. If we take into account the opinion of the third of experts, there is a bilingual environment with the dominance of the Russian language.

To give a clear answer to the question concerning the state language proficiency among the representatives of various ethnic groups, one should analyze the responses to the following question.

Table 10
**In your opinion,
 what part of the
 representatives
 of various
 ethnic groups
 in Kazakhstan
 does know the
 Kazakh language
 at "speaking,
 reading, writing"
 level?**
(experts, %)

Answer	100	80-90	60-80	40-60	10-40	Up to 10	No answer
Kazakhs	6,7	25,0	26,7	15,0	8,3	-	18,3
Representatives of the Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles etc.)	-	1,7	-	13,3	21,7	45,0	18,3
Turkic-speaking ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tatars, Kyrgyzs, a part of Caucasians)	5,0	10,0	13,3	18,3	25,0	11,7	16,7
East Asian ethnic groups (Koreans, Chinese, Dungans)	-	1,7	1,7	15,0	21,7	31,7	28,3
Representatives of European ethnic groups (Germans etc.)	1,7	-	-	6,7	16,7	48,3	26,7
Iranian peoples (Tajiks, Kurds, others)	-	1,7	8,3	6,7	16,7	36,7	30,0

According to the experts, 6,7% of the Kazakhs perfectly speak their mother-tongue, 25,0% of the Kazakhs speak their mother-tongue in 80-90% while the native language proficiency level of 26,7% of the Kazakhs makes 60-80% only. The respondents say that the situation with the state language among the Turkic-speaking ethnic groups is much better. In the experts' opinion, the level of the Kazakh language proficiency of 25% of the representatives of the Turkic-speaking peoples is less than 50%. The level of the Kazakh language knowledge of 44,6% of the Turkic-speaking ethnic groups makes 60-80%. This is stipulated not only by their aspiration to learn the state language, but also by the affinity of the Kazakh and native languages of these peoples.

According to the experts, neither the representative of the Slavic peoples nor the East Asian ethnic groups have perfect knowledge of the Kazakh language. The representatives of these ethnic groups are least likely to speak the Kazakh language. Thus, 45% of the Slavs in Kazakhstan, 48,3% of European ethnic groups and 31,7% of the representatives of East Asian peoples have less than 10% Kazakh language proficiency.

Thus, there is an evident situation with the population's state language situation. To get an unbiased picture a method of focus-groups was used during which different issues related to language policy and factors of command of languages were discussed.

The level of the Kazakh language proficiency by the representatives of the ethnic Diasporas and orientation on its study depend on many objective and subjective factors. The following objective factors have been revealed within the research:

- Cultural and linguistic gap among the ethnic groups – representatives of language groups;
- The intensity and duration of communication with the representatives of the Kazakh ethnoses;
- Place of residence of the Diaspora;
- Rates of mixed marriages with the representatives of the Kazakh ethnoses.

Psychological problems such as motivation aspects and persistence of impression can be referred to as subjective factors. According to the conducted qualitative research, language proficiency of the ethnic groups is in a wide range between total language incomprehension and absolute language fluency. The Slavs (the Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) show the worst state

language competence. The Turkic-speaking ethnic groups (Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Meskhetian Turks) have the best Kazakh language proficiency (colloquial and even literary language). Probably, it is explained by linguistic affinity and lack of cultural and linguistic distance.

Informant R. (male, Uzbek, 37) *«Our cultures and everything coincide in Kazakh and Uzbek. The Kazakhs and Uzbeks are close and understand each other.»*

Focus groups with the representatives of these Diasporas were held in Kazakh.

One can note their total command of the Kazakh language, high motivation for its further learning and improvement. Many of them graduated from schools with Kazakh language of teaching and their children enter the schools with Kazakh as the language of instruction.

Informant F. (female, Kyrgyz, 20): *«I am fluent in Kazakh. I studied at school and university with Kazakh language of teaching.»*

We may also speak on formation of the new insight into their own ethnic identity:

Informant F. (female, Uzbek, 20): *«I am Kazakh.»*

On the other hand, the representatives of the Turkic-speaking groups noted easiness in learning Kazakh for Turkic linguistic group affinity and close communication with the native population.

There are few informants who absolutely don't speak Kazakh. The majority of the informants studied Kazakh at school; a considerable part of them state that they somehow speak or write in Kazakh. They hear Kazakh speech at work or face it in various public or household situations (while applying to the government agencies, listening to TV programs, reading advertisements, shop-signs etc.)

Informant G. (female, German, 60): *«I have learned, basically, through advertisements at shops, it can be said that I do not understand the words but the core of conversations and interest are the same.»*

Both density of communication with the native population and its duration are of crucial meaning for cultural adaptation. Therefore, the dependence between the ethnic groups' language learning and places of their residence in the line of North-South is present here. Demographic predominance of the state language speakers in the south contributes to the spread of the language among the ethnic groups residing there. In this case we observe that the Koreans, living in the south of Kazakhstan, show good command of Kazakh. Many mixed marriages with the Kazakhs are registered there. The same time, the Russian Diaspora in the north of Kazakhstan lives in another ethnic and cultural environment.

Informant A. (Russian, male, 28): *«Historically, there are few Kazakhs at my work and place of residence. We all speak Russian.»*

In learning the language the bulk of respondents speaking Kazakh noted the great role of :

- Their social environment
- Many studied Kazakh within the family unit since childhood
- Many studied the language at schools with Kazakh as language of instruction.

Answering the question, «Who helped you learn Kazakh?» the respondents with good command of Kazakh said:

- Know since childhood
- Environment, neighbors, friends
- Language courses, school

Answering the question, «what hinders you from learning the state language», the responses ranged in other way, first comes complaints on lack of highly

qualified teachers, literature, then comes lack of time, difficulty of learning (for the Slavs), lack of motivation related to age of the participants (I am old, let children learn it). However, the age factor should not be dramatized in learning languages at large, and Kazakh, in particular. For example, many young people in the focus groups failed to specify some reason impeding learning the Kazakh language that proves their passive citizenship in pursuance of the language policy. We may also suggest persistence of habits among some of the informants. There were also answers like this

- It is impossible to learn language collaterally with main activity
- There are no conditions at my work place

We may generally suggest affirmation of some exertion in the state of language. On the other hand, development of the native ethnic language arouses concern among the informants. Preservation, development and reproduction of the ethnic language of the Diaspora when living in the foreign cultural environment depend on many factors such as:

- Endogamy
- Compactness of settlement
- Possession or lack of public education outside the place of inhabitation
- Schools and classes with the native language as the language of teaching
- State policy in the territory of the inhabitation of the Diaspora (for example, in the Soviet times the native language fluency was never regarded as some value)

The research studied the national ethnic composition of the informants' families in order to find out the dominating language in the family unit and the scope of proficiency in other languages. The information allows implicitly to judge at what stage of its development one or another Diaspora is.

As is known, interethnic marriages, will definitely, dissolve mentality of Diasporas, disintegrate and destroy stable group characteristics. They are indicative of vital departure from Diaspora's traditions, including sociolinguistic such as ethnic language dominance in household use within the family unit, the integrity of the language, level of the ethnic language proficiency (usual household, literary, written and oral language). Generally, we may note that the participants of the focus group talks show low ethnic organization, almost all of them are the third, fourth generations born outside their historical motherlands.

As the research showed, the representatives of all diasporas are well incorporated into the Kazakhstan society; they hold high social positions in education and employment types; they demonstrate high level of adaptability preserving their ethno-cultural identity. Some diasporas are more involved in assimilation-integration processes than others.

The same time the participants still understand precisely their non-native origin, essentially, thanks to their relatives repatriated recently (Germans, Poles) or permanently residing in their historic motherland (Uzbeks) with whom they keep in touch. As evidence by the mixed marriage high rates almost all Diasporas are found at the stage of assimilation. Mixed marriages between the representatives of same language group (Poles-Ukrainians) are more common though there are marriages between the representatives of different language groups (Koreans-Kazakhs).

In the international families informants see no threat of ethnic and language determinacy loss from mixed marriages; moreover, they note benefits and by no means attribute this process with the loss of the mother tongue.

Informant E. (female, German, 55). *«Even at the kitchen spreading the table on the occasion of holidays either catholic or orthodox, it is the common holiday as the common family is. There are no problems, on the contrary, only the benefits.»*

The more international family is the more they speak Russian within the family unit (the Germans, Koreans, Poles). Endogamic families more actively use the native language (the Dungans, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz) for intra-family communication.

We can also notice, the research revealed a convention of such a notion as «compactness of the settlement of the Diaspora» in the full sense of the word and in the south and other regions of Kazakhstan, that is naturally affect the weakness of ethnic integration, lack of opportunity to support the native language skills.

Many ethnic groups (Germans, Koreans and Poles) have lost their ethnic languages. Despite this fact, it should be noted the great, even the growing interest in learning the native language and even among those who have already lost it (the Poles, Koreans and Germans) and support the interest of those who speak it actively (almost all Turkic-speaking groups). The ethnic group of Dungans, who have no own state education, enjoy the native oral and usual household language. They have almost no literary language.

Informant V. (female, Dungan, 39): *«Basically we speak the usual household language, we almost do not know the literary one and quite often we extend congratulations at the Dungan weddings in Russian.»*

Preservation and development of the language depend on whether the ethnic group has state education or not called to support language through funding its development abroad. The Dungans and Uigurs have no state associations. Their state of the native language is more complicated as compared to the linguistic situation for example of the Poles, Germans and Russians. The returning interest in learning the native language becomes a widespread practice, a culturological demand, though the ethnic language of many ethnic groups lost its function of the means of communication within the family unit and the Diaspora but is acknowledged as the native one.

The ethnic groups are found at the different stages of their socio-cultural development in the poly-ethnic societies, the native languages have different degrees of functionality and have uneven power of prestige. The informants perceive the native language as the ethnic-centered core. All informants without exception highlight the culturological role of the native tongue, its humanitarian value and even centre role in preservation of ethnic identity.

Informant Sh. (female, Kyrgyz, 50): *«If one protects himself he would protect the native language.»*

Informant V. (male, Korean, 46): *«Any nation is alive if the nation can speak the native language.»*

Informant D. (male, the Pole, 18): *«The language means a lot. It is the culture of each nation.»*

The majority of respondents are quite skeptical of the government capacities to encourage the development of every single language. Almost no paternalist's expressions were voiced in fact.

Informant S. (female, Dungan, 55): *«To my mind, it is impossible to require to equate the status of the Dungan language with the state one. We should preserve the status of the state language, besides we should create conditions for the development of native languages»*

The respondents assign the major role in preservation of the language to the family or special funds backed financially by the national state-run associations.

Informant A. (male, German, 35): *To date the German language exists only for those who want to learn it.*

All ethnic groups noted the presence of some or other social problems in learning their mother-tongues or in preserving their activeness. E.g. the shortage in periodicals in their native language, lack of TV programs or at least several

hours of broadcast per week, lack of good textbooks, classes of in-depth study of the language. The most favorable situation is observed among the Koreans:

Informant V. (male, Korean, 46): *«Generally, we have all opportunities, we have five schools in our district where the Korean-speaking teachers work.»*

The Poles:

Informant Y. (female, the Pole, 59): *«We will have a channel. The Polish delegations will arrive to elaborate an action plan to make a Polish programme. We will watch Polish TV at our classes. We have two Polish language classes.»*

Russians:

Informant M. (female, Russian, 27): *«A Russian organization «Russkyi Mir» (The Russian World) works here in Kazakhstan. It channels great aids and appliances to boost the development of the modern Russian language.»*

The Germans stated discrepancies in learning the German language between the cities and rural areas.

Informant A. (the German, 22): *«My parents live in Kostanay region. Not a centre but a language school was established in Rydnyi, though it worked not so long. I think it doesn't exist any more.»*

The worst situation is observed among the Dungans:

Informant S. (female, Dungan, 55): *«Native language loses its status ... we have no textbooks, we are lack of good specialists. Dungans are the third largest ethnic group living in Zhambyl region, despite this we do not have any newspapers in Dungan and no Dungan-language-specialists are trained»*

Conclusions:

1. While analyzing it is essential to bear in mind that the opinion in the language proficiency by a six-grade scheme poll is determined according to the information provided by the respondents, but not through various tests or examinations which cannot be applied in mass polls. Therefore all the indices in percentage terms to the respondents cannot be assessed as neutral, only dynamic parameters, differences and comparable indicators in regard to the objects of research may have information value. The practical level of language proficiency may be less as the researches by the method of sociometry in small language groups.

2. Introducing the Kazakh official language competence analysis among various ethnic groups it is crucial to highlight the huge inequality among the ethnic groups in the native language proficiency. The inequality provides for also different level of preparedness to learn, understand and use the official language in their lives. According to data received in 2005-2011 the number of those who cannot speak the native language increased. The minor Kazakhstan's ethnic groups experienced the most serious language losses. The share of those who cannot speak the mother tongue among the representatives of minor groups of the non-Turkic-speaking nations reached 10,2% and it constantly grows up

3. The Russian language proficiency level has reduced almost among all ethnic groups. Thus, the level of the native language literacy as «fluent in speaking reading and writing» has fallen almost by 10%

(from 96,3% to 85,5%). The group of the Russians who cannot write properly in their native language has increased since 2005 from 1,4% to 8,3% throughout the entire group on the account of the young Russians who received incomplete (12,5%) and complete secondary education (12,5%) or probably those who have quitted studies.

4. The first reason that is practically lies on the surface is the lowering of the Russian language teaching volumes, level and quality at all educational establishments as a consequence of the general and unprecedented decline of the education quality the countrywide that affected the teaching of the

Russian and languages of other ethnic groups and the unsatisfactory Kazakh language teaching in all the forms of education that meets no modern norms of requirements, not to speak of special disciplines.

5. For the past 10 years of implementation of state-run programs and efforts aimed to improve the language policy, drastic changes have taken place in strengthening the positions and expanding the spheres of the state Kazakh language use. The number of Kazakhstanis who cannot speak the state language has dropped from 24,3% to 16,3% since 2003. Among the Kazakhs engaged in civil service the share of fluent speakers has increased from 55,4% to 81,5% since 2001.

6. The representatives of other ethnic groups engaged in public service show better knowledge of the language: since 2001 the percentage of those who «can read and write» has risen from 1,9% to 37,2%. This occurred mostly due to the representatives of other Turkic-speaking ethnic groups. But as they mentioned they do not know professional vocabulary. Russians engaged in public service show less official language competence. The number of those who absolutely do not speak Kazakh has increased from 21,9% to 28,8% since 2001. Alongside, the percentage of those speaking Kazakh perfectly has reached only 4,1% and the percentage of those possessing a good command of professional vocabulary has made 2,0%.

7. The process of learning the official Kazakh language is uneven and cyclical at large due to rather the lack of continuity in organization of teaching process in system-based and self-regulating organizations and the persistent opportunity for the non-Kazakhs or Russian-speaking Kazakhs to broadly dispense with the knowledge of the state language.

8. The share of the perfectly fluent speakers of the state language throughout the array made 33,9% in 2003 against 39,8% in 2011. Highly-educated people who hold leading positions in information-intense spheres such as civil service, management, industry, science and culture, and mass media contributed to this. The previous language building programs of the above-mentioned spheres provided for accelerated promotion of the Kazakh language. Administrative methods were applied there to propagate introduction of record keeping activities, document flow, extracting and dissemination of information. It yielded some results at large.

9. Among all the respondents divided into five-year age groups the majority of those who cannot speak the official language accounts for the group older than 60 (30,2%), i.e. those who retired with the language intellectual equipment received in the Soviet times. The Russian-speaking youth aged 18-30 belonging to various ethnic groups for education purpose probably individually proceeded to learning the Kazakh language and as a result the number of those who cannot speak the official Kazakh language several time less than among the elder population (7,5%).

10. In the oblasts and regions with relatively stable ethnic composition all the correlations in terms of Kazakh language competence are conditioned basically by the existing prevailing either Kazakh-speaking or Russian-speaking dominance or internal ethnic migration. The tendency driven by the past inertness of the prevailing number of the Russian-speaking population still dominates in the city of Almaty. In 2003 the number of those Almaty residents who could not speak the language amounted to 49,4% against 24,2% in 2011. At the same time Almaty witnessed the less number of those who perfectly can speak the official language up to 22,6%, in 2003 36,4% of the respondents said they are fluent in reading, speaking and writing. The reverse process took place in Astana due to the movement of highly-educated Kazakh-speaking people to the new capital city.

11. The northern regions which are notable for the prevailing Russian-speaking population faced an exception case: since 2003 the number of the people fluently speaking the language has doubled from 15,3% to 38,6%. It is probably due to the high-level Kazakh language mastery of the North Kazakhstanis surely rather with some participation of the Slavic and European and other Russian-speaking ethnic groups. Therefore such a language promotion in the northern part of Kazakhstan should be referred to as one of the best results of the language policy efforts aimed at strengthening the positions and the expansion of the scope of the state language use.



Istanbul Club

The first meeting of Istanbul club was held in The Institute of Eurasia, Istanbul University (Istanbul, Turkey) on 22nd April 2011.

The base of this club was initiated by Russian, Turkish and Kazakh experts. By combining in its ranks experts, politicians and scientists, focused on their countries national interests and traditional values, the Istanbul club will be a platform for the Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia strategic partnership intellectual discussion.

Becoming an open dialogue platform, the club will work in a wide range of world politics and ideology topics, and looked forward to specialists and experts participating in their future endeavors.

The Istanbul club establishment initiators:

Yuri Solozobov - Director of the National Strategy Institute International Projects, a political scientist (Moscow, Russia),

Hayati Tyufekchiogly - Director of Istanbul University Eurasia Institute, Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Professor (Istanbul, Turkey),

Botagoz Rakisheva - Director of the CESSI-Kazakhstan Institute, the journal "International studies. Company. Policy. Economy" publisher, Doctor of Sociological Sciences (Astana, Kazakhstan).

In the First meeting of Istanbul club participated: Sergey Seliverstov - State History Institute Senior Researcher, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Aynur Mazhitova - the Institute for Socio-Political Research expert, Gulden Shalov - the Institute for Socio-Political Research expert.

There were presented the club member's books "Nazarbayev - the leader of the anti-nuclear peace" by Yuri Solozobov (Russia), "Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey: the pages of the Eurasian ideas XIX-XXI centuries" by Sergey Seliverstov (Kazakhstan) in the first meeting of the Istanbul club.

Club members presented a special issue of "International studies. Company. Policy. Economy" journal. JOURNAL THEME: "Eurasianism". It is planned to release a special publication issue devoted to Turkey and Istanbul club's activities.

The meeting will provide information about the first series of the "Kazakhstan's way: CHRONICLE OF INDEPENDENCE" documentary film has been taken by the press service of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the film company "Korkem Film" with the participation of ISC "Kazakhfilm". In general, the film will consist of eight episodes, story of the formation of a sovereign state of Kazakhstan will be disclosed in which. Co-author of the film is Yuri Solozobov.

The site www.ispr.kz will contain information about the Istanbul club's activities. Questions can be sent by e-mail: ispr@ispr.kz

We invite to collaboration in the context of Istanbul club!

CHINESE PRESENCE IN ENERGY INDUSTRY OF CENTRAL ASIA¹

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China's policy in Central Asia after the accession to power of «the fourth generation» of policymakers was built on the ground of the «peripheral diplomacy» concept². Although, unlike the early 2000s, it has been supplemented since 2005 by the strategy of «peaceful development» which replaced «China's peaceful rise» strategy and concept of «building up a harmonious peace», proposed by Hu Jintao. Presently, China's slogan for dealing with its neighbors is *mulin, anlin, fulin*³, which means «be friendly, make them feel secure and help make them rich». This concept was approved at the XVII congress of the Communist Party of China.

As one of the leading Chinese experts in Central Asia Professor at Fudan University Zhao Huasheng stated, this concept formulated back to 2003 is a reflection of a new understanding and a new approach to the neighboring countries. Accelerated economic growth of China and strengthening of its state power stimulated to change the country's foreign policy concept. This process, as a matter of course, affects expectations and fears of the neighboring countries, most of which are weaker than China. It was crucial then to formalize a new concept of policy in such conditions.

The key element of the new concept is that China not only to develop relations with the surrounding countries for the sake of its own goals and interests but is also to take into account the purposes and interests of its neighbors. This thrust is of the fundamental meaning⁴.

China's growing interest in Central Asia is well-founded. There is no intrigue. Significance of the region in the world politics and economics has just changed. Correspondingly, threats and challenges to China stemming from this change escalated and the new prospects and opportunities offered increased.

The key element in China's foreign policy in Central Asia was the economic penetration to the region through implementation of bilateral and multilateral economic and infrastructure projects (within the SCO), mainly, out of Chinese financial resources with the participation of China's companies and extension of soft loans for the development of bilateral trade. This is evidenced by allocation

[1] Nuclear power projects are not covered in this article.

[2] «The comprehensive periphery policy» outlines three trends such as: 1) regions, adjacent to China; 2) APR; 3) Eurasian continent and costal areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its purpose, according to the Chinese authors, is to support friendly relations with the neighboring and closely-adjacent countries which form a stability belt around the country. The periphery policy may help create friendly and secure environment, improve strategic positions of China, and increase its diplomatic resources and expand its international influence. Central Asia and Russia, according to this concept, formed the so-called strategic rear of China.

[3] See: Hu Jintao: Gaojuzi zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi weida qizhi wei douqi quanmian jianshe siaokang shehui xin shenli er fendou (High carrying the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and fighting for another victory in the moderately prosperous society building). Report at the XVII All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China. October 15, 2007 // Guangming Ribao – 2007–October 25//.

[4] Zhao Huasheng. Zhongguo di ZhongYa waijiao (China's diplomacy in Central Asia). Beijing, 2008. – p.181.

of trade and infrastructure credits within the SCO,⁵ also stepping up of bilateral and multilateral economic ties with the countries of the region.

China's economic interests in the region are associated with several trends, first of all, trade. If we speak conventionally about «economic expansion» then «trade expansion» is an accomplished fact. Except for Uzbekistan, and probably, Turkmenistan we may suggest that the rest of the countries of the region lacks option to Chinese trade expansion. Kazakhstan has become long away and badly dependent on this expansion, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since 2005.

Efforts to establish transport and logistics infrastructure⁶ and development of free trade areas⁷ in the Central Asian districts bordering on China are stemming from this trend.

The fourth trend is large-scale financing of the Central Asian economies. This trend became apparent in 2007 when Chinese infusions to the Central Asian projects run into billions of dollars. Finally, the fifth trend, one of the key directions in order of importance, is the development of energy cooperation between China and Central Asia. There are some significant aspects, at one point, acquisition of raw hydrocarbon deposits or their long-term concession exploitation, at another point construction of oil and gas pipelines to transport hydrocarbon reserves of the region to China, besides, mainly, at the expense of Chinese credits. The third highlight is China's participation in construction or reconstruction of hydropower plants, thermal plants and power lines for possible electric supplies to China.

Though transit volumes via those pipelines and power lines (chiefly, oil transit up to 20 mln tons in the long view) are not so significant⁸ for China. From the viewpoint of geopolitics it is difficult to overestimate those projects. Firstly, their availability guarantees Chinese regional presence. Secondly, it gives China a bargaining chip in pricing negotiations with Russia on the Russian oil and gas delivered to China. Finally, together with other projects implemented through Chinese investments, they let acquire the Central Asian hydrocarbon resources at the prices significantly lower than the world benchmark⁹.

Given the growing dependence of China on energy supplies from overseas¹⁰, its presence in the oil and gas complex of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, also in the power industry of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is expected to rise.

Thereat, energy cooperation between China with each country of the region has its own characteristic aspects then it makes good sense to brief on each of the state.

[5] At the SCO Summit held in Tashkent in June 2004 Hu Jintao announced China's intention to allocate a credit line of USD 900 mln to boost trade between the SCO member countries. Multilateral trade and economic cooperation program was signed at the regular meeting of the SCO heads of government held in Beijing in September 2004. It laid foundation for the expansion of both trade and economic relations and in-depth economic integration. In June 2009 at the SCO Summit in Yekaterinburg Hu Jintao said that China would allot USD 10 bln to deal with the financial crisis within the SCO and to invest and fund technical and economic projects.

[6] China's standing is pragmatic as always. Trans-border transport projects in Central Asia, firstly, contribute to China's task to turn into a global trading power. No progressive trade-economic cooperation of China and Central Asia would, basically, develop without faster growth of trans-border transport infrastructure. Secondly, they are natural continuation of the priority development of the western provinces. Thereat, XUAR is cast in the role of the regional foreign economic and infrastructure hub in the intra-China landscape.

[7] Securing no approval to establish a free trade zone in the territory of the SCO, China started acting more subtle preferring to make arrangements with the countries of Central Asia without Russia's participation. Agreements-in principle on a free trade zone in the area of Irkeshtam and Torugart check-points in Kyrgyzstan and Karasu-Kulma check-point in Tajikistan have been achieved so far. The infrastructure of the free trade area near Druzhiba and Khorgos check-points on the border of Kazakhstan and China has been already created.

[8] China's crude oil imports reached 163 mln tons in 2007, 179 mln tons in 2008, 203.8 mln tons in 2009 for the first time exceeding 50% of oil consumption, 239 mln tons or 55% of oil consumption in 2010. See: Zhungo nengyuan fazhan baogao. 2010. (China Energy Development Report. 2010) /edited by Cui Minxuan. – Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010. – p. 92, 95; Zhungo nengyuan fazhan baogao. 2011. (China Energy Development Report. 2011). / edited by Cui Minxuan. – Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011. – p. 12.

[9] For example, Turkmenistan delivers its gas to China at the price of USD 120 per 1,000 cu m. As a comparison, Iran pays 170 USD and Russia pays USD 190 per 1,000 cu m.

[10] According to the forecasts of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China's oil consumption will grow up to 450 mln tons by 2020, and the share of imported oil will hit 64.5%. – See: Zhungo nengyuan fazhan baogao. 2010. – p. 95; Chinese Institute for Energy Studies forecasts that the country's oil consumption will reach 500000 - 520000 tons by 2015, and China's dependence on external oil supplies will exceed 60%. See: Guangming Ribao, November 28, 2011.

Republic of Kazakhstan

It is reasonable to begin with Kazakhstan because, first of all, China started its development of the Central Asian hydrocarbon resources from Kazakhstan. Secondly, Chinese presence in the oil and gas complex of Kazakhstan is the most widespread. Thirdly, it has quite a longstanding history. Finally, it evoked a wide public response.

China made its first step back to 1997 when the two countries signed «the project of the century»¹¹ providing for USD 11 bln of Chinese investments into Kazakhstan's oil industry. It was planned to invest into the rehabilitation of Uzenmunaigaz JSC, Aktobemunaigaz JSC and construction of oil pipelines in West China and Iran. China failed to succeed at Uzenmunaigaz JSC. But on the ground of Aktobemunaigaz JSC the countries founded CNPC-Aktobemunaigaz JSC with 85,45% of shares belonging to CNPC.

The countries came to a five-year standstill. Dealing with other problems China showed then no particular activity in the Kazakh oil and gas sector. It made a breakthrough in the early 2003. China's Sinopec and CNOOC¹² tried to acquire a stake in the Kashagan project run by the British BG Group PLC, however, the deal was blocked by other Kashagan project shareholders.

The second attempt was more successful. In 2003 CNPC acquired in two stages a 100% stake in the Severnye Buzachi deposit in Mangystau region. It bought this substantial equity participation from Nimr Petroleum of Saudi Arabia and the US ChevronTexaco.

At the close of 2004 Sinopec purchased the First International Oil Company (FIOS) for USD 160 mln from mysterious Albatross Trading Limited (British Virgin Islands) developing Sazan-Kurak deposit.

In 2005 China's yield went up. At the start of the year CNODC¹³ acquired Aidan Munai JSC for USD160 mln, October 15, 2005 NC KazMunaiGas JSC and CNPC International signed a memo of understanding which regulated issues of China's take-over of PetroKazakhstan. Simultaneously, China gained the right to PetroKazakhstan share in other oil-extracting joint ventures with its participation, such as KazGerMunai JV and Turgai Petroleum.

At the close of 2006 China's CITIC Group¹⁴ reached an agreement on acquisition of Nations Energy Company for USD 1.91 bln¹⁵.

September 2009 China Investment Corp. (CIC)¹⁶ acquired 41% of global deposit receipts (GDR) of KazMunaiGas Exploration Production,¹⁷ in November CNPC E&D¹⁸ jointly with NC KazMunaiGas completed acquisition of 100% of ordinary shares in Mangistaumunaigas JSC from Central Asia Petroleum. Under the agreement CNPC E&D received 50% minus two voting shares in Mangistaumunaigas JSC.

[11] The analysis of publications of the mid 90s and official documents of the National Company KazMunaiGas JSC indicate that CNPC-Aktobemunaigaz OJSC commenced its operations in Kazakhstan in mid 1995. Notably, the most strange is that the company had been awarded the Zhanazhol production license in June 1995 (for 20 years). In September 1995 it received the Kenkiyak nadsolevoy production permit (for 25 years) and Kenkiyak podsolevoy license in 1997 in Aktobe region, that do not tally with the official version that CNPC entered the oil market of Kazakhstan in 1997 winning Aktobemunaigaz JSC privatization bid. For further information see: K. Syroezhkin: Kazakhstan-China: from trans-border trade to strategic partnership. Book 1. At the beginning of the way. – Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, 2010. – p.158-160.

[12] Sinopec stands for China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation; CNOOC stands for China Offshore Oil Corporation.

[13] CNODC, China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation is a whole-owned subsidiary of CNOOC (China Offshore Oil Corporation), the third largest oil company of China.

[14] CITIC Group (China International Trust & Investment Corp.) is one of the largest investment companies of China, founded in 1979 and is directly subordinate to State Council of China.

[15] Under the agreement signed CITIC Group accepted commitment that after the take-over of Nations Energy it will sell a 50% of stake of Nations Energy to NC KazMunaiGas JSC for USD 995 mln, half of the purchase price paid for 100% stake of Nations Energy.

[16] China Investment Corp. investment fund was founded on September 29, 2007 especially for foreign investments accumulated gold and foreign exchange reserves of China. Its equity capital makes USD 200 bln.

[17] It was acquired through a subsidiary Fullbloom Investment Corp., the sum of transaction made USD 939 mln.

[18] CNPC E&D – CNPC Exploration and Development Company Ltd.

China's last acquisition in the Kazakh oil and gas sector was a privately-owned concern Emir Oil LLP appropriated by MI Energy Corporation¹⁹ last February.

By my calculations (surely, incomprehensive), there are 80 companies with participation of Chinese capital in Kazakhstan so far. 21 of them extract oil in Kazakhstan. (Table 1)

Company	Shareholders	
	Chinese companies	Other participants
Aktobe region		
CNPC-Aktobemunaigaz JSC (since 1997)	66,7% of voting shares have owned since June 1997. CNPC has been owning 85,45% of shares (94,5% of voting shares) since April 2004, including CNPC Exploration and Development Company Ltd. up to 60,33%, CNPC International (Caspian) Ltd. up to 25,12%	JSC staff – 5,02%, different entities and persons – 9,53%
Lancaster Petroleum JSC (since 2007)	CNPC – 87,96%	
Sagiz Petroleum Company LLP (since 2007)	CNPC – 100%	
Kazakhoil Aktobe LLP (since 2003)	CNPC – 25%	NC KazMunaiGas JSC – 75%
Atyrau region		
Embavedoil LLP (since 1996)	50% of stake since 1996, Satko International Limited has been owning 100% since the end of 2005	Kazakhstan and Vietnam owned 50% till the end of 2005
CJSC Sazan Kurak JV (since 2004 r.)	Sinopec through its subsidiary, FIOC Ltd. – 100%	
Precaspian Petroleum Company (since 2004)	First International Oil Company (FIOC LTD) – 100%	
Adai Petroleum Company LLP (since 2004)*	First International Oil Company – 50%	RN-Kazakhstan LLP (Russia) – 50%
Potential Oil LLP (since 2006)	CNPC – 100%	
Kyzylorda region		
CNPC –Ai Dan JSC (since 2005 r.)	SNODC – 100%	
PetroKazakhstan Inc. (since 2005)	CNPC International Ltd. has had 67% in PetroKazakhstan Inc. since October 2005. 67% in PetroChina have been owned by PetroKazakhstan Inc. since January 2007.	NC KazMunaiGas owned 33% of shares in PetroKazakhstan Inc. starting from October 2005 and 50% of shares in Valsera Holding BV. KMG EP has 33% of stake in PetroKazakhstan Inc. since September 2009
Turgai Petroleum JV CJSC (since 2005)	CNPC, PetroKazakhstan, Kumkol Resources – 50%	Lukoil Overseas Kumkol B.V. (the Netherlands) – 50%

Table 1
Chinese companies' presence in oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan
(oil and natural gas production, early 2011)

[19] MI Energy Corporation is a subsidiary of MIE Holding Corporation, registered in the Cayman Islands, which is a subsidiary of CNPC and Global Oil Corporation.

Company	Shareholders	
	Chinese companies	Other participants
KazGerMunai JV LLP (since 2005)	CNPC – 50%	NC KazMunaiGas JSC had 50% since June 2007 KMG EP has 50%
KuatAmlonMunai JV LLP (since 2006)	CNPC – 100%	
Mangystau region		
Buzachi Operating Ltd. (since 2003)	CNPC International Ltd. (registered in the US had 50% (until 2009), currently it owns 75%)	LUKOIL –25% Mittal Investments – 25% (until 2009)
KarazhanbasMunai JSC (since 2006)	CITIC Canada Petroleum Limit – 50%	KMG EP has 50%
KarakudukMunai JSC (since 2004)	CNPC – 50%	NC KazMunaiGas JSC has 50%
Arman JV LLP (since 2005.)	CNPC – 25%	
Mangistaumunaigas (November, 2009)**	CNPC Exploration and Development Company Ltd – 50% minus 2 voting shares	NC KazMunaiGas JSC- 50% plus voting shares
Emir Oil LLP (February, 2011 r.)	MI Energy Corporation (MIE Holding Corporation subsidiary) – 100%	Emir Oil LLC belonged to B. Cherdobayev's company BMB Munai Inc LLP
KazMunaiGas Exploration Production JSC (September, 2009 r.)	Fullbloom Investment Corp. – 11%	NC KazMunaiGas JSC – 89%

Note * In view of no promising outlook for minefield FIOC and Rosneft withdrew from this project last June.
**Pavlodar refinery excluded from bargaining.

By my calculations, China's share in the oil production of Kazakhstan makes 25-27%, 13-15% in gas recovery. It is not 40% voiced by opposition and some deputies frightening Kazakhstanis; however, it is quite significant, especially, keeping in mind the geography of Chinese presence in Kazakhstan (Table 2) and the fact that oil and gas sector forms the basis of the country economy and is the principal payer to the budget.

Table 2
Share of
companies
with
participation of
Chinese capital
in oil and gas
production
(regionwide,
2010)

Region	Total production	Share of companies with participation of Chinese capital in production		China's net ratio	
Oil extraction (tons, %)					
Aktobe region	7417040	7235332	97,55	6494279,7	87,56
Atyrau region	1731133	250404	14,47	250404	14,47
Kyzylorda region	11156308	9904104	88,78	5928772,8	53,14
Mangystau region	12689001	11173016	88,05	6062968	47,78
Gas production (cu m, %)					
Aktobe region	3334517	3181566	95,41	2968979,5	89,04
Atyrau region	23730	4551	19,18	4551	19,18
Kyzylorda region	1606003	1547755	96,37	971615,1	60,5
Mangystau region	2399937	754145	31,42	200302,1	8,35


* All calculations made by author

But for acquisition of oil and gas companies, China works actively to develop infrastructure for delivering Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbons to China, and reconstruction of the country’s refineries. There are some significant projects.

The first project is the West Kazakhstan – China oil pipeline (*Map 1*). The parties announced the intent to build in 1997. The project was reanimated on October 13, 2003²⁰. The agreement on the construction of the first phase of the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline was signed on May 17, 2004. The first phase was completed on November 15, 2005. USD 700 mln out of USD 806 mln was secured against CNPC guarantees on terms of project financing.

West Kazakhstan – China oil pipeline

Map 1



The second phase, the Kenkiyak-Kumkol pipeline construction, started in December 2007 and completed in July 2009. About USD 1 bln was invested in it. The pipeline carrying capacity at the first phase made 10 mln tons per year with possible further expansion up to 15, 5 mln tons by 2010, up to 20 mln tons by 2012 and 50 mln tons²¹ by 2020.

It is owned and operated by Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline Company. Its shareholders CNPC and NC KazMunaiGas JSC act on a parity basis through their subsidiaries.

The second largest project is the Central Asia-China gas pipeline (*Map 2*)²². The agreement on Kazakhstan’s participation in the project was signed early 2007. KazTransGas and Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Limited (CNPC subsidiary) set up an Asian Gas Pipeline joint company on a parity basis to build and operate the Kazakh-Chinese gas pipeline.


[20] The Kenkiyak-Atyrau pipeline was put into operation March, 2003 (the first joint project of NC KazMunaiGas JSC and CNPC). Its reverse exploitation made this pipeline the first part of the West Kazakhstan-China big pipeline.

[21] See: S. Gavrichev. Kazakhstan – China – Kumkol. // RusEnergy Portal. – 2004. – May 21. – <http://www.rusenergy.com/> 7,7 mln tons ran through the pipeline in fact in 2009.

[22] The Central Asia-China gas pipeline starts in Turkmenistan, runs through Uzbekistan (it has two lines, the third one is under construction) and Kazakhstan (with a view of connecting Kazakhstan’s line of the Beineu-Bozoi-Shymkent) to the border of China. The total length of the pipeline is about 7 000 km, out of which 184,54 km run via Turkmenistan, 530 km via Uzbekistan, 1300 km through Kazakhstan and 4860 km via China.

Map 2

Central Asia-China gas pipeline



Under the agreements reached, it was supposed to implement the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline construction project in two stages. The first section of the gas pipeline starts at the Kazakh-Uzbek border runs through Shymkent and Shu to Khorgos. 1,333 km long pipeline with the diameter of 1024/1067mm has the capacity to carry 40 bln cu m per year. Implementation period was 2008-2009. The second section, the Beineu-Bozoi-Kyzylorda-Shymkent gas pipeline of 1,480 km length has a carrying capacity of 10 bln cu m. It has the diameter of 1,016 mm.

The first stage completed in July 2009. It was put into operation on December 12, 2009. The project cost USD 7,5 bln.²³

It was expected to start the second stage of the project as soon as the economic appraisal shows its feasibility²⁴, however, on October 10, 2008 Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Massimov met in Astana with visiting CNPC vice president Wang Dongjin who confirmed Chinese readiness to fund the construction of the second line of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline, the Beineu-Bozoi-Shalkar-Samsonovka section²⁵.

In mid April during Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to China, NC KazMunaiGas JSC and CNPC signed a framework agreement on widening oil and gas cooperation and assistance in obtaining credits. It provided for China's allocation of USD 5 bln for the projects in the oil and gas sector, as well as financing of the Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak-Shymkent gas pipeline project²⁶. On December 7 President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the law on ratification of the agreement on the construction of the Beineu-Shymkent section. China granted the loan for its construction. The project estimated cost is USD 3,5 bln²⁷.

[23] Early March 2009 B. Shayakhmetov stated that about USD 2.5 bln had been already disbursed. See: E. Butyrina, Third of the amount required has been already invested into the construction of the Kazakh-China gas pipeline.// *Panorama*. – 2009 – March 6.

[24] See: K. Konyrova. Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to set up a joint venture for the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline.// *Trend Information Agency* – 2007 – November 8. – <http://www.capital.trendaz.com/>.

[25] See: CNPC vice president confirmed China's readiness to finance the construction of the second line of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline// *Kazinform Information Agency* – 2008 – October 11. – <http://www.inform.kz/>

[26] See: CNPC vice president confirmed China's readiness to finance the construction of the second line of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline// *Kazinform Information Agency* – 2008 – October 11. – <http://www.inform.kz/>

[27] According to KazMunaiGas President K. Kabyldin, «the second phase of the gas pipeline will cost KZT 350 bln (about USD 2.3 bln). See: Zh. Kuzhekov. China laid pipeline to Central Asian gas in record time// *Radio Azattyq* – 2009. – December 14. – <http://rus.azattyq.org/>.

The third large project is the reconstruction of the Atyrau refinery. Sinopec Engineering, a subsidiary of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), won its reconstruction bid October 2009. It will be investing USD 1,04 bln. The project duration is 2010-2013. The primary purpose of complex is paraxylene and benzene extraction. Its actual output is 496000 tons of paraxylene and 133000 tons of benzene, also 200000 tons of TS 1 jet fuel per year. The key part of the second phase of the reconstruction is the construction of an aromatic hydrocarbons complex. The project customer is KazMunaiGas Trading House. The objective is to raise gasoline quality to reach Euro 4 European standard and derive raw material (benzene and paraxylene) to develop petrochemistry. Sinopec Engineering will apply French Axens Company's ParamaX BTX technologies for the Atyrau refinery reconstruction.

What is the peculiarity of Chinese presence in Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector?

Firstly, China acquired all the assets in Kazakhstan through open tenders from foreign investors they earlier belonged to. Therefore, it is incorrect at least to bring up an issue that «China forestalls Kazakhstan's oil-and-gas fields».

Secondly, unlike other foreign investors, Sino-Kazakh joint ventures were created then on the ground of large enterprises purchased by China. Actually with smart use those joint ventures will bring benefits to the Kazakh economy and raise significance of NC KazMunaiGas JSC.

Thirdly, there is no mistaking the fact that Chinese companies working in the oil sector Kazakhstan do not work under the PSA regime but abide by tax legislation in power. Kazakhstan tax agencies have least claims against them.

Fourthly, despite the increase in the number of companies with the participation of Chinese capital working in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan, expansion of Chinese presence and increase in production, China's share in in-place and recoverable reserves is insignificant. (Diagram 1)




Diagram 1
Allocation of oil reserves by country affiliation of extracting companies in Kazakhstan, early 2008 (%)

Source: S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova. *Central Asia and China: economic cooperation in the age of globalization*. M. Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IWEIR) of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2009. p 102.

Fifthly, substantial part of China's acquired minefields has been under development from the late 80s – early 90s and, therefore, as the experts of NC KazMunaiGas JSC forecast the share of companies with Chinese capital in oil and gas production in Kazakhstan will ultimately reduce (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2
Oil extraction
over the period
of 2010-
2020 of the
companies with
participation
of Chinese
investors
(thousand tons)



Source: The expert report of the Kazakh Oil and Gas Ministry requested by the deputies of the Kazakh Majilis (Lower Chamber of the Kazakh Parliament)

// Kazenergy Company, April 14, 2010. <http://www.kazenergy.com/content/view/11750/65/lang.ru/>

Sixthly, it is impossible to accuse companies with Chinese capital of referring to hire Chinese nationals. According to the data provided by Kazenergy, the perating personnel capacity attracted under the contracts to the enterprises with Chinese capital made 17733 people, including 17519 Kazakhstanis, or 98,8%²⁸.

According to NC KazMunaiGas JSC President K. Kabyldin, in PetroKazakhstan JSC with 2,360 employees there are only 25 experts from China, it is just 1,1%. There are only 20 managers from China (4,5%) out of 440 working at the head office. There are 12 Chinese people (1,8%) out of 660 working at JV KazGerMunai LLP. 6000 strong Mangistaumunaigas JSC employed 33 Chinese nationals (0,6% of total number, 2,2% of number of management positions). There are 21 Chinese (1%)²⁹ out of overall strength of Karazhanbasmunai JSC up to 2100 employees.

Finally, Chinese companies operating in the Kazakh oil and gas sector are not unlike other foreign companies, especially, in the context of gains in oil and gas recovery and their exports, when it is beneficial for sure. Besides, China is more active in fulfilling investment commitments, though is mean about solving local social problems. However, it would be absurd to accuse foreign companies, because dealing with social problems is the duty of the state which should lay down the «rules of the game» for foreign investors that would, primarily, accord with the interests and wishes of the people of Kazakhstan. If the state government does not do it, then the question should be put to the state.

Ultimately, any investor plays by the rules established by the government. If those rules are unprofitable to Kazakhstan it is the government's fault rather than the investor's. Chinese «horror stories» are used to distract attention of public mind from the true party in fault. I would like to remind Confucius quote «Don't complain about the snow on your neighbor's roof when your own doorstep

[28] See: Expert report of the Kazakh Oil and Gas Ministry requested by the deputies of the Kazakh Majilis (Lower Chamber of the Kazakh Parliament) // Kazenergy Company, April 14, 2010. <http://www.kazenergy.com/content/view/11750/65/lang.ru/>

[29] KMG President believes, the talks about Sincization of the Kazakh oil and gas sector are exaggerated // Novosti-Kazakhstan IA - 2010 - February 18. - <http://www.newskaz.ru/>

is unclear». I mean, we should not blame China for our problems. I believe there are enough examples, and everyone has heard them.

Republic of Uzbekistan

An official visit of President Islam Karimov to China in May 2005 laid the foundation for the oil and gas cooperation between the two countries. The visit ended with signing an agreement on Chinese investments into the development of Uzbek oil fields. The agreement provided for explorations on 23 deposits inside the Ustyurt, Bukhara-Khiva and Fergana platforms. The parties set up UzChina National Petroleum Corporation joint venture on a parity basis with an USD 96 mln equity capital for exploration activities. It is expected that Chinese company will invest USD 600 mln³⁰ into the project within 25 years.

In spring 2007 CNPC Silk Road (a CNODC subsidiary) started implementing an «Agreement to carry out geological exploration work at five investment blocks in 2006-2010» signed in 2006 between NHC Uzbekneftegas and CNODC. CNODC plans to invest USD 208,5 mln within 5 years with USD 88 mln for minimum program. 15 exploration and 12 development test wells will be drilled then. If new minefields are discovered in the developed regions CNODC and NHC Uzbekneftegas will on a parity basis set up a joint venture for their exploitation³¹.

In 2008 NHC Uzbekneftegas and CNPC signed the memo and articles of associations of Mingbulakneft JV for joint supplementary exploration and exploitation of Mingbulak in Namangan region. The founders of JV are Andijanneft OJSC and CNODC. It was created on a 50/50 equity participation basis³².

At the close of 2008 NHC Uzbekneftegas and CPTDC³³ negotiated the possibility of setting up in Uzbekistan tube and tool making production for petroleum industry. It is expected to implement the project on the ground of Uzneftegasmash³⁴.

On April 30, 2007 Uzbekistan and China signed an agreement on Uzbekistan's participation in the construction of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. JV Asia Trans Gas LLC was founded mid April 2008 for engineering, construction and operation of the Uzbek section of the gas pipeline.

Initially, Uzbek gas supplies via this gas pipeline were not scheduled, though early November 2009 the governments of China and Uzbekistan agreed on export of Uzbek gas up to 10 bln cu m per year to China as soon as the second line of the gas pipeline is launched³⁵. In June 2010 during Hu Jintao's visit to Tashkent Uzbekneftegas and CNPC signed a framework agreement on sales and purchase of natural gas³⁶. The second line of the Uzbek section of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline came on stream on December 25, 2010. Early 2011 it was reported that Uzbekistan intends to carry out a project on the construction of the third line of the Uzbek section of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline until 2014 and increase Uzbek gas deliveries to China up to 25 bln cu m³⁷.

[30] September 10, 2009 NHC Uzbekneftegas and CNODC signed a memo of mutual understanding. 23 deposits located on the Ustyurt plateau were transferred to UzChina National Petroleum Corporation. See: Chinese investors develop Uzbek market // IWPR. - 2009. - September 24. - <http://www.iwpr.net/>.

[31] CNPC may start a well on the Uzbek deposit mid 2009// 12.uz Information Agency. - 2008. - March 25. - <http://www.12.uz/>.

[32] NHC Uzbekneftegas and China's CNPC set a new joint venture for the development of Mingbulak//UzReport.com. Internet portal - 2008. - October 17. - <http://www.uzreport.com/>.

[33] CPTDC stands for China Petroleum Technology & Development Corporation (CNPC subsidiary).

[34] China's CPTDC wants to create oil and gas tubes production in Uzbekistan//12.uz Information Agency. - 2008. - December 17. - <http://www.12.uz/>.

[35] See: In China, will be delivered annually to 10 billion cubic meters of Uzbek gas // Portal «Vesti.uz» - 2009. - November 4. - <http://www.vesti.uz/>.

[36] Azizov D. NHC Uzbekneftegas and CNPC signed a gas agreement // Trend portal - 2010. - June 10. - <http://ru.trend.az/>.

[37] Uzbekistan announced it would lay the third phase of its section of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline until 2014 // Novosti-Kazakhstan IA. - 2011. - February 1. - <http://www.news.kaz.ru/>.

Table 3
Large projects
in oil and gas
industry of
Uzbekistan with
participation
of Chinese
companies

Investor	Year	Project	Capital investments (in mln dollars)	Economic activity	JV
CNPC, NHC Uzbekneftgas	2005	23 deposits in the Ustyurt and in Bukhara-Khiva region	600,0	Exploration, exploitation	UzChina National Petroleum Corporation
CNPC, NHC Uzbekneftgas	2006	Arniyaz, Sardob, Markovskoye, Umid and Ustyurt	208,5	Exploration, exploitation	UzChina National Petroleum Corporation
Dong Sheng	2007	Deposits in Fergana Fergana Valley	113,0	Exploration, exploitation	UzDong Sheng
CNPC, NHC Uzbekneftgas	2007 2010 2014	Engineering, construction and operation of the Uzbekistan-China gas pipeline	The first line – 2,900 the second line – 3,000 the third line – 2,200	Gas transit	Asia Trans Gas LLC
CNODC, Andijanneft OJSC	2008	Mingbulak minefield in Namangan region		Exploration, exploitation	Mingbulakneft JV with 50/50 equity participation
CPTDC, NHC Uzbekneftgas	2008	Production of tubes and engineering tools for oil and gas industry		Production	Several joint ventures on the ground of Uzneftgas-mash

Republic of Turkmenistan

Saparmurat Niyazov paid a visit to China in April 2006 to open a new chapter and bring relations to a new era of cooperation. On April 3 Saparmurat Niyazov met Hu Jintao. The parties signed an agreement on Turkmen gas deliveries to China³⁸. The agreement concluded provided for the construction of the Turkmenistan-China gas main and China's purchase of annual 30 bln cu m of gas in 30 years at the border of Turkmenistan starting 2009.

It also provided for timely Turkmen natural gas supplies to China via the pipeline in indicated volumes.

To provide the pipeline raw material base the parties agreed to jointly exploit and develop all minefields and areas on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River under the PSA terms.

According to the agreement, Chinese side will determine the Turkmen natural gas procurement process, «natural gas price will be set on rational and equitable base on the assumption of comparable prices at the worldwide market. Payments will be effected in US dollars only. Finally, Chinese side «will hold consultations with governments of transit countries to achieve agreements on mutually beneficial terms of natural gas transit through their territories»³⁹.

Besides, the agreement stipulated that the relevant organizations of both sides will conclude an Agreement on joint exploration and development of gas

[38] The issue concerning Turkmen gas deliveries to China was considered back to 1996. The consortium as a part of China's CNPC, Japan's Mitsubishi and the US Exxon developed the pipeline layout feasibility study, it extend from Xinjiang (Dovletabad minefield) through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan to China, South Korea and Japan. However, as a result of low world gas prices at that time and high cost of pipeline installation (USD 9 bln) the project was declared as unprofitable and the project works were stopped. With the world gas prices marching higher the interest in the updated project heads in the same direction. Chinese companies held service activities on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River for Turkmen gas in 2003-2005 to confirm high potential of those sites.

[39] See: The general agreement between the governments of Turkmenistan and China on implementation of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project and Turkmenistan's natural gas sales to the People's Republic of China. Beijing, April 3, 2006 // Neutral Turkmenistan. – 2006. – April 4.

fields to determine the cooperation framework with the participation of China's organization in providing the gas pipeline raw material base; an Agreement on the gas pipeline installation underlying principles to lay down the guidelines for the project implementation with a view to ensuring the development of the gas pipeline construction feasibility study; an Agreement on sales and purchase of gas to specify volumes of gas sales by year and to set organizational, legal and financial and other terms regulating Turkmenistan's natural gas sales to China.

All those agreements were concluded relatively quickly. It was scheduled to complete the gas pipeline installation in 2008 and start gas exports on January 1, 2009. China pledged to finance the project at its own expense and create necessary infrastructure in the territory of China⁴⁰. Deposits on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River with assay value of 1,7 trln cu m was as defined as a raw material base, Samandepo field as the basestock.

New President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov paid an official visit to China on July 17, 2007. The main outcome of his visit was signing of the PSA agreement to develop the Bagtyarlyk gas deposit on the right bank of the River Amu-Darya that should be a raw material base for the gas pipeline construction from Turkmenistan to China. Turkmenistan state agency for hydrocarbon resources and CNPC signed an agreement. The PSA agreement provided for seismic and drilling operations to determine opportunities for preparing the re-opened deposits for exploitation and to attach them to the gas pipeline at the second phase. The gas pipe route was approved. CNPC and Turkmenistan signed the 30-year natural gas supply under which the Central Asian country was to supply 30 billion cu m of gas to China starting from 2009.

Besides, Beijing accommodated Ashgabat with a soft loan to purchase China's drilling rigs⁴¹.

Construction of the Turkmen section of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline started early 2008. G. Berdymukhammedov met in August with CNPC President Jiang Jiemin and Director General of CNPC International (Turkmenistan) Lu Gongxun to propose Chinese partners to consider the possibility to annually buy 10 bln cu m of natural gas as supplementary to 30 bln cu m as prescribed by the interstate agreement. Besides, he spoke for expanded cooperation with CNPC through realization of new projects, in particular, construction of gas processing works⁴².

President of Turkmenistan and visiting President of China Hu Jintao had talks on August 29, 2008 and signed a package of 5 bilateral documents, including the joint statement and framework agreement on widening cooperation in gas sector. It was officially stated that Turkmenistan will annually supply 40 bln cu m instead of 30 bln cu m of natural gas to China⁴³.

However, early 2009 Turkmenistan suddenly postponed gas exports commencement date. CNPC delegation, led by Wang Dungxing, arrived in Ashgabat in March. He succeeded in convincing the Turkmen authorities to set gas pipeline to work at the turn of the year. He came up with compelling arguments: by the end of the year CNPC would build a gas processing plant with a capacity of 5 bln cu m in the Samandepo deposit, put into operation the second gas purifying industrial estate with a capacity of 8 bln cu m which will be built on the promising areas – a group of Altyn Asyr deposits. Its construction was scheduled for 2010. According to the company's plans 30 wells in all (23

[40] August 27, 2009 CNPC announced the outset of the second line of the West-East gas pipeline to ship Central Asian gas. It was planned to complete gas construction by 2008, and to run it at its full capacity in 2010. The gas pipe rated capacity is annual 30 cu m. The pipeline starts at Khorgos check point via Xian, Nanjing and further to the south to Guangzhou and eastwards to Shanghai. Total length of the pipeline is over 7,000 km which is the main line being 4,839 km long. – See: Xinjiang statistical yearbook 2008. – Urumqi, 2008. – p. 168.

[41] See: Agreement between Turkmenistan and China: Gazprom defeat or exchange of markets? // *Gazeta* – 2007. – July 19.

[42] See: China's section of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline has been completed// Turkmenistan.ru Agency. – 2008. – August 9. – <http://www.turkmenistan.ru/>.

[43] See: Hu Jintao, G. Berdymukhammedov meet // Turkmenistan.ru Agency – 2008. – August 30. – <http://www.turkmenistan.ru/>.

renovated and 7 new wells) in the Samandepo deposit will be ready for operation before the end of September 2009. Relevant ground infrastructure, including gas gathering and transport system is being actively developed. 40% of the amount of the scheduled work has already been fulfilled⁴⁴.

Early June 2009 China and Turkmenistan opened a new chapter in energy cooperation, as Deputy Chairman of the Government Tachberdy Tagiyev, said the sides reached an agreement. China approved a USD 3 bln purpose loan for commercial exploitation of the Yuzhnyi (South) Iolotan field. The official specified no loan conditions⁴⁵. On December 29, 2009 the source at the Turkmen government told Reuters, that China's CNPC, South Korean LG International Corp and Hyundai Engineering Co, the UAE Gulf Oil and Petrofac listed on the London Stock Exchange, won contracts to develop the largest gas deposit of Turkmenistan, the South Iolotan, and construction of gas processing plants. Total value of the contracts is USD 9,7bln. Turkmenistan signed the contract worth USD 3,128 bln with CNPC, USD 3,979 contract with Petrofac International (the UAE), USD 1,150 bln contract with Gulf Oil&Gas (the UAE) and USD 1,485 bln contract with consortium of South Korean LG International Corp and Hyundai Engineering Co⁴⁶.

Late June Vice Premier of the State Council Wang Qishan arrived for a visit in Turkmenistan to sign a package of agreements with G. Berdymukhammedov to formalize a gas alliance between Beijing and Ashgabat. The parties shared no details. According to Xinhua, China and Turkmenistan signed cooperation agreements in gas sector, also financial cooperation agreements. As long as the key problem was the price China will pay for Turkmen gas, the parties had seemingly gained understanding on this issue. In any case, early 2010 Russian press told, that China buys Turkmen gas at a price of USD 120 per 1,000 cu m, thereat Iran and Russia pay USD 170 and USD 190 correspondingly⁴⁷.

The Central Asia-China gas pipeline inauguration ceremony took place on December 14, 2009. Hu Jintao, I. Karimov and N. Nazarbayev arrived in Turkmenistan to attend the landmark pipeline official launch.

Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China He Guoqiang visited Turkmenistan in July 2010. Following the talks with G. Berdymukhammedov he briefed, firstly, on approval of the earlier reached agreements on the construction of the second line of the gas pipe and increase in Turkmen gas supplies up to 40 bln cu m per year, secondly, on China's proposal to expand pipeline up to 60 bln cu m, out of which Turkmen share is above 50 bln cu m per year⁴⁸.

In August 2010 there appeared information with reference to the Turkmen sources, that Berdymukhammedov charged heads of oil and gas industry to hold negotiations with China Development Bank on extending a USD 4,1 bln soft loan for further development of the South Iolotan deposit. Last April China Development Bank and Turkmengas signed a USD 4,1 bln loan agreement. Petrochina guaranteed repayment through deliveries of Turkmen gas to China⁴⁹.

With due account for those contracts, China turned into both the largest investor into Turkmen economy and the key consumer of Turkmen gas at

[44] See: Negotiations on the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline were held in Ashgabat// Rusenergy.com. – 2009. – March 31. – <http://www.rusenergy.com/>; China's CNPC will build a gas processing plant with a capacity of 5 bln cu m in Turkmenistan // CA-news Agency – 2009. – January 7. – <http://www.ca-news.org/>.

[45] See: N. Grib. Turkmen gas recovery for Chinese money // Kommersant.ru. – June 8 – 2009; according to reserves proven early 2009 by Gaffney, Cline & Associates (Great Britain), the Yuzhnyi Iolotan enters top four world's largest deposits. Its anticipated reserves equals 4.7-14 trln cu m consistent with Shtokman in the Arctic (Russia) or South Pars (Iran). – See: T. Milacheva. Larger than Shtokman // RBC-daily. – 2009. – February 20. Early October this information was challenged, reaudit and exploration drilling indicated that the field reserves are 2-3 times less than the stated earlier. – See: A. Klyuchkin. Turkmen fairytale // Lenta.ru Internet portal. – 2009. – October 13. – <http://www.lenta.ru/>.

[46] See: China will get gas from the largest deposit of Turkmenistan in 2013//Regnum Information Agency. – 2011. – March 8. – <http://www.regnum.ru/>; Turkmenistan awarded contracts to foreigners //Kommersant.ru. – 2009. – December 31.

[47] See: N.Grib. Turkmen gas divided between three// Kommersant.ru. – 2010. – April 15.

[48] See: Ya. Khummedov China buys Turkmenistan // Vremya Vostoka portal - 2010. – July 5. – <http://www.easttime.ru/>.

[49] See: A. Grivach. Gas in exchange of money. China gives Turkmenistan USD 4 bln against forward deliveries. // Moscow news. – 2011. – April 28.

the prices significantly lower than the world benchmark. Is such cooperation beneficial to Turkmenistan? It is highly questionable. Though, the fact remains.

Investor	Year	Projects	Capital investments	Economic activity	JV
Sinopec	February 2007	Drilling of 6 wells with projected depth of 3.1 km in the Yashildepe field	USD 42,3 mln.		with NHC Turkmenneft
CNPC	May 2007	Drilling of 12 exploratory wells over 12 years in the South lolotan field	USD 1,5 bln	Exploration	with NHC Turkmenneft
CNPC International	July 2007	Exploration and exploitation of Bagtyyarlyk and Samandepede and adjacent sites, construction of infrastructure		Exploration, development	CNPC International (Turkmenistan)
CNPC International	July 2007	Construction and exploitation of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipe	EUR 395 mln		CNPC International (Turkmenistan)
China Exim Bank	November 2007	Maryazot PA reconstruction	20-year loan worth USD 239 mln 358 thousand at a rate of 3% per annum	Production	
China Exim Bank	November 2007	Glass factory construction	20-year loan amounting to USD 642 000 at a rate of 3%		
CNPC / CPTDC	December 2009	South lolotan commercial exploitation	USD 3,13 bln.	Exploration, development	
Petrochina, China Development Bank	April 2011	South lolotan commercial exploitation	USD 4,1 bln	Exploration, development	

Table 4
Large projects in Turkmenistan oil and gas industry with participation of Chinese companies

Republic of Tajikistan

Energy and infrastructure facilities of Tajikistan spark China's interest too. The relations between the two countries were enlivened in 2004 when Hu Jintao announced China's readiness to extend buyer credits on easy terms to the SCO member countries. The Tajik government prepared immediately 53 draft proposals to the amount of USD 1 bln.

In March 2006 the government of Tajikistan and China Exim Bank signed a memo of understating. Chinese side approved three large projects (construction of Lolazor-Khotlon, the South-North high-voltage power lines also Dushanbe-Khudjand-Chanak highway construction) and invited bids for implementation of those projects among the Chinese companies.

On April 19, 2006 Barki Tochik (Turkmenistan) and China Theban Electric Apparatus Stock Co LTD (CTEAS), signed in Dushanbe two contracts worth USD 340 mln providing for the construction of the 350 km long 500 kV South-North transmission line, and 93 km long 220 kV Lolazor-Khotlon power line. On September 16 President E. Rakhmon and China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao attended the official inauguration ceremony of the 500 kV South-North power line construction.

November 2006 China's Sinohydro Corporation announced its readiness to participate in the HPP construction project on the Zeravshan River. In 2007 was signed a contract under which the company pledged to build the 60 km long 150 MW Zeravshan hydropower plant, 220 kV power line from the hydropower plant to Pendzhikent city. China provided the funding through a 25-year loan worth USD 200 mln at a rate of 1% per annum. The project implementation period was 2007-2010.

It was stated in March 2007 that Sinohydro Corporation experts completed the feasibility study for the Yavan hydropower plant construction, also the Tajik finance ministry and China's Exim Bank would sign a corresponding credit agreement in April. However, the agreement was never signed.

According to the expert opinion not far from the truth, the political motivations became involved then. Concerned with building up gas relations with Uzbekistan, China stepped in no conflict with the country for its participation in the construction of the hydropower plant in Tajikistan⁵⁰.

Early June 2009 a large Chinese delegation, led by member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Wang Lequan, paid a visit to Dushanbe to sign cooperation agreements. Energy and Industry Ministry of Tajikistan and China Theban Electric Apparatus Stock Co LTD (CTEAS) inked an agreement on the construction of the Nurabad 1 hydroelectric power plant on the River Khingob (with a capacity of 350 MW, construction to start 2010, volume of investments up to USD 560 mln), an agreement on the construction of the 200 MW Dushanbe thermal power plant with investments up to USD 400 mln. Barki Tochik OJSHC and CTEAS signed an agreement on the Lolazor-Khotlon, South-North power lines construction overwork (it provided for extra investments up to USD 61 mln)⁵¹.

Except for power transmission lines construction, other projects are not implemented yet. The reason is the same; Uzbekistan's opinion and its concern over possible reduction of water inflow to the republic are taken into account.

Late November 2010 Premier of the State Council of China Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to Tajikistan. One of the documents signed during the visit provided for extension of China Exim Bank soft loan over USD 37 mln to Tajikistan for the construction of the 220kV Khudjand-Ayni power line in Sogdi region. CTEAS widely recognized in Tajikistan will build the power line⁵².

Another USD 26.5 bln credit agreement was signed last September. China Exim Bank provided the financing facility for the construction of a new Sogd 500 switching station for the 500 kV South-North power line⁵³.

All of this is, undoubtedly, very good, Tajikistan really needs both the power transmission line and thermal power station construction. The point at issue is how it will pay on the loans. According to the data provided by the Tajik finance ministry, about 36,6% of the country's overseas debt that reached USD 1 bln 790, 45 mln as of October 1, 2010 account for China's loans⁵⁴.

[50] See: R. Abdullo. Sino-Tajik relations: some of the finer points // *Centrasia.ru* portal - 2011. - May 6. - <http://www.centrasia.ru>

[51] See: A. Yuldashev. Wang Lequan visits Dushanbe. // *Asia-Plus*. - 2009. - June 5.

[52] See: R. Abdullo. Sino-Tajik relations: some of the finer points; N. Pirmazarov. Tajikistan should be more cautious to a voracious economic shark of China // *CA-news Agency*. - 2010. - November 26. - <http://www.ca-news.org/>

[53] See: A. Yuldashev. China allocates above USD 30 mln to ensure Tajikistan's energy independence// *Asia-Plus Information Agency*. - 2011. - October 3. - <http://www.news.tj/>

[54] N. Pirmazarov. Tajikistan should be more cautious to a voracious economic shark of China.

Project	Date	Company	Financing facility
The 500kV North-South power line	2006 – 2010	CTEAS	Exim Bank loan amounting to USD 281 mln + USD 61 mln
The 220kV Lolazor-Khotlon power line	2006 – 2008	CTEAS	Exim Bank provided USD 59 mln loan
The 220kV Khudjand-Aini power line	Early 2011	CTEAS	Exim Bank provided USD 37 mln loan
The Sogd 500 switching station for the 500 kV South-North power line	Early 2012	CTEAS	Exim Bank provided USD 26,5 mln loan
The 150 MW Zeravshan HPP construction	Early 2008	Sinohydro Corp.	Exim Bank provided USD 200 mln loan
The 350 MW Nurabad 1 HPP construction on the River Khingob	Early 2010	CTEAS	Exim Bank gave USD 560 mln loan
The 200 MW TPP construction in Dushanbe	Early 2010	CTEAS	USD 400 mln loan of Exim Bank

Table 5
Large energy projects in Tajikistan with participation of Chinese companies

Kyrgyz Republic

China's interest in Kyrgyzstan is driven, mainly, by transport and logistic projects rather than its power economy. This may be due to the fact that China regards Kyrgyzstan, in the first instance, as conduit for Chinese goods that are meant for sale in Central Asia and, partially, in Russia.

Nevertheless, China participates in several energy projects in the territory of Kyrgyzstan.

In 2004 China and Kyrgyzstan entered into partnership for the construction of two hydropower plants on the River Naryn with investments totaling USD 2 bln, though the agreements were cancelled due to the revolutionary unrest in Kyrgyzstan.

In August 2006 China State Power Grid Corporation and Kyrgyz Electric Power Plants and National Power Grid of Kyrgyzstan signed a protocol of intent on long-term cooperation. It reflected the mutual interest in the construction and reconstruction of power lines and power stations, also exchange of technical experience.

The key projects of interest for Chinese investors are the Sarydjaz and Kambarata hydroelectric power chains, construction of the power transmission line in Kashgar and coal-fired thermal power plants, also reconstruction of the Uchkurgan TPP and HPP in Bishkek.

October 2009 one of the largest companies of China, Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock Co. (TBEA), and National Power Grid of Kyrgyzstan OJSC signed a cooperation agreement in Beijing. It stipulated China's participation in the Datka switching station construction and the 500 kV Datka-Kemin power line. The project cost USD 342 mln. The power line construction was supposed to start in 2010 but there is still no information about the beginning of the project⁵⁵.

Kyrgyzstan relies on China's assistance in the Bishkek TPP rehabilitation and modernization, and design works and delivery of China's equipment for hydroelectric generating set 2 and 3 of Kambarata HPP-2 (the first turbogenerator unit was delivered earlier from Russia, Russia had to deliver the second and the third units - K.S.). Kyrgyzstan believes that participation in the Kambarata

[55] See: D. Karimov. China's experience as a development model for Kyrgyzstan economic growth // 24.kg Information Agency. – 2010. – January 15; D. Karimov. Okeila, Mr Chudinov! // 24.kg Information Agency – 2009. – October 16. – <http://www.24.kg/>.

HPP-2 may become China's successful project in the Kyrgyz Republic. China shares the same opinion. «We may start even now our cooperation in the construction of the Kambarata HPP-2 and the Bishkek TPP reconstruction,» China's Deputy Minister for Commerce, Mr. Chen Jian told at the meeting with M.Bakiyev in January 2010⁵⁶.

Last May Kyrgyzstan and China's Sinohydro signed a letter of intent for the construction of a HPP on the River Suusamy⁵⁷. Early September 2011 an agreement on the construction of an oil refinery in Kara-Balta was signed with Shanxi coal-mining and chemical industry company. The estimated amount to be invested is USD 600 mln⁵⁸.

* * *

What are the conclusions? Firstly, it is beyond any doubt that China came to Central Asia for the long haul and apparently this «affection» is mutual as far as in most cases (especially since 2005) the high-level political establishments of the Central Asian countries have lent support to Chinese companies. Needless to say, China will step up its economic presence in Central Asia, as well as in the energy sector.

Secondly, it is clear that China's energy policy will aim at involving the Central Asian hydrocarbon reserves to serve their energy needs on medium-term and, particularly, long-term horizons. However, it cannot be denied that it meets the interests of the states of the region striving to diversify sources of capital investment into their energy sectors and electric power transmission and hydrocarbons transportation routes.

Assessing Chinese presence in the Central Asian energy sectors, we cannot fail to touch upon the widespread thesis that they are turning into a raw material appendage of China. There is a deal of truth in it. The growing home demand, practically, for the entire group of raw materials consolidates Central Asia's turning into the raw material appendage of both the European and Chinese economies. Global uncompetitiveness of the Central Asian economies as compared to the geographically adjacent Chinese economy utterly aggravates if not to fully block the opportunities to diversify their economic setups beyond materials sector.

Besides, allocation of this function to Central Asia is objective by nature and under certain historic conditions has no alternatives. Raw material orientation of the Central Asian economies displays itself in their relations with China and other countries across the world. It is rather the internal problem than the problem of bilateral relations with China. It means that beyond the raw materials and extractive industries and some branches of farming Central Asia and Eurasia have extremely constricted opportunities for efficient employment of population⁵⁹.

Finally, rivalry of geopolitical actors in our region is of utmost interest for me being involved in geopolitics. Given China's growing appetites it is possible to assume that competition between Chinese, western and Russian companies working in Central Asia, particularly, in the oil and gas sector, will escalate that will throw these countries into an explicit dilemma of choosing a priority partner.

Thereat, needless to say China will tend to do what predominantly would serve its interests. And those interests would at some stage step into an outright

[56] See: D. Karimov. China's experience as a development model for Kyrgyzstan economic growth.

[57] See: Yu.Mazykina. A letter of intent for the construction of a HPP on the River Suusamy⁵⁷ was signed with Kyrgyz investors in Kyrgyzstan // 24.kg Information Agency. – 2011. – May 31.

[58] China will build a USD 600 mln oil refinery in Kyrgyz Kara-Balta. //Tazabek Portal. – 2011. – September 3. – <http://www.tazabek.kg/>.

[59] See: S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova. Central Asia and China: economic cooperation in the age of globalization. – M.: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IWEIR) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2009. – p. 160.

conflict with Russia's interests and strategy, and in this case China will certainly try to throw the countries of region into the dilemma of choosing between its «investment opportunities» and Russia's imperial ambitions. It is difficult to predict how the Central Asian elite will vote for in this case. It is quite possible they will opt for China, particularly, with a glance to its equity participation in new oil and gas, transport and infrastructure projects and outlined changes in China's image in the public opinion in the countries of the region. Today, despite the concerns at the mental level over «China's expansion», both the political elite and Central Asian nations regard China as quite a worthy alternative to Russia. That's why the main question to me sounds somewhat paradoxical, how long China-Central Asia idyll will last and how China will react when it has no western or Russian rival companies in Central Asia. We should always remember that in case with China we are dealing not only with the leading power of Asia but also the country which has the following postulate «The Wise Monkey who sits on a high mountain and watches the battle of two Tigers». And the key is not to fall into the Monkey's clutches when the Tigers weaken.

Fears and phobias are a bad advisor. Secrecy shrouding energy cooperation between China and Central Asian countries is a bad advisor too. First of all, openness should replace them, all the agreements signed and waiting to be signed should be debated with the participation of experts, as well as NGOs. Besides, it concerns not only China but also all foreign investors. Secondly, it is crucial to soberly evaluate the reality that presupposes system-based studies of political, national, socio-political and ideological processes underway in China and specific features of its foreign policy. We will also fall into the same trap in the relations with foreign partners if it never comes.

BETWEEN ISLAM AND SECULARISM: RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF TURKEY IN THE TURKISH REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

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Since their independence, Turkish republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus have an entire place apart in the foreign cultural and religious policy of Turkey. Based on years of land surveys made during these past five years, this article is aimed at making a point on religious implications of Turkish policy in Turkish-speaking Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey's religious policy in the republics stemming from ex-USSR must be thought in triple dynamics: official Turkish State politics, Turkish brotherhood movements and «local,» official or private components.

Islam and Politics in these Republics on the Eve of Independences

It is suitable to recall, first of all, that all States in question are of Islamic culture: the major part of the population is Sunnite and the Hanafi school is dominant, in the same way as in Turkey. Nonetheless, in Azerbaijan, more than 60% of the population is Shiite. Historically, Islamic civilization has been present in most of these states since at least the 10th century, except the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes that were Islamized later.

All these States were created in the frame of soviet policy nationalities in the 1920s and 1930s.¹ Islam's management in all these countries during the entire soviet period was the same, even though certain regions were touched more than others by the regime's anti-religious policy². In all these States, during the soviet period a paradoxical situation was noted: officially, the State was basically against all Islam public expression. The Communist Party and press agencies, by perfectly submissive nature to the regime, actively fought against religiosity and against their influence practiced by Islam on consciences³. However, in fact, the situation was quite different. Certain local authorities, often active in certain religious practices, witnessed a lot of tolerance vis-à-vis religious practices in the community. There was numerous official administrators who, while denouncing religion and its hold on populations, respected themselves certain Islamic rites such as circumcision, funeral according to the mores or pilgrimages to the tombs of certain holy personalities. On the same way, in full soviet period, certain religious leaders succeeded, in spite of and under surveillance by official authorities, in continuing to form Islamic groups. Therefore, in Central Asia,

[1] Olivier Roy, *La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des nations*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1997, 326 p.

[2] On the situation of Islam during the soviet period see the classical study by Alexandre Bennigsen, *Les Musulmans oubliés, l'Islam en Union soviétique*, Paris, 1981. For a more recent and pertinent analysis of soviet policy vis-à-vis Islam see Daniel Brower, *Turkistan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, London-New York: Routledge Curzon, 2000. More specifically devoted to the fights led by the Soviet State against Islam, see the work by Soshanna Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca. The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941*, Westport, CN-London: Praeger, 2001.

[3] Soshanna Keller, op. cit.

Domla Hindustani formed several religious groups that since independences have retaken the torch of political Islam by creating associations and political Islamic-prone parties⁴. In Azerbaijan, in Guba region, in the mid-70s, when religious repression was particularly fierce, a local mullah, Mehmed Hesen Shirkevi (1907-1976) was able to publish a *tefsir* (comment) of the Koran and train young disciples⁵. In the same manner, in southern Azerbaijan, especially in the village of Erkivan and in the vicinity of Massalli and Lenkeran, neighborhood mullahs kept dispensing Koranic courses and so trained young disciples who, in their turn, transmitted religious learning to their descendants. For example in Lenkeran city center, in southern Azerbaijan, a commemorative plate placed in 1994 by the local people pays tribute to a known religious personality in the region, Mirza Mehmed Huseyin Molla Hemidoglu (1878-1960). Indeed, there are a lot of several local religious cases that, in parallel to their official activities, contributed to the maintenance of Islamic knowledge and practice among citizen.

One of the first consequences of independences was to allow Islam to become visible in public space. Already started thanks to perestroika and its contributions to freedom of association in the political and cultural domain, the rehabilitation of Islam was going on. Upon declaring independences, the «new» powers, often constituted of old apparatchiks reconverted to nationalism, took a series of measures that favored renewal of Islam and its acceptance as a national culture component. Thus, most presidents of Central Asia and Azerbaijan made pilgrimage to Mecca, took the oath on the Koran and encouraged and participated in the reopening of several religious establishments that had been closed during the soviet period. For example, in Azerbaijan, president Aliiev, although had been serving the State during decades and mostly the KGB, made his hajj in Mecca in 1993 and was the main artisan of the restoration of several local pilgrimage sites such as Bibi Heybet or Mir Movsum Ata mausoleum in the suburbs of Baku. In Uzbekistan, the former communist party secretary, today president, Islam Karimov went to Bahauddin Nakchibend's tomb in Boukhara and brought an effective political and financial support to the restoration of the sanctuary. These measures taken by the new political authorities were not the only encouragements to Islamic revival in these countries.

Since opening of the borders, external influences strongly affected local Islam⁶ and can be ranked according to three origins. First of all, it is convenient to remember that the first foreign influence was the result of soviet cooperation policy with the Muslim world. Indeed, in the mid 1970s, amid of the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Muslim world, Moscow sent to certain Arab countries (mostly socialist regimes) young soviets to study Islam. For some of them, these stays were a crucial moment of making contact with Wahhabite ideas and Muslim Brothers' philosophy⁷. It is supposed that Wahhabism and other radical Islamist philosophies entered the Soviet Union by this means. However, main Islamist influences were clearer after independences, due to several phenomena. Firstly, it is necessary to underline the role of pilgrimage, the hajj to Mecca and Medina. During the soviet period, every year, central authorities only authorized some fifteen or twenty pilgrims to travel to Saudi Arabia. Obviously, this figures have had a spectacular increase upon opening of the borders in the early 1990s. Some pilgrims, facing for the first time rigid Saudi Islam, were seduced by the Wahhabite discourse. In this aspect, the role of migrants originating from Central Asia, installed in holy cities after several decades, must be emphasized. There are in fact at least fifty thousand

[4] See the works by Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov, «Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and the Beginning of the 'Great Schism' Among the Muslims of Uzbekistan», St. phane Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, *Islam and Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to late Twentieth Centuries)*, London-New York, Bahrain, Kegan Paul, 2001.

[5] Interview with Naile Suleymanova, theologian and instructor of Khazar University, Bakou, June 2004.

[6] Habiba Fathi, «La naissance de la coopération islamique en Asie centrale», *Recherches internationales*, n. 46, 1996, p. 65-80.

[7] Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, Muzaffar Kamilov, op. cit.

ethnic Uzbeks and as many Uighours in Saudi Arabia kingdom, which granted them political asylum, when they had to flee their countries because of soviet control strengthening over the entire Central Asia in the early 1930s. On the occasion of two missions realized pursuant to a study on Uzbeks in Saudi Arabia, it was possible to appreciate to what extent Uzbek community had taken part as of 1990 in the re-islamization of Central Asia⁸. Always under the renewing effort of the ties with the Muslim world, it appears that numerous students had chosen to go studying in Arab States, in Iran or Turkey. The contribution of these students to the re-islamization of all these republics was considerable. In some cases, they played the role of true missionaries sent by the States where they concluded their studies and were in charge of preaching the «true Islam.» Most Muslim countries close to Central Asia—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey – encouraged their respective missionaries to come to propagate their national view of Islam in these republics. Paradoxically, it is incontestably the secular of these States, Turkey, which had the biggest influence on the new Islam in each State of Central Asia. This paradoxical Turkish influence deserves a few clarifications.

Turkey and its Model in Political-Religious Matter

The «Turkish model» concept is often, wrongly, seen as a political transition model, economic, political and religious, conceived by Turkey and designed to be exported to Turkish republics⁹. As a matter of fact, the situation was quite more complex in the early 1990s and it is incorrect to believe that Turkish diplomacy forged only one model for these States. It is undoubtedly necessary to remember what the context was at that time. With the Soviet Union dislocation, a new fear was installed in western chancelleries: The preoccupation was that Muslim populations from the former USSR, by reaction to anti-religious policy practiced by the soviet regime, drop into the trap of Islamist propaganda led by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Western experts (headed by Americans and Europeans) were persuaded that the communities in question would radicalize very quickly or at least, it was feared to see them seduced by the charms of Saudi or Iranian Islamism. It is in this context that western diplomats whispered to their colleagues and Turkish allies the idea of a «Turkish model» – where Islam, moderate and laic, is tightly controlled by military power – to be developed for these States and to be promoted as fast as possible. The reason by which Westerners were interested and reassured by the Turkish model was its choice for Kemalist secularism, its great experience in market economy experience and the good integration of the countries to western liberal value system.

By the way, the developments of this «Turkish model» have evolved differently. Whereas Turkey has been chosen by its peers to export secularism in Central Asia, Ankara's policy participated in the dissemination of a quite different kind of private Islam in these republics. The question is to find out why secular Turkey deployed so many means to provide Islamic services in these countries. In order to answer this question, it is appropriate to develop two points that seem fundamental to me: missionary activities of Turkish Islamist movements and the reaction of the Turkish State in view of this competition.

Turkish Missionaries in the Conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus

I use the term missionary to designate all Turkish Islamist movements that have been active in the Turkish-speaking world since the end of the Soviet

[8] Bayram Balci, «The Role of the Pilgrimage in the Establishment of Relations Between Uzbekistan and the Uzbek Community of Saudi Arabia,» *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, v. 2, n. 3, 2003.

[9] Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, 53 p.

Union. The use of this word seems to me to be in accordance with the reality that I observe in the field after ten years. Indeed, conversations with members of different movements, which will be approached here, have allowed me to reach the conclusion that every militant that is expatriated feels to be granted with a mission, i.e. disseminating Islam, or more precisely the Islamic conception of its origin community or of his brother-hood in these virgin countries¹⁰. These movements are comparable, all proportions kept, to Christian missionary movements that set of at their time to conquest Africa or America. In our case, Central Asia and the Caucasus represent these new preaching countries, virgin of every influence, which must be conquered before it is too late, before other movements, Muslim or Christian, come and convert these «survivors of communism.» Of course, we cannot go into details of all missionary activities of Turkish Islamists. We will only mention their most visible expressions, deployed by the most influent movements, and especially the *nurcu*.

It is perhaps appropriate to recall what the *nurcu* movement represents in Turkey, in order to better locate the action of these heirs in the educational domain in the Turkish world since 1991. As everyone knows, Sait Nursi is the founder and thinking master of a vast religious community in Turkey, the *nurcu*. Born in 1873 in Eastern Turkey where he received classical madrasa education marked by *naqchibandi*¹¹ philosophy, he travels all over the country to lead a combat that is dear to him: save the faith in strong erosion in a world in full mutation. Strictly watched by the young Kemalist republic, he recovers certain freedom of action with the arrival of the conservative right to power in 1946. He is the author of exegetics of the Koran of more than 6,000 pages, *Risale i Nur*. The *Risale i Nur* were drafted largely in prison and their original diffusion was at first made in clandestinity. His first and closest disciples scattered «his» good word and formed a very large party of *nurcu* movement militants.

Upon Nursi's death in 1960, the movement split into several branches¹², one of which is run by the not less famous Fethullah G len. These various groups and *nurcu* inheriting currents took different directions. Some privileged education (as is the case with G len), others publishing (such has *Yeni Asya* house specialized in publishing prestigious books on the movement founding master). In all cases, teaching of *nurcu* ideas is done within small circles created by the movement members, in school or even in university environment. The movement is very hierarchical and each bears a specific name: the first degree is to be *Talebe* (pupil), then to be *Abi* (eldest brother), to finally reach the status of *Varis* (heir). However, one of the *nurcu* groups is clearly distinguished from the others in both his organization and his expansion tactics and methods outwards. It is Fethullah G len move, and his disciples, the *fethullahçi*.

Born in 1938 in Erzurum, in Eastern Turkey, Fethullah G len too, like Sait Nursi, received classical, informal religious education, in the sense that at this time there were no official religious educational establishments. The young G len however begins his career in full legality, in capacity as preacher, or *vaiz*, at the service of the State. After having officiated for a certain time in Edirne, he was transferred to a small mosque of the suburbs of Izmir, in Kestanepazari in the early 1960s.

Like Nursi, he developed his own thought of his Islam vision, trained disciples, created a real religious movement, neo-*nurcu*, distinct from the one founded by the master. Fethullah G len's movement is born out of questionings

[10] On the missionary spirit of Turkish islamists in Central Asia see Bayram Balci, *Missionnaires de l'islam en Asie centrale, les coles turques de Fethullah G len*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002.

[11] On Sait Nursi movement, see: Safa M rsel, *Siyasi D þ nce Tarihi Iþ ð nda Bedi zzaman Said Nursi* (Said Nursi in the shadow of political ideal history), Istanbul, *Yeni Asya Yay nlar*, 237 p. One can also refer to the very instructive and most critical contribution by *erif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey, The Case of Bedi zzaman Said Nursi*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1989, 267 p.

[12] On the different religious groups stemming from the movement founded by Sait Nursi, see Hasan H seyin Ongun, «Bablang çtan G n m ze Said Nursi ve Nurculuk Hareketi» (The *nurcu* movement and Said Nursi: from his its beginning until today), *Yeni T rkiye*, n. 45, Nisan 1997, p. 57-71.

on new educational methods and his power grows thanks to the accomplishment and success of educational projects. Indeed, the birth of the movement is confounded with the creation of an educational foundation gathering students' and teachers' relatives, in order to allow children to reach better results at school. It is materialized by the organization by Fethullah and his disciples of courses and activities for scholars, under auspice of this foundation and his activities at Kestanepazari mosque. These activities were consisting first of vacation camps, which G len organizes during several successive summers between 1968 and 1972, for taking care of children and youths during summer months. Generally, the students are devoted to intellectual activities, such as reading of the Koran and Sait Nursi's works, but also learning a series of knowledge allowing them later to integrate and progress in the midst of the organization implemented by G len. The first «vacationers» trained by G len later became personalities among the most influential of the movement and hold important positions in the structures composing the community (*cemaat*), using its term to introduce herself. Among the main bodies of *fethullahci* movement, we quote newspapers and magazines *Zaman*, *Sizinti*, *Fountain*, *Bizim Aile*, and *Aksiyon*, *Samanyolu* television network and more recently the foundation of writers and journalists of Turkey, *Turkiye Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi*¹³.

Since its beginnings, the movement has been hierarchically organized. Similar branches to Kestanepazari community are created in other cities in the country. Influenced by G len's sermons or preaching, pronounced every Friday at the time of the weekly prayer, numerous and simple faithful, seduced by the character's charisma, go about disseminating his ideas and thus take part in the beginning of a truly distinct religious movement, with an original strong educational system. The «educational» foundations, *fethullahci*, initiated throughout the country by personalities marked by G len's *vaaz*, his books or further by the magazine *Sizinti* of which he is the inspirer or editor were increased. The role of the latter, founded by those close to G len and the movement, were crucial in the diffusion of his ideas¹⁴.

On the other hand, the great strength of movement is to have chosen to recruit among pupils and young students, by providing them with effective support in their studies. This support goes through an assistance structure, gathering associations and small merchants close to the movement. It may make available to most impoverished students a collective apartment, called houses of light or *þ k evleri*, where often a responsible person is appointed *Abi*, initiated in the ideas of the movement and in charge of transmitting them to all those who share the apartment with him. Materially, the role of the *Abi* consists of teaching the students how to pray, read the Koran and the works of Sait Nursi and Fethullah G len, but also each student is conducted to recruiting of new faithful in their original environment.

The 1980s constitute unquestionably a turnaround in Turkish economic, social and political history. January 1980 marks the end of the economic dirigisme inherited from the Kemalist period and a certain passage to market economy. Economic opening allows the beginning or at least the reinforcement of the private sector and with it of the associative environment close to brotherhoods and religious movements. G len's movement, and also other movements, at the same way as the *Naqchibandi* took advantage of this context to develop their associations all over the country. In the late 80s, enterprises, institutions and also private schools, university complexes are inspired by G len's and his friends' movement and are already counted by tens in the country. The 1980s can be considered as those of movement influence throughout the country, and

[13] See the foundation's website, www.yazarlarvakfi.org.tr

[14] Hakan Yavuz, «Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah G len,» *Middle East Journal*, v. 53, n. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 584-605.

the next decade was characterized by its expansion, far beyond Turkish borders, mainly in countries of the former socialist block.

The first *fethullahci* missionaries in Central Asia and the Caucasus arrive even before the declarations of independence, thanks to the establishment of intensive cultural ties between Turkey and Gorbachev's Soviet Union. At this point, since 1989, the Perestroika enabled closer contacts between the two countries – these contact opportunities being seized without hesitation by G len's movement businessmen. In fact, initially ties are built by entrepreneurs in the economic sphere before expanding in other domains, mostly educational. A *fethullahci* businessmen association, such as *Aksaray, Nigde* or *Izmir* decided to develop its activities in a precise region, such as for example, Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. Once economic ties are solidly established and the confidence of local political authorities is ensured, the businessmen help teachers so that high schools may be implemented. This informal collaboration between cities and associations worked well and allowed springing up tens of schools in Eurasia. Teacher recruitment for these schools follows co-option logic. A teacher willing to be expatriated asks for a recommendation from the management of an educational enterprise that manages schools abroad¹⁵.

Unlike it is commonly considered, the private schools controlled by the group are not madrasas where the Koran and Nursi and G len religious philosophies are taught. They are «ordinary» high schools, but that are distinguished from local establishments by substantial human and material investment to ensure university and professional achievement of graduates. Initially without charge, schooling has gradually become payable. Mathematics, physics, biology, computing, English and economics are the most taught disciplines in these establishments, often of scientific character. However, although being without any religious expression, education contains some ethics and a certain philosophy, being the reflect, for example, of the nature at the same time conservative and modernist of the *fethullahci* movement. At first, the daily attitude of the teachers – characterized by hygiene, a good presentation, respect for hierarchy, politeness, courtesy, sobriety – has unfailingly had real influence on their local Kazakh, Azeri, Turkmen etc. colleagues. Furthermore, outside school, when it is possible, in the dormitories and university complexes, the most permeable students are often identified, selected and their close tutors give them a religious instruction totally absent in school. Finally, we also must mention that in certain cities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, *cay sohbelleri* (collation-debate) were also organized, and have made the fortune and identity of the movement. They are private meetings, realized at initiative of every one, were a movement member read passages from the *Risale i Nur* by explaining them to the guests. However, two mitigations must be brought to this phenomenon: in Central Asia, still today, these theological debates only gather expatriated Turks. Very few «locals» are active in the movement, open proselytizing being dangerous to educational activities of the *cemaat*, and responsible persons behave in a very prudent manner. On the other hand, the situation is different in Azerbaijan. In this country, though the majority is Shiite, which therefore makes logically the task of *fethullahci* more difficult, who are very Sunnite, Fethullah G len's missionaries have been successful where they failed in Central Asia, namely on-site training of local movement representatives. Thus, there are numerous Azeris *fethullahci* who attend these theological debate soir es; indeed some are organized by Azeris without any Turkish attendance, which is no longer necessary, as the first missionaries have accomplished their mission of local staff training. Several raisons explain this better result in Azerbaijan than

[15] On the implementation, operation of the ideology conveyed by the schools, see the studies of Bayram Balci, «Fethullah G len's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Islam and Turkism.» Religion, State and Society, v. 31, n. 2, p. 151-78.

in Central Asia republics. Although remaining till now the most influential, Fethullah G len's disciples have not the monopoly of Turkish missionary activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Different brotherhood groups or belonging to brotherhoods have deployed their activities in these countries and constitute competition to *fethullahci*.

Under a more or less organized form, Turkish *Naqchibandi* tried to settle in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Central Asia is more particularly interesting to them because it is there, near Boukhara, where the tomb of the order founder is located, Bahauddin Nakchibend. However, it is in Azerbaijan where we find the most powerful Turkish *naqchibandi* order. They are the disciples of Aziz Mahmut Hudayi, mystical 16th century *naqchibandi*, whose tomb is located at Uskudar in Istanbul¹⁶. Around this tomb a large socio-educational complex is erected, whose activities range from assistance to the most impoverished ones and a religious course for everybody. One of the leaders most marked by Aziz Mahmut Huday's teaching, Osman Nuri Topba⁰ interests us more specially.

By his initiative, a charitable foundation *Azerbaijan Gençlerine Yardım Fondu* (Assistance Fund to Azerbaijan Youth) was born in 1994. Under the moral and spiritual authority of Osman Nuri Topba⁰, the Bakou-based foundation developed charitable and educational activities for Karabakh war refugees. However, in parallel, on its sites in Bakou and in province, it organizes in full legality English, computing and Koranic reading courses¹⁷, given by teachers graduated in Turkey and increasingly by Azeris graduated in Turkey. Koranic reading, Muslim history courses and other teaching are accessible to all young people who attend this center. Courses are free because the association is granted by important financial assistance from Turkish or Turkish-European sponsors. The library allows, on the other hand, young and less young people to have access to religious literature coming from Turkey. The movement magazine published in Turkey, *Altinoluk*, is commonly available, Osman Nuri Topba⁰'s books as well as works by other religious movements, such as for example the works of Sait Nursi or even by certain Arab islamist thinkers like Seyyid Qutb.

Recently, the association launched a magazine in Russian aimed at readers from the former USSR, considering that most of them many speak Russian much better than the national Turkish language. *Zolotorodnik* (the golden source) retakes in fact articles published in Turkish in *Altinoluk* and translates them into Russian. At last, another magazine, for children, *Sebnem*, hold an important place on the library shelves. The association's activities are also as important in the province as in the capital, especially in the north of the country reputed to be more marked by Sunnism than Shiism. In the cities of Sheki, Zaqatala, Agdash and Goytchay the foundation owns and manages madrasa or Koranic reading centers. Regularly, the movement leader, Osman Nuri Topba⁰, comes to the country and encourages his disciples to pursue their educational activities. The knowledge transmission means are therefore open, classical, under the form of a course in classrooms, registered at the Ministry of Justice and State Committee for religious affairs. We note that this is not the case of the groups *nurcu* or *fethullahci*, which under cover of secular education in high schools spread their respective leaders' thinking without being «controlled» by political and religious authorities. Likewise, in certain cases and according to their method and tactics, the association makes an agreement with Azeris public establishments to manage certain university branches in province. This is especially the case of the very Shiite Islamic university in Bakou whose branch in Zaqatala is managed by this foundation.

[16] On the movement religious philosophy, see: Kemal Yılmaz, Aziz Mahmut Hudayi, Hayatı, Eserleri, Tarikatı (Aziz Mahmut Hudayi, his life, his works, his brotherhood), Ankara, Erkam Yayınları, 1999, 325 p.

[17] Conversation with Nedim Kaya, director of the foundation that represents in Azerbaijan nakchibendinaqchibandi movement of Topba⁰, Bakou, January 2004.

A small minority, but nevertheless active, the last and *naqchibandi* group of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu must be mentioned. His community regularly meets around Ismail Aga mosque in Fatih-Carsamba on the suburbs of Istanbul. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the movement has sent emissaries upon the collapse of the Soviet Union to develop contacts with local *naqchibandi* groups. Limited in Central Asia due to the distrust of Uzbek authorities, specially, the activity of the movement is remarkable in Azerbaijan and in Georgia (mainly in Adzharia), essentially in Sunnite regions. Until 1997, a date on which the army in Turkey brought a new restriction on religious activities of brotherhoods, the movement regularly received students from the Caucasus and Central Asia and trained them at its madrasa, located on the premises of Ismail Aga mosque. Since the warning of the army in 1997, the madrasa in question works slowly, but Caucasians and Central Asians trained in its ranks continue to spread master Mahmut's message in certain regions of the former USSR¹⁸.

Suleyman Hilim Tunahan, born in 1888 en Bulgaria and deceased in 1959 in Turkey, is another great Turkish religious leader whose heirs have settled in Central Asia and the Caucasus as of the early 1990s. His main concern regards Koranic reading or more precisely training children so that they will be able to read the Koran¹⁹. By all means, the slogan for this movement was «everything for the Koran, everything by the Koran.» It is estimated that disciples of this movement tried to settle in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. After a few months of activities, seeing that the country was not a favorable place for their mission, *suleymanci* disciples stopped their youth supporting work or returned to Turkey. However, at the present time, a small *suleymanci* presence persists, especially in the midst of Turkish students coming to study in Bakou. This presence is however limited, personal and informal, at least compared to other Turkish movements. However, in Spring 2004, an educational center linked to this movement started again its activities in Bakou, in a center where Tunahan's disciples taught young Azeri Koranic reading²⁰.

Several factors contribute to the quick, solid implementation of Turkish Islamist movements in the former USSR. We must first mention the relative linguistic relationship between Turkish and the main languages of Muslim former USSR (Uzbek, Kirghiz, Turkmene, Kazakh and Azeri) which makes Turkish expatriation in these countries easier. We might also suggest, as an explanatory criterion, cultural closeness between Turks and these above mentioned Turkish-speaking peoples, but it seems to me that the settlement of Turkish islamists is made easier mostly by the strong resemblance linking Anatolian Turks' Islam to the one of Turkish-speaking people in Central Asia. In fact, in this huge region extending from the Chinese border to the Balkans, there is the same type of Islam, very marked by brotherhoods and mysticism. The *naqchibandiyya*, this brotherhood born in Boukhara region counts devotees all over Eurasia and Turkish Islam, to a great extent marked by this brotherhood. We must further recall that in its expansion in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkish Islam (the movements as a whole) was supported by the State, and for at least two reasons. The first one refers to a sort of implicit encouragement to the settlement of certain movements, because their presence indirectly favors the implementation of some movements, for the reason why their presence is helping indirectly the implantation of the Turkish language and culture in these countries. For example, in the case of Fethullah G len's disciples, State support was tacit: openly distrustful and skeptical vis-à-vis the movement leader and his ideology in Turkey, the State indirectly strained G len's disciples to extend their

[18] Conversation with Medet Bala, secretary-general of H d yî Vakfı , Istanbul, September 2003.

[19] On S leyman Tunahan movement, see Birol Caymaz, Les mouvements islamiques tures à Paris, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002, 282 p.

[20] Conversation with Abdullah Panlı , responsible for the association, Bakou, April 2004.

school network to Central Asia where henceforth, thanks to G len's schools, Turkish culture is exported to all the steppes. But mostly, the Turkish State itself conceived an Islamic policy and exported a religious ideology that it now appropriate to explain.

Official Policy in the Turkish-Speaking World: between Islam and Secularism

It is not quite exaggerated to say that Turkey's foreign policy in religious matter is inspired by reaction. I mean that Ankara, pushed in this direction by Westerners, conceived an Islamic and Kemalist policy for the States by reaction to the strong dynamism of private Turkish religious movements and by fear that other countries or other Islamist movements of the Arab world or Iran will impose their conception of Islam. Chronologically, after the beginnings of intensive missionary activity by private movements, the Turkish State implemented spreading a moderate Islam and the promotion of Kemalism principles in the new republics.

One of the consequences of independences in all these countries was the keen interest in building new mosques or the restoration of the ones that had been closed or transformed into warehouses during the soviet period. The main mosques funded by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs or *Diyanet Vakfi* are the ones of Achkhabad in Turkmenistan, of Kochkor Ata in Kirghizstan. We will equally mention those of Nakhitchevan bearing the name of Kazim Karabekir or further the one of the Karabakh war martyr monument in Bakou. All these mosques imitate an ottoman style and are run by an imam coming from Turkey. The mosques built in Azerbaijan take into account the Shiite character of Azeri Islam. So, for Shiites to feel at home, The Turkish management of the mosque made available to the faithful the famous *muhurs*, clay stones from holy Shiite cities such as Mashad, Kerbala or Qom and on which the faithful place their forehead during the prayer. Above all Shiite, this practice is usually totally absent in Sunnite mosques.

Spreading an abundant religious literature constitutes the other face of official Islamic presence of the *Diyanet*. In all the republics, this literature is displayed at mosque exit or in the main bookstores. Free, it intends mostly instill to the faithful prayer rules, Islamic morals. Thus, part of the literature insists on the misdeeds of alcoholism or drug usage, which put forth increasingly problems in these countries.

The creation of several Islamic educational establishments (theology colleges and high schools) undoubtedly constitutes the most important religious action, which has more consequence on Islamic revival in these countries. We give some examples of religious establishments opened by the *Diyanet*. In Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan theology colleges were created, where teaching is conceived on University of Marmara theology college model. Regularly, these students are sent to Turkey for long-term courses or training. Likewise, certain students are making all their studies in Turkey. These establishments try to guide themselves today towards general and orientalist teaching, and no longer solely theological, by proposing language and eastern civilization courses, in order to allow graduates to find jobs more easily once their studies are completed²¹. Because the fundamental problem of these colleges is to train religious staffs in the countries where there really no new openings in «religious» professions. By training specialists of Arab-Muslim countries and reinforcing the ranks of Arab and Persian ranks, some students are enabled to find a job in enterprises, NGO or even diplomatic services of these countries.

[21] Conversation with Ahmet Polad, dean of the college of theology at the State University of Bakou, January 2004.

Another initiative taken by the Turkish State via *Diyanet* is to be mentioned. It is setting up a Eurasian Religious Council (*Avrasya Dini Surasi*) that gathers on average every two years the major official religious personalities of Turkey, Caucasus States, Central Asia, the Russian Federation and certain Balkan States²². Meeting for the first time in Ankara in 1995, the council next met in Istanbul, Sarajevo then in the Turkish part of Cyprus. This council seeks to develop Islamic cooperation among all these States and go towards certain harmonization in religious practice and in the celebration of great Islamic holidays. Actually, organized under the auspices of Turkey, this council aims at establishing Turkish hegemony on the entire Caucasus, Central Asia indeed even the Balkans. More than religious, this *Diyanet* policy meets national political considerations originating from Turkish official authorities.

The second phase of the Turkish State reaction in view of the missionary movement offensive was Kemalist and secularist. In fact, noting the strong settlement of Turkish Islamist movements in these countries and their strong polarity, the Turkish State implemented a Kemalism principle promotion policy. This policy had two positions.

By way of educational cooperation policy, Turkish school establishments were implemented in several Turkish-speaking republics. High schools, universities and colleges were created in several cities. Thus, there is a Turkish university in Kazakhstan, another one in Kirghizstan. Turkish high schools attached to the national Ministry of Education were implemented in Bakou, Bichkek, Almaty and Achkhabad. Educational programs of these establishments give great importance to Kemalism teaching and its secularism principles²³.

More specifically conceived to spread Kemalism principles and ideas, Atatürk centers that Turkey implemented in Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan have had more mitigated results. Indeed, these centers produce in local languages a important literature on Atatürk and Kemalism, but they are often centers disconnected from reality, cut off from society and occasionally serving to organize meetings and conferences on modern Turkey's founder.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, three fundamental remarks can be made. First of all, Kemalist republican Turkey, compared to Turkish-speaking republics stemming from the former USSR seems to us to be quite more Islamic. In fact, the secularization policy implemented among USSR Muslims was much more radical than the one of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. After independences, the most Muslim character of the population and even of Turkey's institutions is undeniable in relation in relation to what prevails in Central Asia. For this reason, Turkey in principle had no need to export secularism, already strongly present in the countries that it wanted to secularize.

Actually, the enthusiasm of Turkey to propose an Islamic cooperation to these countries was based in 1991 on a myth, the danger of Iranian and Saudi Islamist movements. From the early 1990s, Ankara implemented a multi-factorial policy, in order to, among others, prevent the new republics, originated from the former USSR from becoming the Shiite or Wahhabite militant activism theater. Actually, these States demonstrated few penchants to being tempted by Islamisms originating from these two countries. This Turkish fear comprises also the Turkish Islamist movements which went to the conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Fearing a harmful influence on its foreign policy, Turkish diplomacy was eager to send religious employees to all these

[22] On current operation of the Diyanet, see its official website, www.diyamet.gov.tr

[23] Sağlam Mehmet, «Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Eğitim İlişkilerimiz» (Our educational exchanges with Turkish republics), *Yeni Türkiye*, n. 14, 1997, p. 683-84.

republics to counteract the competition of Islamists, which is a constant of Turkish diplomacy: not to let its citizens acting alone abroad. At the same way as in Europe, where Turkey's Islamic policy enters into open competition with private Turkish private movements among Turkish immigrants, we in Central Asia watch at an equivalent competition, though less vehement than in Europe.

Thus, to Turkish diplomacy, religion and Islamic cooperation are perceived as tools serving an implementation method of Turkish policy in these countries. In other words, we assist to a religious cooperation instrumentation, on the same way as there is a Turkish Islamist movement instrumentation by Ankara, so that the force and dynamism of *nurcu*, *fethullahci* organizations and others will be useful to Turkey's official policy in these States. The ultimate target for the Turkish State is not so much to contribute to Islamic awakening in these countries, but to accompany it in order to prevent it from becoming radical and hostile to Turkey, and mostly to ensure that these spaces and societies in reformulation enter fully into a true Turkish zone of influence intended by Turkish policy and that would extend from the Balkans to Central Asian steppes.

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INVOLVING CENTRAL ASIA IN AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE – WHAT CAN EUROPE DO?

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Introduction

EU policy on Central Asia is unclear about the relationship between Afghanistan and Central Asia. The June 2010 Joint EU Council and Commission Implementation Report of the EU Strategy for Central Asia argues that cooperation in the area of security is of growing importance in EU-Central Asia relations, especially in light of developments in Afghanistan over the past few years. Even if security is among the Strategy's seven key areas of engagement, the arguments put forward are vague: the Implementation Report states that «Afghanistan is a security issue of particular common concern and there is scope for more focused dialogue and cooperation between Central Asian countries and the EU»; and «there is a need to integrate the growing link between Central Asia and the wider region into EU Central Asian cooperation.»¹

The Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship is therefore evoked only to recall that the states of Central Asia are directly threatened by the insecurity emanating from Afghanistan. Border security programmes are given priority, while the language on «the prevention of extremism and counter-terrorism cooperation» does not really give a clear idea how Europe can pragmatically interact with Central Asian governments and societies on the matter of Afghanistan. Given the importance of the Afghan question, it would be beneficial if Europe could make more daring and concrete proposals.

The progressive departure of ISAF troops – including 10,000 American soldiers in 2011, and 20,000 in 2012 – and the risk generated by the security vacuum which will follow² must be the occasion for more clear-cut EU involvement: how can the states of Central Asia be helped both to deal with the security challenges with which they will be faced in 2014 and beyond, and to build a constructive relationship with Kabul? The Central Asian regimes, which tried to bargain with the West over their involvement in the Northern Distribution Network, now probably realise that they are the first ones to need a stable Afghanistan, and that the complete departure of the international coalition will not only be a challenge for their geopolitical environment, but for their domestic stability.

This paper addresses the issue of involving the Central Asian states in a more constructive relationship with Afghanistan. First, the limitations of the current EU involvement with border security, and the impact of the transit value

[1] Joint Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia (Brussels, 28 June 2010), p. 27, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11402.en10.pdf#page=2>.

[2] G. Dorronsoro, «Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition», Carnegie Paper, June 2011.

of the region on the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship is discussed. After a brief overview of Central Asia's current engagement with Afghanistan the paper turns to ways the EU can further foster economic cooperation, participation in building a regional cooperation architecture and people-to-people exchanges.

Border security is not enough

In European programmes, the concretisation of Central Asia-Afghanistan relations appears foremost in the approach to border security. The three bordering states (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) together with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan participate in the BOMCA programme (Border Management in Central Asia) and CADAP (Central Asia Drug Action Programme), to which more than €45 million has been committed so far, as well as in the training of border guards by the OSCE³. Some joint projects with Afghanistan, like BOMBAF and the OSCE-led Tajik-Afghan and Turkmen-Afghan border security training, have also been organised. The Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI), a platform for dialogue and discussion initiated by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior with support from the European Union, at regular intervals meets members of the international donor community and agencies involved in border security technical assistance, such as the UNDP, OSCE, UNODC, IOM, Japan, the Russian Federation and the U.S.⁴

The fight against drug trafficking is also an important component of the EU and member states' engagement. The Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors has become operational and it plans to establish links with Interpol. The UN Preventive Diplomacy Centre based in Ashgabat, dealing with the implementation of the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, also presents an opportunity for cooperation⁵. However, due to a lack of independent evaluation it is unclear if the ongoing programmes have a positive impact and whether they are sustainable. Anonymous interviews done with OSCE officers were pessimistic.

Strengthening border security is not enough. First, the idea that radical Islamic movements can be stopped by better monitoring the borders with Afghanistan seems to ignore the fact that such groups develop predominantly in a local context. They are founded on domestic issues in which the Afghan Taliban plays only a minor role. Second, stopping drug trafficking is not solely a question of border control, but of the struggle against corruption. The drugs which circulate through underground criminal groups are not being stopped: Western pundits usually agree that a large part of the trafficking is done by people with ties to Central Asian law enforcement agencies. The real battle is therefore against the corruption of these agencies and, more globally, of state structures, and not only against drugs crossing borders illegally. Moreover, the prevention of rising drug use in Central Asia itself is limited by the state practice of criminalizing users. The EU focus on border security is therefore important, but far from efficient, since it cannot thwart challenges which depend on the Central Asian social fabric and the willingness of Central Asian regimes to engage in reform.

[3] High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission, European Parliament, 19 November 2010, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-8381&language=EN>.

[4] «Press Release: Central Asian Border Security Issues Discussed in Dushanbe», BOMCA, 17 March 2011, <http://www.bomca.eu/en/news/8.html>.

[5] Joint Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy (Brussels, 28 June 2010).

The transit value of Central Asia. What next?

Central Asia is reinforced as a transit zone to Afghanistan through its growing role in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In 2010 it supplied about 35 per cent of all ISAF cargo headed for Afghanistan, a figure which will probably reach 75 per cent by the end of 2011⁶ in order for ISAF to reduce its dependency on the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication. This NDN presents two issues in terms of the EU's construal of the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship. First, the Central Asian states, and in particular the Uzbek government, believe that they should be rewarded in political terms for «services» rendered to ISAF. This, of course, is a complete reversal of priorities and should, as an argument, be refuted by U.S. and EU negotiators. As an important chance to stabilise Afghanistan, the NDN is above all an opportunity for the Central Asians themselves. Because NATO and the Pentagon were the main negotiators with the Central Asian governments about NDN – though Germany negotiates directly with Uzbekistan concerning its base in Termez – the EU's involvement was marginal. Its broader call for political reform as a key element to avoid destabilisation coming from Afghanistan went largely unheard and seemed out of touch with European security interests on the NDN that were largely transmitted through other actors.

Second, American policy implied that the NDN would contribute to Central Asian regional development thanks to improvements in the railway network and as an initiative of regional character⁷. However, this is a questionable assertion: while Uzbekistan benefited from the development of its road network and pocketed a non-negligible amount of transit rights fees, in 2010 it maintained a railway blockade against Tajikistan which contributed to the inflation of the price of basic goods there. No regional cooperation really emerged on the transit question, instead the zone's role as a transport corridor is developing through strategies originating in China, not via the NDN. The latter could even be responsible for inhibiting regional trade: a freight tariff increase made by the Uzbek government has placed Central Asian companies in a difficult situation, as they are unable to pass on the price increase. What will the NDN's legacy be once ISAF has departed? Will the transit value of Central Asia only have served the international community in its action in Afghanistan or will it constitute a positive element in Central Asian economic development?

Fostering Central Asian economic presence in Afghanistan

The states of Central Asia are much more than transit sites, whether for non-lethal material bound for ISAF, or, in the opposite direction, for Afghan opium headed for Russia and Europe. The three border states of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Kazakhstan, all play non-negligible roles in providing economic and reconstruction aid, in particular to the northern regions of Afghanistan. In the provinces of Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Kunduz and Badakhshan, Afghans live a life oriented towards their northern neighbours. The economic and political aid supplied to the Tajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks of Afghanistan traditionally originated from the north although today international donors play the most substantial role in assistance in these provinces.

Turkmenistan is an important partner for the Afghan border regions, especially in the electricity sector. Ashgabat constructed power stations and

[6] Joshua Kucera, «Child Labor and U.S. Military Cooperation in Uzbekistan», Eurasianet.org, 5 May 2011, <http://www.eurasianet.org/taxonomy/term/2325>.

[7] A. Kuchins, T. Sanderson, D. Gordon, *The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road* (Washington DC: CSIS, December 2009).

electric lines in the Balkh region, and hopes to increase fivefold its export of electricity to Afghanistan thanks to the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) investment in two new electric lines⁸.

The Tajik authorities have created free economic zones along their border with Afghanistan, which enables border populations to set up small trade mechanisms to help lift them out of poverty. In 2008, a Power Purchase Agreement was signed between both states for the annual export of 300 megawatts of Tajik electricity, but at present exports are still very limited⁹. Feasibility studies for a new electricity line from the Sangtuda 1 and 2 power stations to Pul i-Khumri via Kunduz and Balgan are under way, financed by the ADB among others as part of the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project¹⁰. However, the severe electricity crisis in Tajikistan hampers the prospect of exports. For the moment, the controversial Rogun hydroelectric project is blocked by Uzbek refusal and the absence of credible financing, whereas the Tajik government refuses to prioritise smaller scale power stations.

Uzbekistan is also active. It restored Soviet-era power supply to Afghanistan at the beginning of 2002. Since 2009, it has delivered as much as 150 megawatts to Kabul thanks to the construction of a line, with ADB funds, of more than 400 kilometers stretching from Hairaton to Pul i-Khumri and then to the Afghan capital. This figure should eventually increase to 300 megawatts. Upon the request of the Afghan government, Uzbekistan also constructed bridges between the cities of Mazar e-Sharif and Kabul. The Uzbek national railway company, Ozbekistan Temir Yollari, has won an ADB tender to build a new 75-kilometre long line between Hairaton and Mazar e-Sharif. The line is planned to be operational by the second half of 2011. Uzbekistan is also supplying fuel, construction materials, metal-roll, fertilisers and wheat to Afghanistan¹¹.

Kazakhstan, despite sharing no borders with Afghanistan, also presents itself as a substantial economic partner. It is the only Central Asian country which has an Assistance Programme for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan that includes projects related to water supply, infrastructure development, delivery of cement and construction commodities¹². In addition, Kazakhstan has positioned itself as a pivotal actor in Afghanistan's wheat market: 15 per cent of Afghan wheat and flour imports came from Kazakhstan in 2007 (20 per cent from Uzbekistan, 50 per cent from Pakistan)¹³. Due to the poor Russian and Pakistani harvests, caused by forest fires and flooding, the Kazakh share in the market has grown: in 2010 Afghanistan's 700,000 ton wheat deficit was mostly met by Kazakhstan¹⁴.

How can the EU contribute to promoting these and other Central Asian efforts? Among many issues, three components seem central to success: electricity supplies (connected to water management), food security and small trade.

Central Asia's role in the supply of electricity to Afghanistan, vital for the latter, might contribute to developing water management/energy cooperation in Central Asia. The need for collective water management cannot ignore

[8] «Turkmenistan and Afghanistan», Institute for the Study of War, <http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/turkmenistan-and-afghanistan>.

[9] Import of Power from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Programme, <https://www.irp-af.com/?pname=open&id=291&type=html&c=5>.

[10] «Afghanistan pristupil k stroitel'stvu LEP dlia tranzita elektroenergii iz Tadzhi-kistan», TopTJ, 15 February 2010, http://www.topTj.com/ShowNews.aspx?news_id=ACEA11C0-34D1-4D4B-84ED-78DE9FD56819.

[11] Shoislam Akmalov, «Uzbekistan's Role in Stability and Development», Policy Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1, 2009, <http://www.ips.org.pk/aboutips/1048.html>.

[12] «Commitment to Assist Afghanistan», Kazakhstan Embassy in the United States, <http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?page=commitment-to-assist-afghanistan>.

[13] Regional Food Outlook, South Asia, Appendix 1: Afghanistan (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010), p. 79, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1269620455636/6907265-1287693474030/AFG_Regional_Food_Prices.pdf.

[14] Food Security Outlook Update (March 2011), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-396755.pdf.

Afghanistan, which shares with its neighbours the cross-border Amu Darya River, and whose increasing water needs will have an upstream impact. Water supply reforms and sanitation policy are strategic for the two regions. The inclusion of Afghanistan in the regional water dialogue and gradually also in cooperation structures would therefore be a logical step to take for the EU. On environmental matters – another focal sector for EU aid – both Central Asia and Afghanistan are regions where the negative impact of climate change is potentially catastrophic. The EU Water Initiative and the new EU-Central Asia Working Group on Environmental Governance and Climate Change should therefore incorporate Afghanistan, as the challenges to be met are largely similar.

Kazakhstan's growing role as a grain producing power, and its influence on the food security of its Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen and Afghan neighbours might become a driver for broader discussions about food security. Such discussions will involve not only a reflection on the priority given to cotton, but also on land ownership reforms, the importance of small bank loans to farmers, logistical improvements (transport and food storage), and the development of local agribusiness to gain more independence from rising world prices. EU member states and national agencies for development have a lot of expertise to offer on these matters and some have developed programmes which could be extended by taking into account the regional character of these issues.

Finally, the small private sector may play an important role in restoring economic growth and offering employment both in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Mid-scale economic projects, such as providing support to cereal-export companies or construction material firms, could be promoted, for instance as part of the Central Asia Invest (CAI) programmes or the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Of course the Central Asian legal context, in particular in Uzbekistan, is not favourable to SMEs, although this has improved in Kazakhstan. The EU also supports the Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs) programmes, such as chambers of commerce, sector-specific trade, industrial and professional associations. On this issue, the Aga-Kahn Foundation has already played an important role in fostering Afghan and Tajik cross-border small businesses. The EU-OECD joint «Eurasia Competitiveness Programme – Central Asia Initiative» already includes all five Central Asian countries as well as Afghanistan and Mongolia.

Engaging Central Asia as part of a broader Regional Security Architecture

Central Asia should also be incorporated in long-term approaches to Afghan regional security. In the years and decades to come, with the progressive withdrawal of ISAF forces, the regional character of the «Afghan question» will become more acute, to the detriment of its international character. The neighbouring regional players, which already have a key role in the Afghan domestic situation, will enjoy more and more autonomy and be in a position to exercise greater leverage over it. The Central Asian states will therefore become involved in the exercise of regional cooperation and competition between the main actors – Pakistan, India and Iran – and to a lesser extent Russia and China. As far as the United States and the EU are concerned, they will need to learn to delegate their responsibilities to some of their regional allies. Through the positioning of each country vis-à-vis Afghanistan a new regional order will be created. The EU has every interest both in assuring that the Central Asian states have a say in the future of Afghanistan, and that they both share a similar view on the desired outcome, i.e. a stable, unified and secular Afghanistan.

The EU should, where possible, include Central Asia in mediation activities in Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan, which possesses a positive neutrality status, and which, in the 1990s, was the only country in the region to have relatively good relations with the Taliban, has recently proposed holding inter-Afghan peace talks in Ashgabat under the aegis of the United Nations. Given the weakness of Turkmen diplomacy and its isolationism, this proposition seems rather unrealistic, but it reveals a genuine interest in playing a positive role. The Tajiks have put forward proposals concerning the implementation of peace-building mechanisms at the regional level. Afghanistan has a lot to learn from Tajikistan's experience of ending its civil war of the 1990s, in particular the proposition that political negotiations between the authorities and the insurgency must be held at the local level, province by province, each time taking the local balance of power into account, prior to being discussed at the national level¹⁵. Lastly, Tashkent proposed to revive the idea of a regional mechanism to frame the negotiations between the Afghan parties, and maintained that the solution to Afghan problems can only be solved at a regional level¹⁶. But the proposal has not received great international attention: while the U.S. is not interested in creating a mechanism where Moscow, Beijing, and especially Tehran, would be able to discuss a solution to the Afghan crisis with Western powers.

It is partially up to the EU – whose logics of engagement in Afghanistan have always pertained more to reconstructing a country that had been at war than to the U.S.-style «war on terror» – to propose regional mechanisms in which Afghanistan's neighbours will have platforms for collective discussion. When choosing regional allies, the states of Central Asia ought to be increasingly included, even if their economic weight is limited, their regimes authoritarian, and despite the support they give to their co-ethnics. After all they are relatively free of any distinct political agenda for Afghanistan, which is not the case with Pakistan or Iran. Paying closer attention to the Central Asian viewpoint on peace-keeping mechanisms could also make good use of their knowledge on Afghanistan, and therefore strengthen European involvement.

People-to-people relations between Central Asia and Afghanistan

Due to their Soviet legacy, the Central Asian states in terms of schooling and public health seem to the Afghans like developed countries. Decades of Soviet-Afghan proximity have also legitimated cultural exchanges. Turkmenistan, for instance, offers some financial and technical assistance to the Turkmen minorities in Afghanistan, in the form of medical expertise, as well as various state-funded scholarships. Although not a bordering state and despite not having any co-ethnics in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan is the state that has stepped up as a driver of this type of regional cooperation. During its presidency of the OSCE, Astana announced the implementation of a \$50 million programme to school 1,000 Afghan students between 2010 and 2014 in such specialties as healthcare, agriculture, police, border control, engineering, teaching and education. In this educational and medical domain, the states of Central Asia for once find themselves in the position of being donors and not recipients, and their strategies could be more directly supported by Europe. Even if small-scale, these initiatives show that there is room for manoeuvre on this issue.

Education, science and people-to-people activities, all key aspects of European programmes, offer a potentially large spectrum for cooperation

[15] Interviews with Tajik experts on Afghanistan, Dushanbe, June 2010.

[16] Uzbekistan has referred to the 6+2 initiative – the six countries bordering Afghanistan plus Russia and the U.S. – which initiated negotiations between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban between 1999 and 2001. With the addition of NATO, the mechanism would become a 6+3.

between Central Asia and Afghanistan. Europe's visibility in terms of culture and education is particularly high in both regions. Afghan intellectual milieus have been largely educated in the Soviet mould and their mastery of Russian would facilitate their integration into European networks via Central Asia, or indeed via Russia. Developing the role of the Central Asian states in the training of some Afghan specialists, for instance in medicine or in some technical fields, would enhance the modest progress currently made in Central Asian higher education. Even if education and science in Central Asia have encountered huge difficulties since the collapse of the Soviet Union – foremost lacking resources and restrictive policies – they can still provide a positive framework for those Afghans who cannot afford to go to Europe or to India, another important partner for Afghanistan in terms of educational programmes. The region hosts a few international universities which could teach Afghan students financed through European programmes. Central Asia could also be encouraged to foster a better gender balance in Afghan higher education, as young Afghan women might be more likely to be granted permission by their families to leave for countries of Muslim tradition, deemed culturally closer to them than Europe. Though the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia are unable to serve as a political model for Afghanistan, the EU could promote exchanges in the domain of education, science and people-to-people relations.

Conclusion

At stake is the stability of Central Asia. The unfavourable geopolitical context could deal a fatal blow to the states that are most susceptible to the destabilising effects from Afghanistan, namely Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the EU cannot limit its involvement in the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship to border security and the transit issue. It needs to be more innovative by supporting already existing programmes and instruments involving energy supplies, food security, water management, small-scale investments, people-to-people exchanges, and participation in building a new framework for regional security of which Central Asian states should be an active part. The «Afghan question» must be a motivation for the EU to ask for more reforms in Central Asia. EU activities aimed at securing Central Asia from the possibility of further Afghan destabilization should go hand in hand with a push for domestic change. There is little time remaining before 2014 for the EU to contribute both to shaping a political solution for Afghanistan, and to strengthening Central Asian societies.

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KAZAKHSTAN, ISLAM AND POLITICS

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Religion & Politics in Kazakhstan

The literature of political science is rich with studies about the relationship between religion and politics, particularly in the developed countries. However, the literature is comparatively weak about the connection about religion and politics in the lesser developed countries, particularly the newly established states in Central Asia. The shortcomings of the scholarship in the field has led to a misunderstanding of the sophisticated connections between these two factors, especially in those societies that are in the process of nation building, like the young independent Republic of Kazakhstan.

Ranking the first among Central Asian states in terms of geographic area and the second in population size, Kazakhstan is a unique case among Central Asian states regarding the nature and role of religion in politics and the practice of religious freedom in the country. Observers of the region often rank Kazakhstan in a higher category when compared to other Central Asian states in terms of religious freedom and the connection between religion and politics. The latter ties are often associated with a sense of national identity in Central Asia, especially in the post-Soviet era.

The questions arise: How do religion and politics interact with one another in contemporary Kazakhstan? Why does Kazakhstan enjoy a higher standard about the relations between religion and politics? How are such topics related to the Kazakh sense of national identity? In this essay, we begin with a discussion of the nature of Kazakh society. Then, we analyze the complex relationship between religion and politics in Kazakhstan. Finally, we make a few observation about how our above mentioned research questions can be addressed.

A Pluralist Society

Modern Kazakhstan is a confluence of traditional religious and ethnic identities and the vestiges of its status as a former Soviet republic. Years of secular Soviet rule suppressed a religious and cultural tradition shaped by Islam and Russian Orthodoxy². About 47% of Kazakhs are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school where the remaining 44 percent of the population is Russian

[1] The authors acknowledge the assistance from UCF. Houman Sadri is especially grateful to the Institute for International and Political Studies (Iran) and the Black Sea Center for Strategic Researches (Turkey) for their support of this research project. Nevertheless, these organizations are not responsible for ideas presented here.

[2] Azade-Ayşe Rorlich. Islam, Identity and Politics: Kazakhstan, 1990–2000. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2003, P. 147.

Orthodox with a marginal number of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews³. The resurgence of Islam following the fall of the iron curtain is a delicate subject in Kazakhstan. Islam's role in Kazakh society is continually being redefined politically and socially as newer generations of Kazakhs are returning to this aspect of their cultural heritage.

Historically, Kazakh society was centered on a clan structure composed of social strata known as zhuz. Three classes of zhuz exist: elder, middle, and younger which control southern, central, and western Kazakhstan, respectively. As the influence of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan's patronage system deteriorated in the 1990s, clans once again gained importance. Clan allegiance determines social status and career prospects. Clans from the Middle zhuz are more Russified and more educated whereas southern Kazakhs have become more marginalized⁴.

Religious Tolerance

Kazakhstan stands apart from its Central Asian neighbors because spiritual moderation and tolerance of other religions is encouraged and religious extremism strongly discouraged⁵. In 1995, Kazakhstan joined what later became known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which consisted of China, Krygystan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. SCO is a regional organization concerned with security matters, one of which is to prevent the expansion of Islamic separatist activities⁶. Since Islam in Kazakhstan developed in isolation from the rest of the Muslim world, most Kazakhs do not have a strict interpretation of the Quran⁷. However, in southern Kazakhstan, radical Islamic elements threaten to export their fundamentalist ideology. Kazakhstan has until recently been excluded from most religious extremism due to its geographical surroundings. Islam made several forays into Kazakhstan whose inhabitants were mainly nomadic. The logistics of building stationary mosques to convert a migratory society meant that Islam was not able to fully penetrate Kazakh society, as it did in the urban centers of many Middle Eastern societies. As a result, the Kazakhs adopted a moderate version of Islam mixed with their own indigenous belief system.

With its modern and secular nature, the 1993 Constitution granted the right to freedom of religion in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Religious Associations. This law created a separation between religion and state and provided for equal recognition of religions: «the freedom to practice religion or disseminate one's beliefs» in order to «preserve public order and safety or the life, health, morals or rights and freedoms of other citizens, while also prohibiting the formation of parties or other political formations of a religious nature.»⁸ Despite the reintegration of Islam into Kazakh society as a growing trend, the secular Kazakh government still retains authority over the activities of religious organizations. This has led to a role for Islam by both government and non-governmental organizations. The official state recognized Islam is represented by the Muftiat. The unofficial Islamic groups espouse a range of Islamic ideologies both within and beyond the scope of mainstream Islam.

Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev champions religious tolerance and permits the activities of religious groups so long as they do not harbor unproductive political intentions. Constant surveillance, courts administered

[3] Country Report: Kazakhstan. Library of Congress. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/trd/cs/kztoc.html> (accessed September 10, 2011).

[4] Emmanuel Karagiannis. «The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al Islami.» *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 13:297–322, 2007. Especially, p. 310.

[5] Aitken, Jonathan. «Checking Islam in the Steppe.» *The American Spectator*. Pp. 58-59. September 2008. p. 58.

[6] Country Report: Kazakhstan. Library of Congress. op.cit.

[7] Ibid.

[8] This quote is from 1993 Kazakh Constitution, See Country Report: Kazakhstan. Library of Congress. op.cit.

by the Law of Religion and the encouragement of religious pluralism all serve to keep Kazakhstan's neighbors from exporting their radical Islam to Kazakhstan. When foreign radical elements are discovered they are immediately arrested and deported. This religious pluralism was made manifest in the construction of a 100 meter high pyramid called the Palace of Peace and Concord which serves as a center for interfaith dialogue⁹.

Compared to Kazakhstan's more benevolent management of state and religion relations, neighboring Uzbekistan's leadership approach is more harsh and paternalistic. The Kazakh government views its citizens as «not a dangerous mass to be rigorously policed but as a network of individuals who act based on their needs and desires, and the government sees its task as facilitating the exchanges by addressing those needs.»¹⁰ Due to Uzbek heavy handedness in dealing with political opposition especially religious groups, neighboring Uzbekistan has experienced more fundamentalism within its borders than any other Central Asian nation. Uzbek authorities there have little tolerance for religious groups unrecognized by the state¹¹. The general public does not seem to show support for acts of terrorism against the state. However, the Uzbek state has practically declared a war on Islamic groups which associate with acts of terrorism. The following Islamic groups which are active in Uzbekistan threaten to cross the border to Kazakhstan for safety and survival: the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut Tahrir, and Jamoat¹².

Compared to Uzbeks, Kazakh citizens enjoy more religious freedom, and their government aims to play the role of referee between state and religious affairs. Nevertheless, life in Uzbekistan is very different. In 1998, «The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations» was passed in Uzbekistan to prevent unauthorized religious activity. Only authorized religious officials are permitted to wear religious clothing. Proselytizing and private religious instruction are banned. Religious groups are required to register on a government list. Registering is a form of intimidation, and groups that do not register are threatened with arrest¹³. However, Uzbek's heavy hand has not stopped the growth of Islamic movements in Uzbekistan.

Thus the Uzbek and Kazakh reaction to Islamic movements has been very different. The Uzbek stricter policies in dealing with Islamic groups have backfired against state security. In a secular society, extremist groups will find sympathizers in only the marginalized of society. Exposure to non-Muslim groups and the inflexibility of the state sanctioned version of Islam do not attract the mainstream of society. The uneducated and isolated few who live on the periphery of society are the ones most susceptible to the hardline ideologies of Wahhabism and Salafism¹⁴. These are the challenges of Uzbekistan while Kazakhstan has remained relatively safe from such threats. Both states, however, share the legacy of the Soviet era to which we turn.

The Soviet Era

Islam in Kazakhstan was initially suppressed during the Soviet Period until an official Soviet sanctioned governing body was created to regulate Muslim affairs in Central Asia. Known as the Spiritual Board of Central Asian Muslims (SADUM), it was established in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and headed by the

[9] Aitken, Jonathan. *op.cit.*, p. 58.

[10] Laura Adams and Assel Rustemova. «Mass Spectacle and Styles of Governmentality in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.» *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 61, No. 7, September 2009, pp. 1251.

[11] Reuel Hanks. «Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a paradigm for conflict resolution.» *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40 (2007). pp. 209-221, especially p 209.

[12] *Ibid.* p. 211.

[13] *Ibid.* p. 216.

[14] *Ibid.* p. 217.

grand Mufti. The board was dominated by Uzbeks which caused Kazakhs to be marginalized in Kazakh religious affairs¹⁵.

Despite their general severe anti-religion policy, the Soviet government allowed small groups of Muslims to continue unregulated even before the years of perestroika, because the growing number of Islamic communities was largely apolitical. Underground Sufi brotherhoods and home-based Islamic study groups constituted the religious community during and after the Soviet period. This «parallel» Islam coexisted with the official state sanctioned Islam administered by the Soviet backed Grand Mufti¹⁶.

Traditionally, consumption of alcohol was encouraged by Russian colonialist rule as a means of assimilating Muslim Kazakhs into mainstream Russian society. This strategy left a legacy of alcoholism which many critics feel would be rectified by returning to the principles of Islam which condemns the consumption of alcohol. Others, such as historian Nurbulat Masanov place less emphasis on a return to Islam, but still insist that Kazakhs should look to their nomadic traditions and Islam as a solution to the problems of modern society.

Islam

The 1995 Constitution declared Kazakhstan a secular state. While political parties are allowed, religious ones are not. Ethnic Kazakhs are of the slight majority of the country's population, but many profess themselves as only nominal Muslims. Most Kazakhs ignore the main tenets of Islam also known as the Five Pillars of Islam. Most cannot recite the Muslim testimony of faith. The majority of those who pray are the elderly. As Kazakhs rely on their family for support, the rarely give alms. Lastly, only a small percentage of Kazakhs fast during the Muslim Holy Month of Ramadan and even less have made the pilgrimage to Mecca¹⁷.

Despite being a secular society, the search for a national identity in the vacuum of the post-communist era has contributed to the growing influence of Islam. This shift originated during the Soviet years of perestroika and continues today as the questions of democracy and economic uncertainty have led some Kazakhs in search of an ideological center. A number of intellectuals point to the increasingly apparent need for moral guidance, and Islam as well as other religions seems to fill the void.

While some see the merits of Islam in terms of stabilizing and unifying society, it also serves as an invaluable foreign policy tool that «can serve as the bridge to regional pacts, dialogues, and economic cooperation.»¹⁸ Islam binds Kazakhstan to the greater Muslim Central Asian region. However, its influence on Kazakh society is segmented. In comparison to other Central Asian states, Islam has historically been one component of a pluralistic society rather than a single dominating force. As a regional player, Kazakhstan aims to project its Islamic identity as a mean of closer alignment with its Central Asian neighbors. Nevertheless, contrary to this social growing trend are the urban Russified Kazakhs who «profess discomfort with some aspects of the religion even as they recognize it as part of their national heritage.»¹⁹

Islam came to Kazakhstan in two waves. The first wave occurred in the 9th and 10th centuries when Arab armies conquered southern Kazakhstan. The second wave arrived between the 13th and 19th centuries via Muslim missionaries. The nomadic traditions of the Kazakhs prevented Islam from fully penetrating all aspects of the Kazakh society: «the Kazakh's nomad life with its

[15] Emmanuel Karagiannis. *op.cit.* p. 298

[16] *Ibid.* p. 299

[17] *Ibid.* p. 301.

[18] Azade-Ayse Rorlich. «Islam, Identity and Politics: Kazakhstan, 1990–2000.» *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2003. p. 161.

[19] Country Report: Kazakhstan. Library of Congress. *op. cit.*

constant movement over long distances and the lack of a permanent residence did not facilitate the spread of a mosque-centered faith in the country.»²⁰ Hence, the Kazakh adapted a folk version of Islam combined with local pre-Islamic beliefs and culture.

Even within Kazakhstan's intellectual circles, Islam is promoted as the conduit through which morality and faith can be restored. Intellectuals, the media, and religious institutions have taken charge of refamiliarizing citizens with the core tenants of Islam. Soviet rule may have used Islam as a means of controlling the Kazakh population, but the atheist communist ideology that accompanied it served to secularize the country. As a result, many younger Kazakhs do not have a clear understanding of Islam and their Islamic heritage. The government and by extension the media place value on creating ethnic harmony in modern Kazakhstan. In this process, the importance of Islam is evident by a growing dialogue devoted towards Islamic matters featured in leading Kazakh periodicals and academic journals²¹.

Islamic Institutions

The Kazakh Muftiat is the official institution in charge of Islamic matters in Kazakhstan. It is guided by the Sunni Hanafi madhhab through which it exercises jurisdiction over the religious and spiritual affairs of the majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan. A competing center of Islamic authority is the Sunni Shafii madhhab centered in the Chechen community. The muftiat of Kazakhstan represents Muslims under his jurisdiction on the Religious Board of the Muslims of Central Asia, the Muftiat of Tashkent. Soon after independence, mosque construction initiated by the Muftiat paved way for the construction of thousands of mosques across Kazakhstan²².

In a bid for independence from the regional authority of SADUM, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK) was created as a means of stifling political movements²³. In 1990, The Kazakhstan National Independence Party, also known as Alash (KNIPA) was established to promote the ideals of Kazakh nationalism and moderate Islam. However, its existence was short lived as its members were accused of religious malpractice and illicit activities and forced into exile²⁴.

In addition to the Islamic religious establishment, there are thousands of unregistered religious institutions. Among these are «unregistered mosques» or «home madrasas.» These madrasas and small mosques are typically found in residential areas in homes or apartments. They offer a convenient option for worship for women in particular who can then pray among other women and learn about Islam and the Arabic language²⁵.

A mosque building effort created a demand for educated religious leaders to staff the growing number of mosques. In turn, the graduating classes of madrasas in Kazakhstan grew to accommodate the increasing need for more Imams. The revived interest in Islam helped bring about a stronger Islamic institution in Kazakhstan replete with more mosques and individuals actively pursuing Muslim scholarship.

Radical Islam

Growing interest in Islam has raised concerns over the possibility of radical Islam taking root in Kazakhstan. Neighboring states such as Kyrgyzstan an

[20] Emmanuel Karagiannis. *op.cit.*, p. 298.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 298

[22] Azade-Ayse Rorlich. *op.cit.* p. 162.

[23] Emmanuel Karagiannis, *op.cit.*, p. 300.

[24] *Ibid.* p. 298

[25] Azade-Ayse Rorlich. *op.cit.*, p. 164.

Uzbekistan provide very real examples of how dictatorship and corruption can open the door for religious extremism. One reaction to this is increased security measures along Kazakhstan's borders. Madrasas also became a focal point of government scrutiny in order to prevent the dissemination of radical ideology.

There are several historical precedents for Islamic opposition rising against secular leadership in Central Asia. Various imams led uprisings against the Russian Tsar in the nineteenth century. Later, it was also Islamic leaders who challenged Bolshevik authority in the 1930 s.²⁶ Currently, although most Kazakhs lead secular lives, religious radicalism threatens to invade the southern region of the country. In fact, the Ministry of Education was forced to close down the South Kazakhstan Humanitarian Academy, because it taught a radical form of Islam. Also in 2004, police uncovered the whereabouts of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which has links to Al Qaeda. This group was allegedly responsible for terrorist attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli and U.S. embassies in the summer of that year²⁷.

The loss of identity and the protections offered by universal welfare programs makes the younger generations of Kazakhs susceptible to radical ideologies, especially among the born-again Kazakh Muslims trying to recapture their Islamic heritage and identity. In fact, even Uzbek and Russian Muslims feel connected to what is essentially a regional social movement²⁸. Although the 1995 Constitution retained the social protections such as pension coverage for retirees and benefits for the disabled, unemployed, orphans, the infirm, and the elderly. These previously benefits afforded under communist rule suffered from lack of funding after the independence. This led to many services such as pension coverage to being privatized²⁹. These government policies aimed to establish a safety net for the most vulnerable portions of the society whose economic suffering could have made them susceptible to the messages of radical opposition, especially the religious ones.

The Nazarbayev administration has aimed to unify all Kazakhs under the flag of nationalism, but too many cultural, ethnic, and political subgroups exist in modern Kazakhstan. Southern Kazakhs have traditionally been more aligned linguistically, culturally, and religiously with Uzbeks while northern Kazakhs are more secularized and Russified³⁰.

The social welfare programs that disappeared following the end of communism have become a rallying point for many radical groups. Although advocating an Islamic agenda, their ideology borrows from socialism to appeal to financially struggling Kazakhs. One option the Kazakh authorities have tried to dissuade membership in the group is to provide subsidies to high risk areas. Prostitution, alcoholism, drugs, and human trafficking were also on the rise following the end of the Soviet era. These societal problems were blamed on the weaknesses of the provisional government. Such factors has increased the popularity of some radical groups³¹.

The radical religious groups blame societal ills on the failure of secular government and argue that by founding an Islamic state, all of these social problems would disappear. The conditions seem right for hosting certain extremist groups. Unregistered mosques, unemployed youth, and access to international financial resources provide it with the resources to sustain their activities. Such groups also enjoy better public perception than the Kazakh government which viewed as ineffective and corrupt. They portray themselves as the only viable opposition group capable of offering economic and political

[26] Reuel Hanks. *Op.cit.*, 211.

[27] Emmanuel Karagiannis. *op.cit.*, p. 302.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 298

[29] Country Report: Kazakhstan. Library of Congress. *op.cit.*

[30] Emmanuel Karagiannis. *op.cit.*, p. 315.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

reform. However, playing the role of an opposition group in Kazakhstan is different from having the skills in leading the state.

The nature of some opposition group rhetoric is mostly anti-American, anti-Jewish and critical of the neighboring states, like Uzbekistan. These characteristics leave little diplomatic room for governing state affairs in relationship to global and regional powers in addition to even neighboring states. Interestingly, such groups are largely silent about Kazakh authorities although their ultimate goal is to supplant secular governments with an Islamic based system. In this way, the group avoids incurring the attention of Kazakh authorities³². Casting the Kazakh government as a secular westernized state, radical Islamic groups offer sharia as the base of the state. In a larger context, however, such groups use the «Clash of Civilizations» concept in their comparison of secular government versus Islam³³. Islam is the cornerstone of religious groups like, Hizb ut Tahrir, which plans for social reform. For them, there is no separation of religion and state. They claim that only an Islamic state is capable of creating the ideal society devoid of social problems like alcoholism and prostitution³⁴. Although Hizb ut Tahrir is based primarily in Uzbekistan, it has followers throughout Central Asia. Following the 9/11, Hizb ut Tahrir split into several factions. Many who joined are not actual sympathizers for the cause, but rather individuals seeking relief from their grim socio-economic conditions³⁵.

Sufism

The less talked about religious group in the region is Sufism, which have also had an impact on the government and society in Central Asia. The Sufism includes traditions of tolerance and secularism. Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, is gaining a following but their activities are more difficult to observe since they mostly operate in secrecy. The Naqshbandiyav and the Yasawiya Sufi sects, or tariqah, are most popular. The veneration of Sufi saints, Beket Ata, Shopan Ata, Shora Molda, Aysha-Bibi, and Arstan Bab is also gaining a following³⁶.

Aq jol is a Sufi religious movement founded in 1997 by Bayjanova Zeyniykamal Karjinbaevna. Using Sufi mysticism, the group is centered on the veneration of «Muslim saints» two of which are Sarı Au`liye (The Yellow Saint) and Aq Au`liye (The White Saint)³⁷. Charismatic individuals conduct healing sances and encourage a return to the basic principles of Islam. In this respect, Aq Jol represents a growing range of unconventional religious choices available to Kazakhs. It is especially attractive to those who are disinterested in the brand of Islam promoted by the state. This type of Islamic movement has been benevolent in nature, but the Kazakh system still prefers to keep religion away from politics and the affairs of the state.

Foreign Missionaries

In the Kazakh process of nation building, foreign missionaries have found great opportunities to export different Christian sects and other non-native ideology into Kazakhstan. This has raised alarms from some Muslim groups which view the conversions from Islam to any other religion as tantamount to betrayal of the traditional Kazakh cultural and religious heritage. The introduction of non-native religions is also seen as a destructive development creating divisions within Kazakh society. Although the constitution provides legal protections for all religious groups, missionaries have encountered hostile

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 311.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

[35] Reuel Hanks. *op.cit.*, 211.

[36] Azade-Ayse Rorlich. *op.cit.*, p. 173.

[37] Pawell Jessa. «Aq jol soul healers: religious pluralism and a contemporary Muslim movement in Kazakhstan.» *Central Asian Survey* (September 2006) 25(3), pp. 359.

reactions from the communities in which they operate³⁸. Thus, there is a gap between the Kazakh state behavior as opposed to Kazakh society reaction to foreign missionaries.

Immediately following the independence, an unstable social and economic environment made some Kazakhs more receptive to the message of the foreign missionaries. There is a striking difference between the proselytizing of the foreign missionaries versus the Muslim clerics who sometimes fail to appeal to the hopelessness and desperation of the Kazakhs who are most susceptible. In response to the conversions to other religions, the conversion of Russians and Ukrainians to Islam is heavily publicized in the Kazakh media³⁹.

Although the work of predominately protestant missionaries is seen as a social threat, one may argue that the real destabilizing force is the introduction of radical Muslim sects outside the realm of mainstream Islam. As mentioned indicated, the majority of Kazakh Muslims are followers of the Sunni Hanifi tradition which is the mainstream Islam. However, there also are some followers of certain radical sects whose activities have been rather limited⁴⁰. Thus, Islam in Kazakhstan has impacted the state and society in a very different way from the experience of other Central Asian countries, which have faced more serious Islamic movement challenges.

Conclusion

Our discussion addressed three basic questions about Islam and politics in Kazakhstan:

1. How do religion and politics interact with one another in contemporary Kazakhstan?
2. Why does Kazakhstan enjoy a higher standard about the religion and politics ties?
3. How are such topics related to the Kazakh sense of national identity?

We explained how the Kazakh constitution guarantees religious freedom and organizations while keeping the religion separate from government. Islam has had a long tradition in the Kazakh land; and it has impacted the Kazakh society in ways very different from those in other Muslim nations. The unique features of Kazakh state and society and the nature of Islam in Kazakhstan allowed a more open governmental and social structure in comparison to other Central Asian states, which have had more serious challenges from the Islamic community and civic society.

The moderate nature of Islam in Kazakhstan and the prudent policies of the Kazakh leaders have contributed to the sense of religious and political tolerance. As a result, Kazakhstan enjoys more political stability and security in comparison to its neighboring Central Asian states. We analyzed the sophisticated ties between religion and politics in Kazakhstan. Finally, we made observations about how our research questions are addressed.

In closing, one may argue that a legacy of Soviet rule and higher levels of education has served to discourage Kazakh membership in radical groups. Unlike other Muslim countries, the Islamic renaissance particularly in Kazakhstan and generally in Central Asia is not anti-western or against modernization. The nature, role, and functions of current Islamic movements in Kazakhstan are the tell-tale signs of a society rediscovering a cultural heritage suppressed by generations of Soviet communism. The modern Muslim Kazakhs are learning how to balance their loyalty to their state, ethnic heritage, and religious beliefs. In many ways, this is not only a challenge for the Kazakhs, but also for all societies around the world.

[38] Azade-Ayse Rorlich, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 172.



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
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Vectors and paradigm of Kyrgyz independence (post-Soviet history essays)

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
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Mapping Central Asia Indian Perceptions and Strategies

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Female Face of Terrorism (international research results)

Tatyana Dronzina
PhD, Professor at the Department of
Political Science of St. Kliment Ohridski
University of Sofia (Bulgaria)

«Female Face of Terrorism (international research results)». – Astana, 2011. – 236 pages.

ISBN 978-601-280-244-3

Monograph by famous Bulgarian researcher Tatyana Dronzina examines deep-rooted female suicide terrorism phenomenon in the modern world. The book features in-depth theoretical

analysis of terrorism, reveals various research approaches, defines terms of suicide terrorism as a matter for scientific research. The author focuses also on political and religious grounds of terrorism.

The empirical basis of the work is built upon the detailed analysis of a series of suicide acts committed in Lebanon (1985-1987), Sri Lanka (1987-2008), Turkey (1996-1999), Chechnya (2000-2004), and Palestine (2002-2006).

The book consists of 5 chapters:

Chapter 1. Terrorism: Definition and Explanatory Approaches

Chapter 2. Suicide Terrorism: Definition and Categories of Analysis

Chapter 3. Suicide Terrorism Legitimated by Religion. Nature, Reasons, Evolution.

Chapter 4. Female Suicide Terrorism Legitimated through Secular Ideologies Suicide Missions in Lebanon (1985-1987). The Case of Sri Lanka (1987-2008). Suicide Terrorism of Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey (1996-1999)


Chapter 5. Suicide Terrorism Legitimated by Religion. Female Suicide Terrorism in Chechnya (2000-2004) and Palestine (2002-2006)

Conclusion. Female Suicide Terrorism: Attempt to Rethink in Gender Aspect.

Female Suicide Terrorism is just one of renewed old threats which reminds us that global, regional and national security requires to date another understanding, another way of thinking and various solutions.

The book is published within the book series of «International Research. Society. Politics. Economics» magazine of the Institute for Social and Political Research (www.ispr.kz).

The book is addressed to a wide readership.



Language Policy in Kazakhstan

By the order of the Committee on Languages of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Language Policy in Kazakhstan (Sociological research results) / Edited by A.Sadvokassova, B.Rakisheva, S.Kalmykov / The Committee on Languages of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Institute for Socio-Political Research. – Astana, 2011. – 144 pages

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William Fierman, Ph.D (Political Science)

N.D. Shaimerdenova, Ph.D. in Philology, professor

This edition is prepared for the Committee on Languages of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The book features the findings of the full-scale social and analytical language policy studies. It focuses on people's proficiency in the state and native languages, the state and Russian languages in social and communication environment of the Kazakh society, language policy assessment, people's language preferences, enforcement of the rights in the language field.

The book is recommended for the language policy experts, scientists, PhD students, candidates for master's degree, students, public servants and a wide audience.



Әлеуметтік-саяси зерттеулер институтының **ҚАЗАҚ ДИАСПОРАСЫН ЗЕРТТЕУ ОРТАЛЫҒЫ**

2011 жылы
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


Eurasian National University Faculty and PhD students established Eurasian International Studies Association

EISA is the first and only Association in Central Asia, claiming the title of regional representation of the International Studies Association (ISA), whose members are more than five thousand scientists and experts from 120 countries around the world. A similar branch operates in the Post-Soviet Russia - Russian International Studies Association (RISA) at MGIMO.

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Participation in these activities will enable EISA not only broaden the popularity abroad, but also to raise the profile of L.N. Gumilyov ENU as the initiator of such projects and active participant in the world of scientific life. In addition, ISA membership will provide an opportunity for Kazakhstani representatives to publish the results of scientific works, which will also have a positive impact on the promotion of the image of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstani scientists in foreign scientific environment.



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