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Dear friends!

We are delighted to present the current issue of the “**International Research. Society. Policy. Economy**” journal for your attention. This issue is dedicated to one of the topical questions of today’s world politics– to “**Security Challenges in Central Asia.**”

This is already the second issue of the journal published in English, prepared specifically for the ISA’s 55th Annual Convention: Spaces and Places: Geopolitics in an Era of Globalization, which will be held in March 26th - 29th, 2014, Toronto, Canada. The first special issue was presented at the ISA’s 53th Annual Convention: Power, Principles and Participation in the Global Information Age (USA, San Diego, 2012).

We offer for the attention of our readers articles by authors who outlined their vision of the current situation and perspectives of regional security and stability in Central Asia.

The article of the Candidate of Political Science, Director of the non-governmental educational institution “Bilim Karvoni” *Farkhod Tolipov* (Tashkent, Uzbekistan) “*Central Asia between the Euro-Atlantics and Euro-Asia: the market of security services in the region*” is of interest.

Kazakhstani experts Candidate of Military Science, Chief researcher of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan *Georgiy Dubovtsev*, Candidate of Law, Director of the department of military and defense research of “*Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan*” *JSC Rafiq Tairov* and Doctor of Political Science, Professor of International Relations Faculty at the L.N. Gumilyov ENU *Svetlana Kozhirova* have shared their opinion on security challenges in the region. Their article entitled “*Afghanistan after 2014: Central Asia’s security challenges and solutions*” reveals one of the pressing issues of contemporary Central Asia.

The point of view of American expert Professor *Human A. Sadri*, Associate professor of the University of Central Florida, Model UN Coordinator, member of the Executive Committee of the ISA (Orlando, USA) on the main sources of threats in the Caspian region, the eternal contradictions node of 5 countries of the Caspian region, will be interesting for the readers. Chinese author researcher of the Academy of Social Sciences, Candidate of Economic Science *Hu Hongping* (Sinzyan, Urumqi) also shares his thoughts on this topic.

This issue presents the research results of young scholars: Master of peace and arrangement of conflicts, a doctoral candidate of the Institute of Political Science, University of Magdeburg in Germany *Akmal Sohibov* (Germany, Tajikistan), Candidate of Political Science, Associate Professor of Political Science of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, academic secretary of the Institute of Strategic Analysis and Prognosis under Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University *Zamira Muratalieva* (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), researcher of the Institute of Peace, Conflicts and Mediation “Kokshe” Academy”, History Lecturer at the Department of Humanities and Education of the “Kokshe” Academy” *Murat Mukhamedzhan* (Kokshetau, Kazakhstan).

We thank Professor *Stanislav Tkachenko*, head of the “*Post-communist States in International Relations*” section of ISA and Professor *Gregory Gleason*, a member of the Editorial Board of the journal, for their support and help!

On behalf of the editorial board of the journal, we thank the authors of articles in this issue, and all those that helped us in the course of its publication, for their cooperation!

Sincerely yours,
Botagoz Rakisheva,
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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES FOR REDUCING DRUG ECONOMY IN AFGHANISTAN

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The following article* tackles the conditions regarding economy and sustainability for present and future perspectives as far as economic development in Afghanistan is concerned. Furthermore, this article reviews the common and traditional issue of the Afghan economy: agriculture and its role in Afghanistan. Another aspect that will be discussed here is whether the Afghan agriculture can thrive without poppy cultivation. Besides, concepts like *Comprehensive Development (CD)* and *Development Cooperation Central Asia (DCCA)* reveal an ambitious character of the regional cooperation.

1. The New Economy in Afghanistan after the Collapse of the Taliban Reign

Due to long-term financial support and aids from outside, Afghanistan is still regarded as one of the poorest countries – even with a GDP of USD 27 bln in 2010. The industrial branch of the economy develops slowly. Most companies and factories from the 1970's have been destroyed or are not competitive. They are simply too old or don't work properly anymore. A few companies that exist remain state property. Traditional branches such as agriculture, trade and craftsmanship cannot compensate the current deficits. The government of Afghanistan is therefore aiming at the membership in the WTO and showing initiative by supporting the country e.g. modified and less complicated tax system, easier access and process for licenses as well as registration for companies and an improved export of goods. Nevertheless, taxes on imports are low for this particular region. This does result in the import of cheap goods which also means that goods and products made in Afghanistan cannot compete on the market¹. The main aspects for the economic development in Afghanistan are the geographical conditions. The mountains that are dominating the landscape of Afghanistan are also a hindrance to transport and infrastructure. The dry climate is an infringement to production and agriculture. Therefore Afghanistan remains dependent on neighboring countries such as Pakistan².

* First of all I want to express my gratitude to my supervisors Prof. Dr. Klaus Schlichte and Prof. Dr. Heiko Schrader as well as to my friends Susanne Schweigel and Sebastian Schiek for their academic support and hints in publishing this article.

[1] The Role of the Afghan Government in Successful Development – Starting an Open Dialogue on Afghanistan's Future Economy, Economic Conference, Kabul, 18th and 19th of June 2012. A Reader on Afghanistan's Economic Development since 2001 With the Complements of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) and German-Afghan Network (DAN, Deutsch-Afghanisches Netzwerk), page.2, June 2012.

[2] GIZ Afghanistan: <http://liportal.giz.de/afghanistan/wirtschaft-entwicklung.html>

Since the country's economy mostly depends on external funds and receives its support from development projects outside of Afghanistan, it is not sure how sustainable its growth is. This concerns construction companies, as well as transportation and logistics. Due to the low taxes, prices and regulations for customs, the Afghan goods and products are replaced by cheap imports and goods from outside of Afghanistan³. For example, a company in Herat that is responsible for producing tomato paste had to face bankruptcy due to the low costs of production in Iran and prices offered for the same product by Iran. Another good example can be given with regards to the printing business which could hardly develop. It could not thrive as large printing orders were given out to (printing) companies in Pakistan due to the low costs of the production and materials as well as low customs rates for import and low transportation fees⁴.

Foreign Aid as an Engine for Afghan Economy

The contribution of foreign aid is decisive for Afghan economy. The total expenditure for foreign aid mounts up to USD 62 bln from 2001 until 2009, 50% of which were given to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. 55% of the total sum of the development aid has been announced at the international conferences for Afghanistan (Tokyo, Berlin, London, Rome and Paris)⁵. In 2010 the total budget for foreign aid and development assistance amounts up to USD 6.4 bln and only 10% of which was spent on humanitarian aid or projects. Thus, Afghanistan has also been the sixth largest recipient of foreign aid and development assistance worldwide in 2010. Afghanistan did receive 45% of its gross national income (GNI) as a financial support from outside with a state income of USD 3.4 bln⁶.

Economic development in Afghanistan is based mostly on foreign aid, branches such as construction industry, logistics as well as transportation in particular. At present, 48% of the government expenditures are financed and covered by foreign aid and development assistance. The World Bank states that 97% of the Afghan GDP are due expenses made by humanitarian and military presence of the donor countries⁷. The countries concerned are now making an effort to adjust their strategies and take into account real conditions and actual developments in Afghanistan. An inquiry panel of the US government has warned that this type of foreign aid might lead to corruption, instability and insecurity as well as a distortion on the jobs and goods markets⁸. Yet, the international community cannot completely withdraw state control from the Afghan government over the foreign aid. Thus, the countries involved promised in Communiqués to channel 50% of the development aid through the Afghan government within the next two years. This has been discussed thoroughly in 2010 at the international conferences for Afghanistan in London and Kabul⁹. The withdrawal of military troops from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014 would cut back development assistance and hence cause a crisis in economy for many relevant branches. But still foreign aid is spent on old projects. The EU approves USD 600 mln for development assistance in order to ensure transition of security to Afghanistan by the end of 2014¹⁰.

[3] Nijssen, Stefanie 2010, Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan, The Afghan Economy: A Brief History, page 5.

[4] Outlook Afghanistan, June 15th 2011: Foreign imports killing off Afghan industry, page 8 and 11.

[5] The Role of the Afghan Government in Successful Development – Starting an Open Dialogue on Afghanistan's Future Economy. Economic Conference, Kabul, 18th and 19th of June 2012. A Reader on Afghanistan's Economic Development since 2001 With the Compliments of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) and German-Afghan Network (DAN, Deutsch-Afghanisches Netzwerk), page 18, June 2012.

[6] ReliefWeb: Afghanistan: Donor Financial Review Report, <http://reliefweb.int/node/349355>

[7] <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/afghanistan>

[8] Gregg Carlstrom, Economic Depression Looms in Afghanistan, June 2011. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2011/06/20116812933228775.html>

[9] Evaluating US Foreign assistance to Afghanistan, 2011, page 2, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/search/?q=Evaluating+US+Foreign+assistance+to+Afghanistan&as_sitesearch=&x=38&y=18

[10] Communiqué, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, page 2. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/355350/publicationFile/51498/100720-Kommunique-Kabul.pdf>

The international community is expecting the financial gap to be closed only by foreign aid with the help of subsidies and drastic cut-backs in the expenses within the security and civil sectors until the year 2020. Besides, the international community has offered its support for Afghanistan in connecting with the world market, in lifting trade and transit barriers as well as in the development of infrastructure and the exploitation of natural resources¹¹. In the meantime, the international community is calling for a change of the development approach from “Aid to Trade” (financial aid to support trade)¹².

2. Traditional Rural Economy in Afghanistan

Agriculture is still one of the most significant sources of income for the rural population in Afghanistan. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 70% of those employed in rural areas and 85% of Afghans depend on agriculture and the processing of agricultural goods. The main goods are rice, sweetcorn, barley, wheat, vegetables, fruits and nuts. Wheat is still the most important staple food with up to 83% of its harvest consumption and the largest cultivation in Afghanistan. Industrially useful field crops such as cotton, tobacco, common madder, sugar beet and castor oil plant are increasingly grown and being marketed¹³. Goods for export are pomegranate, grapes, apples as well as dried fruits, walnuts, pistachios and raisins. Today’s most important fruit-growing regions are Herat, the area north of Kabul called Shomali, Kandahar and Pandsher-Valley, where grapes, pomegranates and apricots are grown¹⁴.

Poppy-Free Agriculture?

The eradication of opium poppy fields increased the geographical distribution for growing opium poppy. For the first time, farmers in the province Ghor (in central Afghanistan), for instance, found it lucrative and profitable to grow opium poppy after the Taliban ban on cultivation has increased prices¹⁵. In the years 2004-2005 drug traffickers were sending out the financial agents and middlemen to other areas in order to ensure delivery that is sufficient enough. As a result the opium harvest of 2005 has shown the highest geographical distribution compared to other years¹⁶. Eradication or forced reductions of poppy fields does not decrease the cultivation of poppy. Afghan farmers grow opium poppy for security reasons, both physical and economic security. When conditions proved to be hard and insecure, the opium production seems to be the only alternative for farmers in rural areas in order to provide them with credits, services, access to markets and land¹⁷.

Opium is hardly just a cultural crop. It is more than well-organized industry. According to the UNODC 14% of the population in Afghanistan contribute to the cultivation of poppy, generating 20-30% of the export volume with regards to opium produced in Afghanistan. Those facts do not take into account that a large number of those people participating in this business work directly for various branches in the drug economy rather than in poppy

[11] Outlook Afghanistan, July 18th 2011. EU pledges 600 m \$ in aid to Afghanistan, Front Page & page 8.

[12] The Role of the Afghan Government in Successful Development – Starting an Open Dialogue on Afghanistan’s Future Economy. Economic Conference, Kabul, 18th and 19th of June 2012. A Reader on Afghanistan’s Economic Development since 2001 With the Complements of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) and German-Afghan Network (DAN, Deutsch-Afghanisches Netzwerk). page 22, June 2012.

[13] *Ibid.* page 23.

[14] Economic guidelines-Afghanistan, 2011, Germany Trade and Invest. (Wirtschaftsleitfaden-Afghanistan, 2011). June 2012, page 15. <http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/trade.did=342842.html?view=renderPrint>

[15] The Role of the Afghan Government in Successful Development – Starting an Open Dialogue on Afghanistan’s Future Economy. Economic Conference, Kabul, 18th and 19th of June 2012. A Reader on Afghanistan’s Economic Development since 2001 With the Complements of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) and German-Afghan Network (DAN, Deutsch-Afghanisches Netzwerk). page 13, June 2012.

[16] cf. David Mansfield, “Water Management, Livestock, and the Opium Economy,” AREU Case Study Series, 2006, page 28. <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/618E-Opium%20Cultivation%20in%20Kunduz%20and%20Balkh%20CS%20web.pdf>

[17] cf. Rubin, Barnett R. & Sherman, Jake 2008, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication. Center on International Cooperation, NY University. pp. 27-28. <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/afghanistan/docs/counter-narcotics-final.pdf>

cultivation. Most people earn a living by indirect additional labour that corresponds with the demand of the drug industry for example the construction industry, trade, repairs as well as gastronomy and hotels¹⁸.

3. What is the Alternative Development for Afghanistan?

Projects for alternative livelihoods are usually based on sweeping concepts. Those projects aim to bring about a development that is questionable, a “development in the drug environment”¹⁹. Projects for alternative livelihoods or alternative development trying to combat the drug economy are in theory a promise of the foreign aid, which is used as a tool for negotiations in order to reduce poppy cultivation. In this case, success is measured not in terms of sustainable changes and improvements of the living conditions for the rural population, but instead in reducing the number of hectares and not in terms of decreasing the dependency on opium poppy as a means of income and property either. This approach to development assistance is seen rather as a means of compensation than as a tool of fostering and strengthening for the sake of an adequate wellbeing of poor rural population²⁰.

The state framework *Securing Afghanistan's Future* (SAF) of the former finance minister Ashraf Ghani did investigate the influence and effect of eradication in a study of 2004. The results of the evaluation therein reveal that the eradication of drug economy could be achieved within a period of 15 years without reducing the living conditions provided that legal economy will grow at a rate of 9% each year. The growth rate alone would not ease the shock as the loss of opium could not produce the same kind of growth within those areas of social groups. Hence a policy of sectors and redistribution is required. The interim strategy of Afghanistan National Development (I-ANDS) subscribes to this goal. However no further steps were taken to integrate this aim into the fight against drugs with the macroeconomic planning. Instead the development components have been limited to small format rural development. At a meeting with officers of drug enforcement agency the farmers from Helmand have required cotton subsidies from the government as incentives for changing from opium poppy to cotton cultivation. Even if cotton alone is not competitive, Ashraf Ghani's proposal remains that the textile industry is competitive. A fixed set of textile quotas for Afghanistan in the larger market combined with an investment in simple manufacture could raise chances for employment opportunities in Afghanistan. According to Ashraf Ghani, the brand “Made in Afghanistan” or “Made in Afghanistan by Afghan Women” could compensate for the raised costs for production and transport²¹.

Proposals for Alternative Projects for Sustainable Economic Development and for Reducing Poppy Economy in Afghanistan

In certain academic circles the opinion holds that Afghanistan's drug problems, alongside with the eradication of opium poppy fields and possible legislation of opium production could be solved²². The following concepts for regional cooperation and sustainable economic development I suggest could be further discussed in relevant academic circles and development aid policy institutions.

The Concept of Comprehensive Development

Comprehensive development comprises a regional framed approach of measures of development policy of an aid donor and economic dependent

[18] cf. Ibid. page 28.

[19] cf. Ibid.

[20] cf. Mansfield, D. and Pain, A. 2005: Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? AREU Briefing Paper, page 2, <http://areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/524E-Substance%20or%20Slogan%20BP.pdf>

[21] cf. Ibid. page 5.

[22] cf. Ibid. page 35.

collaboration between resource-rich and resource-poor neighbouring countries. This cooperation expedites economic development by a resource-dependent industrialization of border areas in a conflict-laden country and moreover enables relative stable neighbour country and international donors to enforce their interests related to security policy and economy. The concept of Comprehensive Development does require a lot of theoretical amendments and practical examples from different regions in crises. Taking Afghanistan as an example and its resource-rich neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan this concept could be applied here in theory.

Resource-Dependent Industrialization of the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan

In the quite stable northern provinces of Afghanistan such as Balkh, Jowzjan and Faryab it could be possible to promote small and mid-size factories which would import their raw materials from the Central Asian neighbouring countries. What kind of raw material could be sustainable for economic development of northern Afghanistan? For example, cotton and its components such as seeds and stems. With the help of mid-sized enterprises one could expand a local textile industry in order to process cotton in northern Afghanistan. Small enterprises could produce cooking oil, soap from cotton seeds as well as protein-rich forage from oil cake of cotton. Cotton stems serve as alternative material to produce boards, an optimal construction material for the region.

For instance, there are already cotton fabrics in the provinces Balkh and Kunduz, which in addition to cotton fibre produce also cooking oil and forage. A company located in Balkh works under auspices of the “Northern Afghanistan Project for Cotton and Oil Development” (NAPCOD), the Joint Venture between the DAGRIS Group, the French Agency for development, and the Afghan Government²³. But this factory has a lot of problems: the old equipment that has been produced in Germany and the Soviet Union in 1940s and 1960s, lack in skilled specialists (many of them were trained in the Soviet Union), lack of systems of quality control, inconstant power supply and a shortage of cotton itself sold by farmers not directly to fabrics, but mostly with more expensive prices on black markets²⁴. These barriers for development could be better removed by a close partnership with Central Asian neighbouring countries, Western aid donors and Russia. Besides, the provinces that have been mentioned are well linked with neighbouring countries of Central Asia. They have an easy access to roads of Russia, East Europe and the Gulf region being linked to Kazakhstan, Iran and the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan has already built a railway line to Mazari-Sharif (Balkh province) and Turkmenistan is planning the construction of the railway lines to the border districts of the Afghan provinces Jowzjan and Faryab²⁵.

Raw Materials from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Industrial Facilities from Development Aid from the West and Russia

Integrating the northern neighbour countries of Afghanistan such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in an economic and export oriented development cooperation would not only optimize the import of raw materials but also improve northern export corridors of Afghanistan. The question remains however who can co-finance and cooperate to install such industrial facilities to process cotton and its components to Afghanistan? Furthermore which regional power is advocating eradication and stemming distribution and

[23] cf. Maaß, Githa D. 2010:35, Keefer P. & Loayza, N (ed.) 2010: 335, Felbab-Brown, Vanda 2010: 180.

[24] cf. Parto S., Paterson A. & Karimi A. 2007. Enabling or disabling? The Operating Environment for Small and Medium Enterprises in Rural Afghanistan. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Working Paper Series. page 9. <http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/720E-Enabling%20or%20Disabling-WP-web.pdf>

[25] cf. Ibid.

consumption of drugs from Afghanistan? Russia. At the time of the Soviet development aid, 142 industrial facilities were built in the 1960s and 1970s. Russia is still able to provide them with replacement parts. Russia could cooperate with Western development projects for a “resource-dependent industrialization” in the northern Afghanistan and contribute to reduction of opium production in Afghanistan. The same can be said for Kazakhstan. The country is also famous for its wheat export in the region. Wheat from Kazakhstan could further contribute to industrialization of northern Afghanistan by producing pasta and other relevant products both for internal consumption and for export purposes.

A significant role of Western aid donors is to some extent participating with targeted financial resources, monitoring and consulting Afghan business people when buying industrial facilities for small and mid-size companies. Donors could also support the production of goods as well as their sale or export in order to enhance the cooperation within the region to foster comprehensive development. Moreover, Western development aid could integrate Russian transit ways and infrastructure and closer cooperation of entrepreneurs from the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan.

What to Do with Products Made in Afghanistan?

Thanks to local products, e.g. foods in particular, high prices in Afghanistan might sink partially, demands on local markets could be satisfied. Moreover, locally made products could be bought also by aid organizations for humanitarian aid. Materials intended for construction industry could be used both for Afghan and for regional development projects. One could for instance establish *Peace Shops* to bring to market Afghan textile products in those countries participating in the project or in other developed countries with a label that states “*Made for Peace in Afghanistan*”²⁶.

The concept of comprehensive development closely links Afghanistan with the neighbouring countries in the North and makes a large contribution to finding a solution for socio-economic and security related problems. Western development projects can link these regional development potentials in the struggle to weaken the drug economy. This will be the cornerstone for the cooperation between Western, Russian, Central Asian and Afghan companies. The economic projects of comprehensive development would also move the migration of farmers especially from southern and western provinces to the northern provinces and infringe their participation in the rural production of opium.


Projects similar in theory include a network of projects with the local production of raw materials from neighbouring countries and are planned in the western and northern border provinces of Afghanistan. In 2013 private companies such as ANSAR and KINGSTON that focus on fuel delivery to the Afghan market are planning to set up two small enterprises for oil processing. Experts share opinion that those companies will be capable of processing Afghan oil in the near future. One of companies will be located in the province Herat. The other one is placed close to the border of Uzbekistan, in the northern town Hairaton. To start with, these two companies will be in charge of processing of oil from Russia and Kazakhstan. Afterwards these companies will be processing the Afghan oil. Their focus will be on the production of petrol and gasoil. The Chinese company CNPC started to extract oil in Afghanistan, i.e. in the northern Province Sari Pul, near the river Amudarya. This also means that oil processing companies could get crude oil from this Chinese company²⁷. Both experts and scientists place a great value on the construction of Afghanistan’s infrastructure. They state for

[26] Tolo News, Construction of Aqina-Andkhai Railway to Begin Next Year, <http://tolonews.com/en/business/3597-construction-of-aqina-andkhai-railway-to-begin-next-year>

[27] cf. also the proposal of Ashraf Ghani about textile industry. Rubin,

instance that new roads, rail networks, power supply lines and pipelines have to be introduced to the country, and be closely connected with neighbouring countries²⁸.

Map: Road and rail road networks (existing and planned) connecting through the "Afghanistan hub"²⁹.



Development Cooperation Central Asia (DCCA) Initiative

The *DCCA Initiative* could become a regional or international concept for fostering economy by development policy. The *DCCA Initiative* is working closely with US-American and European development projects. The aim is to link potentials for development in the Central Asian countries (such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) with those in Afghanistan in order to support coherent development of sustainable economy in the region. This initiative places its focus on cross-border networking of resources, knowledge and technology. The DCCA - initiative supports both American and European development organizations in elaborating plans, ideas and concepts as well as in the coordinating and implementing of projects that support this kind of network cooperation between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. The main focus of this initiative lies in the integration of Afghan enterprises into the economic projects of European and American companies in Kazakhstan³⁰, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This also includes other activities such as training for businessmen as well as workers of regional projects. The aim of these projects is to establish a series of Joint Ventures between Western, Afghan and Central Asian enterprises. This can be done with the help of development aid organizations and regional sponsors (ministry of industry, economic development and commerce, responsible authorities and the chamber of trade and commerce).

Looking at the present day situation of Afghanistan we see that Afghan enterprises or businessmen work under instable and insecure conditions. They also have little chances and potential for the foundation of Joint

[28] The construction of two oil processing companies is being planned in Afghanistan (В Афганистане планируется строительство заводов по переработке нефти). 26.10.2012. <http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/53262.html>

[29] Starr, S. Frederick & Kuchins, Andrew C. 2010. The Key to Success in Afghanistan. A Modern Silk Road Strategy. Silk Road Paper May 2010, page 10. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1005.Afghan.pdf>

[30] Ibid. page 38.

Ventures with Western or even the neighbouring Central Asian countries. Therefore a regional focus with an internationally supported approach to development is mandatory for sustainable development of the Afghan economy. Entrepreneurial spirit and capital are used marginally due to economic and political instability in Afghanistan. Central Asian enterprises are facing problems exporting the produced goods to the international markets. Western companies show a tendency to careful cooperation in Central Asia. Nevertheless they would like to benefit from the economic development of this region and open up new markets.

An advantage of this initiative with regard to development policy is a sustainable cooperation of the economy based on the foundation of Joint Ventures between the Afghan entrepreneurs and their Western and Central Asian partners in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These trilateral Joint Ventures receive industrial facilities from Western countries and Russia and they export their goods to the neighbouring and partner countries. The German companies, such as KfW Development Bank and DEG (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft, engl. German Investment and Development Association), support for instance development projects and private-economic initiatives in order to achieve sustainable progress in developing countries as well as transformational countries. Potential Joint Ventures in Central Asia could qualify for funds from these German companies in order to finance their industrial facilities and economic projects that way. As a result of successful cooperation, Afghan businesses would then reinvest their income in local projects in Afghanistan. In doing so, it would improve socio-economic situation of Afghanistan after the possible cutbacks in foreign aid after 2014. One of the most important requirements for Afghan businesses to participate in the DCCA Initiative is the reinvestment of 20% of the company's profit in development, reconstruction, or social projects respectively in Afghanistan in order to ensure sustainability of these local projects.³¹ Afghan businessmen partially take over the responsibility for development projects in their own country. Correspondingly they will be in charge of the development projects, hoped for sustainability of donor countries in Afghanistan to relieve or keep the aid budget of donors as low as possible. These so called Joint Ventures also support international organizations in the region. In addition they offer goods, products with reduced prices for humanitarian aid and development projects in the region in particular during a period of hard winters. Thus Western companies and industrial equipment gain a foothold on the regional market.

The advantages of DCCA-Initiative would be the opening of the new markets for exporting goods from Kazakhstan to China, Russia and into other countries of Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Gulf region. A practical exchange of expertise and experiences is required through the purchase of the industrial facilities and the strengthening of business contacts. It would be more realistic for political and economic support to involve decision makers from participating countries in order to establish and realize a close cooperation for development and sustainable economic development in Afghanistan. Selling the produced goods for humanitarian purposes will be a marginal but a safe profit; it is beacon of hope for participating companies of this region. The sale of goods to potential consumers with the label "Made for Peace in Afghanistan" or "Buy for Peace in Afghanistan" is also highly promising as these products can be consumed worldwide by Afghan Diasporas for peacekeeping and solidarity reasons.

[31] Kazakhstan is an optimal county for development projects based on Joint Ventures. The country has an advantageous location and a good access to markets in China, Russia, EU and (through the Caspian Sea) in the Gulf region. <http://www.kfw.de/kfw/de/Entwicklungsfinanzierung/index.jsp>

IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE REGIONAL SECURITY FROM TERRORIST THREATS

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Actions of terrorist organizations have caused a lot of problems for the world community in the past decade. Virtually no state of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan is currently immune from their destructive activities. Therefore, President Nursultan Nazarbayev charged to step up the fighting against terrorism and extremism at the meeting with the heads of the law enforcement agencies in January 2013. The state program on combating extremism and terrorism is being developed pursuant to the President's task. As the Head of State said, the main criterion for the efficiency of antiterrorist activity is the lack of terrorist attacks.

If earlier terrorism was perceived mainly as a form of restricted political violence and was the subject of criminal investigation and other activities within the framework of the criminal justice system, then lately it came to be regarded as a military threat, a specific form of violence that may spread practically without any restrictions and requires the use of military force against terrorist groups.

It is for this reason the military doctrine approved in October 2011, determined international terrorism as one of the country's main external security threats. The doctrine considers illegal activities of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist and terrorist movements, organizations and institutions as an internal threat, aimed at disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the country, destabilizing the internal situation in the country. All this leads to the need to improve military and political counterterrorism activities.

Playing an integrating role in the system of military policy of the country, military and political activities are called to guide the efforts of all its subjects to respond effectively to external and internal military security threats, including those on the part of terrorist forces.

Many experts predict an increase in terrorist activity in the region due to the impending withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan. This may also be triggered off by the interest of external forces and some states in destabilization of the political situation in the region. The good example of this is the scenario of "Arab revolutions".

The existence of a number of internal factors in the countries of the region contributes to this in the same degree, including:

- Inconsistency between the proclaimed democratic principles and the actual practice of public administration;
- The increase in the gap between the criminalized political elite and population with inactive position;
- Decline in the cultural and educational level and marginalization of a certain part of the population;
- Possibility of aggravation of interethnic and interfaith conflicts caused by actual or alleged infringement of the rights of individual ethnic groups and confessions;

- Expansion of separatist sentiments and trends generated by the past and present errors of the political leadership;
- Insufficient operating effectiveness of the law-enforcement authorities, discrepancy between the staff competence and levels of terrorist and criminal threats;
- A high level of corruption among officials and law enforcement authorities, the fight against corruption yet brings no tangible results throughout the region;
- Uncontrolled migration flows against the background of ineffective protection of state borders;
- Processes of deformation of legal consciousness, legal nihilism of a part of the population, as well as existence of serious problems in the system of spiritual and moral education of the youth;
- Organized crime, increase in its economic and financial power and armed capacity.

In turn, transnational organized crime creates a breeding ground for activities of various terrorist organizations in the region.

Religious terrorist and extremist organizations pose particular danger in modern conditions to practically all countries of the region. Subjective interpretation of the religion turns the norms of behavior of their members into harsh stereotypes.

Many experts say the rapprochement of military and terrorist forms of violence as well as network organizations when it is impossible to trace the organization center are peculiar to modern terrorism. Such a center of terrorist networks exists, as a rule, only in the ideological, political, and sometimes - in the financial sense. Such a network is lacking in fact a vertical hierarchy. Moreover, the lack of hierarchical subordination of certain groups gives additional flexibility and stability to the terrorist network.

We are witnessing the fact that modern terrorists defiantly demonstrate contempt for the universal moral principles and ethics. Their cruelty is comparable to or even surpassing the brutality of crimes committed during military conflicts against the civil population. In an effort to inflict the greatest possible damage, to kill as many innocent people as possible, terrorists are trying to intimidate both the population and the authorities, to make them accept concessions and meet their demands.

The existence of people for whom terrorism is the only means towards this end could be explained by psychological roots. The way of thinking of religious terrorists can be understood through scrutiny of shahidism traditions which are especially strong in the Shiite Islamic space. For example, during the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Iranian command sent death notices to the bereaved families congratulating on the soldiers' martyrdom and self-sacrificing. The Middle East and even the North Caucasus boast often committing of terrorist acts by shahids as the source of family pride. To uncrown such misanthropic ideology, it is necessary to conduct well-planned and well-organized work of government and law enforcement officials, religious and public organizations. Certainly, the youth, who joins the ranks of potential terrorists, should be in the area of special attention.

Despite the support which is officially expressed by many countries to the efforts of the international community aimed at combating international terrorism, such statements are often at odds with the real actions, explicitly or implicitly taken to fulfill their geopolitical ambitions. So, emissaries from the Middle East countries actively and purposefully organize their activities to propagate the ideas of Wahhabism in the Central Asian countries and have certain influence, as well as their adherents, including those from Kazakhstan.

For the moment, manifestations of terrorism and extremism are not so far-reaching in our country. However, the interest of foreign terrorist and extremist organizations, missionaries of radical confessions and various totalitarian

sects in our country arouses concern for they are trying to create their structural units. During the international counterterrorism conference held at the Majilis in November 2012, it was noted that foreign terrorist organizations had taken significant steps to tighten their domination in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. Terrorist emissaries recruit Kazakhstani citizens willing to participate in hostilities abroad, through the Internet and personally spreading their ideas among our population. A good example of this is the long-term activity of an extremist organization of Ismatulla Abdugappar. Despite the conviction in 2011 of the spiritual mentor of the organization and his several most active members thereof, numerous adherents and followers of Abdugapparov remain almost the countrywide. And we cannot exclude the probability of their further growth in the future.

Therefore, the counterterrorism organization requires a reasonable combination of power methods with ideological and socio-economic measures to avoid unnecessary radicalization of the society due to the use of criminal law measures, often perceived as repressive.

Extremism stems from the extremities of perception of a social life phenomena, and terrorism derives from the exigencies of extremism. It is impossible to effectively fight against the extremists without knowing their intentions, without tracking the processes within those organizations. To this end, competent sources of information shall be used and special investigative measures shall be implemented.

Terrorism itself is not able to accomplish much, but it can run the mechanism of a more complex and destructive social phenomenon which is called a war. A good example of this are the events connected with the second Chechen campaign, when the apartment bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities and the invasion of the Chechen militants in Dagestan, gave a rise to a counter-terrorism operation, which in fact was a war.

The same roots of the logic can be traced back to September 11, 2001, when the U.S. and its allies began to take decisive actions against the "Al-Qaeda" movement and its supports, the Taliban, which triggered off the launching of the war mechanism in Afghanistan.

In total, the question of the use of military force in the fight against terrorism and extremism is the most complicated and provoking a lot of controversy.

If previously terrorism was regarded as a criminal offence involving mainly law enforcement and intelligence agencies to fight with, in recent time its transformation into a military threat demanded involving of the armed forces and other counter-terrorism military formations. Participation of military forces in such fighting requires a well-defined legal regulation concerning the use of weapons and military equipment, as well as social guarantees to servicemen who practically attain combat tasks in peacetime.

At their core, the activities of the armed forces in the fight against terrorism are aimed at preventing, in case of failure, it is aimed at eliminating terrorist attacks aftermath, as well as destruction of those forces that are guilty of committing such a crime. In addition, the armed forces can assist law enforcement agencies in the fight against terrorist organizations and criminal networks that support terrorism.

Such activities include:

1) protective measures to reduce the vulnerability of civilian population, territory, infrastructure, information processing and communication systems (anti-terror);

2) offensive measures to detect, prevent, forestall and suppress terrorist activities (counter-terror);

3) measures to minimize the consequences of terrorist acts and stabilizing the situation, after-effects providing assistance to civil authorities (overcoming the consequences);

4) peace-making efforts in conflict zones to prevent the uprising of terrorist forces and their spread (peacekeeping);

5) military blockade of terrorist forces that have territorial isolation (blockade);

6) military support to law enforcement authorities in suppression of criminal offenses related to transit and illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, illegal migration, protecting borders from entry into the country of illegal armed groups and terrorist groups (ensuring security);

7) protection and prevention from possible leakage of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment from the armed forces, other troops and military formations (security functions);

8) joint training of the military personnel to conduct anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism fight (cooperation).

All this extends the framework of use of the armed forces and requires a search for new forms of coordination of activities with other countries in the military-political sphere, improvement of a single legal space and creating a harmonious interstate system of combating terrorism and extremism. Joint actions by the states in this area should be more focused on the prevention of terrorist acts and acts of sabotage. Regular joint anti-terrorist exercises, command-staff trainings with the participation of representatives of the competent authorities are among the most effective preventive measures.

For example, “Peace Mission” counterterrorism exercises of the SCO member states have been regularly held since 2003. The counterterrorism issues are tackled during the annual joint military exercises of the CSTO coalition forces. Since 2001, it has become the practice to hold joint antiterrorism exercises by the CIS member states. In 2012, “Don-Anti-Terror 2012” exercises were held under the coordination of the ATC of the CIS member states on the territory of Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. Law enforcement, intelligence agencies and military forces acquire skills to fight against terrorist groups that use insurgent and guerrilla-like tactics.

As the experts say, it is crucial to solve a set of problems concerning international cooperation and upgrading military and political activities in the fight against terrorism, such as:

1) some countries follow the policy of double standards on fighting terrorism;

2) some countries fail to perform international counterterrorism treaties;

3) contradictions in international law:

- between the right of nations to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of the state;

- between the principle of sovereignty and the need for adopting security measures against terrorist organizations and their sponsors;

4) inconsistency of the concept of preventive strikes against terrorist organizations under the international law;

5) political, economic, religious and other differences between the countries and unions of states;

6) some countries disregard the role of the UN and other international organizations;

7) counteraction to the approval of draft Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and Comprehensive Convention on Combating Terrorism.

Military threats posed by terrorism, as well as intricate sociopolitical processes, economic difficulties and restricted opportunities of the Central Asian states to ensure their own security require more decisive joining of their efforts and formation of an effective system to combat terrorism and extremism using the potential of the CSTO, SCO and other international organizations, as well as world powers concerned. It is the very problem to come to the forefront in the field of military-political cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan with other countries.

TRADITIONAL ISLAM AND RADICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ISLAM: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

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This topic is quite complicated, ambiguous and full of conflicting opinions. To date, our experts have not yet decided which interpretation of Islam shall be considered as “traditional” for Kazakhstan. “The complex nature of development of Islam, significant differences in the interpretation of Muslim dogmatics, various movements and trends - all of these hindered the development of single-valued solutions, an unambiguous assessment of religion in general. Suffice it to say that even the concept of “public Islam”, which would cover this complex phenomenon to the extent required has not been fully determined yet” [1]. In 2013-2017 Governmental Program on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism “radical” Islam is assessed as following: any Islamic ideology that justifies wanton violence against society is considered radical [2]. Not pretending to be absolutely accurate, I will try to present, firstly, traditional Islam, relying on sources that are considered “traditional” in the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), and secondly, the radical interpretation of Islam, based on the sources of “jihadists”. It gives an opportunity to compare the two opinions and to find common and different points between them. Special attention should be given to such concepts as jihad, shahadah, shahid and takfir.

For study accuracy it is important to rely on primary sources, as they say in the East, “the master of the house knows best what is in his house”. A reader will only impartially comment on the results.

Many researchers of the topic, trying to understand the phenomenon of aggressive forms of Islam, consider only Salafism¹ as the underlying cause of radicalism. I think it is necessary to get at the root and delve into the essence of the problem; only then we will be able to understand this fever of pitch. The division of Islam into radical and traditional forms took place immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad, i.e. during the early days of the Caliphate and is only politically motivated. Therefore, one and the same groups may be both moderate and radical. It all depends on attitude to rulers.

Background

The issue of legitimacy of power has not been finally resolved in Islam and led to the division of Muslims which in turn caused deep political woes. The one

[1] Z.G.Dzhalilov. Islam and Society in Modern Kazakhstan. Almaty, 2006. pp.7-8.

[2] State and Religion. Journal of the Religious Affairs Agency. 3 (26), 2013. Astana, 2013. pp.39-49.

who seized the throne declared himself caliph; he appointed court theologians, issued laws and established “traditional religion” for the population. So it was with Umayyad caliphs: Ali the fourth Caliph was not considered “righteous” (661-717).

But since 717, he was already recognized “righteous” and the dogma of “The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs” (Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman, Ali) has been still considered traditional in Sunnism². In the period of ruling of al-Mamun, Abbasid Caliph (813-834), Mu'tazila movement³ became traditional and asarism (early Salafism) was announced radical. Since 847 under al-Mutawakkil's rule the Mu'tazilites were persecuted and asarism (represented by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and then al-Ash'ari and his books “al-Ibana”, “Maqalat al-Islamiyyin”) is recognized traditional. Last Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil III was captured by the Ottomans, and after his death the Turks did not allow to elect a successor, and in 1543 the title of Caliph moved to the Ottomans. The Ottomans Turks declared maturidism⁴ (close to the late ash'arism⁵) traditional theology, and their opponents, the Turkic Safavids, immediately supported shiism⁶. Asarism became a stronghold for the Arabs, opposing the above-mentioned invaders and, as expected, was considered a radical ideology (but after complete separation of Arabia from Turkey in early XX century asarism again become traditional in this region). And so on...

Arab troops which in 751 won up over Chinese troops in Talas valley brought Islamic belief to Kazakhstan. It was not homogenous; as per historical data, Central Asia, located on the periphery of the caliphate, was the place where various opposition movements flowed to. Suffice it to mention the native of Samarkand Jahm ibn Safwan - jahmi ideologist and ardent opponent of the Umayyads, and a native of Khorasan, Abu Muslim – pro-shiite warlord who overthrew the Umayyads. “The information on that kaysaniya-mubayyidiya⁷ having arrived in VIII-X centuries in Turkestan brought major political and spiritual changes can be found in versions of “Nasab-nama”. In addition, it also contains information on distribution of shafiiya⁸; ismailiya⁹ teachings among Turks... all these trends are spiritual formations that formed religious and philosophical views of the Turkic peoples. The roots of Khoja Akhmet Yassawi brotherhood lie in these spiritual formations [3].

On the threshold of XXI century

On the threshold of XXI century, after years of militant atheism, Kazakhstan gained its independence. Cultural past did not allow forgetting about itself and in a short period of time religious consciousness of the population grew, and ideologists faced an unresolved dilemma: what is traditional for us?

According to the Law of Republic of Kazakhstan “On religious activities and religious associations” dated October 11, 2011 No. 483-IV “... the Republic of Kazakhstan affirms itself as a democratic, secular state... recognizes the historical role of Hanafi Islam10...” [4]. Thus, the historical role of the Hanafi School of law is formally recognized.

SAMK declared its commitment to a certain school of theology and law on April 14, 2012 during VI Qurultay: “Charter 1.1. SAMK is a republican religious association of Kazakhstan citizens adhering to Sunni Islam - Abu Hanifa school... 2.2....provides true and systematic preaching of Islam according to maturidism” [5].

So what can we learn from this? Maturidi-Hanafi school is de facto recognized traditional interpretation of Sunni Islam in country for over a year.

[3] Z.Zhandarbek. Versions of “Nasab Nama” and Turkic History. Almaty, 2002. p.13

[4] <http://adal-kz.info/book/export/html/24>

[5] <http://e-islam.kz/kz/dumk/view/747>

Therefore, in my article, citing the opinion of the traditionalists, I will quote only this confession.

Maturidi-Hanafi school about “jihad”, “shahadah” and “shahid”

“Jihad is compulsory kifaya, i.e. if a group of people makes it, the responsibility for it falls to others. “You all fight against the polytheists, just as they fight with you all” (Quran 9:36) and “Jihad continues until the Judgment Day” (Sunan Abi Dawood, 3\40)... If no one commits jihad, the sin for leaving jihad will be incumbent upon all people... The fight against Kafirs is obligatory... even if they did not start the first” [6].

“If the enemy attacks on the country, then all men are bound to defend themselves: a woman goes out without her husband’s permission, and a slave without the master’s permission. Because jihad becomes absolutely necessary, as praying and fasting; because absolute duty is above the interests of a husband and a master. If Muslims entering the country of kafirs surround a city or a fortification, they call (defenders) to accept Islam. If they agree, the war stops. If they refuse, then we have to call them to pay the per capita tax. If they pay it, then they will have all the rights enjoyed by Muslims.... If they refuse, then Muslims should start fighting... Shooting (of enemies) is not condemned, if there is a Muslim captive or a trader among them. If (the enemy) takes children of Muslims or captives hostage, don’t stop shooting, and shoot kafirs. Because the enemies will use this method (human shields) to stop the war against them...” [7].

Below is the view of Maturidi-Hanafi school on “shahadah’

“Martyrdom is a great degree. The Muslim, who gave his soul to the way of Allah, is called Shahid... There are three types of Shahids: 1) Shahid is a Muslim who died on the battlefield fighting non-Muslims, or defending his property, honor, soul... He is not washed, a funeral prayer is held for him and he is buried in his clothes. 2) Shahid is a hypocrite, who being a Muslim was killed by enemy... So he is also not washed, a funeral prayer is held for him and he is buried in his clothes. 3) Murtas is a Muslim, who died in other ways (by accident, was wounded in a battle some time later, drowned, burned, died under the rubble, because of cholera, etc.)... He is washed, put dead-clothes on, held a funeral prayer for him and buried...” [8].

As for Istishhad /suicide bombing, opinions vary here. Turkish theologian, expert in Islamic law and professor Abdulaziz Bayindir (born 1951) argues that suicide bombing is absolutely prohibited [9]. Sheikh Wahba Az-Zuhayli (born 1932), a specialist in the four Sunni schools of law, justifying suicide bombing as modern need, believes that such action is permitted under the following conditions: confidence that the enemy is about to kill him, permission from the legitimate government, because of strong fears and in order to resist the aggression of the enemy^[10].

The view of Maturidi-Hanafi school on “shahid” is expressed as follows: “Anyone who is fighting the three groups (kafirs, rebels and bandits) and killed directly by the enemy or for their cause will be considered as shahid\martyr. Anyone who is not killed by an enemy would not be considered a shahid. The same opinion is given in al-Muhite” [11].

“He was called shahid, because paradise was promised to him... It’s the one who was directly killed by kafirs ... or for their cause, for example, if they throw

[6] B.Aliyev-Marginani. Al-Hidaya. Beirut, 2003. V.2. p.424

[7] A.Al-Ghuneim. Al Lyubab. Istanbul, 2004. V.4. p.115-118

[8] O.N.Bilmen. Büyük İslam ilmihi. Istanbul, 2003. p.282-284

[9] <http://www.fetva.net/yazili-fetvalar/istishad-eylemleri-hakkındaki-gorusunuzu-tekrar-gozden-gecirir-misiniz.html>

[10] <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/books/alamlyat/alamalyat.htm>

[11] ed. N-al-Balkhi. Al-Fataawa al-Hindiya. V.1. Second book, chapter 21, section 7 “fi ash-Shakhid”. p.169

stones or empty the water, causing a Muslim death... or crush with their own transport..." [12].

Radical interpretations

Let's return to radicalism. Under the radicals we assume salafist-jihadists. However, experts do not have a consensus on Salafism and its classification. Member of the Research Institute at the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.Izbairov in his thesis "Non-Traditional Islamic Trends in Independent States of Central Asia" (2009) classifies Salafis as follows: 1) extreme radicals; 2) radicals, who pose a threat to national security by their actions and 3) moderate Salafis, whose actions remain within the purely theological disputes [13, 14].

So what can we learn from this? For over 3 years (after the first terrorist attacks in 2011) Salafis were de facto recognized standing for a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam. Therefore, in this article, citing the opinion of radicals, I will quote only this group.

Salafi school on "jihad", "shahadah" and "shahid"

"Jihad is mandatory according to the Quranic Ayah (verse) "You are Ordered to Fight "(Quran, 2:216)... It is mandatory kifaya, i.e. if someone commits it, the responsibility falls away from the others.... It is mandatory for those who meet five conditions: majority, health, freedom, being a male and opportunity..." [15].

"Scholars divided jihad against the kafirs into two types: offense and defense. Defensive Jihad is obligatory for those, who were attacked by enemies and the attack leader shouldn't necessarily be... Offensive Jihad is prescribed in Quranic Ayah "Fight against those people who believe neither in Allah, nor in the Judgment Day, who do not consider forbidden what Allah or his messenger has forbidden, who does not follow the true religion, until they pay the per capita tax with their own hand" (Quran, 9:29), and prophetic utterances, indicating that jihad is mandatory and will continue under the leadership of a righteous or unrighteous ruler..." [16].

And here is the opinion of the Salafi School regarding "Shahadah". "It is allowed to desire martyrdom. Anyone who sincerely desires martyrdom, can die as martyr, even in his own bed. There is no difference between male and female in this... The difference between the terms Shahid and Shahadah as follows: shahid is a person, who died in the way of Allah, Shahadah is a verbal noun, calling the name of the action that happened to Shahid..." [17].

As for martyrdom\suicide bombing, the opinions vary. Ex-Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910-1999) in "Sharia-based Fatwa on modern problems" (page 166) states that suicide bombing is prohibited. The current Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz Al Shaykh (born 1943) supports him in this idea [18]. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (born 1926) allows suicide bombing in case of emergency. Sheikh Ibn Uthaymeen (1929-2001) in one of the fatwas permits suicide bombing, provided that it will bring great benefit. Sheikh Albani (1914-1999) allows this action upon condition, that it will be ordered by the Islamic state governed by the ruler who knows the Islamic laws [19].

What does Salafi School says regarding "shahid"? "In an authentic legendary it says that all sins of shahid except for debts will be forgiven. Shahid

[12] A.at-Tahtawi. Hashiyat al-Tahtawi. Damascus, 2001. S.281

[13] <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1308905040>

[14] <http://www.zonakz.net/blogs/user/patriot/17411.html>

[15] A. Ibn Qudamah. Al-Kafi fi Fiqh al-Imam Ahmad. Kitab al-Jihad p.424

[16] <http://www.saaaid.net/Doat/assuahim/b/1.htm>

[17] <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=141041>

[18] <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/books/alamlyat/alamalyat.htm>

[19] <http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/books/alamlyat/alamalyat.htm>

is the one, who was killed in Allah's way, in a state of patience, being aware of it (honestly), able to attack (but not to escape)... As for someone who died of injuries after the fight, then he is also considered a shahid, if he died of his wounds.... Shahids are divided into degrees. The highest degree is to die on the battle field... then come those who die from the plague, stomach diseases, under the rubble... and in a car accident... Shahids who die on the battlefield are not washed and no funeral prayer is held for them. Others are washed and held funeral service [20].

“There are two types of shahids. First is a Muslim who fought in Allah's way and died on the battlefield... He is not washed, not wrapped in dead-clothes and buried in the clothes, with traces of the sacred blood.... The second is the one who died of stomach illness, drowned ...woman who died after childbirth... they are martyrs too...[21].

The difference between the two judgments is shown in Table 1

Table 1
Below are the
opinions of both
schools on the war,
suicide bombing
and martyrdom:

Opinion on	Maturidi-Hanafi School	Salafi School
Defensive jihad	Mandatory even without ruler	Mandatory even without ruler
Offensive jihad	Mandatory with ruler	Mandatory with ruler
Shahadah (martyrdom)	Permitted	Permitted
Istishhad (suicide bombing)	No consensus	No consensus
Shahid who died in fight	Will be in paradise	Will be in paradise
Shahid who didn't die in fight	Will be in paradise	Will be in paradise

According to popular belief in the CIS “traditional Islam is more democratic and Jihadism is alien to him, but Salafism is...”. But from the table we see that it is far from being true, as proponents of this hypothesis would like to see. On the contrary, we see the full identity of the proposed schools. Hanafis who constantly assumed the posts of the Supreme Sharia judges from VIII to XX century wrote a lot about legitimacy of offensive jihad as per the orders of the rulers of those times. Therefore modern Salafis, explaining rigorous questions of jihad have to turn to the works of Hanafis, as they don't have such a “violent” past. Based on this, we can conclude that moderation or extremity depends not so much on ideology, as on the political situation in the country. For example let's consider the following table, and try to compare “flexibility” of the Hanafis and the Salafis:

Table 2
Moderation and
radicality of both
schools regarding
jihad:

Country	Traditional school supported	Attitude to offensive jihad	Does the country face foreign aggression?
Turkish Republic	Maturidi-Hanafi School	Negative	No
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001)	Maturidi-Hanafi School	Positive	Yes
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Salafi School	Negative	No
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (2006)	Salafi School	Positive	Yes

There is an opinion that “Hanafis are peaceful, and Salafis are...”. But the reality suggests the opposite. These schools act like twins. They equally respond to internal and external factors: on the orders of the rulers and foreign aggression.

[20] <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/11733>

[21] <http://kulalsalafiyen.com/vb/showthread.php?t=34949>

So what's the difference? I think the main difference is in matters of Takfir, i.e. accusation of unbelief of those who moved away from Islam.

Let's briefly clarify this difference.

1. Opinion of Maturidi-Hanafi school regarding "apostate":

"If a Muslim retreats from Islam, he is offered to accept the faith again, wave his doubts he is arrested for three days nevertheless. If he does not accept Islam, then he is executed... Female-apostate is not executed, but she will be under arrest until she accepts Islam..." [22]. "... Faith is a confirmation of all the priority by heart, with which the prophet came from God... a man becomes kafir, if he denies the obligation of prayer and a ban on wine... Priority is... monotheism, obligation of praying and the ban on wine...."[23].

2. Opinion of Maturidi-Hanafi regarding those "who left prayers":

"Great sins do not take the believer out of religion... Kharijites¹¹ consider sinner as kafir, based on a literal understanding of the prophetic words "He who deliberately leaves prayers, he commits disbelief".... Answer: literal meaning of these texts is not accepted because of the existing categorical arguments in favor of that the sinner is kafir" [24]. However, the one who is persistent in leaving prayers is considered a Muslim-kafir, he is arrested until he returns to prayer.

3. Opinion of Maturidi-Hanafi regarding "non-Islamic government":

"Kharijites consider sinner as kafir, based on the literal interpretation of the Quranic Ayah "And whoever does not judge by what Allah has sent down, they are kafirs" (Quran, 5:44)... the literal meaning of these texts taken from the existing categorical arguments in favor of that sinner is not kafir... Allah does not forgive polytheism... and ... forgives small and big sins of those whom he wishes to forgive..." [25].

1. Opinion of Salafi School regarding "apostate":

"... If a person thinks that he can commit sins, he falls into disbelief. Because thinking so is equivalent to a denial of the Quranic and prophetic covenants that prohibit those actions..." [26]. Ibn Idris al- Bahuti in "Sharh Muntaha al- Iradat" said (v.3. p.386) that an apostate is someone who commits disbelief by words, heart, action, even if he says jokingly". It is mandatory to call upon an apostate and female apostate to repent within three days. If they refuse to return to Islam, it is necessary to kill them as punishment... this is the viewpoint of Hanbali lawyers" [27].

2. Opinion of Salafi School regarding "those who left prayers":

"... the scholars have different opinions... If a man says that prayer is not obligatory, it is up to a person to pray or not to pray, then he is unanimously recognized an apostate ... But if he, recognizing obligation, does not perform the prayer due to laziness, then disagreement arises: some consider him sinner and others kafir... He who stops praying because of laziness and negligence, he is still kafir..." [28]. "We know from the school of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, that the one who is persistent in leaving prayers is considered kafir and executed as an apostate" [29].

3. Opinion of Salafi School regarding "non-Islamic government":

"If a person knows Sharia, but does not judge by it, he is considered kafir by unanimous decision of scholars... If he because of predilection does not judge by

[22] A.Al-Ghuneim. Al Lyubab. Istanbul, 2004. V.4. p.148-149

[23] A.Al-Kari. Sharh al-Akbar Fikhal. Beirut, 1997. p.182

[24] S.At-Taftazani. Sharh al-Nasafiya. Istanbul, 2000. p.173-179

[25] S.At-Taftazani. Sharh al-Nasafiya. Istanbul, 2000. p.178-180

[26] H.Al-Hackami. 200 questions about the truth of Islam. Almaty, 2008. p.203

[27] http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Denia9/HododShrya/sec09_doc_cvt.htm

[28] <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/20067>

[29] <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&lang=&Option=Fatwald&Id=1145>

what Allah has sent down, knowing that he disobeyed Allah and the prophet, realizing the severity of the act, recognizing priority of Islamic law, such a person does not become kafir. However, he makes this very much blameworthy act and a great sin..." [30].

Table 3
Opinion of both schools regarding apostasy, and etc.:

Opinion on	Maturidi-Hanafi School	Salafi school
Apostate punishment	Death Penalty	Death Penalty
Apostate punishment	Arrest	Death Penalty
Denying prayer deliberately	Apostate	Apostate
Leaving prayers for negligence	Sinner	Apostate (another opinion - a sinner)
Punishment of the person who left prayers for negligence	Arrest	Death penalty (another opinion - arrest)
Position of a man who judges as per non-Islamic laws deliberately	Apostate	Apostate
Position of a man who judges as per non-Islamic laws for negligence	Sinner	Sinner

As it was explained in the previous tables, in many areas, both groups have absolutely similar position. But in this table some differences have been finally revealed: that is the disagreement over those who stopped praying because of laziness. Hanafis occupy relatively peaceful position, and the majority of Salafis are close to the Kharijites. At the end, I focus on another important feature of the Hanafis and the Salafis (and in general all the Sunni schools), which is shown in the following table.

Table 4
Opinion of both schools regarding subordination to rulers:

Opinion on	Maturidi-Hanafi School (see any book on Maturidi doctrine)	Salafi School (see any book on Salafi doctrine)
Subordination to righteous ruler-Muslim	Obligatory	Obligatory
Subordination to despotic ruler-Muslim	Obligatory	Obligatory
Opposing righteous and despotic ruler-Muslim	Forbidden	Forbidden

Again we see a common opinion of both schools and it is very interesting! This is a stumbling block in the current religious situation in the region. For a simple reason that if to make takfir to the ruler, accusing him of apostasy, then all agreements will be cancelled and temporary chaos will occur. A chain reaction will bring to emergence such concepts as jihad, shahadah, shahid, and jihad will be defensive and offensive, which will be led by various "emirs". This, of course, will destabilize the situation and will work in favor of external enemies. This is a crime and it should be regarded as a crime.

On the threshold of XXI century, after years of militant atheism, Kazakhstan gained its independence. Cultural past didn't allow forgetting about itself and already in a short period of time religious consciousness of the population grew, and ideologists faced an unresolved dilemma: what is traditional for us? We hastily labeled Salafis, but forgot that it strikes Hanafis as well, "historic role" of which we recognized.

"In the academic debates, there are two basic positions. The first is that in the era of globalization, all religions are subject to the process of

[30] <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/1825>

radicalization.... It is, however, believed that violence is inherent to one religious tradition - Islam, which creates a special relationship and susceptibility to terrorist activities.... In this context, David Martin, professor of sociology at London School of Economics, said: "I would like to speak more positively, but bomb attacks are not surprises for me. In Islam, there is a deeply rooted ideology of violence - military psychology.... Isn't Islam a religion that preaches peace? It seeks peace, but its own way.... It's a good religion, but it gives too much importance to victory..." [31].

To my mind, David Martin is right speaking about the ideology of violence rooted in Islam because the coded early history of Caliphate is full of violence. But he is wrong to say about Islam, as the focus of violence, as "There is no compulsion in faith" (Quran, 2:256) and faith and is not responsible for the actions of some sort of caliphs and their theologians. In this regard, it is wise to offer our professionals to further explore the history of the Caliphate formation. Because there is a dozen of theological trends that declare their "tradition" in Islam. A detailed study of all the nuances will allow us either to confirm or revise some of the opinions.

Summarizing the article I would like to draw the readers' attention to the following tough thrust. Islam is a traditional religion in Kazakhstan, but what of its interpretation is traditional has not been elucidated yet. Comparing the two teachings on several "sensitive" issues mentioned above, I did not see a significant difference between them. Therefore, it would unlikely be fair to put them on different sides of the barricades, one-sided attributing things to only one group that are still common to both. Islam supports only peace, which means that non-peaceful character was later grafted. Theologians have to do what mathematicians would do, having made a mistake in the formula, or architects who have made a tilt in the building basement.

Notes:

1. Salafism or asarism - Sunni theological school originated in VIII-IX centuries. Ideologists are Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah and others. Asserts the priority of tradition over mind

2. Sunnism - branch of Islam. Consists of several theological and legal schools. Differs by recognition of "Four Righteous Caliphs" and doctrine in the democratic nature of power under the leadership of the oligarchy. Traditional confession during the reign of the Umayyad, Abbasid and Uthmans, i.e. from 661 to 1922.

3. Mutazilism - theological school of Islam, which originated in VII-IX centuries. Ideologists are Vasil ibn Ato, Qadi Abdul -Jabbar and others. Asserts the priority of mind over tradition.

4. Maturidism - Theological school in Sunnism, which originated in IX-X centuries. Ideologists are al- Maturidi, en- Nasafi and others. Asserts the priority of mind over tradition, but minds are subject to religious dogmas.

5. Asharism - Theological school in Sunnism, which originated in IX-X centuries. Ideologists are al-Ash'ari, al-Ghazali and others. Asserts the priority of mind over tradition, but minds are subject to religious dogmas.

6. Shiism - branch of Islam. Consists of several theological and legal schools. Denies Sunni caliphs and advocates the theocratic nature of power under the leadership of a spiritual aristocracy - Fatimids - Hasan and Husayn, where power is inherited, or "best" is elected by the majority community.

7. Kaysaniya - mubayyidiya - disappeared Shiite movement, which emerged at the end of VII century. Ideologists are Abu Muslim al- Khorasani, Ishaq bab and others. Considers 'Alids (Muhammad Hanafi and his descendants) as

[31] Quoted on: T.Dronzina. Female face of terrorism (the results of an international study). Astana, 2011. p. 95-96

equal Fatimids in claiming to the caliphate; was successful in Khorasan and Mawarannahr.

8. Shafiya or Shafi - Law School in Sunni. The founder is Imam Ash-Shafi'i (767-820). In theology, the students of this school follow ash'arism, rarely other schools.

9. Ismailiyya - Theological school in Shiism, which originated at the end of VIII century. Ideologists are the followers of Ismail ibn Jafar, Hassan as-Sabbah, etc. Strongly condemns Sunni caliphs. Believes in the theocratic nature of monarchical power under the leadership of a spiritual aristocracy - the descendants of Ishmael from Hussein ancestry.

10. Hanafiyya or Hanafi - Law School in Sunni. Founder - Imam Abu Hanifa (699-767). In theology, the followers of this school followed maturidism, rarely other schools.

11. Kharijites - first trend in Islam, which considered inveterate sinner as kafir and allowed to oppose a ruler who does not judge according to the Quran.

EXPERT REVIEW OF THE KEY TRENDS OF THE INTERETHNIC SITUATION DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN (RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT POLL)¹

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Introduction

20 years have passed since the countries of Central Asia gained their independence. A historically short period of time was attended with important political events that defined our vision of the developments occurring in the region. The opportunity provided then to govern the state and develop state-run and public institutions for each of the five countries of the region proved to be a task that led to quite unpredictable results. Each of the country went through their own epoch entailing various political vision and target-setting. It is hard to escape a conclusion that Central Asia is heterogeneous, fragmentary and turbulent. Such a vision has deepened over a period of 20 years against the background of relative stability no matter how incredible it may seem.

The civil war experience in Tajikistan, ambiguous transition of power in Turkmenistan following the sudden death of the first president, revolutions occurred in Kyrgyzstan, religious and extremist experience of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan events prove that each of the countries faces various challenges and in different ways approximate to their solution. Moreover, thanks to all these processes, Central Asia was perceived as the one region,

[1] Authors are the members of the working group of the project on interethnic relations monitoring and development of proposals and recommendations on improving the state policy in the sphere of interethnic relations, conducted at the end of 2013. The survey was carried out within the framework of the project of the Culture and Information Ministry of Kazakhstan.

on the assumption of the growing feeling that certain problems in one of the countries of the region will affect the others. Such an ambiguous dissociation and interdependence largely undermine interstate relations simply deepening enmity and mounting tensions in the region. The notorious problem of the control over material resources has turned into a significant political lever that brings the Central Asian countries to confrontation exerting thus overwhelming influence on the relations of ordinary nationals. The growing nationalist trend in some countries of the region put the fly into the ointment making vital regionalization impossible. The same time, common unsettled humanitarian and social problems like never before binds them together.

Extremely mosaic social milieu of Central Asia presents thereat some opportunity for more creative and constructive relations to each other. As the survey finds, Central Asia is engaged in a wide range of fundamental problems which being unsolved lead to conflicts, permanent escalation of tension, enmity. Such a structure of mutual relations alienates societies decreasing people's pressure of the five countries of the region on their governments with the aim of peaceful settlement of interstate problems.

The last decade shows that despite the whole potential the countries of Central Asia fail to elaborate joint and more constructive approach to solving issues that year after year become chronic. Some actions and acts of rapprochement of heads of state do no mean that there exists or has been drafted a system-based policy and precise strategy for the region. Today the countries of the region like never before focus on their own problems particularly stemming from asymmetrical relations with foreign countries and neighbors. This vicious circle with a high dose of contradictions is a reflection of the fact that every time the situation will be escalating much faster. And the very fence-mending among the countries keeping in mind that we face common development problems, strengthening of sovereignty, raising of the people's living standards should spur us to develop common positions and ideologies.

A group of researchers conducted an international expert poll as part of the full-scale study at the end of 2013 to study interethnic situation in the region. 50 experts from 15 countries of the world specialized in interethnic relations were interviewed. This article contains the part of the expert poll results.

The purpose of this survey is to contribute to the development of common positions on interethnic cooperation in Central Asia. It is noteworthy, the problems should not be considered in isolation from other public, sociopolitical and humanitarian problems. Precisely this awareness is the key factor in further establishing and strengthening of mutual understanding and trust among the societies of all the five countries. This study tried following the expert evidences to detect the most problem areas, support with their solution would let the Central Asian countries minimize impact of "the ethnic factor" in the negative meaning of this word.

Conceptual framework

The authors regard Central Asia as the integral region that attains such integrity thanks to the threats and challenges posed. Regionality at this stage is being built through the existing threats that should be dealt with and should be necessarily solved. Such "a discourse of menaces" suggests that the existing border conflicts, water and land resources problems, drug trafficking, religious extremism, Afghanistan problem, to some extent consolidates the region urging a united approach to solution of these problems. This discourse to a greater degree is dictated by external players and their information, analytical and scientific capabilities. Generally, the countries of Central Asia are influenced by the discourse and reproduce it within themselves finding thus an opportunity to strengthen survival capacity of their own political

regimes. “The ethnic factor” is a part of such a discourse, but in fact, it is more polarizable, and enhances the fragmentary nature of the region.

Therein lies the paradoxical nature of Central Asia which gains ground through external pressure as the integral region, but concurrently keeps its “spitted” nature. Thanks to the ambiguousness Central Asia is perceived as a turbulent zone with great risks and unpredictable nature. Such “problem areas” as borders, Fergana Valley, and ethnic enclaves simply aggravate fragmentarity, but the same “Afghan problem” and hypothetical attack of the Taliban movement on the countries of the region push the countries to elaborate the common position. Such a position is of great importance for it lets the external players consolidate all the Central Asian countries around them and their geopolitical interests. To this end it may be said about the influence of Russia and CSTO, China and SCO, the US and NATO. These countries and international structures close to their interests realize their “high status” through “the discourse of threats”. Anyway these countries supervise such issues to reproduce “the discourse of threats” and to avoid conflicts in Central Asia, including ethnic strife.

The same time the authors of this research have no desire to reproduce the discourse specified. This research may show and tries to show that building of the region and ethnicity is quite a political question and depends on a set of other key factors. First of all, access of both the government, population and some groups and communities to material resources is worth noting. This resource-oriented perspective means that the region’s conflictogenity to some extent originated from the problem of equal distribution of material and other resources among the population, their inefficient use and lack of efficient regulatory mechanisms for their control and distribution.

The answers of the experts favor the view that there is no ethnic problem in Central Asia at large. The ethnic problem tied to other issues concerning social rights, access to material and spiritual resources, etc, is politicized. Therefore, this research in some way links the ethnic problem to more “pressing” issues claiming not only attention but also their solution involving public resources and levers. The authors, generally, share the viewpoint of the interviewed experts that the ethnic issue to a greater extent is an artificially-created problem. The same time, this problem is unique in its kind for it allows in a very short time to mobilize the population of Central Asia escalating internal enmity, hatred and distrust.

It is important to realize that the ethnic problems urge the most sensitive approach and careful attention, also certain government interference and regulation. Reasoning from this fact the ethnic factor turns into a resource most frequently subject to politicization and exaggeration. Consequently, deterioration of living standards, low household incomes, lack of social airbags and state guarantees, social and economic inequality yield that ethnic and religious identity provides the pillar of support for people to feel unity and consolidation. It becomes more fragmentary and polarized in terms of appealing to the ethnic constituent of the society. There is nothing wrong when a man is stuck in ethnic constraints, the same time there exists a threat of politicization and manipulation. When the feeling of a lack of social justice, or being deprived or needless gains in strength such a prism might be used and switched onto aggressive track.

Methodological aspects

Since gaining independence the countries of Central Asia have focused on the problems of interethnic cooperation spurring the political machinery to draft the most convenient and acceptable matrix of mutual relations between the government and society. For the past 20 years the expert environment has

also developed to contribute to regulation of such relations seeking not only to formulate the problem itself but also show the right way for the government in governing sociopolitical processes. To this end our work sets a goal not only to denote the freedom of speech in the expert environment in regard to interethnic problems but also to carry out synthesis of a variety of opinions for further elaboration of new formulas appropriate for solving the country's pressing issues in maintaining internal harmonious relations. The very regulatory role let us refer to the expert commentary as the most humane and apt to reflection and critical re-evaluation. Sure enough, the authors of this study do not overemphasize the role of experts, political scientists, ethnographers in handling the country's problems. Moreover, the very scientifically-grounded expert report, in our opinion, should come to the forefront in coming up with solution promoting trust relations inside public groups and the government. It is important to realize that the social and regulatory role of a scientist should be used to advantage for the national development, and this in turns necessitates prioritizing of the expert judgments putting forward new hypothesis enabling to look from a new perspective at public processes, unthinkable without public interests.

As is known, many Central Asian processes are ambiguous and contradictory. Interethnic relations acquire new, sometimes more categorical nature, ceases to preserve moderate nature along with the growth of social problems. Despite the existing social problems, Central Asia, in view of its mosaic structure still may present certain congruent model for others. It's worth mentioning that Kazakhstan with its interethnic accord elevated to the systematic public policy, every time reminds us that contradictory processes in the country unable to shatter the foundation laid the early days of its independence.

The expert poll is not so much important for a priori it is a trustworthy resource allowing to elaborate credible information. Appeal to the expert commentary which is a definitively-stated value judgment is of importance for the following reasons:

- it may reflect broader vision of the problem providing comparative and deep insight;
- it allows to ascertain position of the epistemic community on certain issues. This circumstance is seen important if keeping in mind the advisory function of specialists, and possibility to provide recommendations to state structures, politicians;
- features the primary problem areas setting forth the fundamental root causes;
- assists in identifying solutions to issues and searching for new unconventional approaches to have them tackled.

For the purpose of gaining deeper insight into the interethnic problems based on expert commentary we should explore not only the position of the Central Asian experts but also analyze the vision and viewpoints of foreign experts. The foreign expert discourse on Central Asia is known as quite influential and it still keeps on forming the way of thinking of many people and a new generation inside the region itself. To this end the expert poll embraces respondents not only from Central Asia but also seeking to synthesize the local and global subject matters. This is of particular importance to include views voiced by experts from Russia and the West into the scientific paper. The inquiries were conducted following the method of "a huge snowball" to a greater extent based on the expert poll specialized in various issues within the theme under review.

The network of experts is by no means politically motivated and sets no goal to represent a politically committed viewpoint, conclusions and

recommendations. The authors of this study were at all times open to new contacts and expert views perceiving that impartiality and critical approach are the most acceptable rating for estimating efficiency of the inquiry. “Scientific ethos”, to this end came first though some part of the expert poll was based on private contacts and acquaintances, so the very conviction that each of the interviewed experts can furnish with distinctive expert opinion, let carry out the research in the said tideway. On the other hand, the authors enhanced through the study itself the scientific network, consisting of scientists engaged in interethnic subjects to find areas of common interest and polar concepts. Such an activity let researchers be aware of scientific-and-expert community trends and give some insight to tilting in exploring interethnic problems inside Central Asia.

The list of questions was compiled in such way so the expert himself could channel his judgments representing the meaning correct for himself. The questions were little expected to direct respondents to stay within the framework they needed. The same time, it was hard to formulate impartial questions. The study authors didn’t want the questions asked be so broad and ambiguous but with the aim to avoid various reading the questions have some nebulosity. Given that the interethnic problems is quite a sensitive zone, bearing in mind and a chain of events that have seriously influenced the region for the past 20 years, the researchers tried by all means to avoid loaded questions.

It was crucial to ascertain the role and function of the ethnic factor in the public and political life of Central Asia. The question concerning border issues, near-border peripeteia and contacts that largely escalate the situation in the region is also worth mentioning. They also wanted the interviewees draw attention to interstate relations and find out the level of their influence on perception and attitude of their societies to and vice versa. For the purpose of not whipping up ambiguous tensions, the authors offered the experts to jointly formulate the most important problem zones letting thus the governments strengthen understanding, empathy and respect among the nations. Consequently, some issues were based on knowing that there exist pressing problems and tasks whose solution would impact mutual relations among ethnic groups and communities of Central Asia.

“Ethnic” Central Asia?

Many experts tend to believe that it is crucial to focus on ethnic issues, mutual relations between various ethnic groups to gain deeper insight into socioeconomic and political processes in the Central Asian region. The level of mutual understanding inside those groups, their integratedness into the society and involvement into the public processes and debates should also be taken into account. The key is that such an analytical approach suggests explaining relations between the ethnic groups and their ties with the government agencies. The quality of contacts with the representatives of public authorities, level of confidence, perception and rhetoric, informal practices in relations with authorities shape the climate inside the countries, as well as the countries of Central Asia.

The nation-building is underway. Naturally, the so-called ethnic factor is of key importance. Practically, all the countries of the world rely on ethnicity even if other ethnic groups are the full-fledged members of the nation at the moment. Inclusion develops over the years. Originally the nation-building entirely rests on the so-called ethnic factor. Inclusion in present conditions should be observed from the very beginning.

Research worker, Turkey

The greater part of the interviewed experts tends to believe that the region can be identified from the ethnicity viewpoint. The ethnic perspective allows to understand other interdependent socioeconomic and political issues. According to the respondent from Russia, these issues “maintain debates of any social and political issues” within the region. The same time, he went on, “the ethnic factor is not determining in foreign and internal policies of the countries of the region.” Other experts share this opinion. One of the experts regards the ethnic problems as “a part of the complex process”. Since gaining their independence the countries’ new status was provided and grew strong through “ethnicity”. After the USSR collapse the self-identification for the countries of the region became the major issue.

Such a continuous process is progressing in the tideway of affording access to material resources, their distribution and re-distribution for the benefit of some or other ethnic groups. Reasoning from this fact, another expert believes that redeployment of funds in Central Asia abides to grounds of ethnicity and “the system practically of each Central Asian country is geared in fact to serve the interests of one ethnic group.” One of the Kyrgyz experts also shares this judgment. According to him, access to some or other resources is provided thanks to appeal of groups to their ethnicity. “The very titular ethnic groups” benefit from their ethnicity, at least Kyrgyz and Tajik bureaucratic meritocracy extends to just a majority group.” These circumstances are “the problem zones” the interviewed experts drew attention to.

“Politics based on ethnicity is seen in each of the five Central Asian countries even if they do not officially admit it, but for Turkmenistan. Ethnic preference towards the titular ethnic group is present throughout the entire public administration system of the five countries.”

Scientist, the US

Generally such an assessment allows to instrumentalize “the ethnic factor” and makes it a strand of policy of enmity leading to discrimination, marginalization and alienation. At this standpoint the ethnic factor may become a policy tool and resource. Its manipulative nature is exactly the very “weak link” that made social processes turn into more tense and unpredictable. It is also stipulated by the fact that “unfortunately, the countries of Central Asia build their nationhood on the mixed foundation of the institute of citizenship and ethnic background. For example, according to a Kazakhstani expert, the population of such a country as Kazakhstan shows rather weak civil consciousness. That’s why “they perceive political processes to a greater extent through the prism of the ethnic factor in their everyday life.”

Another expert stressed that the events occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 proved how important is “the ethnic factor” in understanding of key political processes. As the Kyrgyz expert said, “the political development of Kyrgyz Republic supposed the process of the nation-building, and to this end the perception of “the nation” in the ethnic sense rather than the civil one has predestined vulnerability of ethnic issues as the object of politicization.” Another Kyrgyz expert draws attention to the language problem and gears it to the ethnic factor. He believes “declaration of the ethnic majority language as the only official language of the country which is a home to a variety of ethnic groups is not always acceptable.”

The language problem is a sphere where the ethnic factor obtains its legitimacy developing its pretension to be regarded as an overriding factor while analyzing public processes in the region. From the viewpoint of one of the experts, “the language policy aimed basically at voluntary-compulsory acquisition of the language of the majority ethnic group may negatively affect

interethnic relations. Though the language development state policy itself is not a negative factor, there is every reason to believe that such a policy may be misunderstood and realized wrong. There are some groups of people acting quite aggressive both to ethnic minorities and their “soul brothers” if the latter fail to meet their vision of how a representative of a certain nation should look like. Such individuals may reap the benefits of the country’s language policy and try all by themselves to put it into practice at their own level, through discrimination, insulting and lynching.

Consequently, the language problem is equally important, if we want to understand the role and to a greater extent the manipulative function of the ethnic factor in Central Asia. The same time, as some respondents noted, the countries of Central Asia follow the way of the nation-building, therefore, the ethnic majority language in any part of the world will be overriding. As the well-known expert on Central Asia said, “any attempts to raise the role of any language are perceived as discrimination or a step to shatter status and the existing balance of interethnic relations. It means more flexible, incentive and encouraging approach would be more beneficial and favorable.

Impact of global and regional processes on situation in Central Asia should be also mentioned. The experts say, politicization of ethnicity and religion continues the worldwide with growing politicization of the Islamic ideology. Undoubtedly, decrease in energy and raw material prices should be noted as a negative factor. As for the regional problems, sure enough the withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan and escalation of water and climate problems are referred to as the key issues. Another internal factor, according to some researchers, the lack of explicit mechanism of transition of power may also affect both the country’s internal stability and interstate cooperation and competition. These factors must be given consideration to while analyzing no less delicate issues such as near-border areas and enclaves.

“The world once again focuses on interethnic relations. Globalist ideologies based on the idea that the western model of democracy and expansion of economic ties lead to decreasing the role of the ethnic factor and ethnic conflicts proved their invalidity. The global key trend is connected with enhancing the importance of interfaith relations to ensure stability of some countries and regions.”

Expert, Bulgaria

Borders and enclaves

Not least important is the problem of borders and ethnic enclaves in the region. Many experts believe that near-border conflicts occurring in Central Asia arise and stem from interethnic relations. The others say that they are of secondary or partial meaning. Generally the experts outline the near-border zones as the most conflictogenic.

“New borders in the Central Asian region which have never actually existed for 15 years ago contribute to escalation of these problems. For example, Fergana Valley is known as a place with a high potential for conflicts. Kyrgyz and Uzbek people have lived for a few generations without any clearly defined borders. They have never thought that the new borders between the new countries would literally lie through their yards and houses. Today people need to get a lot of permissions even to pasture in the near-border regions of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. And conflicts are not always resolved peacefully. It is a direct consequence of bad interstate relations!”

Researcher, Russia

Kazakh experts pay attention to the Kazakh-Uzbek border known for tense relations between the Kazakhs and the Uzbek Diaspora in the south, i.e. there

exists an opinion that “border disputes give rise to interethnic conflicts.” But here comes an opposite viewpoint that interethnic relations do not cause border disputes.

Given that Central Asia is poly-ethnic, “any political standoff is turning into interethnic at places of residence of diverse ethnic groups.” Mentioned as an instance, border areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan exert direct influence on Kyrgyz-Tajik ties in the Batken oblast of Kyrgyzstan. It is of great importance for it prioritizes access to resources and their allocation, in this case, to water and land resources. Some western scientists have similar views. As the British scientist stressed that the water, trade, migration and rivalry problems between the regional countries became actual, brought the factor of ethnicity into action.

Another scientist also shares his view. According to him, any events can easily adopt any “ethnic” colors, in particular, in near-border regions.

To this end resource-related conflicts lay the very foundation for the ethnic problem. As one of the experts said, such conflicts grow into interethnic disputes in official and informal discourse.

The main causes of the conflict are:

- access to water and pastures;
- strict border control;
- lack of clean-cut defining of borders, many locals disagree with the decisions on delimitation of borders;
- rise of nationalism;
- difference in approaches to resolving conflicts;
- lack or crudity of the existing interstate agreements;
- passive and aggressive rhetoric of public figures and mass media;
- information policy.

All the said problem zones in expert’s opinion give rise to conflict inside the society and various communities and groups politicizing “the ethnic factor”.

Another highlight is the ethnic enclaves remaining in expert’s view “an urgent problem of the region”. The enclaves are one of the most politically and economically vulnerable places. The recent events in Sokh and Vorukh emerge the enclave issue full blown. Many experts tend to believe it is necessary to develop a special policy in regard to enclaves. The same time, the very strong good neighborhood should lay the foundation for formulation of the enclave policy. They say such a policy should be based on bilateral agreements. The enclave policy-making should proceed from special features of a particular enclave relying on revealing and eliminating of prime causes leading to conflicts and mutual distrust, dissent, enmity.

Enclave	Country	Location	Population	Ethnic composition
Barak	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	About 600 people	100%
Chonkara	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	0	pastures
Dzhangail	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	0	pastures
Sarvak	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	400-2,500 people	99% of Uzbeks, 1% of Tajik people
Shakhimardan	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	5,000	91% of Uzbeks, 9% of Kyrgyz people
Sokh	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	25,000-70,000	99% of Tajik people, 1% of Kyrgyz people
Vorukh	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	10,000-30,000	95% of Tajik people, 5% of Kyrgyz people
Kairagach	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	150	100 % of Tajik people

Source: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HB_ROCCA_20130709%20Russian.pdf

Consequently, the problems concerning the status and state of enclaves should be tackled deliberately. A set of overriding issues triggering off tension in the enclaves should be dealt at the bilateral level. Border delimitation and demarcation remain the most important and one of the disputable issues. Enmity and lack of consensus on this problem area are stipulated by distrust of political elites of the countries of the region to each other.

At the same time the very policy on transforming water, energy and land resources into a political tool further scatters the region converting it into a large problem enclave. Thus the policy affects the situation in the enclaves themselves with population in need. Any competition for resources, transportation routes and goods flow control and other means, including those smuggled, actualizes “the ethnic factor” merging into the political and economic struggle not only of the centre but also of the outlying districts with their own regional elite, informal circles and communities.

Furthermore all the respondents suggest the following solutions to minimize tension in near-border areas and enclaves of the region:

- observation of a law;
- to ask for help if solution of the problems of enclaves needs foreign interference as a piece of advice and assistance in international legal regulation;
- solution of socioeconomic problems;
- ultimate boundary delimitation;
- full-fledged negotiating structures and creation of conditions for such structures in the enclaves.

The experts stressed the need to focus on water and energy problems. In particular, the problem of construction of hydroelectric power stations and uncompromising stand of the countries in this issue boost the conflictogenic potential. President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said that water problems may cause the conflict. It is a serious contradiction that may grow into a war in the region. Such a political position once again confirms the fact that Central Asia may fall into “an ethnic trap” when material resources issues put strain on the relations between the countries of the region. As one of the researchers noted, “the ethnic factor is derivative, given that the countries of Central Asia are “national”, the key socioeconomic and political issues may grow into ethnic problems. This is true even more in mutual relations between the Central Asian countries, in cooperation in handling with disputed issues.”

The above-mentioned aspects of the Central Asian realia suggests that it would be extremely hard to speak of maintaining and strengthening of mutual understanding and trust between the ethnic groups and communities if water and energy, enclave and border issues in the light of more widespread socioeconomic picture of the region are unsolved. Some of the said points spurred us and the experts to pay attention to the prevailing socioeconomic and humanitarian problems. The experts and authors agree that they serve the very key catalyst to have negative impact on mutual relations between the citizens of the countries of the region, strengthening thus the ethnic factor and generating destructive power to break fragile mosaic of polyethnicity, tolerant society.

What to do and not to do?

Many of the said problems are not peculiar and indicate that the region faces the global challenges resulting in serious political clashes between the society and authorities. It is worth mentioning that cultural and psychological factors along with sociopolitical fuel the situation.

In the other expert's view, the lack of efficient institute of local self-government and tough centralization inside the countries in the region are another circumstance to hinder shaping of a flexible public policy to settle issues with ethnic background. In the expert's judgment the governments of the

countries in the region should avoid supporting nationalism that deteriorates the public consent.

“The state political promulgation definitely may to some extent exert its negative effect (for example, anti-Uzbek propaganda by some representatives of the Kyrgyz authorities). However, the greater part of the nations is tolerant to each other and maintains kinship relations. For example, the Uzbek-Kazakh relations on the border with Shymkent, the same Uzbek-Kyrgyz ties in near-border areas enjoy normal good neighborhood relations and absence of any negative propaganda.”

Expert, Uzbekistan

“Dependence of interstate contradictions”, focus of international organizations through their projects on ethnic issues, both global and regional geopolitics, criminalization of public relations, Islamization among titular nations” aggravate internal instability and further breakup on ethnic grounds.

All those systemic problems taken together must tell us that challenges and tasks set in opposition to efficient socioeconomic, cultural and political policy will not be resolved in an instant. Each of the country should work out the most acceptable development strategy and jointly address issues depending upon one another and making the region the whole structure.

The experts stressed the need to enhance the legal framework with respect to important international legal regimes entailing international control, more reporting requirements and transparency. It is hard to give a single-value estimate to such an approach though some experts stand for close cooperation with many international organizations to promote transparency in execution of international obligations, as well as observance of human rights, improvement of socioeconomic living standards, provision of education, medical assistance and other core services. The issue of availability of education and quality of education is one of the pressing according to the opinions expressed.

“It’s more likely that internal policy issues should rest on the principles of multiculturalism and civil nation though principles of the civil nation sometimes come against principles of multiculturalism because the civil nation is built as a rule on a particular majority nation. In this case it is crucial to give minorities certain mechanisms to get involved into decision-making, for example, the People’s Assembly of Kyrgyzstan, sure if authorities were evenly divided.

Scientist, Kyrgyzstan

One of the experts insists that the Central Asian countries should draft “the common doctrine, at least the regional one”. It would let each of the country to compare their positions and coordinate some socioeconomic issues. The fragility of the ethic balance should push the countries for closer cooperation through strengthening economic soundness and tolerance.

It is crucial that “the interstate dialogue and coverage of the people’s lives in neighboring countries should never be hostile and negative. The friendly atmosphere and mutual understanding may help improve relations between the nations.”

The respondents largely stressed the importance of the following rights and opportunities to positively affect the interethnic relations, enhancing mutual understanding and trust-based relations:

- to ensure equal rights and equal opportunities;
- to respect cultural traditions;
- to avoid discriminatory practices;
- to improve economic opportunities and create proper business climate;
- to preserve political stability;

- to improve living standards;
- to exercise the rights of national minorities;
- to create conditions for learning the native language;
- to promulgate tolerance and common understanding and condemn discriminatory acts.

All the said once again prove the importance of law observance. Besides, the economic and cultural constituent should also be considered.

As for preventing conflicts the interviewed experts suggest the following measures:

- more large-scale approach to ethnic problems;
- deepening of the Central Asian integration processes;
- deeper insight into interethnic relations in the region;
- enclaves and disputed territories policy development;
- improvement of the legal system;
- transparent democratic system;
- to promote mutual ethnic respect;
- to set up People's Assembly in all countries of the region;
- to pursue right national policy;
- to take preventive measures at various levels;
- to spur brain trusts development specialized in these problems;
- timely and impartial assessment of clashes and armed conflicts prevention opportunities analysis.

The experts largely stressed the significance of solutions to socioeconomic problems and raising of living standards in the region. Some experts emphasized the importance of strengthening concept of citizenship and civic consciousness. "Notion of "civil nation" was used more than once in the answers. From the view of one of the famous scientists "Central Asia needs transformation of ideology from ethnic interpretation of the notion "nation" (national state) to the civil interpretation, gradually deviating from "nationality" issues at large, seeking for new symbolic and ideological models of the state unity and loyalty."

The countries of Central Asia have been searching for ideology. It is important to preserve public peace and trust through ideological influence. Undoubtedly, it is important to realize that attitude to the authorities is a weighty factor that should be regarded in searching for a proper model. Another Kazakhstan's expert sharing the idea of "the civil nation" said that "the people of Kazakhstan are primarily the citizens of Kazakhstan, and then the representatives of various ethnic, cultural and language groups."

Another researcher drew attention to the succession in the notions. Development on the way of the "civil nation" is the most efficient way to overcome the "ethnic trap": "The notion of the titular nation is the product of the Soviet Union, the engrained belief peculiar to the "soviet" generation and in a certain sense to a younger generation. It is necessary to build the nation on civic consciousness. Whether it is efficient or not is another issue but it is the only option as of today."

Kyrgyz expert highlights the importance of the analogous approach with applicability in the region. "The civil nation" is the same efficient paradigm to help minimize the negative influence of "the ethnic factor": "It is crucial to think originally, "citizens" of this country not "the ethnic minorities" should live there. If a man is the citizen of Kyrgyzstan he is Kyrgyzstanis and no way a "Kyrgyz", "Uzbek" or "Uyghur". If this policy is pursued the ethnic problems will definitely vanish over a while."

Such an optimistic approach suggests that "the ethnic factor" happen to be in fact and its influence is perceived rather strong in the relations between

the ethnic groups and government agencies. Such a position should also reflect that the leading experts keep on searching for a congruent model of social structure or there is provided a certain model to cut full cost of the nation-building process. It is important to realize that transition to such a policy will be accompanied by the above-mentioned socioeconomic problems. Sure, it requires great efforts, expenditures and energy. Probably coordination of these two processes to supplement one another would let the measures taken sound more reasonable and efficient.

"Its better not to implement positive discrimination in Central Asia because it accentuates belonging to minority and gives rise to indignation among the majority, thus destroying the feeling of civil equality. However, it may be applied in the sensitive state structures where ethnocentrism creates tension, for example, at Kyrgyzstan police with ethnic Kyrgyz prevailing over Uzbek policemen.

Scientist, the US

There is a point in the research trying to reveal who may act as a destabilizing power in the region. We consider it important for it might help attack this problem along with the large-scale sociopolitical issues detecting "the problem areas" through their agents, actors and institutions. From the other side, the aim was to understand who can become a mediator able to prevent or cease the conflict sparked. The very opportunity to prevent the conflict situation minimizing internal tension is an important attribute of public and national institutions, and certain influential figures.

Provocateurs or mediators: who are they?

According to the experts, politics of the regional countries, some internal or external elements may instigate conflicts in the region. Provocations of one or another side will fail without adequate social environment. Social injustice, being deprived, lack of workplaces, unsteady jobs easily mobilize some parts of the population that make provocations more efficient and resonant. Certain destabilizing forces and their efficiency, in expert opinion, are stemming from the problem of access and control, reallocation of material resources. This challenge highlights broadening of economic opportunities, granting the right to properties and strengthening legislation each time and the role of legislative branch.

The following forces may act as destructive forces in the region playing on "the ethnic map" and may stir up a new round of instability and confrontation in the countries:

- the third forces;
- the forces, interested in destabilization of the region or a country in the region;
- national ideology of the ethnic nationalism;
- language and ethnic rights official policy;
- groups, engaged in drug, arms and human trafficking;
- religious groups, disseminating extremism and Shariat-based government of a state;
- religious clans of Diasporas at the areas of compact settlement relying on their mother countries during redistribution of authorities and property.

"Interference of any country (Russia, the US) may be regarded negatively. The key is political will and readiness for a dialogue of the countries. Partially international organizations may play a mediating role in providing fair scientific inquiry and sound recommendations.

Scientist, Uzbekistan

As we can see from answers and assessments, the actors themselves staying in the region to a greater extent may affect the sociopolitical situation. Sure enough, inspired by conspiracy spirit, we should bear in mind the influence of external actors willing for certain reasons to add the fly into ointment to the process of destabilization. The political will and intention of internal players often lie at the bottom of conflicts. Consequently, some external players may get involved in the processes and benefit from destabilization. The above-said socioeconomic and political problems are the most important catalyst of such trends which may result in ethnic clashes, purges and disputes.

As a counterbalance to spoilers the experts suggest addressing to some influential structures and figures able to prevent conflict situation or resolve some conflict moments related first to “the ethnic problem”:

- authority figures;
- political elites;
- international organizations or third parties staying out of conflicts and enjoying authority;
- nobody yet;
- to initiate a regional structure;
- to set up a substructure under the operating regional organizations.

Conclusions and recommendations

The expert poll finds that any attempts to harness ethnic clashes will be a hard undertaking without a package approach to the ethnic problems. This study, answers and assessment of the experts, once again proved the urgency in elaborating socio- and resource-oriented perspective so the ethnic factor is no more an irritant. The judgments help us once again highlight that the issues of ethnicity may be in a very short time utilized and manipulated spilling over into a conflict situation. But the country’s socioeconomic situation is first of all to lay the foundation for such situations. Generally, it is crucial to pay attention to the ethnic problems to get deeper insight into dramatic and underground processes occurring in Central Asia, but all the same it should be dealt along with other problems seeking further solution and sensitive approach and forward-looking policy.

Following this line of reasoning, we and the experts interviewed suggest the following recommendations to help in some way mend situation in our societies. The recommendations are purposed to maintain and preserve interethnic and intra-social mutual understanding, trust and empathy.

Socioeconomic recommendations:

- to ensure equal rights and equal opportunities;
- to respect cultural traditions;
- to avoid discriminatory practices;
- to improve economic opportunities and create proper business climate;

Legislative recommendations

- to exercise the rights of national minorities;
- to develop enclaves and disputed territories policy;
- improvement of the legal system;
- law compliance;
- complete border delimitation;
- to ask for help if solution of the problems of enclaves needs foreign interference as a piece of advice and assistance in international legal regulation;

Political recommendations

- to preserve political stability;

- to promulgate tolerance and common understanding and condemn discriminatory acts;
- to promote mutual ethnic respect;
- to set up People's Assembly in all countries of the region;
- to pursue right national policy;
- to take preventive measures at various levels;
- to set up full-fledged negotiating structures and create conditions for such structures in enclaves;

Cultural recommendations:

- to respect cultural traditions;
- to avoid discriminatory practices;
- to find out broader approaches to tackling ethnic problems;
- to gain deeper insight into interethnic relations in the region;
- to promote mutual ethnic respect;

Scientific recommendations

- to spur brain trusts development specialized in these problems;
- timely and impartial assessment of clashes and armed conflicts prevention opportunities analysis.

AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014: CENTRAL ASIA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

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Regional security after the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan remains an important issue for all Central Asian states and the international community. The opportunities of quick solution to the problems that had accumulated over almost 35-year history of the Afghan conflict find no implementation because of their complexity and uncertainty.

It is clear that a unifying factor for the majority of the Central Asian countries is a common interest in stabilizing political and military situation in Afghanistan.

Therefore, collective approach in the region is one of the most effective ways to prevent numerous security threats.

However, despite the efforts of the international community and neighboring states to normalize relations with Afghanistan both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, no common long-term policy has been developed yet in regards to this state and Central Asia as a whole.

One of the reasons for this situation is different socio-economic development potential, opportunities and extent of political modernization of the Central Asian states.

These opposing or at least not always coinciding foreign policy vectors often become a source of controversy. As a consequence there is no unified concept of comprehensive measures allowing to build a long-term strategy in the region not in a conformist way, but depending on the interests of internal and external geopolitical players.

Currently the situation in the region is not simple. Because of its geographical position, Afghanistan lies at the junction of three regions: Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. The total length of its border is 5,813 km. The country shares borders with six countries: Turkmenistan - 744 km, Uzbekistan - 137 km, Tajikistan - 1,387 km, Iran - 936 km, Pakistan - 2,430 km and 76 km with China.

Afghan authorities have adopted measures to ensure the protection and preservation of its state borders, but the forces and means of the Afghan Border Police are still insufficient.

This has caused some concern for their safety in states bordering with Afghanistan.

After the withdrawal of coalition forces of NATO and the U.S. from Afghanistan, terrorist attacks can move outside this country because of the existing problems in the protection of the state border.

This concerns especially Tajik-Afghan, Turkmen-Afghan and Afghan-Pakistan borders serving as transit ways for drugs, weapons, illegal migration as well as dissemination of extremist religious ideas.

The main problems of Afghanistan's neighboring countries after the withdrawal of the international coalition could be:

- The fight against drug trafficking;
- The fight against international terrorism;
- The fight against illegal border crossing;
- Armed conflicts with extremist groups at the borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan areas.
- Increased flow of refugees and illegal migration, etc.

Obvious is the fact that the adverse progression of events in Afghanistan will inevitably lead to the aggravation of the situation on the migration routes, including increase in the number of illegal migrants and refugees.

At the same time external factors contributing to illegal migration are:

- Instability of the socio-economic situation in the migrants' countries of origin;
- Instability of the political situation in the migrants' countries of origin, the consequences of war, armed conflicts, religious and racial intolerance etc.;
- Active criminal activity of the illegal migration organizers.

Despite the short length of the Sino-Afghan border, the PRC at the end of 2012 strengthened the existing grouping of troops and border guards at the border with Afghanistan. The purpose of such decision is not to let the refugees enter China and prevent the Taliban and terrorists from using border areas.

At the third regional meeting of heads of border departments of the CISCAR member states held at the end of March this year in Astana the situation at the external borders of the region and its development trends after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan were discussed once again.

The members of the delegations of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan border agencies made suggestions on the development of joint measures to counter threats to border security in the region¹.

In particular, implementation of a package of measures is aimed at rendering effective assistance by the countries in the region and Russia to Tajikistan in strengthening the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border area, as well as strengthening training and preparation of border agencies to a possible change in the situation in the region.

Thus, today Central Asia is a highly conflictogenic region having the most direct ability to influence the state of the security sector including territorial integrity of the key countries of Central Eurasia: Russia, China, Iran, India and Pakistan.

In this regard, it would be incorrect to approach to solving the problems of Afghanistan without consideration of regional dynamics and existing threats to border security in the region.

Therefore, let's briefly consider:

firstly, the situation at Tajik-Afghan, Turkmen-Afghan, Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian borders;

secondly, the model of sustainable development of Afghanistan;

thirdly, the policies of international organizations and Central Asian countries in relation to Afghanistan.

It should be noted that this model is based on the analysis of different points of view of scientists, political leaders, media publications, heads of state by means of finding common ground.

[1] Heads of the border agencies of the CISCAR countries discussed the forthcoming withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan <http://www.ca-portal.ru/article:5900>

The border problem in Central Asian countries remains one of the most acute ones. Of the three Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan only Uzbekistan is capable to protect its own borders.

A particular concern, as we noted earlier, is to ensure the protection of the state border at the Tajik-Afghan, Turkmen-Afghan and Afghan-Pakistani directions, which in one way or another can be a destabilizing factor for the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Let's consider them briefly.

The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border

The length of border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan is 1,387 km. The existing border protection system is outdated and is not effective for protection against militants and religious extremists, and needs material and technical equipment.

Military-political authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan are taking steps to strengthen the border in this area, including those at the expense of other countries.

So, on October 5, 2012 in Dushanbe six documents were signed, and the main of them is the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of Presence of the Russian Military Base in Tajikistan. It has been developed instead of the current contract which expires in 2014. The new agreement will be valid for 30 years, i.e. until 2042, with following five-year renewals, and will guarantee the security of Tajikistan from external threats, especially from attempts to violate the state border and armed attacks by Afghan terrorists.

The Russian base has about 7,000 militants and is deployed in Kulob and Kurgan-Tube.

Also, the Russian Federation decided to assist in strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, equipping that border with modern kinds of equipment and support Tajikistan in other areas, including cooperation under the CSTO, between law enforcement and border control services.

In addition, thanks to the partnership between Tajikistan and the United States, the border of the Republic of Tajikistan has been equipped for 5 years as per American projects and at the expense of the U.S.

Reference:

Thus, the U.S. has granted vehicles and equipment worth more than USD 2 million² to the border troops in Tajikistan.

The equipment includes the following: twenty ATVs, ten snowmobiles, six hundred fifty sets of «Motorola» radio stations, thirty three sets of solar systems, forty-four sets of computer equipment, as well as tactical PPE.

All of these will help border troops, frontier posts and units improve the ability to ensure the security of Tajikistan's borders from external threats.

However, the existing balance of forces and means in accordance with international standards does not allow to fully ensure the protection of the state border between the states.

The world practice of state borders protection involves 10 to 50 people for one kilometer of border protection.

The major part of the state border runs along the inaccessible mountain ranges, making it difficult to control and protect these sites. At the same time it becomes more complicated:

firstly, because of the military and political situation in Afghanistan;

secondly, because of cross-border activity of criminal groups operating in the area of illegal drug trafficking and arms smuggling, stable dynamics in the smuggling of narcotics across the Tajik-Afghan border.

[2] U.S. Embassy provided grant aid to the RT border troops <http://www.pressa.tj/news/posolstvo-ssha-okazalo-bezvozmездnuyu-pomoshch-pogranichnym-voyskam-rt>

The security structures of the Republic of Tajikistan more or less successfully manage to suppress terrorist attacks of certain groups of Afghan militants.

One may recall the tragic events in Khorugh last year, when security forces of Dushanbe were provoked for a punitive operation aimed at ending the activities of the Pamir warlords and at the same time intimidating the local population traditionally opposing Dushanbe. Now, when all the main Pamir authorities are neutralized, the «Chinese factor» is artificially fomented.

Reference:

Over the years of its independence Tajikistan has already ceded to China 1.5 thousand square km of disputed territories, the total area of which makes 28.5 thousand square km. And now there is a new agreement with China. In repayment of external debt to Beijing, Dushanbe prepares to give up another part of the Pamir highlands which are considered unsuitable for life, but are rich with precious stones, rare minerals and even uranium. Exploratory works have already started in Murghab, maps are made and evaluation of deposits will soon begin. To remove obstacles, on January 17, 2013 Tajik Parliament ratified the Agreement on the Tajik-Chinese Boundary Regime which was signed in June 2012 between the Governments of Tajikistan and China. According to the new arrangements, the citizens working in the adjacent territory enjoy easier entry and exit regimes. They cross the state border as per special lists.

Pamir is a key to the entire Tien Shan. One who controls the Pamir gets a controlling stake in a number of «projects of century» in Central Asia.

Within the framework of the U.S. – NATO operation on movement of troops gathered in Afghanistan by western allies, the tension on the lines of the Afghan province of Badakhshan - Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan and towards Murghab-Osh-Gulcha is formed artificially.

The Chinese, under the guise of searching mineral deposits, are now working for preemption: while solving the issue of the disputed territorial areas, they are seeking to gain a foothold and prevent NATO forces from Murghab. «In any conflict in Pamir area both parties' interests are quite clear: China, on the one hand, and the West, which is operated mainly by the UK, on the other».

The years of crisis in Afghanistan had a serious impact on different spheres of political and socio-economic life of Tajikistan. Until peace and tranquility are restored in Afghanistan, Tajikistan will experience negative effects of the conflict being, in fact, a front-line state.

Some analysts suggest that while conducting the operations in Afghanistan by the Afghan army and international coalition troops it is quite possible that armed Afghan fighters may cross the Tajik border. This factor may destabilize the difficult situation in Tajikistan. Today in Tajikistan there are over 6 thousand Afghan refugees. Weak economy of Tajikistan is unable to withstand the new wave of refugees.

It should also be noted that security forces have not succeeded in closing drug transit corridors from Afghanistan.

The analysis of the existing official data shows that the volume of drug trafficking in Tajikistan increases year by year.

The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of combating drug transit are:

- insufficient financial and technical maintenance as well as staffing problems in Tajik law-enforcement bodies;
- a great length of the Tajik-Afghan border running through mountainous area;
- high unemployment and migration rate among the Tajiks seeking jobs abroad;

Many Tajik areas are experiencing high level of poverty and social tension, so the probability of a serious social explosion is very high.

For example, half a million of Tajik people move to Russia for earnings. In connection with this, transfers from abroad make 35% of Tajikistan's GDP³.

In addition, according to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Tajikistan, 38% of the population lives in poverty, and their daily income is less than TJS 10 (just over U.S. \$ 2).

Given the fact that the average salary in Tajikistan is extremely small, drug dealers do not find it difficult to hire those willing to risk their freedom and sometimes their lives for the promised sums (about \$100) for drug trafficking.

This is aggravated by the fact that Tajik citizens involved in drug trade don't have a language barrier with the Afghan Tajiks, and for this reason it is easy to negotiate and even to coordinate their actions.

Only in the first quarter of 2013, law enforcement and security agencies of Tajikistan seized more than two tons of drugs. The total amount of confiscated drugs was 76.5% higher than compared to the same period last year⁴.

Law enforcement agencies arrested 243 people involved in drug-related crimes for the same period.

In general, the situation in Tajikistan is extremely hard due to the difficult economic situation and political instability; the number of young people involved in drug trafficking and religious terrorist organizations is growing. Tajikistan is the weakest link in Central Asia and the destabilization of its territory can impact the situation in Afghanistan and wider region.

The situation on the Turkmen-Afghan border

Foreign policy of Turkmenistan based on «positive neutrality» principle contributed to the fact that during the last two decades the country was in good relations with all the authorities and the regimes that ruled in Afghanistan.

About 500 thousand ethnic Turkmen are living in Afghanistan today⁵.

The length of the Turkmen-Afghan border is 744 km. On this direction there is Kushka commandant's office (Kushka town), «Imamnazar» checkpoint (in Atamurat, Lebapskaya oblast), and two border guard detachments – Takhtabazar (Tahta-Bazar) and Koytendag (Koytendag).

All transportations, transshipments and passage of people in this country through the border are made through the commandant's office in Kushka and border guard detachment in Tahta-Bazar.

Despite the fact that the frontier posts, border command posts and border guard detachments are equipped and have well-developed infrastructure, the border with Afghanistan remains open in fact.

20-30 foreigners enter the CIS territory through the Turkmen-Afghan border daily⁶.

Turkmenistan is considered to be one of the channels through which Afghan drugs are illegally transferred to Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe.

As experts say, Turkmenistan has already turned into one of the main drug trafficking corridors, but the overall closeness of the country makes it difficult to obtain information on drug trafficking.

Turkmenistan does not face the challenges associated with religious extremism, as the other Central Asian states do. Therefore, the Government of Turkmenistan may experience less anxiety about the penetration of armed Islamists.

[3] Heroin eggs <http://customsunion.ru/info/4423.html>

[4] Tajikistan reports on progress made in the fight against drugs <http://centralasiaonline.com/ru/articles/caii/newsbriefs/2013/04/25/newsbrief-16>

[5] Afghanistan: ethno-political situation. <http://www.bsblog.info/афганистан-этнополитическая-ситуация/>

[6] V. Georgiev Turkmen-Afghan border may become uncontrolled <http://www.ng.ru/cis/1999-12-24/>

The situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border

The border issue was and remains one of the sharpest ones in Pakistani-Afghan relations.

The length of border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is 2,430 miles, however, it is not defined properly. The two states are divided by the so-called «Durand Line.» In Afghanistan, the number of Pashtuns is approximately 14 million, while in Pakistan it is more than 20 million people⁷. In this connection, the Pashtuns were dispersed in the two states.

About 700 check points have been set along the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan to date, but in a mountainous area along its entire length it is almost impossible to control the border crossing processes.

Pakistani and Afghan authorities have little control over a large part of the border territories.

As «Dawn» Pakistani newspaper reports, 50,000-60,000 people cross the border every day in Baluchistan province⁷. And none of the security forces in the area can hold or control their flow.

Lack of proper regulation on the Afghan-Pakistani border leads to different incidents in which various terrorist groups, drug smugglers are involved, and growing revenues from the sale of drugs not only allow farmers of the two countries to survive, but also create a financial base for terrorist activities.

Moreover, from Pakistani side these areas serve as shelters for militants and other extremist organizations, despite this process is partially constrained by the government.

According to the UN, 1,500 madrasas are functioning in Pakistan to date admitting children from an early age (homeless and from underprivileged families). The children are trained there for 8-10 years. These madrasas are sponsored by some Arab countries and international organizations. Students enrolled in madrasa are taught non-traditional Islam and can later be used for extremist activities in the neighboring countries of Central Eurasia.

Today, it's not a secret that the Taliban groups were trained, handed out weapons and ammunition in Pakistani camps, and Pakistani soldiers took part in the hostilities in Afghanistan together with the Taliban troops. This is one of the reasons of military success of the «Taliban» and its assumption to power in 1996.

Permanent border crossing by militants «holds U.S. and Afghan troops in constant tension.»

According to the experts, to reduce the activity of such groups it is important to eliminate militants training centers functioning as religious schools outside Afghanistan.

Thus, the border areas remain the most vulnerable point.

The regulation of border issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan lies both on interstate and international levels.

As year 2014 approaches - the time of withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan – the relations with Islamabad shall become increasingly important for Kabul in the context of stabilization of the country and the fight against terrorism.

Pakistan should be considered as a key player in Afghan regulation in logistical, regional and geopolitical contexts. Afghanistan and Pakistan share common history, and their future is inseparable. Therefore it is necessary to further enhance bilateral relations between the states through compromise and mutually beneficial offers.

[7] V.Y.Belokrenitskiy, Pashtuns and Future of Pakistan // Middle East and Modernity. Collection of Articles. / Israel and Middle East Studies Institute; Editor-in-Chief. M.R.Arunova, A.O.Filonik. - Moscow., 2003. - Issue 18, pages. 46-53.

The situation on the Afghan-Iranian border

The border issue between Iran and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan requires special concern. Its length is 936 km.

To date, taking into account the outstanding problems of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, Tehran and Kabul continue their close cooperation in combating drug trafficking through Iranian-Afghan border with the support of UNODC.

Afghanistan and Iran signed an agreement on state border management between the two countries. More than 700 km of ditches have been dug, frontier posts and extended border fortifications including barbed wire forced entry-resistant constructions and concrete fences have been built in recent years at the Afghan-Iranian border.

However, Iran is seriously concerned about security of its borders with Afghanistan and drug trafficking problem in this country. Iran's government has thousands of security personnel and other law enforcement agencies in the east of the country. These measures allowed to significantly reduce the supply of Afghan heroin through Iran and to redistribute flows to the north of Afghanistan.

Speaking on foreign policy of Iran regarding Afghanistan, it should be noted that its focus and objectives are quite clear and are characterized solely by national interests of Iran in this country. The Iranian authorities are interested in the existence of Tehran-loyal regime in Afghanistan, which has no political, economic or border claims to Iran and is not throwing down ideological - «Islamic» challenge to Iran.

In this regard, the Iranian authorities are taking active measures to influence the development of the situation in Afghanistan in order to promote its interests. To do this, Tehran uses every available means and methods of influence on the Kabul leadership, authoritative leaders of the Afghan political, ethnic and religious groups, as well as the most relevant economic factor now. This situation will be preserved in the nearest future.

Today the fate of Afghanistan is actively discussed, various alarmist scenarios are modeled.

Various programs for Afghanistan are developed today which suggest how the Afghan people should live. Why do we believe that the Afghan people are not able to do this themselves?

However, the key to the Afghan problem is primarily is in the hands of the Afghan people and government being its legal representative.

In this regard, the presidential elections in Afghanistan planned for 2014 are of critical importance.

Today, the same logic dictates the need for intra-Afghan dialogue with the subsequent generation of acceptable forms of transfer of power before the coalition forces leave the country.

To bring together all the main factions of the Afghan society at the negotiating table is a really tremendous challenge. One of the reasons is the burden of the past, especially during the rule of «Taliban» movement.

It is necessary to let the Afghans themselves check into the matter and choose the way of its development.

Either it will be a democratic state with the institute of presidency and parliament, or a constitutional monarchy. It is for Afghan people to decide.

Perhaps it will take 5-10 years and it will be hard, but the regime will remain as it exists now. And when this happens, the international community should not intervene; it should provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and help rearrange the national economy.

Kazakhstan is ready to take an active part in this process. This goodwill is confirmed in the statement of President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev made on April 26 this year at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Istanbul process, where he said: "... the fundamental element of international assistance programs is the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan. It is necessary to accelerate the expansion of economic cooperation in the region and actively integrate these processes in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is a firm supporter of regional integration⁸."

Reference:

Kazakhstan has been actively investing in the creation of the regional transport infrastructure.

«Western Europe - Western China» transit corridor, «Kazakhstan - Turkmenistan - Iran,» railroad, transport infrastructure of Kazakhstan in Northern Distribution Network system for withdrawal of ISAF forces, new ideas in the framework of «New Silk Road» are our country's contribution to the regional integration.

We support major regional projects which are still at the stage of development.

Among them are «TAPI» («Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India») pipeline, «CASA-THOUSAND» (high-voltage power line «Central Asia – South Asia - 1000»), as well as expansion of the rail network in and around Afghanistan.

«New Silk Road» is one of the pilot projects on economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan considered by the U.S. There are various viewpoints on this project.

So, according to experts, the idea of the project is that if Afghanistan actively joins the region's economic life, it will have more chances to attract new investments and it will benefit from the regional resource potential as well as will ensure the growth of economic opportunities and expectations for its people. Such expansion will be beneficial not only for Afghanistan, but will also provide stability in the region, including through the establishment of trade incentives and new jobs.

The project aims at giving impetus to the economic development of the region, and Afghanistan serves as the main transport hub. However, as experts say, the project is designed to perpetuate the American influence, justify the retention of military bases in the region and reduce the role of Iran, China and Russia.

Thus, the «tug of war» between competing centers of power will not contribute to further stabilization in the region for a long time.

The internal political situation in Afghanistan

The ethnic factor has always played a huge role in socio-political life in Afghanistan, and its importance cannot be underestimated now.

Afghanistan has never been a mono-ethnic state. According to a survey conducted by the Association for International Solidarity in Asia, with the assistance of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, as well as the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research in 2010, Afghanistan is inhabited by different ethnic groups and none of them dominates in terms of number.

[8] Speech by President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Istanbul Process on April 26, 2013

Ethnic group	Percentage quantityindicator	Numerical quantityindicator
The Pashtuns	42%	about 12,776,369
The Tajiks	31%	about 8,349,000
The Hazaras	10%	about 2,737,793
The Uzbeks	9%	about 2,500,000
The Aimaks	2%	about 500,000
The Turkmens	2%	about 500,000
The Baluchi	1%	about 270,000
Other	3%	about 700,000

Reference:

It should be noted that the above given figures cannot be considered as an absolute truth because they are the results of the survey, and not of the population census.

If you look at the ethnic map of Afghanistan, it is evident that the country can be conditionally divided into two parts: the Pashtun South and non-Pashtun North. Also in the south there is a territory inhabited by the Baluchi, but their small number in Afghanistan does not show a serious impact on ethnic and political landscape in this country.

Due to its topography and demographic structure, the fact that the Afghan society is divided as per ethnic or tribal lines is becoming a major factor in some areas. If the interests of a group are ignored, it can destabilize the situation as a whole.

The war-stricken country needs reconciliation among all ethnic groups, tribes and stakeholders.

Therefore, one of the main tasks of the Afghan leadership is to consolidate society in resolving ethnic conflicts.

We can assume that if the problem is not resolved, then immediately after the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country in 2014, all ethnic problems and conflicts in Afghanistan will receive a new round of development, perhaps even more intense than before. Given the presence of coalitions that were formed during the last Afghan war, as well as possible support from abroad for each of the parties, we can assume that the de facto division of the country into two parts is not impossible: the south - mainly inhabited by Pashtuns and controlled by the "Taliban", and the north - the territory with non-Pashtun population and ruled by the former "Northern Alliance."

The role of foreign allies of each side should also be taken into account. Pakistan and Iran will definitely support their Afghan allies to strengthen their influence in the region, which can lead not only to prolonged internal conflict within Afghanistan, but even to the (de facto) disintegration of the country for at least two, and probably four parts: Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek.

In this context of the current military and political situation in the region the following question arises: who could be the guarantor of stabilization in the Central Asian region?

We might think about border control forms within the CSTO.

In-depth cooperation between NATO and the CSTO by entering into a formal agreement between NATO and the CSTO has a huge potential, as it provides for "military-political symmetry" between the two organizations.

The joint work of the SCO and the CSTO should be organized as a tool of ensuring security in the Central Asian region by:

- establishing security regime along the Afghan borders together with CSTO member states where the issue of joint border control within the CSTO and SCO is envisaged;

- assisting the Afghan authorities in improvement of the national legal framework, training of law enforcement agencies and strengthening the national armed forces.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which unites Russia, China and four of the five Central Asian countries, is likely to give full membership to India and Pakistan. Afghanistan received observer status and Turkey became a partner in dialogue. SCO's unique configuration allows it to become a regional umbrella under which India and Pakistan could work together to solve regional security issues, including those associated with Afghanistan.

Furthermore, it is clear that China will play a greater role in Afghanistan after 2014, mainly in the framework of the SCO and through its close ties with Pakistan.

However, China and Russia feel that the U.S. is trying to move the Central Asian region out of Chinese and Russian orbit and bring it closer to the countries of South Asia.

The politics of the Central Asian countries in relation to Afghanistan shall be based on a number of objective and subjective factors.

Firstly, from national security viewpoint, the countries of the region would prefer to have if not a friendly, then, at least, a neutral and loyal neighbor having no political, economic or border claims.

Secondly, the geographical position of Afghanistan makes this country a potentially profitable trade partner, as well as a necessary mediator in matters of transportation of hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas, etc.) and goods for various purposes in "North - South" and "West - East" directions.

And *thirdly*, common historical roots, proximity, language, religion, culture, customs etc. create favorable conditions for mutual cooperation.

Thus, peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved through political and diplomatic means and through the consistent implementation of major infrastructure projects aimed at reviving economy and social life of the Afghan people.

ENHANCING ENERGY COOPERATION ON THE CASPIAN SEA WITHIN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION¹

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The SCO member states located in Caspian-Central Asian region possess rich oil and gas resources for which they are called a strategic energy base of XXI century. Promotion of energy cooperation among the member-countries of the Organization has not only been the most important objective of the SCO but it also demonstrates an important agreement among the member states.

Since the year of its establishment the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been developing mechanisms for stable economic cooperation, and based on the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit it has been promoting close economic cooperation and economic progress of member states. In 2006, an “Energy Club” was established within the SCO. “The Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity” signed following the SCO Summit in Beijing on June 7, 2012 as well as “The SCO Mid-Term Strategic Development Plan” and “The Information Communiqué” – all these documents emphasize the idea that the SCO member states will aspire for “enhancing energy cooperation in the Organization” and “protection of energy security of the region”.

The SCO member states as well as its observers include both producer-states with huge reserves of energy resources and consumer-states providing big markets. In accordance with available data, as for energy resources, the SCO member states and observer countries possess about ¼ of the world oil in terms of output and resources in their territories; almost 50% of world reserves of natural gas and more than 50% of its world’s output; almost 50% of the world coal reserves and more than 50% of their world’s output; as well as almost 50% of explored reserves of uranium. According to international energy experts, the SCO region possesses the second largest potential for discovering natural oil and gas reserves after the Middle East. At the international energy resource market, China has been ranked among the most stable and reliable energy markets of the world. At the same time, China acts as one of the largest producer- and investor-countries at the global scale. Being an observer, India is also a dynamically developing country, whose energy market has a great potential. Besides, many of the SCO countries, both members and observers, concentrate several significant transport corridors in their territories by which the energy resources can be transported through the entire Eurasian continent, thus linking Caspian energy resources with the East,

[1] Source: International Conference «Paradigms of international cooperation in the Caspian Sea: energy, environment, modernization, safety», September 2012, Aktau.

creating potential route of the “Energy Silk Way” of the Eastern Asia. Located in the depth of the Eurasian continent China can also provide sea export of energy resources from Central and Western Asia.

While the countries producing energy resources hope to receive stable markets for long-term energy supplies, the consumer-countries, in turn, hope to obtain stable and reliable energy supplies for long-term outlook, achieve diversification of import of energy resources and avoid risks for their own energy security. Thus, further enhancement of energy cooperation within the SCO forensuring economic development and social stability of its member-countries has a great importance for regional security and sustainable development.

It is evident that energy cooperation within the SCO today occurs mainly in the framework of bilateral relations. Energy cooperation between China and Kazakhstan is impressive in this regard. Kazakhstan has already become a stable supplier of oil and gas for China in the sphere of import from western territories. Today, China-Kazakhstan Gas Pipeline “South Flow” project (Beineu-Shymkent section) has reached the stage of full-scale construction where gas launch is scheduled for March 2013. China-Kazakhstan “South Flow” project will allow to transport rich natural gas resources from the western territories of Kazakhstan to the south. It will definitely benefit the population of Southern Kazakhstan increasing well-being of more than 10 thousand settlements and more than 5 million people and promoting economic development of the southern regions of the country. Upon completion of the construction of gas pipeline under China-Kazakhstan “South Flow” project, the Central Asian gas pipeline will be connected to the network of Kazakhstan main pipelines and thus linked to main oil and gas regions of Western Kazakhstan. Effectively increasing the strategic level of the Chinese-Kazakh cooperation in the field of oil and gas, we are opening a broad space for the Chinese-Kazakh energy cooperation. Chinese-Russian, Chinese-Uzbek and Chinese-Turkmen energy cooperation has also achieved great results; deepening of bilateral cooperation in the SCO generates more opportunities for multilateral cooperation.

At present, there are many approaches to the issue how exactly energy cooperation in the SCO must be developed; below are two most widespread ones:

The first approach is to create the SCO Energy Club. Initially it was proposed by the Russian side; however, at present this initiative seems to lose its supporters.

Secondly, some scientists propose to create a common energy space. Some Chinese experts believe that while deepening energy cooperation within the SCO it will be quite possible to form a “common energy space” up to “Energy Union”. This “common energy space” or “Energy Union” will introduce new forms of energy cooperation and will allow to implement a new concept of energy cooperation and, in general, has good prospects to initiate a specific, different from the world’s energy alliances, “harmonious” geopolitical energy unit.

The first type of cooperation is relatively free, and at the modern stage, seems to be more feasible. The creation of “common energy space” is much more complicated; we need to solve a lot of technical and legal issues; it is difficult to do this in short term perspective. But, regardless of what model will be selected, further enhancement of energy cooperation within the SCO is a flagrant necessity.

Enhancing energy cooperation in the framework of the SCO not only corresponds to the basic interests of the member-states, but also promotes strengthening regional security and stability. Of course, it is necessary to

distinguish a number of negative factors affecting energy cooperation in the SCO. The most significant of them are the four points:

1) Caspian states of Central Asia are experiencing political and social changes; their further development depends on a large number of variables, while the international situation and domestic problems should be taken into consideration.

2) The position of Russia regarding the idea of promoting Caspian energy cooperation within the SCO is not clear. To date, Russia pays greater attention to the common economic space in the Eurasian Union.

3) Interference of external powers, in particular, western countries. At present, oil and gas deposits of Central Asia are owned by large western oil companies; this in turn impacts the choice of the regions, where the oil and gas are exported.

4) Non-traditional security factors, including “three evil forces” rampaging in the region -the proximity to Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been at war for several years; tensions between Iran and the international community. In addition, it is difficult to predict the possible impact of the activities of illegal armed groups in Chechnya, the consequences of the Russian-Georgian conflict, etc. on the organization of future energy supplies from the Caspian region

Despite all the negative factors, strengthening energy cooperation on the Caspian Sea in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is important, not only for the interests of oil and gas producers, but also for the fundamental interests of energy consumers. Close cooperation, mutual benefit and common development are the common aspiration of the SCO member states. Moreover, further strengthening of energy cooperation on the Caspian Sea within the SCO will gradually lead to that energy cooperation will stimulate other kinds of cooperation in non-energy sectors. Collaboration among the governments, dialogue and exchange between governments and enterprises for strengthening mutual trust and solidarity among the SCO member states – all of these will certainly play a very important role in maintaining regional stability and prosperity, as well as in overall development of the SCO. However, it is clear that regardless of which way of energy cooperation is selected, the member states of the Organization will have to work hard.

THE SCO EVOLUTION AND IMBALANCE OF ITS PRIORITIES

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Currently, there are several large projects being implemented under the auspices of the SCO that could dramatically change the life of the region, in other words - to change the balance of power on the Eurasian continent in favor of China. The Shanghai Five experience demonstrated the high and largely unique potential of this alliance. As Chinese experts rightly noticed, no other organization in the region can replace the special function of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in guaranteeing the border security and stability in the areas along the border¹. No labeling of the SCO as a bloc should be used for tangible strengthening of the organization's authority². Indeed, the SCO is building a new security system based rather on partnership than on the allied relations³.

Along with positive views concerning the future and prospects of the SCO, there is another less optimistic position. As some Western experts believe organizations such as the SCO and CSTO do not even represent a security system, and Central Asian region is peripheral in terms of formatting the effective geopolitical security. Therefore, the US, Russia and China perceive the region as no more that the periphery of their strategic interests in compliance with the proposed concept of "security subcomplex"⁴.

This statement is partially true, given that for Russia and China, the SCO is a good mechanism for implementation of their strategic partnership and mutual regulation of the delicate balance in the undercurrents of competition and rivalry in Central Asia. European experts metaphorically call Russia a "captive soldier", and China—a "silent dealer"⁵.

Division of zones of influence similar to the US and EU can be traced in these metaphors in the context of the opposition to the United States. Being on the opposite sides, the US and Russia are the supporters of hard power, the EU and the People's Republic of China are the apologists of soft power instruments.

Thus, there is certain gap between Beijing and Moscow within the SCO. The latter insists on strengthening the military capacity of the organization (an initiative to establish a center on the ground of the RATS to counter security threats the SCO member states may face) and tries to restrain intensification of the SCO economic cooperation (China's initiatives to create

[1] Chzhao Huashen. The SCO and the ratio of the great powers on the background of a new situation in Central Asian region / *Analytic*. - 2003. - № 1. - p. 3

[2] K. Kosachev. The SCO as an alternative to the US influence in Central Asia / *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. - 2003. - September 29.

[3] See more: Galenovitch Y.M. Orders of Jiang Zemin: principles of foreign and defense policies of modern China. - Moscow, 2003. - . 265.

[4] Central Asian Security. The new international context / Ed. By Allison. - L.: Johnson; Wash.: RIIA: Brookings inst. Press, 2001. - XV, 279 p.

[5] Peyrouse S., Boonstra J., Laruelle M. Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia. The EU Compared to China and Russia // URL: www.eucentralasia.eu. (May 2012)

a free trade zone, a special account and the SCO bank), in which China will be the main investor and trading partner of Central Asian countries that will enhance its authority both within the Organization and bilateral relations, to which Beijing pays special attention. Significant financial resources allow China to build trade and investment ties with the countries of the region on bilateral basis without rigid safeguards and commitments, which sets it apart both from the United States and Russia. In addition, China, as one of the major trading partners of the EU, is actively involved in the projects of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), aimed at creating overland trade routes between Southeast Asia and Europe, bypassing Russia, allowing Beijing to solve tasks associated with CA: ensuring of economic growth and stability of the western provinces, respectively (XUAR), grouping of marketing outlets for their products in the space ranging from Central Asia to the EU, access to Central Asian natural resources.

However, the Russian Federation, in response to the US New Silk Road project and the European-Chinese CAREC, lays the foundation for the Eurasian land transit schemes. In particular, after the Bishkek Summit of the SCO Heads of Government in December 2012, with Kyrgyzstan lobbying financing of China - Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan railway line by the SCO member states, an initiative of building Russia - Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan - Tajikistan trunk railway was announced at the informal summit of the Heads of the CSTO member states. Thereat, the type of organizations within which these initiatives were voiced, reflect tactics of involving Central Asian countries into the areas of interests of Russia and China, “a captive soldier” and “a silent dealer”.

On the one hand, Beijing maintains with Russia a common position on a number of major geopolitical problems that does not allow the West to ignore it. On the other hand, the task of ensuring the military security of the region with Russia in charge creates conditions for further growth of its economic presence in Central Asia and to avoid accusations of deliberate expansion in the midst of cooperation with Russia. However, China has the opportunity to focus on the Asia- Pacific Region that observes growing conflicts with Japan - the main US ally in the region.

In turn, Central Asian countries, first of all, obtain support guarantees in case of failure to cooperate with the United States, and secondly, massive financial and economic assistance.

It is important to note that to achieve fruitful and effective cooperation in any area and between any states, first of all, it is necessary to focus on one or two specific areas, and only after achieving success in these areas, cooperation may be extended to other areas. It is possible to move to a higher level of interaction with a new agenda in case of achieving full compromise on positions of the member states and further development of the organization. As for the SCO, it can be noted that the tasks aimed at addressing issues of borders and security, which had been resolved at the beginning of the Shanghai Five activities, were subsequently extended. As it is known, there was created the RATS, the fight against the three evil forces was declared and joint military exercises began. It is important to note that at that time, the Organization operated effectively. Uzbekistan, having positively assessed the SCO activities, decided to become a full member of the structure in 2001. However, in recent years, the Organization activities began to shift from security issues towards economic cooperation. We can observe expansion of cooperation towards intensification of economic relations and development of infrastructure projects such as transport corridors and pipeline routes.

As we can see, the stage of cooperation in dealing with border and security issues proceeded to the economics and education that impressively expanded the Organization's competence and made to think about admission of new members. By then, we can talk about the beginning of the process of searching for a new identity of the Organization, upon which the prospects for its further development depend.

If we analyze this transition from the standpoint of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan interests, it is a very convenient mechanism for the political elite of these countries for obtaining investments and funded benefits from China.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's attitude regarding the future development of the SCO for the past years can be formulated as standpoint of observers, which adopted a wait-and-see approach trying to predict which trend wins, trying to balance between the interests of Russia and China.

Russia is likely to perceive such shifts towards economic interaction as a threat to its influence in the region, which leads to a conflict of interests. It may be added that when the SCO was deeply involved in solving problems in the field of security, no internal contradictions were observed.

The SCO bank and SCO fund, which are being actively lobbied, stand for the tools for the SCO further evolution according to the Chinese version. In other words, the SCO is gradually getting on the way to become a mechanism for the implementation of China's foreign policy, in particular its economic interests. The argument in favor of this assertion is that not a multilateral economic project has been yet implemented. Basically the countries enjoy bilateral cooperation and sign bilateral agreements namely, China-Tajikistan, China-Kazakhstan, China-Kyrgyzstan, etc. In our opinion, the SCO as an international organization was primarily established to strengthen multilateral cooperation on urgent issues of development, but it is still in search for its common identity.

Thus, the relations of China and Russia in the geopolitical space of Central Asia are ambiguous. On the one hand, both countries aim at cooperation through various areas for spreading their influence in the region due to the presence of the third player - the United States, which shows clearly hegemonic aspirations. On the other hand, the economic rise of China in Central Asia can not affect the regional interests of Russia. Dominance in the military field on the background of the socio-economic crisis experienced by the countries of the region cannot be the only basis for Russia's long-term presence in the region. However, it's hard for Russia to compete with China's economy. Its tactic for economic binding of the region on the ground of bilateral cooperation looks more attractive than the proposed Russian economic integration projects, coupled with the commitments and guarantees of the member countries in the light of a lack of such a financial reserve in Moscow as in China. In addition, it is necessary to take into account "the lost decade" of the 90s, when Russia actually broke off all trade and economic ties with Central Asian countries, and a lack of experience in applying soft power mechanisms, stated in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia only in 2013.

The point of positive equilibrium in favor of the SCO member states has not been yet found, alignment of interests between the major players and important regional powers is still free flowing. Currently, the organization lacks adherence of internal forces for a dynamic onward movement.

The SCO expansion in such a situation of uncertainty, rather will even more contribute to loosening, blurring of objectives. The changing balance of powers within the Organization will encourage emerging of new tensions and disagreements. Given that China is focusing on trade, economic cooperation, transport and infrastructure projects with Central Asia, Beijing will influence

the new members of the Organization by the same methods such as financial preferences and investments.

The SCO is seen as part of China's foreign policy towards the countries of Central Asia and the creation of China's positive image. Given heavy criticism of the SCO, in my opinion, nevertheless the Organization stands as a much-needed tool to consolidate the potential of the participating countries. Maybe not today, but in the future, having gained experience in multilateral cooperation, the SCO will be able to solve vital problems of the region. To make regional mechanisms of the SCO work, in our opinion, it is necessary not only to single out and voice "corporate" interests of the participating countries, but also to designate a clear timeframe of certain tasks and resources to have them implemented. In this case, the SCO has a chance to become a powerful body and to be heard in the world arena.

CENTRAL ASIA BETWEEN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AND EURO-ASIA: SECURITY SERVICES MARKET IN THE REGION

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Introduction

Since the Soviet Union's collapse the Central Asian region has been simultaneously experiencing various transformations such as democratic, market-based, cultural, national self-determination, religious, geopolitical securitological ones etc. These transformations, each of them separately and together, have turned into a tough test and an existential challenge for the new independent states of the region.

Since that time a lot of discussions have been held and many articles have been written about the problems and prospects of building regional security architecture, so the analysts could have already found solution to these issues and offer the foundations for this architecture. However, these issues have not been solved, moreover some of them are aggravated while the ongoing scientific discussions create darker and more complex picture of the regional situation in Central Asia.

Moreover, the actual idea of regionalism in this part of the world turned out to be so disoriented and the perception of political and geopolitical fragmentation of Central Asia became so exaggerated that many experts have already questioned the relevance of the "Central Asian region" concept. The prospects of creating the Eurasian security system are increasingly discussed, and less attention is paid to the self-worth of our region.

Meanwhile, since 1991, Central Asia (CA) has been in spotlight of the world community, not only because of possessing huge natural resources of international importance, but also because of the proximity to one of the epicenters of threats to the international and regional security. That is why the so called "market of security services" of various providers has been established here.

In the emerging global international security architecture, the CA has found itself in fact between the Euro-Asian and Euro-Atlantic regions.

Theoretical and Conceptual Aspects of Regional Security Issues

Before we proceed to discussing the solution of the regional security issues, I think it is important to make up an inventory of our theoretical views. What do we mean by regional security? The judgments on regional security should be obviously based on some or other idea of regional community whose safety we are considering. This community, obviously, should consider the threats to its national security as common ones and as uniting them.

Ken Booth, whose opinion the author shares, in the following way outlines the objective of critical security theory which must develop its teaching focusing on safety but not on security of real people in a real place: this theory may be divided into two tasks of criticism and reconstruction. Criticism is a critical examination of what is real (ontology), that is reliable knowledge (epistemology), and what can be done (praxis). The reconstruction requires dealing with specific issues of world politics referring to maximization of opportunities to enhance safety, commonness and emancipation in human interests¹.

Thus, the ontological aspect of the issue is as follows: do five Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – as Karl Deutsch says, form a “security community”? The latter, according to Deutsch, is an integrated group of countries and peoples with its own institutions and customs of communication which guarantees peace and there are no contradictions among these countries². Many people may argue that these countries do not form a security community, as there are a lot of conflictogenic problems that supposedly divide them.

The dividing nature of any conflictogenic issue is obvious, but with a relevant approach to and interpretation of the issue one can see its unifying potential too, which is often ignored while studying the region. Let us recall the history of European regionalism and regional associations. Our region has never experienced such conflicts, civil strives, territorial, resource-based and other disputes, which Europe had. But these conflicts not only did not prevent Europe from unification, but they even gave an impetus for integration.

The existing territorial issues in CA are related, as we know, to the artificial division of the region in 20s and 30s of the last century. In Soviet times, this division remained as administrative, conditional and symbolic one and after the USSR collapse it became, one might say, real and interstate. This, in turn, entailed international implications which became an unexpected challenge for the region, as they started to correlate their foreign policy and foreign economic actions with their national interests, as well as “new” geopolitical trends. In my opinion, the two main factors - an exaggerated idea of the national interest and destructive geopolitics - have quite negatively impacted the integration process, slowing down or even halting it. The new independent states of the CA region have faced mental and strategic challenge, while their national interests shall be determined amid the rise of the status of international, regional and humanitarian interests. Therefore in many ways the countries of the region faced various kinds of tensions, incidents, conflicts and wars related to watershed and construction of new hydroelectric power stations, delimitation and demarcation of boundaries, ownership of cultural and historical centers, etc.

The emergence of intra-regional challenges coincided with the intensification of non-traditional threats to international security, such as terrorism, religious extremism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, mass labor and other migration of people, spread of dangerous diseases, environmental threats and other. Central Asia is almost completely surrounded by the nuclear-weapon or threshold states. Tajikistan experienced a civil war, and Kyrgyzstan’s Osh city twice experienced (with a 20-year hiatus) massive bloody ethnic clashes between local Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Neighboring Afghanistan, after the Taliban came to power, also had a civil war which ended with the engagement of foreign troops in October 2001. In such a complicated security environment Central Asia has been reviving regionalism since 1991.

[1] Ken Booth. *Beyond Critical Security Studies*, in “Critical Security Studies and World Politics”, edited by Ken Booth (New Delhi, Kolkata: Viva Books, 2005), p. 275.

[2] Deutsch, K. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1968).

As is known, alongside with this process the prospects of creating a common security space from Vladivostok to Lisbon are widely discussed today. This concept arose from the idea of the commonness of the new non-traditional security challenges faced by the countries of Europe and Eurasia in the 21st century. 9/11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent operation of the international forces in Afghanistan again confirmed the demand for the creation of a common space between Vladivostok and Lisbon, i.e. between Eurasia and Europe. The symbolism of choosing these two cities seems to emphasize the scale and comprehensive character of the concept and holistic approach to security in this vast space.

However, the preparation for the “magic date” 2014 and the vision of possible new challenges from Afghanistan prove the presence of uncertainty factors regarding the expectations and preparations for this date of the Central Asia, Russia, the Caucasus, Eastern and Western Europe. Various countries are concentrated in this symbolic security space stretching from Vladivostok to Lisbon, which inevitably causes heterogeneous external policy which is subject to various geopolitical trends that in turn inevitably leads to the vision of this vast space as fragmented. One of these countries is Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2012. Its foreign policy doctrine is based on the principle of bilateralism and non-membership in the military-political blocs. In addition, Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian states as a participant of the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme collaborates with the North Atlantic Alliance in ensuring its security, with which Russia has a special Russia-NATO format of cooperation. At the same time, the interaction between the CSTO and NATO also has not fully formed yet that well illustrates the situation of so called geopolitical tensions. Finally, in 2014-2015 Uzbekistan will respectively have parliamentary and presidential elections, which may bring new changes in internal and foreign policy of this country. Under these circumstances, both regional security in Central Asia and Uzbekistan's national security leave open the question of “security umbrella” for the region. As it turns out, “common security space” between Eurasia and Europe is still divided, and strategic positions and prospects of the countries differ noticeably from each other.

We are proceeding to the epistemological aspect of the issue: what do we know about security of the region and its security mechanisms?

Is the Regional Collective Security System Possible?

In conditions of permanent geo-politicized status quo and emergence of security services market in Central Asia, a question of choosing the best system or, as many say, regional security “umbrella” for the five countries of the region arises. In particular, the following question is pertinent: Is the regional collective security system being established by these countries possible?

In 2005, President Islam Karimov said that the region is notable for “strategic uncertainty” situation³. I think, such statement could be made by the president of any other country of the region. Geopolitics of great powers - on the one hand, intra-regional issues - on the other, the test of sovereignty - on the third, and Afghanistan - on the fourth hand, largely complicate the assessment of the strategic situation that can be found on static and practically invariant descriptions of challenges to regional security. The knowledge of development laws of security environment requires, above all, correct assessment of security challenges. These challenges are not given to us once

[3] Report of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov at the joint session of the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis dated 28.01.2005.

and forever as constant values, however, ignoring their volatile nature often leads to a distorted interpretation of regional security and how to ensure it.

Since 1990s we have heard about the threat of terrorism, extremism, etc., especially in the context of events in neighboring Afghanistan. The existence of such threats is true. But it is evident that the level of this threat at different times was different. In general, Afghanistan has always posed terroristic and other threats, regardless to the presence or absence of foreign forces there. Therefore, it is better to assess the potential threat not under static formula “whether the escalation of threat after 2014 will take place or not”, but from the viewpoint of how the nature and level of threat has changed compared to the moment when the threat was at its height - i.e. when September 11/ 2001 events occurred, when the Taliban ruling Afghanistan stood at the borders of the Central Asian countries. From this perspective, we cannot ignore that the military operation in Afghanistan largely reduced the potential threat from the country to the north.

Russian expert Andrei Serenko made an interesting analysis. “In this situation, it seems the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have only two ways. The first way is to go to Moscow and, making all possible concessions, to achieve the modernization of the CSTO and deployment of Russian troops along the Afghan border. The second way is to stop responding to political manipulation and nervousness of Moscow which is concerned about its status in the post-Soviet Central Asia, and start resetting the relations with the U.S. and NATO. The establishment of a number of western military bases in the territory to the north of the Amu-Darya and Pyandj instead of “Manas” will be a part of such reset.

In contrast to the CSTO and the Russian army forces, which in the post-Soviet period were not involved in any serious international armed conflict, the U.S. and NATO forces demonstrated good fighting qualities in Afghanistan, the ability to successfully curb the expansion of the armed Islamist movements. NATO troops have not created a general welfare state in Afghanistan and did not completely destroy the Taliban, but for 12 years they, in fact, have kept Islamists in hard “Afghan” reservation, ensuring security for the entire post-Soviet Central Asia and the Russian Federation too.”

“All of these suggest that, in case of emergence of the project on deployment of the U.S. and NATO military bases in India, a similar process will be activated also in relations between Washington and Brussels with the capitals of the Central Asian republics. And this interesting process results in radical change in the entire system of regional security in Central and South Asia”⁴.

As we may see, the situation of strategic and geopolitical uncertainty puts the Central Asian countries before a difficult choice. However, this complexity is largely predetermined by the modality of the geopolitical game, which in turn was based on the old interpretations of the international system as an arena of great powers’ rivalry, dividing the world into spheres of influence. Central Asian states were so enthusiastic about “romantic” nature of the mythical Great Game (macro-geopolitics), that they even did not notice how far they became involved in the non-mythical Minor Game (micro - geopolitics) among themselves⁵.

Famous American expert Frederick Starr most exactly outlined the goals of the United States: “America’s goal is not to enlarge the foreign troops in the region. On the contrary, it aims to help Central Asian countries and Afghanistan strengthen their own borders and, over time, make the presence

[4] A.Serenko Withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan could lead to U.S. military bases in India. <https://afghanistan.ru/doc/63716.html>

[5] Tolipov F. “Micro-Geopolitics of Central Asia: Uzbekistan Perspective”, in *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 35 Issue 4, July 2011.

of all foreign troops, including American ones, unnecessary. For this, all the neighboring countries and especially Russia and China should ensure that the region grows in more security - in military, political and economic contexts”⁶.

The leading U.S. expert on Central Asia is obviously right, when he remarks that the old “Great Game” may not be an adequate strategy of global powers in the region. “The basic truth, upon which any consideration of security in Central Asia should be based, is that no single country or two countries can provide adequate security environment for the Central Asian region. Surrounded by the nuclear states and threatening regional powers, each of which has close historical and cultural ties with the region, Central Asia cannot depend on any of them in security issues without jeopardizing the safety of all others”⁷.

So what do we know about the threats and means of countering them, how do we assess the strategic situation, what factors and principles determine the formation and changes in the security environment in the region, who may be the main subject and who can be a provider of regional security - all these questions are of paramount importance, without understanding that all our arguments on this issue are not full-fledged. And, for what region namely we build this very regional security? Is Central Asia, in securitological sense, a part of Euro - Asia, Euro-Atlantic or is it an independent region?

Now let us consider the praxiological aspect of the issue.

Security Providers in Central Asia

A “market of security services”, if I may say so, has been established in the region: this is a number of international organizations as well as the world’s great powers including the European Union implementing their Central Asian strategy (or programmes, projects), the priority of which is to assist in addressing regional security issues.

Let us consider some of them.

The CSTO, in my opinion, serves as a tool of implementation of the Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine for the post-Soviet space. This is a kind of tool of “multilateral bilateralism” of the RF, if not to say “multilateral unilateralism”, due to the fact that this organization is actually concentrated on Russia and almost completely depends on Russian power, position and policies. So, in general, all member states see it the following way: CSTO membership for them is a form of their relations with the RF rather than genuinely multilateral cooperation format. In 2012, the budget of this six-party quasi-alliance was only USD 53 mln, reflecting its very limited potential. As a collective security organization, the CSTO is experiencing a serious problem of collectivism. CSTO could not yet solve the above-mentioned “strategic uncertainty” problem largely due to the paradox of formulation of Russia’s strategy for Central Asia, which lies in inevitability for Russia to overcome the post-Soviet relict and self-formation as a new center of attraction for the new independent states⁸.

CSTO undoubtedly has some practical asset: in 2009 CRDF forces were created which conduct regular “Unbreakable Brotherhood” exercises; the exercises of “Interaction” peace-keeping forces, “Channel” anti-drugs operation, “Thunder” and “Border” exercises are conducted⁹. However, the functionality of the organization constantly weakens in proportion to weakening of the unity of its members. Thus, Uzbekistan held dual and passive

[6] Starr, F. “The United States, Afghanistan, and Central Asia”, in Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies, no. 3 / 2002.

[7] Ibid

[8] Trenin, D. Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects, in Boris Rumer (ed.), “Central Asia: views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing” (New York 2007), p. 127.

[9] <http://www.odkb-csto.org/training/>

position in it. In December 2012, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO, and thus contributed to the strategic uncertainty in the region. In fact, the outlines of regional security system in Central Asia have become blurred, and now it is difficult to imagine how the CSTO can serve as a security umbrella for the entire Central Asia without Uzbekistan, which also activates its partnership with NATO¹⁰.

Meanwhile, the CSTO representatives agree that while the states as the members of the organization bear the corresponding responsibility, this does not exclude the right of each to cooperate with other countries and international organizations. The consistent position of the CSTO members, as they say, is that they do not consider any state of the world as its opponent¹¹.

The SCO is viewed by many as a China-centered organization and, similar to the CSTO, in many ways represents a specific format for multilateral geopolitical implementation of China's strategy in Central Asia. This association, though being not a security organization like the CSTO, claims to be the geopolitical "community of continental states"¹². SCO agenda prioritizes combating the "three evils" - terrorism, separatism and extremism. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO is located in Tashkent. The agenda in the field of security within the SCO provides for cooperation in such areas as energy security, food security, information security, emergency response and drug control. The organization carries out counter-terrorist exercise "Peace Mission". Nevertheless, the SCO has never proclaimed itself as a security organization and the SCO member states have not yet claimed the services of this organization when facing directly terrorist or extremist threat.

Meanwhile, certain securitological binding of the CA countries to Russia and/or China, is inevitable and is predetermined by one objective factor, namely landlockedness location of small countries of our region. There is another factor of such binding, which some analysts specify, namely "protectionist integration", i.e. a form of collective political solidarity with Russia and China against the international political processes or agenda which are perceived as a challenge to the incumbent regimes and their leaders¹³.

The OSCE - is another important international security organization, which Central Asian countries joined shortly after independence in 1992. It was almost the first time that young undemocratic countries met regulatory challenge in a multilateral forum. Namely in this regulatory area the OSCE activities fundamentally differ from the activities of the CSTO and the SCO. Indeed, the European commitment to the values of democracy and human rights and promotion of these values as important conditions for achieving and consolidating peace, stability and security contrasts to the Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Belarus etc. positions, which emphasized maintaining the stability as a condition for democracy building¹⁴.

Symptomatic in this respect became the demarche of the CIS states, including CA, headed by the Russian Federation in 2003 against the OSCE, when they were accused of allegedly unbalanced organization activities and deviation towards democracy and human rights. Uzbekistan has gone even further and lowered the status of the OSCE Centre in Tashkent to the status of the OSCE Projects Coordinator in Uzbekistan. Today, this security organization implements small projects separately in each country of the

[10] Tolipov, F. Uzbekistan without the CSTO, in Central Asia and Caucasus Institute Analyst, 02/20/2013, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5929>

[11] Lyakin-Frolov, I. The CSTO as a Guarantor of Eurasian Security, in A Russian journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 58, No.4, 2012, p.166.

[12] Barsky, K. Central Asia Under the SCO's "Impermeable Umbrella", in A Russian journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. 58, No.4, 2012, p.158.

[13] Allison, R. Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia, in Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No.2, 2008, pp. 185-186.

[14] Lundin, L.-E. and van Kaathoven, K. Deciphering the Security Community Debate, in the ISDP Policy Brief, No. 107, November 30, 2012. See: www.isdp.eu

region, and its activity here has weakened recently. Even the OSCE summit in Astana in December 2010 became an illustration of its regress rather than progress.¹⁵

The UN as a universal global organization, as we know, operates on the basis of a comprehensive approach to international security with a special focus on developmental program. We may say, that the function of security services provider is distributed to specialized agencies such as the UNDP, UNODC, UNHCR, UNICEF, as well as BOMCA program on border management in CA realized jointly with the EU.

It should be noted that, unlike other international organizations, the UN pays more attention to the regional dimension of the issues of stability, security and development. Thus, the creation of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia - UNRCCA – in Ashgabat seems to be an important element of the emerging regional security architecture. Notably, for example, that UNRCCA Action Program for 2012-2014 includes, specifically, holding regular meetings to promote promising approaches among organizations dealing with issues of peace and security in Central Asia, including the OSCE, SCO, CSTO, NATO, etc. This programme also provides for cooperation with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to exchange views and make recommendations on the role of the region in peace-building efforts in Afghanistan¹⁶.

The NATO among other international organizations probably made the most significant contribution to regional security in Central Asia. Cooperation of the North Atlantic Alliance with Central Asian countries has passed two big saturated stages: “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program and interaction to support NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, including the creation of the NDN (Northern Distribution Network). Almost all the Central Asian countries have been participating in the PfP program since 1994 (Tajikistan joined it in 2002) and have since gained quite a unique experience of interaction with the Alliance¹⁷. This experience is enhanced today due to the NDN and new geopolitics arises respectively; as some observers note, henceforth the Central Asian countries will not be able to keep a low profile in regional affairs, as they had until now¹⁸.

The withdrawal of the NATO troops is both a major challenge and opportunity for the Central Asian countries to deepen cooperation with the Alliance¹⁹, and through it with each other. NATO Secretary General recently stated that the Alliance must always be ready to restrain and protect against any threat. The Alliance proceeds from operating activities to operational readiness, from a campaign to emergency situations, from the deployment of forces to their training²⁰. In this context, will the Central Asian countries keep their importance for NATO after 2014 trying to find their new modus vivendi between Euro - Asia and Euro- Atlantic?

A deeper analysis of the situation on the market of securitological services detects even more complex picture of reality: the placement of various foreign military facilities in almost all countries of the region became a specific phenomenon. I would call this phenomenon “the base race”. This race involves the United States, Russia, Germany, France, NATO and even India.

[15] Final Declaration of the Astana OSCE Summit and enclosed Explanatory Statements of number of states may be a confirmation of this thesis. See: http://www.osce.org/search/apachesolr_search/Declaration%20Astana%20Summit.

[16] <http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9306&language=en-US>

[17] Detailed information on partnerships between Kazakhstan and NATO, Kyrgyzstan and NATO, Tajikistan and NATO, Turkmenistan and NATO, Uzbekistan and NATO can be found on the NATO website <http://www.nato.int>

[18] Reisinger, H. “How to get out of Afghanistan: NATO’s withdrawal through Central Asia”, in NATO Defense College Research Paper, No. 79. June 2012.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “NATO after ISAF – Staying Successful Together”. Remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Conference on 02.02.2013. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94321.htm

In Kazakhstan there are seven Russian military facilities, five ones are in Kyrgyzstan, including the Russian air base “Kant”, two - in the territory of Tajikistan, including the 201st division in the status of a military base²¹. The U.S. has “Gansi” air base at “Manas” airport in Kyrgyzstan, and during 2001 - 2005, placed its troops at Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan. Small German contingent is placed in Termez airport in southern Uzbekistan. Further, until present there have been many arguments that both Russia and the U.S. plan to deploy new military facilities: the signals from Russia showed the possibility of deploying the second Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, where the United States, in turn, allegedly intended to open a training center. Symptomatic in this regard has been the report that in 2006 Tajikistan proposed the U.S. to locate an airbase on its territory, but Washington chose “Manas”. In 2010, Tajikistan reiterated its proposal to the United States²².

In conclusion, we may say that all of these providers with their obvious strengths and weaknesses, obviously, cannot be guarantors of regional security, because the region’s states themselves can and must be such guarantors. International organizations and great powers can only, so to speak, assist the countries, but the latter assume primary responsibility for the state of affairs in the region. It should be noted that since gaining independence in 1990s until 2006 the Central Asian countries consistently moved towards strengthening the regional associations, including the sphere of security. Suffice it to mention a few facts pertaining to regional security, which is often underestimated.

In 1992, the Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, in the same year 1992 five countries signed an agreement “On cooperation in joint management and protection of water resources of interstate sources”; in 1993 the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea was established; in 1995 Central Asian battalion (Centrasbat) was established; in 1997 the five states declared the Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia, and in 2001 the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) was established; in 2000s, when the region faced increased terrorist threat, three countries - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan –established a joint headquarters for counter-terrorist operations, etc. But, unfortunately, after the well-known Andijan events in May 2005, the regional integration process was frozen and security issues began to exacerbate again.

Finally, in June 2013 the Agreement on strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was signed in Tashkent, which seems to raise to a new level both the bilateral relations among the key states of Central Asia and have serious implications for the entire region. But for this, the two states must develop new approaches and new perspectives for the region and their foreign policy positions²³.

Conclusion

Thus, the geopolitical Great Game in Central Asia is approaching its culmination, arousing even a Minor Game. And the modality of this game is now determined not only by the superpowers, but also by the countries of the region. Kazakh political scientist S. Kushkumbayev accurately observed that the collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations has led to a sharp decrease of superpower control and loss of stable balance²⁴. During the

[21] Russian military bases abroad. References. Source - RIA News, 16.02.2010.

[22] “Tajikistan Wanted U.S. Air Base At Kulyab; Rumsfeld Gave Them Bridge Instead”, by Joshua Kucera, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66698> March 15, 2013.

[23] Tolipov F. “Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Competitors, Strategic Partners or Eternal Friends?”, in 08/07/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst” <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12786-uzbekistan-and-kazakhstan-competitors-strategic-partners-or-eternal-friends?.html>.

[24] S.K. Kushkumbayev - Central Asia on the way of integration: geopolitics, ethnicity, security. - Almaty, “Kazakhstan”, 2002 - p. 57.

Cold War, the global balance of forces between the two dominant superpowers served as the main mechanism for the establishment and management of local (regional) balances. As in due time, Hans Morgenthau showed “the more the local balance of forces is connected with the dominant balance, the less opportunity it has to act autonomously, and the more it becomes just a local exertion of the dominant balance of forces”²⁵.

Namely this passion for geopolitics, balancing and narrowly understood national interests brought the newly independent states of Central Asia back to the old system of international relations. We must ask the question: Have our countries and peoples gained greater security over 22 years of independence and what state of their existence and development they call safe?

Central Asia is a unique “security complex”, but it has not turned into a “security community” yet. The research of this issue shall go beyond static descriptive narratives. I think the theory of critical geopolitics and critical security studies can give way out of this analytical complication. Within this theory it is stated that when facing a complex threat to its security, human community needs the theory of global security that would be ontologically inclusive, epistemologically sophisticated and praxiologically differentiated²⁶. In any case, the old orthodox theory does not answer the question about its choice of Central Asia’s own choice, where the Euro- Asian and Euro -Atlantic actors and trends have created a situation of strategic uncertainty.

[25] H.J. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (NY: Alfred-A-Knopf, 1985), p.219.

[26] Ken Booth. *Beyond Critical Security Studies*, in “*Critical Security Studies and World Politics*”, edited by Ken Booth (New Delhi, Kolkata: Viva Books, 2005), p. 275.

MAJOR SOURCES OF THREATS TO THE CASPIAN REGION, WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON KAZAKHSTAN

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Introduction

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea region has increasingly gained international attention as several formerly Soviet - controlled countries have gained their independence. This report will focus on Kazakhstan, in particular, given its direct political connection and dependence on Russia. Although Kazakhstan is growing its influence within the Caspian region due its stabling economy and ample supply of natural resources, the country is highly susceptible to domestic and regional threats¹. The main threats to Kazakhstan, which will serve as the independent variable, are: great powers (Russia and China), regional Caspian states (Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), terrorism, political, separatists, and ethnic tensions. These threats threaten both the sovereignty and stability of Kazakhstan as a newly independent country while making the Kazakh government vulnerable to (increased) dependency on Russia². Given these multiple threats to the security of Kazakhstan, it is likely that the newly independent country will continue to rely on Russian security, unless the government can create or strengthen ties with other great powers. Additionally, the Caspian region, in general, is vulnerable to these same threats and it is likely to be dominantly controlled by regional great powers such as China and Russia. This dependency could decrease should the surrounding smaller countries exert their influence in an attempt to limit the hegemonic powers³.

Brief History

Because the focus of this report is Kazakhstan, it is important to be informed of the country's history following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The country gained its independence in 1991 and has kept close security, economic, and political ties with its former colonizer since the early 1990s⁴. The country has a land mass approximately the size of Western Europe while sharing the largest international border in the world with Russia.⁵ It is an oil producing and uranium enriched country that has an impressive literacy rate of 98%, low inflation, strong Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and low unemployment⁶. Out of all of the (former) Soviet states that all gained independence in the early nineties, Kazakhstan is considered the

[1] Dave Bhavnai, *Kazakhstan – Ethnicity, Language, and Power* (New York: Routledge, 2007) 96-105.

[2] Mikhail Ustivgon, "A "Temporary Nuclear State." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (1993): 33-6.

[3] Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources: Conflicting Perceptions, Clashing Interest." *Europe-Asia Studies* 50 (1990): 17-391.

[4] "The Economy: Economic Structure," *Country Profile: Kazakhstan* (2003): 28-9.

[5] Yelena N. Zabortseva, "From the "forgotten region" to the "great game" region: On the development of geopolitics in Central Asia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2010, pp. 168-176.

most economically successful; as a result, the continued contention within the Caspian region could direct the international community's attention to Kazakhstan to help it become a regional great power. In turn, the country would become less dependent on Russia.

Independent Variables

There is an underlying assumption that is made within this report: this research will be based under the premise that both Russia and China are regional dominating threats⁷. In the latter pages when the report focuses on the regional unit of analysis, the hegemonic threats (from both Russia and China) will be discussed. In addition, regional threats within the Caspian Sea region (particularly Iran, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) will be analyzed and discussed⁸. The report will then shift to focus on the state level of analysis, in which information on the politics of the Kazakh government will be discussed in relation to the correspondence with the international community. Politics, which will be operationalized in the latter pages of this report, will be discussed in respect to threats both to and from the Kazakh government, in particular, and the country as a whole, in general⁹. Another state level threat that will be discussed is terrorism: it has become an increasing problem for Kazakhstan as many terrorists seek shelter within the country due to its immense natural resources and availability to key ingredients needed to create chemical weapons¹⁰. In addition, the issue of separatists will be discussed as it could potentially create (future) contention within the country. The final state level threat is internal, which will focus on ethnic conflicts within Kazakhstan (creating instability) as a result of different ethnic Russian citizens immigrating to Kazakhstan¹¹. The individual unit of analysis will then be discussed in relation to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in which the focus will be on both his domestic policies and foreign policy in relation to Russia and regional countries. Because he has remained in power for over twenty years, he has immense influence in the policy making process, despite the country being semi-democratic; therefore, the discussion on President Nazarbayev will be more of an analysis as opposed to a threat.

The report will then offer an extensive literature review, composed within each section of the above mentioned threats, followed by two hypotheses: (1) As China and Russia's influence within the Caspian region increases, the more vulnerable smaller Caspian region countries will become, since their influence will decline; (2) Kazakhstan's security dependence on Russia will increase as the security threats increase. Giving an ample amount of information to support the hypotheses, a prediction on the direction of Kazakhstan will then be made. In the concluding section of the report, limitations within the research will be discussed as well as suggestions to scholars for future research.

Systemic Level of Analysis

Global Threats: Russia and China

Geographically, Kazakhstan is in a vulnerable position since it is a landlocked country trapped between two hegemonic powers. Although the

[6] Alex Danilovich, "Kazakhs, a Nation of Low Identities." *Problems of Post-Communism* 57 (2010): 54-8.

[7] David Kerr, "Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic Emergence." *International Affairs* 85 (2010): 127-152.

[8] Stanca Costel, "Future Developments on Oil and Gas Transports in the Black Sea Region." *Constana Maritime University Animals* 12 (2011): 107-110.

[9] Sally Cummings, *Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003) 103-111

[10] Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (1999): 22-35.

[11] Dominique Arel, "Demography and Politics in the First Post-Soviet Consensus: Mistrusted State, Contested Identities," *Population* 57 (2002): 801-822.

country capitalizes on their unfortunate proximity by utilizing its oil reserves, both Russia and China serve as threats to the Kazakh sovereignty due to its economic dependence on these two great powers.

In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest hydrocarbon producer; in an attempt to convey these hydrocarbons to refineries and to market, the Soviets constructed the largest integrated pipeline networks in the world.¹² After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been tension between Kazakhstan and Russia over the legality rights to the hydrocarbons. As Rafael Kandiyoti explained in 2008, Kazakhstan produces significant amounts of hydrocarbons and export their oil and gas to or through Russian Federation territory. Russian government policy aims to continue exercising political control over these resources in an attempt to maximize Moscow's share of profits from their export. The Kazakh economy is unable to afford cutting off the pipeline to curb tension with Russia but it is essential to retain good political ties as the Kazakh government needs Russian approval to run the oil and hydrocarbons through their territory. When Kazakhstan was a part of Soviet territory, its main role in the Soviet economy was focused on wheat production, metallurgy, and mineral extraction.¹³ However, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, this central economic system collapsed and caused Kazakhstan to rely heavily on Russia economically. This reliance on both Russia's economic and political sector causes Kazakhstan to become dependent on Russia and because it is a hegemonic power, it is difficult to sever ties without repercussions.

It is not coincidence that Kazakhstan is economically dependent on Russia; rather, it is the strategy of the Russian foreign policy. Bertil Nygren argued in August of 2008 that Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the need for natural gas supplies; therefore, he sought to reintegrate the region into a new Soviet economic empire by positioning Russia as both a monopoly supplier and buyer in the energy sector.¹⁴ The gas pipeline projects, in particular, were priority to ensure Kazakhstan utilized its oil resources to the advantage of the Russian economy. This can be exemplified through the Russian-owned Gazprom: a global energy company that holds the world's largest natural reserves.¹⁵ Robert Orttung and Indra Overland reported in 2011 that Gazprom bought assets from Kazakhstan during a time when the Kazakh economy was vulnerable.¹⁶ To date, the assets are still owned, causing Kazakhstan to become even more dependent on Russia given that it is the number one producer of natural gas.

Because Kazakhstan can be identified as a post-Soviet rentier state, Russia is seen as a threat to the Kazakh government given that they rely heavily on Russia's ability to purchase enormous national resources of gas and oil.¹⁷ Should the Russian government decide to spontaneously cease oil purchases from Kazakhstan, the Kazakh economy would be devastated. Therefore, it is imperative for the Kazakh government to become less economically dependent on Russia and broaden trade agreements to other regional countries.

China's demand for oil could be advantageous to Kazakhstan, as they are the exporters and profit heavily, too much reliance on Chinese purchases could

[12] Rafael Kandiyoti, "What Prices Access to the Open Seas? The Geopolitics of Oil and Gas Transmissions from the Trans-Caspian Republics," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 75-93.

[13] "The Economy: Economic Structure." 2003. Country Profile. Kazakhstan. 28-29. Military and Government Collection. EBSCO Host, (accessed June 29, 2013).

[14] Bertil Nygren, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 55, No. 4, July-August 2008, pp. 3-15.

[15] Zauiesh, Ataklianova, "The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom," *The Energy Journal*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2006), 181-184.

[16] Robert W. Orttung and Indra Overland, "A Limited Toolbox: Explaining the Constraints on Russia's Foreign Energy Policy," *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2011, pp. 74-85.

[17] Anja Franke, et. al. "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autoocracy as a Double 'Curse' in Post-Soviet Regimes," *Europe - Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 107-140.

be economically threatening.¹⁸ For the past four years, the argument of China emerging as a world power has been heavily debated, especially in Central Asia where Chinese foreign policy directly affects the regional countries. David Kerr argued in 2010 that China will be an unconventional superpower that will present different facets of itself in different regional contexts.¹⁹ In turn, this will be a threat to Kazakhstan since China would be creating a strategic space that exists outside of both Kazakhstan and Russia while expanding (petroleum) trade with other countries. Should this prove to be true, it would directly threaten the Kazakh economy.

In 2001, the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian security organization. The SCO conducts multilateral military exercises while also establishing a free trade area for the purpose of improving the flow of goods in the region.²⁰ Although there are six members within the organization, the hegemonic powers (Russia and China) dominate policy making. In turn, Kazakhstan's influence is stunted and the SCO as a whole is unable to become a comprehensive regional organization.²¹ The SCO creates economic policies that bind the Kazakh and hegemonic powers' economies while allowing little influence to direct policy making. Inhibiting Kazakhstan's influence threatens the sovereignty of the country; if the Kazakh government was not as dependent up on Russia or China, it would be able to exert more influence in the SCO summits.

In the hopes of reducing the amount of money spent from imported oil subsidies, the Chinese government utilizes the SCO when purchasing oil from Kazakhstan. In 2005, the Chinese government conducted a meeting with the Kazakh president in the hopes of creating a pipeline that would benefit both China and Kazakhstan.²² Trade relations with Kazakhstan have clearly emerged as an important element in China's economic and security strategy. Just five years later in 2010, Kenjali Tinibai explains that the Kazakhstan-China pipeline opened (in 2009) due to the Chinese government's desire to minimize costs of subsidies by purchasing oil from its neighbor.²³ Although this trade relationship allows Kazakhstan to profit, it is also a threat in that should China seek oil elsewhere, the Kazakh economy could become stagnant.

Aside from the ambition of Russia to consolidate power by making Kazakhstan's economy dependent on it, the issue of nuclear weapons is also a threat. Right after the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited thousands of nuclear warheads from the Soviets and became the second republic in the Soviet sphere to develop a biological weapons program.²⁴ Shortly after Kazakhstan inherited these nukes, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was asked by the international community to take a stance by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because the government lacked funds to finance the nuclear disarmament and President Nazarbayev, understandably, refused to simply return the nukes to Russia, Kazakhstan was forced to appeal for a close military political union with Russia.²⁵ Shortly after

[18] Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "China's Oil Security Pipe Dream," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring 2010, pp. 84-112.

[19] David Kerr, "Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic Emergence," *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2010, pp. 127-152.

[20] Stephen Aris, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 'Tackling the Three Evils,'" *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 3, (May 2009), pp. 457-482.

[21] Teemu Naarajarvi, "China, Russia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Blessing or Curse for New Regionalism in Central Asia?" *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2012, pp. 113-126.

[22] "Suppression, China, and Oil." 2005. *Economist*, Vol. 376, No. 8434. Academic Search Premier, EBSCO Host (accessed July 2, 2013).

[23] Kenjali Tinibai. 2010. "Kazakhstan and China: A Two-way Street." *Transition Online 3*. Academic Search Premier, EBSCO Host (accessed June 29, 2013).

[24] Yelena N. Zabortseva, "From the 'forgotten region' to the 'great game' region: On the development of geopolitics in Central Asia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2010, pp. 168-176.

[25] Mikhail Ustiugov. July 1996. "Kazakh Power Play." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, No. 4: 45-49. Academic Search Premier, EBSCO Host (accessed June 29, 2013).

the appeal, Kazakhstan was able to successfully disarm the nuclear warheads, but only at the expense of increasing political ties and dependence on Russia.

A decade after inheriting the Soviet Union's vast collection of nuclear warheads, authorities in Kazakhstan discovered plutonium hot spots. Because the Russian government insisted it had a stake in these hot spots since they assisted the Kazakh government in de-nuclearizing their nukes in 1993, Kazakhstan was politically forced to work with Russian officials in divvying up the plutonium.²⁶

Although being landlocked between two hegemonic powers is economically beneficial, it is equally threatening to Kazakhstan's economic sovereignty. Becoming dependent on its former colonizer (Russia) and an emerging global power (China), the Kazakh government places itself in a vulnerable position. Should the hegemons expand trade with other countries, Kazakhstan's economy will be stagnated and could directly threaten the stability of the country as a whole. Therefore, the Kazakh government must expand their trading to other surrounding countries in addition to diminish political ties with Russia so that President Putin does not have ample influence in Kazakh foreign policy making.

Regional Threats:

In this second sub-section of the systemic unit of analysis, regional threats from countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan will be discussed. Additionally, the Caspian Sea region, in general, will also be discussed since Kazakhstan shares a border with the majority of its members.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been intense interest shown by the major international oil and gas companies in the Caspian Sea. This region is located in northwest Asia and is seven-hundred miles long while five countries (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) share the Caspian basin.²⁷ Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the Caspian states became open to foreign investment, which enables the region to emerge as a potential significant play in the realm of global energy. However, there are threats to the Caspian region that could hinder its potential success: ethnic conflict, disagreements over the most cost-effective pipeline routes, and disputes over the legal status of the Caspian.

As Suha Bolukbasi argued in 1999, multiple policies between Turkey and Russia have been made with respect to the Caspian Sea involving the oil pipelines without the involvement of Kazakhstan.²⁸ An agreement was signed that would transport oil and gas directly out of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Clearly, this raises tension and creates rivalry between these countries over the Caspian Sea minerals as all states attempt to exert their influence and compete over limited natural resources. If the smaller Caspian states do not exert their influence among the major powers surrounding them (such as Russia and Turkey), they will become dependent on them while risking their sovereignty.

One decade later in 2008, Mahmoud Ghafouri also discussed the ongoing inability of the Caspian Sea states to reach a consensus of the legality of the region.²⁹ Although few compromises have been made, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are continuously disputing the natural gas and petroleum harvesting processes while constant rivalry over control of the geographic area persists. The constant debates over transportation routes and

[26] Richard Stone, "Plutonium Fields Forever," *Science*, Vol. 300, No. 5623, March 2003, pp. 1220-1221.

[27] Gawdat, Bahgat, "Regional Report the Caspian Sea: Potentials and Prospects," *Governance*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Jan 2004, pp. 115-126.

[28] Suha Bolukbasi, "The controversy over the Caspian Sea mineral resources: Conflicting perceptions, clashing Interests," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 3, May 199, pp. 17-391.

[29] Mahmoud Ghafouri, "The Caspian Sea: Rivalry and Cooperation," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 15, No.2, summer 2008, pp. 81-96

pipeline accesses, in particular, directly threaten the stability of Kazakhstan since oil is the country's largest exported commodity. Despite being in negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea since 1993, the Kazakh government has been unable to successfully claim rights to the water, oil, and natural gas beneath the Caspian region.³⁰

Uzbekistan, in particular, is a threat to Kazakhstan's stability in that the country is ruled by an ardent dictator who has implemented harsh policies. Such strict policies have resulted in the dissatisfaction of its citizens while causing several Uzbekistanis to immigrate into Kazakhstan.³¹ Many have gone so far as to create an underground movement that could disrupt the stability of regional countries, namely Kazakhstan. Illegal immigrants is a problem for the Kazakhs as many do not speak the same language and have become radicalized in Uzbekistan, while sharing their radical ideas with ordinary Kazakh citizens.

Although Iran is a member of the Caspian Sea region, it is not a direct threat to Kazakhstan due to their long-term development and close various relationships.³² In 2000, Alima Bissenova argued that Kazakhstan has well-developed trade and cultural relationships with Iran, and considerable amounts the Republic's oil production is barged to the Iranian port of Neka. Therefore, the Kazakh and Iranian governments have agreed to allow a pipeline to be run through Iran, making it less expensive had it be ran in other Caspian Sea countries.

Another regional issue that is a major source of threat to Kazakhstan is the border issue in regard to illegal drugs, human trafficking, and threats posed by Islamist extremists.³³ In 2004, Richard Giragosian exposed the trans-national threats posed by Islamic extremism and drug production and trafficking inherent in the region's location as a crossroads between Russia, China, and Kazakhstan.³⁴ Such border issues significantly impede the stability of Kazakhstan and seriously erode the fragile security environment. Only one year later, Golunov Sergey and Roger McDermott argued that the Republic of Kazakhstan has been confronted by complex border security problems such as illegal narcotics smuggling, arms trafficking, WMD materials and militants transiting through its territory.³⁵ Despite the Kazakh government's efforts to combat these threats, Kazakhstan's border security is continuously diminished given the fact that the large country is completely landlocked and shares a border with several regional countries.

State Level of Analysis

Political Threats:

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev became president in 1992 and has continuously been reelected, remaining in power to date. In comparison to the other former Soviet-controlled states, Kazakhstan has been the most politically stable while maintaining a semi-Democratic government.³⁶ What began as a totalitarian regime, the Kazakh government has transitioned nicely to a (semi) democratic state while having the ability to retain moderate relations with surrounding Islamic authoritarian countries.³⁷ Because of this democratization,

[30] Majid Sheikhmohammady and Marc Kilgour, and Keith Hipel, "Modeling the Caspian Sea Negotiations," *Group Decision and Negotiations*, Vol. 19, No. 2, March 2010, pp. 149-168.

[31] Laura Adams and Assel Rustemova, "Mass Spectacle and Styles of Governmentality in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 7 (September 2009), pp. 1249-1276.

[32] Alima Bissenova, "Nine Years After Independence, Kazakhstan's Ambassador Sees Secure and Prosperous Future," Vol. 19, No. 7, August 2000, pp. 53-54.

[33] Akezhan Kazhegeldin, "Shattered Image," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, pp. 76-7.

[34] Richard Giragosian, "The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: an Overview," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* Vol. 17, 2004, pp. 43-77.

[35] Golunov V. Sergey and Roger N. McDermott, "Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies, and Future Challenges," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, pp. 31-58.

[36] Irina Morozova, "Towards Soviet Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia," (Netherlands: IOS Press, 2005) 261-284.

[37] Vladimir Ardaev, October 1993. "Bridging East and West." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 49, No. 8: 24-29. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO Host, (accessed June 29, 2013).

Kazakhstan has been receiving Western political approval while creating close political ties and, in turn, becoming less reliant on great power Russia. In 2011, Ellen Barry reported that because Kazakhstan successfully completed one year in the Organization for Security and Cooperation (in Europe), the country was able to print banknotes incorporating the organization's logo.³⁸ This is the first post – Soviet country to be able to do so.

Although the Kazakh government has relished in Western approval by becoming semi-Democratic, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been accused by Kazakh citizens of fraudulently become elected.³⁹ As Bhavna Dave argued in 2007, Kazakhstan's political regime has used elements of political clientelism and neo-traditional practices to bolster its rule. Should this prove to be true, it could be detrimental to the stability Kazakhstan as citizens could revolt in anger of conducting fraudulent elections. Other scholars, such as Lilit Gevorgyan, argue that regardless of how the president is elected, he should still remain in power given the country's economic success and potential disruption of political struggle or social unrest should he step down from power.⁴⁰ Regardless of whether the electoral process must be reformed or not, the issue itself is a threat to Kazakhstan's political stability.

Political conflict does not only exist because of the "fraudulent" electoral system, but also arises because of the financial sector. In 2010, Barbara Junishai reported that there has been immense competition between financial – industrial groups over scarce economic and political resources, in regards to who gets what, when, and how.⁴¹ Clan politics and regional grievances influence struggles over the distribution of power and wealth while political elites clash over the interest of Kazakhstan's business sector.

Terrorism as a Threat

Because Kazakhstan is a natural mineral enriched country that harvested an ample amount of plutonium, uranium, and other elements required for nuclear weapons, it has become vulnerable to terrorists immigrating into the country. The Islamic fundamentalist Taliban, in particular, represent a major threat to Kazakhstan set members of the terrorist group actively seek out citizens of newly democratic regimes and preach Islamic tradition with extremism and rhetoric of holy wars.⁴² Typically, authoritarian regimes that suppress their citizens often cause the people to retaliate by creating underground Islamic movements. There are two types of terrorism: "loyal" and "disloyal;" the loyalist seek peaceful revolution in an attempt to overthrow their government due to the constant oppression. Often times, this can be successfully accomplished through elections. The "disloyal" terrorists may initially create peaceful movements, but are often quickly radicalized, leaving members to become radical terrorist who seek the destruction of their government at any cost.

As Farkhad Tolipov and Roger McDermott argued in 2003, terrorists of the latter sort directly threaten Kazakhstan's national and regional security. Regional extremism is becoming an increasing problem given the authoritarian governments that surround the landlocked country of Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has recognized the need for increased border control soon after the 9/11 attack on the United States and has, therefore, joined other countries of the international community in the fight against terrorist. Since the formation of Kazakhstan's armed forces in

[38] Ellen Barry. 2011. "Monitors Fault Voting in Kazakh Election," New York Times, April 5, 1. Academic Search Premier, EBSCO Host (accessed June 29, 2013).

[39] Dave, Bhavna, *Kazakhstan – Ethnicity, Language and Power*, New York, (NY): Routledge, 2007.

[40] Lilit Gevorgyan, "One Man Band," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 24, No. 6, June 2012, pp. 34-37.

[41] Barbara Junishai, "A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavages and Conflict in the Post-Soviet Period," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 2, March 2010, pp. 235-269.

[42] Rashid, Ahmed, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6, November 1999, pp. 22-35.

the early 1990s, western countries have taken an increasingly active interest in providing military cooperation aimed at enhancing Kazakhstan's defense capabilities.

Because of its geographical location, the Kazakh government still maintained close military ties with Russia, as they were the closest great power that could immediately assist them militarily, if need be. However, as Roger McDermott expressed in 2008, the U.S., Turkey, UK and France have developed security assistance programs with Kazakhstan, while the latter is also seeking to further diversify its bilateral military cooperation with other western countries as well as deepening its partnership with the NATO alliance.⁴³ Despite the Kazakh government's efforts to become less militarily dependent on Russia by seeking ties with the West, the threat of terrorism is preventing the severance of the Kazakhstan-Russian military ties. For example, in 2012, a terrorist attack was planned in Kazakhstan but was prevented because of the detection of Russian authorities.⁴⁴ Because of Russia's close proximity and deep political ties with Kazakhstan, the explosives were successfully detected and the terrorist attack was prevented.

Separatists Threats

When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the Russians that were living in Kazakhstan were automatically labeled "Kazakhs" given the country's new independence. Many Russians were, understandably, confused when they began being ruled under a new government, forced to adhere to new laws, and transitioned into a completely different economy.⁴⁵ While most Russians eventually adapted to living in the same territory under a different government, others were more reluctant to be labeled as "Kazakhs" and, instead, wanted Kazakhstan to remain incorporated into Russia. Kazakh identity is distinct from the former collective Soviet identity and because of these ethnic tensions separatists that advocate for Kazakhstan to become incorporated into Russia may revolt against the Kazakh government and cause internal instability.⁴⁶ Because of the success of the economy and citizens enjoying democratic civil liberties, the country has not been threatened by these separatists to an extent that could hinder the country's stability. However, it is still noteworthy to address this as a threat since it could potentially become a problem in the future.

Ethnic Conflict Threats

Currently within Kazakhstan, there are three main ethnicities: Kazakhs make up 63% of the population, Russians make up 23%, Uzbeks make up 3%, while other ethnicities make up 11%. The dominant religion is Islam (70%), Christianity (26%), Judaism (1%), Buddhism (1%), and other (2%).

When the Soviet Union fell, traditional culture was threatened for most Russian and there was immense difficulty to maintain inter-ethnic peace.⁴⁷ Given the existing various social cleavages that have risen as a result Kazakhstan gaining its independence, ethnic tension could potentially threaten the economic reform within the country.

In 2000, the Russian government made efforts to the Kazakhs to establish cultural ties, but there is a continuing problem with different ethnicities within Kazakhstan that has made it difficult to become culturally tied.⁴⁸ Specific

[43] Roger N. McDermott, "United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: the Need for a New Approach," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 21, 2008, pp. 715-641.

[44] "Transitions Online." 2012. "A Bomb Plot in Kazakhstan. A Shattered Nuke Plant in Bulgaria." 1-1. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO Host, (accessed July 2, 2013).

[45] Danzar, Alexander M., "Battlefields of Ethnic Symbols. Public Space and Post-Soviet Identity Formation From a Minority Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 9, Nov 2009, pp. 1557-1577.

[46] Alex Danilovich, "Kazakhs, a Nation of Two Identities," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2010, pp. 51-58.

[47] Paul Kubicek, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 29-43.

[48] Charles King Neil J. Melvin, "Diaspora Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 2000, pp. 108-109.

ethnic communities have been divided by state frontiers and have been difficult to influence.

Sabastien Peyrouse argued in 2007 that since 1991, there has been political, social, and identity evolutions within Kazakhstan with particular reference to the Russian minority. Russians (in Kazakhstan) are of a non-homogeneous nature and have been politically marginalized, unable to gain political party recognition. Being politically isolated increases the tensions among the Kazakhs and Russians and the minority is often denied cultural rights.⁴⁹ This results in many Russians wanted to leave Kazakhstan to return to Russia; however, because many have created their entire lives in Kazakhstan, it is difficult to simply emigrate.

In the same vein, there is also religious oppression in Kazakhstan as the government leaders have viewed adherents of minority religions as unpatriotic.⁵⁰ In 2007, several churches have had offices raided and computers confiscated in the hopes of diminishing the minority religious groups. Even after the new religion law took effect in 2012, Jehovah's Witnesses and members of other small faith communities in Kazakhstan have faced heightened scrutiny from the state while favoring Orthodox Christianity and Hanafi Islam.⁵¹

The different languages also present a threat to Kazakh stability because there is increased tension between the Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. In 2010, Dinara Tussupova argued that there are taboos against frank discussion of interethnic issues prevailing in the predominately Russian-language media at the national level in Kazakhstan, especially in television and radio.⁵² The Kazakh –language press is more likely to frame local conflicts in ethnic terms and stoke tensions between the Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs.

These ethnic and religious tensions directly threaten the stability of Kazakhstan and if the Kazakh government seeks less dependence on Russia, President Nursultan Nazarbayev must offer more rights and protection to minority groups while allowing the state to become more secularized.

Individual Level of Analysis

Although President Nursultan Nazarbayev does not pose a direct threat to Kazakhstan, it is important to provide information on the democratically – elected leader given that he has been in power for over twenty years. President Nazarbayev has created a “multi-vector” foreign policy that has allowed Kazakhstan to skillfully maintain solid ties with Russia and the U.S. while extracting concessions from both. Because the Kazakh government seeks to decrease dependence on Russia while creating economic and military ties with the West, the Kazakh president has been utilizing this foreign policy to maintain economic stability while exerting its influence within the region. The term “multi-vector” refers to a policy that develops foreign relations through a framework based on pragmatic, non-ideological foundation. This foreign policy is motivated solely by the perceived interests of the state in achieving its policy objectives.⁵³

Conclusion

Although there is an ample amount of literature available through various databases and journals, it is difficult to assess the Kazakh government's

[49] Sebastien Peyrouse, “Nationhood and the Minority Question in Central Asia: the Russians in Kazakhstan,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2007, pp. 481-501.

[50] Susan Wunderink, 2007, “No Mercy for Grace Churches.” *Christianity Today*, Vol. 51, No. 11: 18-19. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO Host, (accessed July 2, 2013).

[51] Dariva Tsyrenzhapova, 2012. “Kazakhstan's Faith Registry.” *Russian Orthodox Church* 7. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO Host (accessed July 3, 2013).

[52] Tussupova, Dinara, “Mass Media and Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 57, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2010, pp. 32-45.

willingness to become less dependent on Russia. By creating closer economic and military ties with the West, it is clear that the Kazakh government intends to utilize its multi-vector foreign policy to the fullest which will, in turn, allow Kazakhstan to rely less on Russia. However, despite the Kazakh government's desire to become less depending on its hegemonic neighbor, major threats hinder their ability to do so. Such threats include: great powers (Russia and China), regional Caspian states (Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), terrorism, political, separatists, and ethnic tensions. These threats threaten both the sovereignty and stability of Kazakhstan as a newly independent country while making the Kazakh government vulnerable to (increased) dependency on Russia.

To become more self-sufficient and less reliant on regional hegemons, Kazakhstan must make more of an effort to exert its influence within the Caspian Sea region. In addition, the Kazakh government must increase trade with countries other than Russia and China and establish closer trading ties with the West.

Should future scholars want to extend this research, greater attention should be paid to the actual foreign policy of the Kazakh government. Additionally, scholars should conduct an in-depth analysis of the economic structure of Kazakhstan and offer alternative options of economic success for the state.



[53] Reuel R. Hanks "Multi-Vector Policies and Kazakhstan's emerging Role as a Geo-Strategic Player in Central Asia," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Sept 2009, pp. 257-267.

«Map of Caspian Sea.» Chart. Geographic Guide Maps, 2000. Web. 29 July 2013.

«Map of Caspian Sea.» Chart. Geographic Guide Maps, 2000. Web. 29 July 2013.

«Map of Kazakh-China Pipeline.» *Geopolitics-Geoeconomics*. 2003. Web. 29 July 2013.


«Map of Oil and Military presence in Caspian and Middle East region.» *SPGP: Socialist Opposition to War*. 2004. Web. July 29, 2013.

«Map of Kazakhstan – Major Ethnic Groups in 1990». Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 1993. Web. July 29, 2013.

«Map: Kazakhstan – Ethnic Groups/Language/Religion.» Kazakhstan. 1997. Web. 29 July 2013.



Kazakh-China Pipeline:




Oil and Military presence in Caspian and Middle East region:

STAFF

Major Ethnicities in Kazakhstan (1990):


KAZAKHSTAN – MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN 1990




Kazakhstan – Ethnic Groups/ Language/ Religion:

KAZAKHSTAN: PEOPLE


ETHNIC GROUPS



LANGUAGES



RELIGIONS





Eurasian National University Faculty and PhD students established Eurasian International Studies Association

EISA is the first and only Association in Central Asia, claiming the title of regional representation of the International Studies Association (ISA), whose members are more than five thousand scientists and experts from 120 countries around the world. A similar branch operates in the Post-Soviet Russia - Russian International Studies Association (RISA) at MGIMO.

Public association “Eurasian International Studies Association” (EISA)-organization dedicated to research in the field of international relations, geopolitics, regional security and other relevant issues connected with the participation of Kazakhstan in the international arena.

Participation in these activities will enable EISA not only broaden the popularity abroad, but also to raise the profile of L.N. Gumilyov ENU as the initiator of such projects and active participant in the world of scientific life. In addition, ISA membership will provide an opportunity for Kazakhstani representatives to publish the results of scientific works, which will also have a positive impact on the promotion of the image of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstani scientists in foreign scientific environment.





“PUBLIC OPINION” RESEARCH INSTITUTE

“Public Opinion” Research Institute (Kazakhstan), International Studies Association (USA), L.N.Gumilyev Eurasian National University (Kazakhstan) in May 17, 2013 hold a Meeting of members of the International Studies Association from Kazakhstan, the United States and Canada. Presentation of the International Studies Association will be held during the meeting, meeting participants will tell about the possibilities of Kazakhstan’s researchers participation at the annual congress of the Association, about opening of the sectional panels on the 55th Congress of the ISA in Toronto (Canada), which will bring together scientists and experts from Kazakhstan.

Members of the editorial board of “International Researches. Society. Policy. Economy” journal issued by the Research Institute “Public opinion” “will tell about the preparation of a special issue of the journal, which will be presented at the next 55th Congress of the International Studies Association (ISA) “Spaces and Places: Geopolitics in an Era of Globalization” in Toronto (March 26-29, 2014).

On the second half of the meeting there will be master classes from ISA members.

Moderators – Botagoz Rakisheva, Director of Public Opinion Research Institute, candidate of sociological sciences, member of ISA, prof. **Svetlana Kozhirova**, Editor-in-Chief of “INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH. Society.Politics.Economics” journal, Doctor of Political Sciences, member of ISA Executive Committee.

The following ISA members will participate at the meeting:

Prof. **Gregory Gleason** – political science professor at the University of New Mexico (USA), Professor at George Marshall European Center for Security Studies (USA-Germany)

Prof. **Houman A. Sadri** – Associate professor of the University of Central Florida, Model UN Coordinator, member of the Executive Committee of the ISA (Orlando, USA)

Prof. **Rouben M. Azizian** – Program Manager of Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, member of ISA (USA, Hawaii)

Prof. **Mikhail A. Molchanov** – Chair of Department of Political Science, St. Thomas University, member of the ISA (Canada)

Meeting participants: Kazakhstan’s members of the International Studies Association (ISA), scientists, experts, doctoral candidates, master’s students.







Svetlana Kozhirova



Houman A. Sadri



Aigerim Shilibekova



Gregory Gleason



Raushan Elmurzaeva



Rouben Azizian



Botagoz Rakisheva



Mikhail A. Molchanov



Yevgeniya Rudneva



Helena Nechaeva



Alexander Kovalenko



Bakhit Ospanova





«ҒАЛЫМДАРДЫҢ ЕУРАЗИЯЛЫҚ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ КЛУБЫ» АССОЦИАЦИЯСЫ
АССОЦИАЦИЯ «ЕВРАЗИЙСКИЙ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ КЛУБ УЧЕНЫХ»
«EURASIAN ECONOMIC CLUB OF SCIENTISTS» ASSOCIATION

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Robert Kaplan
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Tair Mansurov
Oleg Kuznetsov
Marc Uzan



VII Astana economic forum
21-23 May, 2014
www.astanaforum.org



II World anti-crisis conference
21-22 May, 2014
www.projectwac.org

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!

On behalf of the members of the Eurasian Economic Club of Scientists from 120 countries of the world, let us express our sincere respect and invite you to take part in the VII Astana Economic Forum and the II World Anti-Crisis Conference held on **May 21-23, 2014**, in the city of Astana.

Every year, members of the Forum are about 10,000 delegates from 130 countries, including Heads of State and Government, prominent politicians and public figures, heads of international organizations and business corporations, as well as leading scientists and Nobel Prize winners.

“Public perception of Eurasian integration” Panel session will take place within the framework of the Forum. This session is organized by the *Center for Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank* and *“Public Opinion” Research Institute*.

The state and prospects of Eurasian integration cannot be evaluated in isolation from the public perception of these processes. The issue of attractiveness of these processes to the general public is increasingly standing alongside with the assessment of their economic feasibility.

Issues of perception of processes of integration and cooperation of the CIS region in the economic, political and socio-cultural (humanitarian) spheres by the people and the elites will be discussed as part of this session. A performance and participation of leading experts is planned in the field of study of integration orientations in the states of the CIS region from Kazakhstan, Russia and other countries. One of the central elements of the discussion will be the question of support by the people and the elites of the CIS region of the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Union formed (EAC), in the context of assessments of participation in them by the member countries and in the context of the prospects of joining this integration associations by new countries.

During the Session the results of “EDB Integration Barometer” will be also present, one of the key projects of permanent EDB Center for Integrative Studies. Within the framework of the project annual survey of residents of 12 countries in the CIS region will be conducted to study public opinion on various aspects of Eurasian integration and cooperation in the dynamics. According to the survey results, composite indexes and forecasts of integration attraction of countries of the CIS region are calculated.

Before the beginning of the Forum’s work, virtual sections on **G-Global international informational platform** are held, where participants from 190 countries contribute to the development of recommendations for modern global challenges. The electronic platform of “Public perception of Eurasian integration” Panel session is located at: <http://www.group-global.org/ru/session/view/545>. We ask you to go to the address and to take part in discussions on social perception of the integration on this platform, where you can also post reports or prospects, and post your comments. More information on the work at the electronic platform of the Session is in the Annex.

To participate in the session within the framework of the VII Astana Economic Forum, please send an application (name, position, contacts (telephone, e-mail address) to Yevgenia Rudneva, Deputy Director of the “Public Opinion” Research Institute, coordinator of the Session, to yevgeniya.rudneva@mail.ru (mobile: +7 701 647 07 21, business phone number: +7 (7172) 78 35 59).

We deeply hope for your participation in the VII Astana Economic Forum and the II World Anti-Crisis Conference destined to promote economic and social progress of the world and national economies.

We ask you to read the attached draft program of the Section, pass the preliminary registration on the Forum website (www.astanaforum.org) and participate in the work of the electronic platform of the Session on G-Global.

We thank you for your attention and will be glad to welcome you in the city of Astana.

**Respectfully,
Organizing Committee of the Panel Session**



PUBLIC OPINION
Research Institute

“PUBLIC OPINION” RESEARCH INSTITUTE

«Public Opinion» Research Institute was founded in 2013. The Director of the Institute is Rakisheva Botagoz, candidate of sociological sciences, member of ESOMAR.

The Institute specializes in public opinion study, it conducts marketing and sociological researches. The researches are carried out both in Kazakhstan and other countries of the world (Institute staff has a research experience in 20 countries of the world, including the Central Asia, Western Europe countries, China, Mongolia, USA, Canada etc.).

Institute team is the professional sociologists, the marketing specialists and the politologists with long-term work experience.

PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES:

The Institute carries out sociological and marketing research, using various quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection:

Qualitative methods

- Expert interviews
- Focus group
- Depth interviews
- Biographical narrative interview
- Observation
- Mystery Shopping (Mystery Shopper)

Quantitative methods

- Personal interviews
- Telephone surveys

The major research projects of the Institute:

- Inter-ethnic and inter-confessional assessment
- Social tensions and conflict potential
- Ethno-linguistic situation in the region
- Regional and National Security
- Socio-political and economic situation in the border regions of Kazakhstan
- The socio-political situation
- The electoral mood and behavior of voters
- Exit pool
- The formation of civil society, etc.

PARTNERS AND CLIENTS

Analytical Centers

- The Eurasian Development Bank Centre for Integration Studies
- The center of the Military-strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan
- The center for the study of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations of the Academy of the State administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
- The center of Security program
- Institute for Public Policy of “Nur Otan”
- Academy of business “Isker”
- National Chamber of Entrepreneurs

International organizations

- UNICEF - United Nations Children’s Fund
- The Office of the European Commission in Kazakhstan
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation
- Public Fund of Alexander Knyazev
- Municipality of Burgas city
- The Korean cultural center
- The International center of Korea studies
- Europatners 2007
- United National Development Programme (UNDP)

Universities

- The University of Granada (Spain)
- The Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Granada (Spain)
- The Sofia University named after St. Kliment Okhridskiy (Bulgaria)
- School for humanitarian and social sciences under the Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan)
- The International Catalan Institute for peace at the regional government (Spain)
- The Academy of the State administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan)
- The Institute for archeology and ethnography, Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)
- The Institute for Central Asian Studies, Hangoon University of Foreign languages (Seoul, South Korea)
- The Institute under Eurasia Istanbul University
- The University of Toronto Mississauga (Canada)
- Institute of Economic Research (IDE-JETRO) (Japan)
- Indiana University

Public associations

- The Assembly of Nations of Kazakhstan
- Corporate University "Samruk – Kazyna"
- Federation of Kazakh cultural centers in Western Europe (Munich, Germany)

Information resources and agency

- Anti-terror site www.counter-terror.kz/
- Info-Ros Information Agency
- Joint Stock Company "Kazcontent"

Embassies

- The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the RK
- The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the RK
- The Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the RK
- The Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in the RK
- The Embassy of France in RK
- The Embassy of Chile in the RK
- The Embassy of Ukraine in the RK
- The Service of trade-economic affairs under the Embassy of Bulgaria

State authorities

- The Prosecutor General's Office of the RK
- The Ministry of Culture and Information of the RK

INFORMATION FOR FUTURE AUTHORS

The articles should meet the following requirements:

1. A text of 10-12 pages in the Kazakh, Russian or English languages should be typed in point size 14, single-spaced, font «Times New Roman» and saved in the format of Word for Windows.
2. Writing an article please give:
 - *An author's full name;*
 - *Official work place and position;*
 - *Academic degree and title;*
 - *Title of an article (in capital letters in the middle of the line, without a point);*
 - *A text of the article;*
 - *Telephone number, fax and e-mail*
3. References to literary sources in a text should be put in square brackets by the page. It is necessary to name sources of all quotations, figures and other information cited in an article. Please explain abbreviations.
4. Articles should be represented in electronic version.
5. Articles should have an abstract in Russian and English limited by 250-300 words.
6. The publisher reserves the right to select and edit articles and would inform authors about corrections made.

Articles should be sent to the e-mail account of the journal staff:

opinion.kz@gmail.com



ДЕЛОВОЙ СОВЕТ ШАНХАЙСКОЙ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА



上海合作组织实业家委员会

THE BUSINESS COUNCIL OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

119180, Москва, Б. Якиманка, 1 • +7 [495] 725-78-07 • E-mail: bc-sco@mail.ru

The Secretariat of the Business Council of Shanghai Cooperation Organization shows you respect and inform that September 18-20, 2014 in Aktau(Kazakhstan) city with the support of the Business Council of SCO it is planned to hold an international conference on cooperation between the member states of SCO and the Caspian region in the field of energy.

The purpose of the event is to consolidate the intellectual resources of the expert and business community of member states, observers and partners of the SCO dialogue to create a harmonious energetic balance on the whole space of the Organization. Leading energy industry professionals, eminent scientists, politicians and representatives of government agencies, businesses and non-governmental organizations of Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, as well as Turkey, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and other countries in Asia and Europe are invited to participate in the conference.

The Conference will discuss national energy strategies of member states of SCO, long-term projects of international cooperation in the field of traditional and alternative energy, as well as within provision of expert assistance to the SCO Energy Club creation - possible models for the interaction of the SCO countries in the energy sector. The conference will take place in the framework of "Paradigms of international cooperation in the Caspian Sea" forum, traditionally gathering the elite of the scientific and business community of the Caspian countries. From Kazakhstan the Forum is co-organized by the "Public Opinion" Research Institute.

We ask you to support our initiative and invite you to participate in the International Conference on Energy, held under the auspices of the Business Council of Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

To participate, please email an application (name, position and contact information (phone, email) to the coordinator AinurMazhitova until Septemner to: opinion.kz@gmail.com

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Institute team is the professional sociologists, the marketing specialists and the politologists with long-term work experience.

Members of the working group have 16 years of work experience in the field of sociological and marketing study. More than 700 research projects have been carried out in total.

«**Public Opinion**» **Research Institute** publishes a research journal «INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH. Society.Politics.Economics». The journal priority is to highlight current social issues. The journal focuses on results of the research projects conducted in the CIS countries as well as all over the world.

Consulting support for the journal is provided by famous and outstanding scientists and experts from Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Germany, India, Kazakhstan, China, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, U.S.A., Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Finland, South Korea, Japan – they are the members of the journal Editorial Board.

Editor-in-chief – **Svetlana Kozhirova**, Doctor of Political Sciences

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